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This collection of essays is neither a history of Russian literature in 
disguise nor is it a collection of separate interpretations of great Russian 
books. Close Encounters is an answer, a new answer to the old question 
of what to look for in Russian literature. Years ago we had Aaron 
Copland’s What to Listen for in Music; and, with quite similar intentions, 
our author now presents his approaches to “Russian fiction” which, 
as William Lyon Phelps of Yale University once put it, “is like German 
music—the best in the world.”
The categories are “Freedom and Responsibility” (eight essays 
covering Pushkin, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Chekhov); “Two 
Kinds of Beauty“ (five essays dealing with Dostoevsky, and one on 
Solzhenitsyn); “Critical Perspectives” (four essays about the purposes 
of art, with special reference to Dostoevsky’s concept of reality, 
Gorky’s polemic with Dostoevsky, Bakhtin’s Poetics of Dostoevsky, 
and ‘Dostoevsky’s Christian declaration of Faith,’ and Vyacheslav I. 
Ivanov’s poem “Nudus Salta!”); and last but not least, “Poems of 
Parting” (four essays on poems by Tyutchev, Igor Severyanin, the two 
final stanzas of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin, and Nabokov’s translation of 
a poem by Goethe).
Erudite and clear, these twenty-two essays comprise political 
implications and esthetic theory as well as intimations of mortality and 
immortality. Close Encounters means that the reader feels provoked to 
react and respond to all these writers of prose and poetry as if they 
were our contemporaries. And they really are our contemporaries, 
because tradition is brought to life by Robert Louis Jackson’s art of 
interpretation, turning the scholar of Russian literature into a teller 
of tales of text, subtext and context. The principle of his hermeneutics 
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comes to the fore in the motto of his collection of essays, taken from 
Goethe: “Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten,/Geh nur im Endlichen 
nach allen Seiten,/Willst du dich am Ganzen erquicken,/So musst du 
das Ganze im Kleinsten erblicken“ (If you would advance into the 
infinite,/Go then and explore the finite in all directions./If you would 
renew yourself in the Whole,/Then you must discern the Whole in the 
smallest of things). 
This, and only this, is the real definition of “close reading.” It was 
the renowned German publisher, Ernst Rowohlt, who really knew how 
to test a manuscript offered for publication. He would throw it down 
on the carpet, it is said, and just read the page which opened by chance. 
If the page was of interest to him he published the manuscript. He was 
convinced that the reader in a bookstore tested a book the same way; 
open a chance page: to buy or not to buy. We can test whether Ernst 
Rowohlt was right here, today, by opening at random any page of Close 
Encounters.
Take, for instance, page 100. We are in the middle of the essay 
on Anna Karenina’s night train to St. Petersburg. “Anna’s deliriums, 
her hallucinations, or what we might for convenience’s sake call 
her nightmare, follow on her recognition and her joyful acceptance 
of her sexuality, her shame, her passion for Vronsky. Her passion is 
the focal point of her nightmare, but the nightmare itself centers on 
the conflict this passion arouses in her, and her inner awareness of 
the consequences of her passion for Vronsky. We are witness to the 
convulsions of conscience. The emotional climax of these convulsions 
is both a vicarious experience of sexuality and a premonition of death— 
a premonition linked with her encounter with Vronsky at the railroad 
station and her troubled reaction to the death of the guard.”
The interpretation draws the reader into the whirlpool of 
emotion going on in Anna Karenina, but at the same time the reader 
becomes aware of Tolstoy the artist who connects the outer world of an 
accident at a railway station (death of a guard) with Anna Karenina’s 
forbidden passion for Vronsky as a premonition of death. The chance 
passage quoted here arouses the reader’s interest; he does not want 
to stop reading and will not because the rhetoric of interpretation 
yields completely to Tolstoy’s rhetoric of fiction. The craft of fiction is 
fused with the art of interpretation. And this is exactly the governing 
principle of Close Encounters. We are seeing the fictional world with the 
novelist’s eye guided by the interweaving commentary of the essayist. 
As a result we turn again, or perhaps for the first time, to Tolstoy’s 
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novel. The effect is that we learn to criticize the critic by going back to 
the work in question, since literary essays belong by definition to the 
liberal imagination.
The range of literary matter offered in Close Encounters is extraor-
dinary. Not only are we introduced in several essays to the “big” novels 
War and Peace and The Brothers Karamazov, but also to most rewarding 
miniatures such as Dostoevsky’s “The Peasant Marey” or “Anecdote 
from a Child’s Life,” both taken from his Diary of a Writer. And we pay 
a visit to Dostoevsky’s The Gambler to see Polina and Lady Luck. We get 
an analysis of Chekhov’s most famous play, The Cherry Orchard, placed 
in the context of his use of verbs of motion, as well as an interpreta-
tion of Pushkin’s “little tragedy,” The Stone Guest. A microcosmic poem 
by Tyutchev, “In Parting there is a Lofty Meaning,” is shown to be 
a universe of its own, while Nabokov’s drama of exile in Berlin is high-
lighted in his Russian translation in 1923 of a poem by Goethe: See 
the concluding essay, “From the Other Shore. Nabokov’s Translation 
into Russian of Goethe’s “Dedication” to Faust”—one that combines 
the worlds of Goethe, Pushkin and Nabokov, and demonstrates again 
the three leading qualities of our author: erudition, “Einfühlung,” or 
empathy, and what is called “hermeneutic humility,” meaning patience 
and attention to every detail. The ever present horizon of Western phi-
losophy, including Plato and Aristotle as well as Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Nietzsche, guarantees a rare equilibrium of judgment. 
For sheer power of convincing argument and didactic know-
how, Close Encounters, I think, can only be compared to the essays of 
T. S. Eliot. They need no introduction. Try reading any single one of 
them and you will find yourself reading all of them.
Horst-Jürgen Gerigk 
(Universität Heidelberg)
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Close Encounters: Essays on Russian Literature, a selection of writings on 
Russian prose, poetry, and criticism in four parts, covers the period 
from my second book, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form: A Study of his 
Philosophy of Art (1966), to the present. For reasons of space, I have 
omitted selections from my earliest period of writing, notably, from 
The Underground Man in Russian Literature (1958). Yet that study, with 
its core focus on Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground (1864)— 
a work that both defends free will and criticizes self-will, while pointing 
to a spiritual path out of the underground—laid the groundwork for 
one of my most sustained interests in Russian literature: the theme of 
fate, freedom and responsibility. The first group of essays, centering on 
works of major Russian writers, consists largely of discussions on this 
theme, while the second, under the heading “Two Kinds of Beauty,” 
focuses mainly on Dostoevsky’s higher esthetic and its centrality in his 
worldview. The third group of essays, “Critical Perspectives,” consists 
of a discussion of Dostoevsky’s views on reality and realism, individual 
essays on two radically different responses, Gorky’s and Bakhtin’s, 
to Dostoevsky’s work, and the the consideration of a Russian poet’s 
view of the purpose of art. The final group of essays, “The Poetry of 
Parting,” centers on themes of loss and separation in Russian verse and 
in translations of Goethe’s verse into Russian. 
The essays in this book are diverse in theme and content, but 
all give expression to my binding interest in esthetic and moral-
philosophical questions. 
Fate, Freedom, and Responsibility
“All’s for the best; having accidentally killed Don Carlos. . .”—these 
are Don Juan’s first words in his opening monologue in scene iii of 
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Pushkin’s play, The Stone Guest, the last of the Russian poet’s “little 
tragedies.” Don Juan is expressing his satisfaction that the way is now 
open to a conquest of Dona Anna. “All’s for the best!” is an allusion 
to Dr. Pangloss’s optimism in Voltaire’s Candide (“all’s for the best in 
the best of all possible worlds”). The words offer a clue to Pushkin’s 
critique of a rationalism that frees man from moral responsibility. As 
one of Don Juan’s lovers, Laura, remarks: “It’s really most vexing. 
Your eternal tricks—And yet you’re never to blame.” And yet there 
is something endearing and affirming about this happy libertine, this 
boyish lover, this “improviser of the love song”: a man whose very 
existence challenges a rigid and stifling moralistic order. “Moral-
Philosophical Subtext in Pushkin’s The Stone Guest” explores the tension 
between opposing views of Don Juan. It is with some reluctance, we 
feel, that Pushkin condemns his liberated and liberating Don Juan. Yet 
actions have consequences. 
“A land primed for fatality, already cursed with it,” William 
Faulkner wrote about the South in his novel Absalom, Absalom. The 
same might be said about Russia’s tormented history, yet a deep 
spiritual legacy in Russian literature and culture argues against such 
pessimism. The colossal undertow of fatality in Russian national 
consciousness, nonetheless, is at the center of Ivan Turgenev’s early 
historical-philosophical story, “The Inn” (“Postoialyi dvor,” 1855), the 
melancholy tale of a diligent Russian Job in a land of binding serfdom. 
Turgenev empathizes not with the resignation or “wise humility” 
(smirennomudrie) that wells up in his defeated peasant hero at the end 
of the story, but with the latter’s earlier vigorous efforts to forge his 
own destiny in the face of what appears, at first, to be a hail of accidents 
and arbitrary blows of fate.1 
Turgenev’s almost hypnotic fascination with fate surfaces 
again, years later, in his subtle philosophical tale, ”Knock... Knock... 
Knock!..” (“Turgenev’s ‘Knock… Knock... Knock!..’ The Riddle of the 
Story”). Chance plays an outsized role in the destiny of Turgenev’s 
strange protagonist, Teglev. Yet Teglev, as his creator underscores, 
stubbornly wills his own fate; he continually turns chance into fate. 
Ridel, however, the morally ambiguous and rational-minded narrator 
of Turgenev’s tale, plays a subversive role in the drama of his friend, 
1 For a discussion of Turgenev’s “The Inn,” see my article “Turgenev’s ‘The 
Inn’: A Philosophical Novella,” in Russian Literature 16 (1984): 411-419.
—  XIV  —
Introductory note
Teglev: he gambles with Teglev’s credulous nature, thereby facilitating 
his ultimate suicide. 
Man’s position is a precarious one in Turgenev’s bleak and 
incalculable universe. No one, or “Nobody,” responds to our knocking. 
We must look inwards rather than outwards for an answer, respond to 
the heart rather than the head, Turgenev believes. We are our brother’s 
keeper. 
Through gambling, smuggling, attempts at escape, and other 
forms of risk, Dostoevsky affirms in Notes from the House of the Dead 
(1861-1862), the convict in his fate-bound prison world seeks to act 
“according to his own free will.” That freedom, however, is “so utterly 
without foundation as to border almost on delirium.” Dostoevsky’s 
convict is a psychological prototype for the Underground Man 
(Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground, 1864), a disillusioned idealist 
who knocks his head against the walls of rationalist utopia and of 
a fate-ruled universe of his own making. 
Dostoevsky’s gambler, Aleksey (“Polina and Lady Luck in 
Dostoevsky’s The Gambler”), an educated person who has lost his faith 
and national roots, is ultimately caught up in roulette’s perpetual 
mobile of challenges to fate; it is a game, however, in which Polina, 
the woman who is attracted him, albeit very cautiously, becomes 
a surrogate for the “lady luck” he seeks to conquer at the gambling 
tables. The results are predictably tragic for the relationship. On 
discovering his real love in “lady luck,” Aleksey continues to seek 
“salvation” at the gambling tables. Salvation in roulette, however, is 
a metaphor for spiritual bankruptcy. Man, Dostoevsky insists, will find 
neither God nor freedom in play with fate.
 “If Napoleon is France, if Napoleon is Europe, it is because the 
people whom he sways are little Napoleons,” Ralph Waldo Emerson 
famously wrote in “Napoleon; Or, the Man of the World.” The Napoleon 
of War and Peace is a satirical figure, while the officer Fyodor Ivanovich 
Dolokhov might be described as a little Napoleon in everyday life, the 
quintessential gambler in life. He does not lend himself to caricature. 
A person of keen intelligence and energy, a duelist and calculating 
killer, he embodies the spirit of the times, what Napoleon, writing about 
himself to his brother Joseph Bonaparte, August 12, 1795, describes as the 
“moral state” of France, “the habit of running risks.” The duel between 
Pierre and Dolokhov, a dramatic and philosophical centerpiece in War 
and Peace, juxtaposes an unpretentious, unaggressive, and bumbling 
amateur, stumbling into trouble with a professional who has an 
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overweening confidence in himself and in the powers of the mind. The 
duel, in many respects contrasting eastern and western philosophies 
of life, echoes in War and Peace the larger confrontation between Russia 
and Napoleon; it underscores, on the one hand, the limits of rational 
calculation and, on the other, the ultimately unpredictable character of 
human events.
“A man’s character is his fate.” Tolstoy dramatizes this ancient 
truth early in Anna Karenina in the chapter treating of Anna’s meeting 
with Vronsky at the railroad station. Vronsky, glancing at Anna as 
she steps off the train, notes a “restrained animation” on Anna’s face, 
the abundance of something that expressed itself “against her will.” 
Vronsky’s appearance upsets the delicate balance between animation 
and restraint in Anna. She signals her troubled awareness of the impact 
Vronsky has made on her when, some moments later, she observes 
to her brother with regard to the accidental crushing of a guard at 
the railroad station: “It’s a bad omen.” She immediately follows this 
remark with the question: “And have you known Vronsky for a long 
time?” Anna’s conflation of the horrendous accident with the agitation 
aroused in her by Vronsky’s appearance underscores a predisposition 
in Anna herself to a tragic view of life. Her remark casts a long shadow 
ahead to her suicide at a railroad station. Ever-present chance plays 
a role in this episode, but Anna unconsciously weaves it into the basic 
design of her nature. 
“Breaking the Moral Barrier: Anna Karenina’s Night Train to St. 
Petersburg” details the triumph of animation over will, even as Anna’s 
violent emotional upheaval attests to her moral resistance to that 
happening. Nothing is fated in this scene, Tolstoy insists. Anna is free 
to resist or to yield to temptation. Chance and circumstance play a role 
in this dramatic episode, but it is Anna who determines the outcome, 
not as one who wills it, but as one who is caught up in nature’s powers 
of creation and destruction. 
Oscar Wilde once wrote that the “dreadful thing about 
modernity was that it put tragedy into the raiment of comedy, so that 
the great realities seemed commonplace or grotesque or lacking in 
style.”2 Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych, a story of the commonplace 
and grotesque which moves from satire to tragedy and then to 
2 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis and Other Writings, With an Introduction by 
Hesketh Pearson (London: 1986), p. 183.
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eleventh-hour redemption; a story that conflates Joban, Aristotelian, 
and Christian drama in a parable of everyday life, demonstrates that 
the great realities never take holiday. These realities are at work even 
in everyday language. 
Nobody among Judge Ivan Ilych’s middle class entourage is 
capable of facing the fact of death, the reality of his own death, in 
particular; nobody is capable of reflecting on the meaning of life that 
the fact of death poses. The thought of death is repressed. Yet the very 
language Tolstoy’s characters use to cover up their fear and anxiety 
betrays their inner turmoil. 
The language of evasion is at the center of “Uzhas in the Subtext: 
The Death of Ivan Ilych.” Concentrating on the opening and closing 
scenes of the story, “Uzhas in the Subtext: The Death of Ivan Ilych” 
focuses on the way horror (uzhas), penetrates everyday language and 
manifests itself in veiled and euphemistic forms of speech. The essay 
begins with an analysis of the way Ivan Ilych’s colleagues gingerly 
process the “news” of his death and concludes with a discussion of the 
end of the story, where horror is replaced by pity. 
“What Time is it?” asks Lopakhin, former serf and now merchant, 
in The Cherry Orchard. “Time is marching on” (Vremia idet—literally, time 
is coming), he warns the Ranevsky family with reference to the impending 
sale of the estate. Nobody in the Ranevsky entourage, however, nobody 
except Lopakhin, is moving to meet time and the exigencies of the 
situation. In Act I of the play, everybody is going to sleep.
Yet there is constant movement throughout the play. The Russian 
verbs of motion idti (to go on foot) and ekhat’ (to go in a vehicle) in all 
their variant forms, uses, and meanings, literal and figurative, are on 
everybody’s lips. The play is bracketed by the grand actions of coming 
and going. Remarkably, one can structure the literal and dramatic 
action of the play almost entirely around verbs of motion. 
The verbs of motion become the means of transportation, so 
to speak, for the motifs of coming and going, arrival and departure, 
farewell and reunion, sleep and awakening, death and resurrection. 
Arriving very early in the morning at the estate, Anya wants to go to 
sleep quickly so as to awaken and run about the cherry orchard—her 
Garden of Eden. The need for sleep is real, but sleep, the long sleep, 
dream, death, and awakening form a subtext to the topics of the play. 
What time is it? It‘s later than you think. In fact, the Ranevsky family 
does not so much live in time, in the present, as out of time. Time is 
apocalyptic in The Cherry Orchard. There is no more time ... 
—  XVII  —
a Glance at the Essays
Two Kinds of Beauty
The opening essay of the second group of essays, “Two Kinds of Beauty,” 
focuses on Dostoevsky’s higher esthetic, the classical and Christian 
foundation of his view of beauty, and the way in which it is reflected 
in Dostoevsky’s concept of “obraz” (image, form, shape, but also icon) 
and “bezobrazie” (ugliness, shapelessness, moral disfiguration), its 
opposite. Dostoevsky’s higher esthetic is the organizing element of 
his worldview: it constitutes a philosophical credo, at once a view 
of beauty and a statement about the human condition. Dostoevsky’s 
interest in Christian esthetics goes back to his earliest years, when he 
became familiar with the writings of Schiller and with Chateaubriand’s 
Genius of Christianity (Le génie du christianisme, 1802). In 1856 he wrote 
an essay on the “significance of Christianity in art,” the “fruit of 
decades of thought,” he noted in one of his letters. The essay was not 
published or preserved, but elements from it resonate in his critical 
writings of the early 1860s, in particular his critique of the utilitarian 
esthetics of the radical critic N. A. Dobrolyubov, and above all in his 
letters and notebooks, where the religious foundation of his esthetic 
finds direct and explicit expression. The deeply personal character 
of Dostoevsky’s higher esthetic may be felt in his moving letter to 
N. D. Fonvizina in 1854 where he speaks of moments, in prison, where 
he conceived of Christ as the ideal of beauty and perfection. He emerges 
in this letter as one whose faith is inconstant, but whose striving for it 
is permanent and passionate. Echoing his own personal outlook, his 
higher esthetic posits a tragic view of mankind eternally striving, in 
spite of all setbacks and failures, for the highest ideal. “Mankind on 
earth strives for an ideal that is contrary to his nature,” he wrote in his 
notebook in 1864.
Dostoevsky dramatizes the concept of “obraz” and “bezobrazie” 
as moral and esthetic polarities in “Over the Brandy,” the chapter 
Dostoevsky devotes to Fyodor Karamazov’s fatal moral and 
ideological encounter with his sons. The theme of “Over the Brandy” 
is “bezobrazie”—desecration, the defilement of everything sacred 
(Russia, the Russian peasant, woman, the mother of Alyosha and Ivan, 
and, finally, the icon of the Madonna.). “An eclipse as never before,” 
Fyodor himself babbles at the end of this scene in recognition of 
moral and spiritual catastrophe. “Why is such a man alive!” shouts 
his son Dmitry Karamazov in an early scene in the novel. In “Over 
the Brandy,” one may say that Fyodor has passed sentence on himself. 
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A more human image of Fyodor emerges in the course of the novel, but 
at this point Fyodor’s behavior would seem to be evidence in favor of 
Ivan’s deep skepticism over human nature. 
The issue of Fyodor’s basic nature, and his sons’ response to 
it, is taken up in “The Defiled and Defiling ‘Physiognomy’ of Fyodor 
Karamazov.” The essay begins with a consideration of the French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s anthropological concept of the “indissoluble 
complicity between defilement and sexuality”—a complicity that is 
dramatized in Fyodor’s unbridled sensuality. The discussion then turns 
to the narrator’s provocative sketch of Fyodor’s face, or “physiognomy,” 
as he puts it. The sketch raises a question that was at the center of the 
so-called art or science of physiognomy in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries: do a person’s physical features offer the key 
to his character? Dostoevsky denies a direct correlation of face and 
character. One must “look into” the face of a person, he insists, to find 
his spiritual center. Here Dostoevsky’s poetics of insight concord with 
his religious worldview: “Man is created in the image and likeness of 
God.” Man’s “obraz,” man’s image, his likeness to God, may be marred, 
as in an old icon, but the sacred image retains its essential link with 
divinity. 
The narrator’s sketch of Fyodor (a purposeful provocation on the 
part of Dostoevsky) suggests otherwise; it effectively sets into motion 
the esthetic and moral-philosophical dialectic of the novel, the issues 
of good and evil, of the nature of man, of “obraz” and “bezobrazie,” 
that are dramatized in the novel’s action and, in one form or another, 
debated by its main characters. 
“Anecdote from a Child’s Life,” the account of a twelve-year-
old girl who unexpectedly leaves her home, goes through harrowing 
experiences on the dark streets of St. Petersburg, then returns home to 
tell the tale to her mother, who tells it to Dostoevsky, who tells it with 
embellishments to his reader, is one of the most important yet least 
examined sketches in Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer. Here is fact, but 
here is fiction (three stories rolled into one). Here, too, we are witness to 
the process of creation, to threshold art—a mode of writing that marks 
many of the pages of Diary of a Writer. A high-minded excursus on the 
nature and dangers of preadolescence in a predatory world, a sketch 
with a focus on child-molestation (a frequent theme in Dostoevsky’s 
work), “Anecdote” on every level—genre, form, content, style, 
language, imagery, view and presentation of character—is marked by 
the phenomenon of duality. 
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“Life is a whole art,” Dostoevsky writes in “Petersburg Chronicle” 
in 1847, “and to live means to make an artistic work of oneself.” This 
can be done, he writes, only in accord with “communal interests,” 
in sympathy with the “mass” of people, “with its direct, immediate 
requirements, and not in drowsiness, not in indifference . . . not in 
solitude.”3 These remarks are foundational for any consideration of 
Dostoevsky’s life, work, and artistic muse, especially for Dostoevsky’s 
post-prison and exile writings when his personal, and defining, social 
contract with the Russian people merges with an explicit Christian 
ethic and faith.4 
Artistic self-creation in Dostoevsky’s early credo finds its apo-
theosis in social engagement and creation.5 Dostoevsky’s ideal finds 
explicit expression in the narrator of the semi-fictional Notes from the 
House of the Dead (1861-1862). Here the subjective element of autobio- 
graphy is subordinated to the objective task of the national biography 
of the Russian people.  The esthetic and spiritual accomplishment of 
this biography consists in the restoration of the image of the martyred 
Russian people. The narrator of the main text himself emerges by the 
end of his memoirs as a man of the upper classes who, through his so-
cial and personal testament, through suffering shared with the people, 
himself has attained spiritual liberation. This result punctuates, as it 
were, the concluding lines of the memoir devoted to the narrator’s re-
lease from prison, lines laden with spiritual-religious content and al-
lusion (Dante):  “Yes, with God! [a response to the convicts’ “God be 
3 F. M. Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v tridtsati tomakh, 30 vols. (Lenin-
grad: Nauka, 1972-1990), 18:13-14.
4 For a critique of a negative interpretation of Dostoevsky’s “muse,” see 
my discussion, “A View from the Underground: On Nikolai Nikolaevich 
Strakhov’s Letter about His Good Friend Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky 
and on Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy’s Cautious Response to It” in Robert Louis 
Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky. The Overwhelming Questions (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press: 1993), 104-120.
5 Dostoevsky’s notion of self-creation through social creation or engagement 
would seem to come under the rubric of the Romantic notion of 
“zhiznetvorchestvo”—“life” (zhizn’) and “[creative] work” (tvorchestvo)— 
a belief later adopted or adapted by the Russian Symbolists. For a discussion 
of this concept and its various nuances and applications, see Michael 
Wachtel, Russian Symbolism and Literary Tradition. Goethe, Novalis, and the 
Poetics of Vyacheslav Ivanov (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1994), 37, 143-156.
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with you!”] Freedom, a new life, resurrection from the dead… What 
a glorious moment!”
In this work, however, there is little direct discussion by the 
narrator of his spiritual life or how he arrived at his populist outlook. 
“The Peasant Marey” (1876), with its account of a daydream recol-
lection in prison of a childhood encounter with the kindly and earthy 
peasant Marey, seeks to fill in that gap. That daydream “miraculously” 
banished all hatred from his heart, Dostoevsky writes; it enabled him to 
see the Russian convict in a new light. This peasant with shaven head and 
branded face, “may be the very same Marey: after all, I really can’t look 
into his heart.” 
In reading “The Peasant Marey,” one feels that Dostoevsky’s 
esthetic dream of artistic self-creation through social creation, through 
merging with the mass, had been realized and, remarkably, in a single 
moment of the second week of Easter, most likely in April 1851, a year 
and a half into his terrible prison ordeal. Did this happening, however, 
take place in historical time or artistic time? Is this a single, or a triple 
vision? What is the mix, here, of truth and poetry? Such are some of 
the questions posed in “The Triple Vision: Dostoevsky’s ‘The Peasant 
Marey’.” 
Dostoevsky’s concepts of “obraz” (image, form, but also sacred 
form, the icon) and “bezobrazie” (the ugly, deformed, disfigured, the 
scandalous) are rooted in the Russian language and spirituality. In 
“Matryona’s Home,” one of Solzhenitsyn’s finest works, ethical and 
spiritual truths are expressed more through imagery than in direct 
authorial statement. Here, the concepts of “obraz” and “bezobrazie” 
find embodiment respectively in the peasant woman Matryona and 
in the disfiguring juggernaut of Soviet power. Matryona is destroyed, 
but her redeeming iconic image survives. Solzhenitsyn’s Matryona 
is not a doll, not a smiling Soviet advertisement, but the Russian 
peasant woman upon whom Russian life has depended from time 
immemorial. 
Critical Perspectives
“Critical Perspectives,” the third grouping of essays, opens with 
“Dostoevsky’s Concept of Reality and Its Representation in Art.” The 
Russian author’s omnibus conception of reality lies at the root of his 
realism. Reality embraces everything from the familiar to the fantastic. 
It encompasses psychological, social, economic, cultural, scientific, 
—  XXI  —
a Glance at the Essays
historical, metaphysical and religious realms. Reality is everywhere, if 
we only have the eyes to see it.
Dostoevsky depicts life and death fearlessly—“nothing human 
is alien to me.” “Mere realistic truth, however,” is alien to him. The 
artist must “look into” reality and seek out its “main idea,” an idea 
that at its root is inseparable from the ideal. Man “thirsts” for beauty 
and the ideal; there is no contradiction, he says, between realism and 
idealism: both have the same ultimate goals. “There is no reason to be 
ashamed of one’s idealism.” 
Few if any Russian writers carried on a more intense and at 
the same time self-lacerating polemic with Dostoevsky than did the 
Russian writer, Maxim Gorky (“In the Interests of Social Pedagogy: 
Maxim Gorky’s Polemic with Dostoevsky”). Here is a tale of attraction 
to, and repulsion from, one’s psychological double. Dostoevsky’s 
artistic genius was never a question for Gorky: he ranked him with 
Shakespeare. The trouble was Dostoevsky’s allegedly gloomy 
assessment of man and the human condition, the “sadistic” and 
“masochistic” elements that Dostoevsky allegedly “discovered” in 
Russian history and human nature. Yet his sense of the cruelty and 
chaos of Russian man and, it seems, of human nature, runs like a red 
thread through Gorky’s own writings, including his brilliant three- 
part creative autobiography ”Childhood” (“Detstvo,” 1913), “In 
the World” (“V liudiakh,” 1916), and “My University Years” (“Moi 
universitety,” 1922).
“As a ‘judge of the world and of people,’” Gorky declared to 
an audience of Soviet writers and critics in 1934, “Dostoevsky is 
easy to imagine in the role of a medieval inquisitor.” Yet Gorky at 
the end of his life naively gave the luster of his name to a modern 
Soviet inquisition. “In the Interests of Social Pedagogy: Maxim 
Gorky’s Polemic with Dostoevsky” explores the social, esthetic, and 
philosophical dimensions of Gorky’s polemic with Dostoevsky in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, a period when a whole section of 
Dostoevsky criticism confused Dostoevsky the writer with his heroes 
and anti-heroes. Gorky nonetheless remains one of the most interesting 
figures of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one who has not 
yet emerged from the critical clichés of eastern and western criticism. 
M. M. Bakhtin was not among the critics who identified Dosto-
evsky with one or another of the characters in his novels. His Dostoevsky 
study in 1929 struck a sharp blow at much of earlier Dostoevsky 
criticism and scholarship. “The present book,” Bakhtin wrote in the 
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opening line of his preface to the 1929 edition of his study, “is devoted 
to problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics and surveys his work from that 
viewpoint only.” (Bakhtin’s italics). In spite of the limitations he placed 
on his inquiry, one that excluded “ideology that found its direct 
expression in the pronouncements of Dostoevsky” (or more precisely 
of his characters), Bakhtin will give real thought to how Dostoevsky’s 
“radically new authorial position” in the novel accommodates 
‘Dostoevsky’s Christian declaration of faith.’ Whether he succeeds 
in integrating this line of thought with his core polyphonic view of 
Dostoevsky’s novels is another question. This topic is at the center of our 
discussion, “Bakhtin’s Poetics of Dostoevsky and ‘Dostoevsky’s Christian 
Declaration of Faith.’” 
“Nudus Salta!”, one of the late poems of Vyacheslav I. Ivanov 
(1866-1949), contrasts an orgiastic-Dionysian view of the “purpose of 
art” with a lofty, spiritualized Dionysian and Christian view of art. 
Ivanov certainly embraces the view of art set forth in the second stanza 
of his poem. On the other hand, though in earlier years he had taken 
a deep interest in the orgiastic elements of  Dionysianism he had never 
embraced the “all is permissible” program for art trumpeted in the 
first stanza of his poem.  Significantly he distances himself from this 
stanza by putting it in quotation marks, thus suggesting an alien voice. 
“Vyacheslav I. Ivanov’s Poem ‘Nudus Salta!’ and the Purpose of Art” 
brings to the foreground one of Russia’s great poets and thinkers.
Poetry of Parting
The final group of essays in this book, “Poetry of Parting,” brings 
together poems of widely differing interests and directions. All, 
however, share a focus on the themes of parting and loss. 
Brevity and compression of artistic thought characterize many 
of the poems of Fyodor Tyutchev (1803-1873). Such is the case with his 
microcosmic philosophical poem, “In Parting there is a Lofty Meaning.” 
In five lines, with a working vocabulary of 26 words, Tyutchev offers 
a poem of astounding complexity on the themes of mortality and 
immortality. What starts out as an affirmation of the “lofty meaning” of 
parting ends with an abrupt ”awakening.” “Here are some bad verses 
expressing something even worse,” Tyutchev wrote his wife in a letter. 
Yet Tyutchev’s poem has its own understanding of what it wants to say. 
As André Gide observed in his preface to The Immoralist: “Really, there 
are no problems in art for which the work itself does not provide an 
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adequate solution” (A vrai dire, en art, il n’y a pas de problèmes dont 
l’oeuvre d’art ne soit la suffisante solution).
Igor Severyanin’s poignant and prophetic poem, “No More 
Than a Dream,” about the loss and recovery of the legacy of the great 
Russian poet Alexander Blok, has an outward simplicity that belies its 
inner complexity. This dazzling poet of pre-revolutionary Futurism has 
lost none of his mastery of poetic technique in this post-revolutionary 
poem of exile and loss. Poetry in Severyanin’s poem, however, turns 
away from provocative “innovation” for its own sake and returns to 
the roots and role of poetry as inspiration and prophecy. Not without 
reason does the dream occupy the center of Severyanin’s poem, and 
not surprisingly does it return on its deepest level to the poetry of 
Alexander Pushkin, Russia’s greatest poet. 
In the final two stanzas of his great “novel in verse,” Eugene 
Onegin, Pushkin bids farewell not only to Onegin and to his, Pushkin’s, 
“faithful ideal,” Tatyana, but also to “those to whom at friendly 
meetings/the first strophes I read . . ./‘Some are no more, others are 
distant,’/as erstwhile Saadi said.” (The translation here is by Vladimir 
Nabokov). On the historical plane, scholars have seen in these lines 
a veiled reference to the Decembrists, participants in an abortive 
insurrection in St. Petersburg in 1825, people with whom Pushkin 
was intimate. In his Commentary on Pushkin’s final two stanzas of 
Eugene Onegin, Nabokov gives a good deal of time to searching out 
the source of the so-called Saadi line. My essay, “Supremum Vale: The 
Last Stanzas of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin: Goethe, Zhukovsky, and the 
Decembrists,” directs attention to works whose impact on the last two 
stanzas of Eugene Onegin is indubitable, namely, Goethe’s “Dedication” 
(Zueignung) to Faust and Vasily Zhukovsky’s free adaptation of 
Goethe’s “Dedication,” entitled “A Dream: An Imitation of Goethe” 
(1817). The essay focuses on how Pushkin integrated fragmentary 
literary reminiscences with his own creative design. 
The inspiration for the final essay in this book, “From the Other 
Shore: Nabokov’s Translation into Russian of Goethe’s ‘Dedication’ to 
Faust,” is quite simply the question: why did Nabokov in his discussion 
of the final two verses of Pushkin’s “novel in verse” ignore Goethe 
and Zhukovsky, two writers who figure prominently elsewhere in his 
Commentary on Eugene Onegin?
The genius of Nabokov is “strong,” not only in “opinions,” but 
in the wizardry of his art and artistic persona; it is famously strong, 
too, in the art of play, of hide and seek, of mystery and disclosure. One 
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takes note not only of what Nabokov says, but of what he does not say, 
as one does of empty space on a chess board. “From the Other Shore” is 
an effort to fill in this space. My discussion involves Nabokov the man, 
writer, scholar, critic, and translator of Eugene Onegin. It focuses on his 
tragic loss of family, home and hearth, land and homeland, and, in this 
connection, on his translation of Goethe’s “Dedication”—a poem also 
dealing with the theme of grief and loss. 
In an extraordinary way, the problem content of Nabokov’s life 
and poem-translation merges with the works of Pushkin, Goethe, and 
Zhukovsky. One becomes aware, again, of the fraternity of great artists 
and of the way in which images and motifs, through shared concerns, 
bound and rebound across the centuries.
A Note on the Text 
The twenty two essays brought together in Close Encounters, with the exception of 
the final one on Nabokov written for this book, were taken from my books, from 
journals, or from collections published over a period of fifty years. In editing this 
book, I have systematized different styles of footnotes and transliteration. Where 
citations from Dostoevsky’s works were concerned, I have shifted from the use of 
earlier collections of his works, letters, and notebooks to the most recent Russian 
edition of his collected works published in the Soviet Union—Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii Dostoevskogo v tridtsati tomakh, 30 vols. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972-1990).
In editing Close Encounters I have made stylistic changes and adjustments 
in the text, very occasionally deleting passages or quotations that were redundant 
in the context of the entire work. However, it was not possible to eliminate all 
repetitions without damaging the content of the essay. For reasons of space, I had 
to make significant cuts from “Two Kinds of Beauty” and “Dostoevsky’s Concept 
of Reality and Its Representation in Art,” two long essays taken from my second 
book Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form: A Study of his Philosophy of Art (1966). In the case 
of the first essay, I have added a small amount of material from an adjacent essay in 
Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form so as to provide a more complete view of my thought. 
My special thanks go to David M. Bethea, Professor of Slavic Languages 
and Literatures at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Series Editor of 
Ars Rossica, and also to Deva Jasheway, Kira Nemirovsky, Sharona Vedol, Lauren 
Taylor, and other staff of the Academic Studies Press, for their assistance in the 
preparation and launching of Close Encounters. Essays on Russian Literature.
Robert Louis Jackson 
Truro, Massachusetts , August 27, 2012 
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Moral-Philosophical subtext in Pushkin’s  
the stone Guest 1
Who is it that can tell me who I am?
—King Lear
A Question of Identity
“The beginning is always decisive,” German novelist Theodor Fontane 
observed well over a hundred years ago. “If one hits it off right, then 
what follows succeeds through a kind of inner necessity.”2 One may 
add that that necessity sometimes carries with it a hint of the inner 
content of the work. That is eminently the case with the beginning of 
The Stone Guest (Kamennyi gost’, 1830) where Pushkin projects a major 
concern of his play: the question of Don Juan’s identity.
The four opening lines of The Stone Guest, in contrast to the 
opening lines of Pushkin’s Mozart and Salieri, seem disappointingly 
plain. But plainness in Pushkin always masks complexity. Nothing in 
Pushkin ever disappoints. He had the uncanny art of making everyday 
words, speeches, gestures, and actions laden with meanings and 
1 From Alexander Pushkin’s Little Tragedies: The Poetics of Brevity, ed. Svetlana 
Evdokimova (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 191–
208. Part one of the present essay was first published as part of a larger 
essay, “Beginnings: The Opening Lines of Skupoi rytsar’, Motsart i Sal’eri 
and Kammenyi gost’”) in Transactions of the Association of Russian-American 
Scholars in the USA 30 (1999–2000): 85–96. Part two of the essay originally 
appeared under the title of “Moral-Philosophical Subtext in Kammenyi 
gost’” in Scando-Slavica 35 (1989): 17-24.
2 Der Anfang ist immer das Entscheidende. Hat man’s darin gut getroffen, so muss 
der Rest mit einer Art von innerer Notwendigkeit gelingen. Letter of March 6, 
1879, to Mathilde von Rohr. See Th. Fontane, Briefe 4 v., ed. K. Schreinert and 
Ch. Jolles, vol. 3 (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1971), 190. 
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resonances inside and outside the text. The opening lines of The Stone 
Guest are remarkable in the way they intimate in their camouflaged 
way the tragic direction of the action and a basic issue of the play. 
On the surface, the lines introduce a tale and hero as familiar to the 
audience as was the story of Oedipus to the ancient Greeks.
Let’s wait for night here. Ah, finally
We’ve reached the gates of Madrid! Soon
I’ll fly through familiar streets,
My moustache covered with a cloak, my brows with a hat.
What do you think? Could I ever be recognized?3
[Dozhdemsia nochi zdes’. Akh, nakonets
Dostigli my vorot Madrida! Skoro
Ia polechu po ulitsam znakomym,
Usy plashchom zakryv, a brovi shliapoi.
Kak dumaesh’? Uznat’ menia nel’zia?]
The fate of Don Juan, the fatality of the play’s action, is prefigured 
in the words “night,” “finally,” “gates,” “soon” (noch’, nakonets, vorot, 
skoro). The first two lines subtly foreshadow the fate of Don Juan at the 
gates of hell, suggesting, too, that he is “flying” toward that fate, that 
is, freely accepting and motivating his own fatality; this fact is made 
explicit in his last words at the end of the play, “I called you, and I am 
glad to see you” (Ia zval tebia i rad, chto vizhu). The last two phrases 
of the opening lines signal with equal subtlety Pushkin’s conscious 
and unconventional quest in his Don Juan play: the deconstruction of 
the standard or popular image of Don Juan and its replacement with 
a morally and psychologically complex figure.
Don Juan, attired in cape and hat that half-masks his face yet at 
the same time flaunts his conventional signature identity; this familiar 
Don Juan, ready to fly along “familiar streets,” asks lightheartedly, 
“What do you think? Could I ever be recognized?” Don Juan here 
puts the question of the entire play: Who is Don Juan? Will the reader 
“recognize” Pushkin’s Don Juan? What is the nature of his identity? 
Not accidentally do the words “know” and “recognize” (znat’, uznat’, 
priznat’) recur in the text.
To the popular audience, the dashing cavalier that appears at the 
beginning of The Stone Guest is as recognizable as the “familiar streets” 
3 All translations of The Stone Guest are mine.
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through which he flies. But the question of Don Juan’s identity is put, 
almost mockingly, to the audience: “What do you think? Could I ever 
be recognized?” The answer will come, slowly but surely, in the course 
of the play. The audience will ultimately be confronted with a Don 
Juan who defies conventional romantic or pre-romantic monological 
labeling; they will find a man, like Odysseus, of many turns, a man of 
complex and elusive identity, a polyphonic and ultimately tragic Don 
Juan. The image that Pushkin creates for his reader is that of a man 
who specializes in masks but who, at the last moment, is unable or 
unwilling to put on a new disguise, unless it be his own face.
This man of many faces is not apparent to the good-hearted but 
limited Leporello, a person who, in fact, stands closest to the audience 
in his monological perception of Don Juan. Leporello takes the mask 
or myth for the man; loyal to the traditional two-dimensional image 
of Don Juan, he is certain that his master will be easily recognized. 
With irony, Leporello replies to Don Juan’s question, “Could I ever be 
recognized?”
Oh yes! It’s hard to recognize Don Juan!
There’s a mass of people like him!
[Da! Don Guana mudreno priznat’!
Takikh, kak on, takaia bezdna!]
Don Juan, carefree but reluctant to be tagged, retorts:
You’re joking?
Now who will recognize me? 
[Shutish’?
Da kto zh menia uznaet?]
Leporello proceeds to name the people who will recognize him:
The first watchman,
Gypsy, or drunken musician,
Or one of your own kind, some insolent knight
In a cape with sword under arm.
[Pervyi storozh,
Gitana ili p’ianyi muzykant,
Il’ svoi zhe brat, nakhal’nyi kavaler
So shpagoiu pod myshkoi i v plashche.]
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Leporello’s Don Juan is the cliché, the familiar Don Juan, the 
stock image that will be recognized by people of his class or by people 
who share similar traits with him. Yielding to a fatalism that will 
characterize him throughout the play, Don Juan gives up the argument 
with the remark: “Well, what matter, what if I’m recognized” (Chto za 
beda, khot’ i uznaiut). Pushkin, however, does not give up the matter. 
He has just begun his play, one in which a complex Don Juan will defy 
the expectations of the audience and, indeed, if we are to believe Don 
Juan’s final revelations to Dona Anna, perhaps Don Juan’s own image 
of himself.
Don Juan’s encounters with Dona Anna in scenes 3 and 4 wit-
ness a dramatic process of unmasking. Confronted by her persistent 
questioning, he declares at last, “I am Don Juan [and] I killed your 
husband”; “I am Don Juan and I love you” [Ia Don Guan . . . Ia ubil 
supruga tvoego; Ia Don Guan, i ia tebia liubliu]. Don Juan’s strange, 
seemingly reluctant, yet inwardly driven unmasking of himself leads 
Dona Anna to respond with amazement, “So this is Don Juan . . .” (Таk 
eto Don Guan . . .) Yet even this “Don Juan,” the supposedly rock-bottom 
one, does not strike the reader as the ultimate Don Juan. The removal 
of one mask after another leaves a gallery of masks. The reader is left to 
wonder, is the Don Juan who declares, “I am Don Juan,” just one more 
mask, or is he the sum of all the masks that he has worn?
The image Don Juan seeks to present to Dona Anna at the 
final moment of their encounter before the appearance of the knight-
commander is that of a man reborn to virtue and humility. Yet even 
in confession, Don Juan has difficulty (one might say a constitutional 
one) in expressing, indeed, in feeling, a direct sense of guilt or remorse 
for his actions. At first, he flatly and defiantly declares to Dona Anna 
that he has killed her husband, that he “doesn’t regret it,” and that 
“there’s no repentance” in him (“Ia ubil / Supruga tvoego i ne zhaleiu / 
O tom—i net raskaian’ia vo mne”). Yet in response to Dona Anna’s “So 
this is Don Juan . . .” he is driven to a strange, even hobbled confession, 
one in which he speaks of himself, as it were, at a remove:
True, is it not, he’s been described to you
A villain, a monster.—O Dona Anna,
Rumor, perhaps, is not quite mistaken,
On my tired conscience much evil
Weighs, perhaps. Thus for long I have been
An earnest student of debauchery (my italics—RLJ).
6 Fate, Freedom, and Responsibility
[Ne pravda li, on byl opisan vam
Zlodeem, izvergom.—O Dona Anna,
Molva, byt’ mozhet, ne sovsem neprava,
Na sovesti ustaloi mnogo zla,
Byt’ mozhet, tiagoteet. Tak, razvrata
Ia dolgo byl pokornyi uchenik.]
Don Juan is certain only of his earnest attention to “debauchery.” Not 
without reason does the reader (to say nothing of Dona Anna) react 
with a certain suspicion to the affirmation of rebirth that follows Don 
Juan’s reference to his “tired conscience”:
But from the time I first saw you,
It seems to me that I have been completely reborn.
Loving you, I love virtue
And for the first time humbly
Bend my trembling knees before it (my italics—RLJ).
[No s toi pory, kak vas uvidel ia
Mne kazhetsia, ia ves’ pererodilsia.
Vas poliubia, liubliu ia dobrodetel’
I v pervyi raz smirenno pered nei
Drozhashchie kolena prekloniaiu.]
Don Juan is at least consistent in indicating, most surely naïvely, 
the fact that he relates to issues of good and evil in a very vague way. 
His conscience, it would seem, is “tired” not so much through stress as 
inactivity.
Does Don Juan really have knowledge of himself when he speaks 
of being reborn? Is there a perceptive shift toward “virtue” in him? Or 
does it just seem so to him? Is not the supposedly unmasked face he 
turns to Dona Anna in these last moments even more of a mask than 
his other disguises? Everything in Don Juan’s moral nature at this last 
moment is in the realm of “perhaps,” a realm of flux. What is certain 
is that his sensitivity to moral problems at this point is not above that 
of the child-adult (in this Don Juan is emblematic, like Dostoevsky’s 
Dmitry Karamazov, of the broad human condition) struggling with 
the names or notions of “good” and “evil,” awkwardly trying to relate 
them to the confused reality of his own inner feelings and strivings. 
The concept of a “tired conscience” best describes the deepest stratum 
of his moral personality at this fatal turning point in his life.
The near-final image we have of Don Juan as he confronts the 
“stone guest,” the statue of the knight-commander, whom he has 
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summoned, is that of an untrembling and unrepentant figure boldly 
and gladly accepting his fate. Yet even this picture of a defiant Don 
Juan is not the final picture of Don Juan that Pushkin leaves us.
“Who knows you?” (Kto znaet vas?), that is, who can make you 
out, Dona Anna wonders. Her “Who knows you?” is the obverse side 
of Don Juan’s “It seems to me.” Don Juan does not fully know himself, 
and Dona Anna, like the reader, is baffled by appearances. In any case, 
the figurative meaning of “Who knows you?” masks the practical 
question of recognition, for Dona Anna accompanies her words, “Who 
knows you?” with an obvious concern that Don Juan, in coming to her, 
risks being recognized:
But how could you come here.
You could be recognized,
And your death would be inevitable.
[No kak mogli priiti
Siuda vy; zdes’ uznat’ mogli by vas,
I vasha smert’ byla by neizbezhna.]
With this practical question we have come full circle to the 
beginning of the play, where the literal question of Don Juan’s 
recognition, and of his safety in Madrid, masks the figurative question 
of his identity: will anybody recognize the real, complex, enigmatic 
Don Juan? The implications of being recognized are spelled out in Dona 
Anna’s concern that recognition of Don Juan would lead ineluctably to 
his death.
Death, however, will come not from the king of Spain but from the 
statue of the knight-commander, from the implacable stone guest, an 
embodiment of a fate that Don Juan has been inviting from the opening 
lines of the play: “I have come at your call,” says the commander. 
“I called you, and I am glad to see you,” replies Don Juan.
Don Juan’s question at the opening of the play, “Could I ever 
be recognized?” has now become moot. He has long discarded the 
familiar cape and disguise that popularly define him and that are the 
signs of carefree erotic triumphs. He has made himself vulnerable 
and disclosed his complexity. He recognizes both his fatality and his 
free choice of that fatality. All that remains, it would seem, is a proud 
confrontation with death. Yet here, too, Don Juan defies expectations.
Don Juan’s behavior in the last act and in his last moments 
casts his fate in a tragic light. To the knight-commander’s peremptory 
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“Give me your hand” (Dai ruku), Juan answers, “Here it is . . .” (Vot 
ona . . .). Pushkin’s suspension points suggest hesitation on the part of 
Don Juan. Ona (“it” when the Russian noun is of the feminine gender 
but also “she”) refers to Don Juan’s hand, but it might also refer to 
the commander’s hand, the death-bearing “right hand” (desnitsa) of 
retribution: “Here it is . . . oh, it’s heavy / The grip of his stony hand!” 
(Vot ona . . . o, tiazhelo / Pozhat’e kamennoi ego desnitsy!) That is the hand 
of death.
The same kind of ambiguity a few moments earlier in the text 
characterizes Dona Anna’s “Here it is” (Vot on) when Don Juan begs 
a kiss. On (“it” when the Russian noun is of masculine gender but also 
“he”) refers to the kiss—a masculine noun in Russian—Dona Anna 
gives Don Juan. “Vot on” may also refer, however, to the arrival of 
the knight-commander, the “stone guest” whose knocking is heard 
simultaneously with Don Juan’s kiss; thus, “Here he is.”
In remarkable play with the simplest elements of the Russian 
language and with the simplest gestures, Pushkin accents at the end 
of his play the complex and dramatic linkages of love and death in the 
relationship of Don Juan and Dona Anna.
The phrase “Vot ona” (that is, “Here it is,” here is my hand) might 
also refer in the subtext to the presence of Dona Anna, who, at the 
appearance of the commander, “falls” (padaet). Thus, along with “Here 
it is” (Don Juan’s hand or the right hand of the knight-commander), 
the same Russian phrase might also read “Here she is” (Vot ona), that 
is, here is Anna lying on the ground. Such an association between ona 
(she, it) and “Anna” is strengthened by the fact that ona and “Anna” 
are similar-sounding words in Russian, differentiated orally only by 
differences in stress.
Don Juan’s “Vot ona” at the end of the play echoes his use of this 
phrase at the beginning of scene 3. Immediately after his evasive but still 
hubristic description of how he killed Dona Anna’s husband, Don Juan 
sees Dona Anna and remarks, “Ah! Here she is.” (A! vot ona.) At this 
point, Pushkin notes, “Dona Anna enters.” When one considers the 
intimate associations in the play between Dona Anna and death, one 
may say that Don Juan, seeing Dona Anna for the first time immediately 
after having described his murder of Dona Anna’s husband, sees not 
merely the woman who will arouse a storm of passion in him but his 
nemesis, that is, “death”—but without recognizing it.
The allusion to Anna at the end of the play (Vot ona) suggests Don 
Juan’s human concern for Dona Anna. Thus, “Vot ona”—“Here it is” 
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or “Here she is”—preludes both approaching death (the death-bearing 
hand of the knight-commander) and Don Juan’s despairing invocation 
of Anna’s name at the end of the play: “O Dona Anna!”—last words 
that now, poignantly and unambiguously, attest to his attachment not 
so much to himself as to Dona Anna.
The movement, then, in the development or disclosure of Don 
Juan’s character is bracketed by two signposts—one at the beginning of 
scene 3 and the other at the end of scene 4: “Vot ona,” “Vot ona.” Though 
identical, each pair of words testifies to very different attitudes toward 
Dona Anna: in the first instance, Don Juan sees Anna as an object; in the 
second case, as a subject, a shift that hints at a change of consciousness 
in Don Juan, at least “momentarily.” But the moment of change is the 
moment of death. Death puts an end to the individual’s ever-present 
freedom, a freedom that in Don Juan’s case has been systematically 
abused. It is death, and only death, that makes it possible to invoke the 
ancient Heraclitian law that “a man’s character is his fate.”
Actions have consequences, Tolstoy observed in connection 
with his novel Anna Karenina. Pushkin’s Stone Guest is about many 
things, but it is also about consequences. Don Juan invites the knight-
commander to his tryst with Dona Anna. However, his resoluteness, 
his almost buoyant defiance of a moment earlier—“I called you, and 
I am glad to see you”—deserts him. His final appeal to the “stone 
guest”—“Leave me alone, let go, let go my hand . . .” (Ostav’ menia, 
pusti—pusti mne ruku . . .)—and his last words—“I’m perishing—it’s 
the end—O, Dona Anna!” (Ja gibnu—koncheno—O, Dona Anna!)—no 
longer reflect a resolute acceptance of fate.
Don Juan’s last words, however, reflect not repentance but regret 
and concern for Dona Anna. As such, they also undercut any last 
attempt on the part of the reader to reset the portrait of Don Juan in 
any of the old conventional moral-didactic frames. Pushkin is never the 
prescriptive moralist; he is a writer, in this case, a tragedian. The final 
image we have of the doomed Don Juan is that of a man liberated from 
literary convention; though a transgressor of higher law (on this point, 
Pushkin remains firm) this Don Juan is far from being a conventional 
deceiver or villain.4 He is psychologically complex, multidimensional; 
4 Relevant here is Pushkin’s remark in a letter to Prince P. A. Vyazemsky 
about the crowd’s attitude toward Byron: “It is delighted at the discovery 
of any kind of nastiness. He is petty, as we are, he is nasty, as we are! You lie, 
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he is strangely appealing; at the same time, he is enigmatic and 
disturbing in the way anarchy combines in him with a beguiling aspect 
of innocence. Don Juan is, ultimately, a tragic figure.
The play’s conclusion, one that presents Don Juan disappearing 
or descending (provalivaiutsia) into some netherworld, brings the reader 
back to the opening lines of the play: “Let’s wait for night here. Ah, 
finally / We’ve reached the gates.” These lines, as we have suggested, 
signify the fact of Don Juan’s arrival, “finally,” at the gates of Madrid; 
they also anticipate his arrival at the gates of hell.
A Question of Higher Law
Alas! My God! he said, I have killed my old master, my friend, 
my brother-in-law. I am the best man in the world, and behold, 
I have just killed three men; and of these three, two were 
priests.
[Hélas! Mon Dieu! dit-il, j’ai tué mon ancien maître, mon 
ami, mon beau frère; je suis le meilleur homme du monde, 
et voilà, déja trois hommes que je tue; et dans des trois il 
y a deux prêtres.]
—Voltaire, Candide, or Optimism
Scene 3 of The Stone Guest opens with a brief monologue by Don Juan. 
As the Russian scholar Dmitrii D. Blagoi observed, the monologues 
in Pushkin’s Little Tragedies serve the function of psychological self-
disclosure. With respect to Don Juan’s monologue, however, Blagoi 
maintains that it has “not so much a psychological as an informational 
character, leading [us] on into the subsequent course of action.”5 On 
the contrary, whatever its informational function this monologue, 
indeed, its opening phrase, goes to the heart of Don Juan’s complicated 
psychology and raises fundamental moral-philosophical issues that 
underlie Pushkin’s whole play. These issues engage Pushkin’s complex 
response to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.
“All’s for the best; having accidentally killed Don Carlos” (Vse k 
luchshemu: nechaianno ubiv Don Karlosa) are Don Juan’s opening words in 
scoundrels. He is both petty and nasty—not like you,—but in a different 
way!” See Pushkin o literature, ed. I. V. Bogoslovskii (Leningrad: Academia, 
1934), 85.
5 D. D. Blagoi, Tvorcheskii put’ Pushkina (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 
1967), 648.
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his brief monologue. This accidental, unintentional, unexpected killing 
of Don Carlos (this is Don Juan’s view of the matter) has annoying 
consequences: Don Juan is obliged to mask himself as a hermit in 
a monastery. However, there are compensations: he is now in a position 
to cast his eyes on the charming Dona Anna. In short, “All’s for the 
best.”
The phrase “All’s for the best” resonates with meaning. It recalls 
the social-philosophical, indeed, cosmological, euphoria of the early-
eighteenth-century Enlightenment, Voltaire’s lethal counterattack 
in Candide, or Optimism (Candide, ou I’Optimisme, 1759), and the 
unforgettable Dr. Pangloss, who in the face of every misfortune insists 
that “all’s for the best” (tout est au mieux) “in this best of all possible 
worlds” (dans le meilleurs des mondes possibles). 
Voltaire is satirizing the philosophy of Gottfried Leibnitz (1646–
1716) as distilled in the writings of Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and 
others, one that posits a divinely preestablished harmony in which 
everything has its place and purpose, and everything is directed toward 
a beneficent end. Moral evil and suffering ultimately dissolve in the 
universal harmony. “But Pangloss consoled them by the assurance that 
things could not be otherwise than they are; for, said he, all this must 
necessarily be for the best. As this volcano is at Lisbon, it could not be 
elsewhere; as it is impossible that things should not be what they are; 
as all is good.”6 Optimism here is but the obverse side of fatalism: “All 
Chance, Direction which thou canst not see,” as Alexander Pope put it 
in his Essay on Man (1734).
With fatalism, of course, goes the rejection of the notion of 
responsibility or accountability. Such a fantastic and shallow outlook is 
quite congenial to Pushkin’s Don Juan, this buoyant and blithe gallant, 
this happy libertine, this childlike lover who appears to live beyond 
good and evil. But is this outlook Pushkin’s? Pushkin’s approach to the 
question of responsibility lies at the center of his “little tragedies.”
“All’s for the best; having accidentally killed”: Don Juan’s evasion 
of the question of responsibility is implied in the juxtaposition of these 
two phrases. The problem of responsibility dissipates in the realm of 
6 “[M]ais Pangloss les consola, en les assurant que les choses ne pouvaient 
être autrement; car, dit-il, tout ceci est ce qu’il y a de mieux; car, s’il y a un 
volcan à Lisbonne, il ne pouvait être ailleurs; car il est impossible que les 
choses ne soient pas où elles sont; car tout est bien” (chapter five).
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a larger beneficent purpose. Juan’s monologue closes as it opens: with 
a characteristic evasion of the question of responsibility.
When hard by the Escurial we met,
He stumbled upon my sword and expired.
Just like a dragonfly upon a pin.
[Kogda za Eskur’ialom my soshlis’,
Natknulsia mne na shpagu on i zamer,
Kak na bulavke strekoza.]
Don Juan does not consider himself responsible for killing Dona 
Anna’s husband; rather, he views his opponent as at fault for stumbling 
upon his, Juan’s, sword. Juan, further, distances himself from the moral 
significance of his act by comparing his opponent to an insect.
The theme of self-will (samovolie) is raised obliquely at the play’s 
beginning in Leporello’s reference to Don Juan’s decision to return to 
Madrid. “The exiled Don Juan has willfully turned up in Madrid.” 
(Don Guan iz ssylki samovol’no v Madrid iavilsia.)
Don Juan’s hubris, his moral and social declaration of 
independence, echoes again in the subtext of Leporello’s answer to the 
monk’s question, “Who are you? The servants of Dona Anna?” (Kto 
zdes’? ne liudi l’ Dony Anny?) “No, we are our very own masters, / We 
are out for a stroll.” (Net, sami po sebe my gospoda, / My zdes’ guliaem.) 
Yet as Pushkin demonstrates in his play, no man is master in this world, 
and life is not a stroll.
Scene 2 is decisive in establishing the moral-philosophical 
context of Don Juan’s singular psychology. The theme of guilt and 
responsibility is introduced at first, indirectly, by Laura, a character 
who in large measure shares the optimistic and carefree nature of 
Juan, but who nonetheless is not oblivious to moral questions. When 
Don Carlos objects to Laura’s uttering the name of Don Juan, she 
retorts, “Am I to blame if every moment / That man’s name is on my 
tongue?” (A vinovata l’ ia, chto pominutno / Mne na iazyk prikhodit eto 
imia?) What is spontaneous, happenstance, unpremeditated, Laura 
seems to suggest, is not subject to moral accountability or censure. This 
outlook is implicit in Don Juan’s behavior and actions. The theme of 
the accidental, the unintentional, the unexpected is a major one in sce- 
ne 2. When Don Juan arrives in Laura’s apartment, he finds Don Carlos 
there and exclaims, “What an unexpected meeting! / Tomorrow I’m at 
your service” (Vot nechaiannaia vstrecha! / Ia zavtra ves’ k tvoim uslugam). 
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But the encounter and its consequences can be viewed only partly as 
unexpected or accidental. Don Juan, on setting forth to Laura’s house 
unannounced, remarks, “I’ll go straight in the door—and if somebody’s 
with her, / I’ll suggest that he jump out the window” (K nei priamo v 
dver’—a esli kto-nibud’ / Uzh u nee—proshu v okno prygnut’). Don Juan 
comes looking for trouble. Characteristically, after killing Don Carlos, 
he puts all the blame for the event on the Spanish grandee: “What’s to 
be done? / He asked for it himself” (Chto delat’? / On sam togo khotel). 
“And it is difficult to come up with any rebuttal to this [fact],” Blagoi 
remarks at this point in his analysis of The Stone Guest.7 The matter is 
not at all that simple, however. There is much to object to in Don Juan’s 
remark, “He asked for it himself.” We have here a typical attempt on 
his part to sidestep personal responsibility for killing Don Carlos.8
Laura grasps the issue more subtly than does Blagoi. To Don 
Juan’s “he asked for it himself,” she replies ironically:
Ah, Don Juan,
It’s really most vexing. Your eternal tricks—
And yet you’re never to blame . . . Where have you come from now?
Have you been here for long?
[Ekh, Don Guan,
Dosadno, pravo. Vechnye prokazy—
A vse ne vinovat . . . Otkuda ty?
Davno li zdes’?]
Laura’s words go to the heart of the problem of the capricious 
child-adult Don Juan: eternal tricks, pranks, spontaneous actions, 
gambling with love and death—and yet never guilty! Laura brings 
to the foreground Don Juan’s unexpressed assumptions: chance is 
supposedly at fault. Yet the childish prank committed by an adult 
is often a stepping outside of law and limits. One may recall, too, in 
this connection that “tricks” (prokazy) are usually mischievous, even 
7 Blagoi, op. cit., 647.
8 Another typical instance of Don Juan’s moral evasiveness is his response 
toward the end of scene 4 to Dona Anna’s question: “How many poor girls 
did you ruin?” Don Juan replies, “I did not love a single one of them till 
now”—as though not loving these girls justified his ruining their lives!
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malicious. Of significance, in this connection, is that the Russian word 
for trick (prokaza) also means leprosy.
We, too, may ask Don Juan, as Laura does, Where have you come 
from now? Have you been here for long? That is, from what world or 
realm comes this man who places himself consciously or unconsciously 
above all accountability and law? Does Don Juan, variously called 
“devil,” “a real demon,” arrive with his “eternal tricks” like some fallen 
angel from exile? “I’ve just arrived, / And on the sly—for I’ve really 
not been pardoned” (Ia tol’ko chto priekhal / I to tikhon’ko—ia ved’ ne 
proshchen). Precisely, neither king nor God has pardoned this charming 
but devilish Don Juan.
Laura’s remarks inadvertently bring out the moral dimension of 
Don Juan’s tricks. She quickly drops the matter but in a manner that 
recalls Juan’s “All’s for the best.” She goes on:
And you immediately remembered your Laura?
Well and good. But come now,
I don’t believe [it]. You were passing by accidentally
And saw the house.
[I vspomnil totchas o svoei Laure?
Chto khorosho, to khorosho. Da polno,
Ne veriu ia. Ty mimo shel sluchaino
I dom uvidel.]
Chto khorosho, to khorosho, “Well and good,” literally, “What’s 
good is good.” In other words, whatever happened, the end is good. 
What is good for us, what brings pleasure, however, is not always 
ethically good. In the hierarchy of things good, esthetic good does not 
take precedence over ethical good. “What’s good is good” does not 
address the issue of the corpse on the floor, of murder, although in 
Dr. Pangloss’s philosophy, “It is demonstrable that things cannot be 
otherwise than they are, for all things having been made for some end, 
everything must necessarily be for the best end.”9 Not in Pushkin’s 
view, however. Indeed, in his play, the notion that “all is good” (tout 
est bien), “all’s for the best” (tout est au mieux), or that man is what he is 
9 “II est démontré, disait il, que les choses ne peuvent être autrement; car, 
tout étant fait pour une fin, tout est nécessairement pour la meilleure fin.” 
Chapter one.
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and ought to be is not the end of the matter, but the beginning of the 
problem.
In Pushkin’s active subtext, Laura’s “I don’t believe [it]” tells us 
more than the fact that she doesn’t believe Don Juan intentionally came 
to see her. On the moral-religious plane neither Laura nor Don Juan 
believes firmly in anything except themselves; certainly, they do not 
“believe” in the religious sense of the word. In any case, they do not 
strongly believe in a world where is accountable for one’s acts.
Scene 2 ends with a mutual confession of infidelity. Don Juan 
asks Laura how many times she has been unfaithful to him. “What 
about you?” she asks in return. “Tell me . . . No, we’ll talk it over later” 
(Skazhi . . . Net, posle peregovorim), he replies as the scene concludes. 
What Don Juan wants, feels, desires comes first; other matters come 
later, if at all. In the presence of the dead Don Carlos, both Don Juan 
and Laura make love. Significantly, the words “We’ll talk it over later” 
are immediately followed by the phrase that opens scene 3: “All’s for 
the best.” That notion is the underpinning of all of Don Juan’s actions 
and behavior.
In fact, Don Juan is not beyond good and evil, either objectively 
or subjectively, as the play’s conclusion demonstrates. Nor is the 
“improviser of a love song”—one of Don Juan’s redeeming disguises—
always an improviser. In his monologue at the beginning of scene 3 he 
wonders how to address Dona Anna, but then decides:
Whatever comes into my head
That’s what I’ll say without preparation,
Like the improviser of a love song.
[Chto v golovu pridet,
To i skazhu, bez predugotavlen’ia,
Improvizatorom liubovnoi pesni...]
All the ambiguity of Juan’s character is present in this remark: he 
is an improviser by nature, an impromptu musician of love who bends 
to the winds of chance. Yet the improvisation can also be a calculated 
one. With Don Juan, sincerity and guile go hand in hand: “I’ll strike up 
a conversation with her; it’s time” (Vpushchusia v razgovory s nei; роrа). 
Time for what? Time to entangle, time to seduce, time to love. 
“All’s for the best,” then, is pivotal in the play: it defines Don 
Juan’s underlying amoral outlook; it inaugurates the final movement 
toward catastrophe in scenes 3 and 4 of The Stone Guest, episodes in 
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which Don Juan challenges the statue of the knight-commander and 
makes his last gamble with love and death, his final and fatal play for 
unlimited freedom.
It is clear, however, that Pushkin, like E. T. A. Hoffmann in his 
novella Don Juan, breaks decisively with the traditional perception 
of Don Juan as mere libertine, a cynical and godless bon vivant. Like 
Hoffmann, Pushkin posits a complex psychology in Don Juan, one 
in which the sensual and spiritual elements are contiguous with one 
another. While sharing Hoffmann’s perception of Don Juan’s nature, 
however, Pushkin generally dispenses with the romantic idealization of 
Don Juan as a superior being hoping to “still through love the [higher] 
longing that tore at his heart.”10 Pushkin replaces the suggestive but 
still flimsy romantic and melodramatic paraphernalia with a profound 
and quite realistic consideration of Don Juan as a complex moral-
psychological and cultural type.
“What if Dona Anna had been destined by heaven to let Don Juan 
recognize the divine nature in him?” asks Hoffmann, and he answers, 
“Too late.”11 But does the tragedy of Pushkin’s Don Juan consist in the 
fact that he was snatched away at the very moment he was reborn, that 
is, when he was on the threshold of a new life? There is no question that 
Pushkin’s Don Juan feels reborn in his encounter with Dona Anna, but 
it is a feeling or value he experiences only momentarily—“the value of 
momentary life” (tsenu mgnovennoi zhizni). His tragedy is not that he 
meets a potential savior, Dona Anna (his “angel,” his “goddess,” his 
“heavenly beatitude”) when it is too late;12 this puts the matter back 
10 “Here on earth there is really nothing that so elevates man in his innermost 
nature as love . . . Little wonder, then, that Don Juan hoped to still through 
love the [higher] longing that tore at his heart and that the devil here 
flung the noose around his neck” (Es gibt hier auf Erden wohl nichts, was 
den Menschen in seiner innigsten Natur so hinaufsteigert, als die Liebe . . . Was 
Wunder also, daß Don Juan in der Liebe die Sehnsucht, die seine Brust zerreißt, 
zu stillen hoffte, und daß der Teufel hier ihm die Schlinge über den Hals warf?). 
E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Don Juan. Eine fabelhafte Begebenheit die sich mit einem 
Reisenden Enthusiasten zugetragen,” in Fantasie und Nachtstücke (Munich: 
Winkler-Verlag, 1960), 75.
11 Ibid., 77.
12 The Russian poet Anna Akhmatova held this view. She writes: “Don Juan’s 
last exclamation . . . ‘I’m perishing—it’s the end—Oh, Dona Anna’ convinces 
us that he really has been reborn at the time of his meeting with Dona Anna; 
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into that realm of accident and contingency that is so congenial to Don 
Juan. 
The tragedy of Don Juan is that he is Don Juan, that he cannot 
escape himself. He is forever moving in and out of his multiple 
disguises and identities, forever gambling, challenging limits, laws, 
conventions, death itself, in the pursuit of a limitless and illusory 
freedom, forever experiencing the deceptive self-renewal of the 
gambler in his momentary triumphs.
What the English critic D. S. Savage has said of the gambler 
in Dostoevsky’s novel The Gambler may be said of Don Juan as well, 
“The seduction which draws his soul is that of an ultimate irrational 
and groundless freedom which, containing equally within itself every 
possibility, is devoid of the power to actualize any of these possibilities 
and can give birth only to an ineluctable necessity.”13 Challenging the 
ultimate necessity, death, Don Juan brings death to himself; positing 
a fatalistic universe (“all’s for the best”), Don Juan in the end succumbs 
to fate, to the grip of the “stony right hand” of the knight-commander. 
He suggests evasively that fate had something other in store for him 
than beatitude: “Fate decreed something else for me.” (Sud’ba sulila 
mne inoe). But Juan, obsessed with death, “relentlessly courting his own 
death,”14 has freely brought about that fate through his own actions. 
His tragedy, again, is that he cannot escape his nature. That nature has 
much that redeems it. Yet the very elements that redeem it, such as his 
permanent moral adolescence, hasten his movement as an actual adult 
to a tragic end.
The ideal of a life without constraints or limits is emotional and 
moral utopia: the womb, the paradise of the child, the happy world 
of the playground. Here, indeed, is the “best of all possible worlds,” 
a world seemingly without beginning or end, outside of time, and 
free, at least ideally, of any perception of causality or consequences. 
the whole tragedy consists in the fact that at this moment he loves and is 
happy, but instead of salvation that is within an arm’s reach he is struck 
down (gibel’ prishla).” Akhmatova, “Kamennyi gost’ Pushkina,” in Pushkin. 
Issledovaniia i materialy, 2 (Moscow-Leningrad: 1958), 190.
13 See D. S. Savage, “Dostoevski: The Idea of The Gambler,” in The Sewanee 
Review, 57 (1950): 281–298.
14 See Barbara Heldt Monter, “Love and Death in Pushkin’s Little Tragedies,” 
Russian Literature Triquarterly, 3 (Spring 1972): 210.
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Noteworthy in this connection is Don Juan’s response to Dona Anna’s 
willingness to meet with him again: “I am happy! . . . I am happy as 
a child! . . . I am happy! / I am ready to sing, I am ready joyfully to 
embrace the whole world” (Ia schastliv! . . . Ia schastliv, kak rebenok! . . . Ia 
schastliv / Ia pet’ gotov, ia rad ves’ mir obniat’). The child-lover Don Juan 
is ready to embrace Dona Anna as he would embrace the world. Yet 
Juan’s childlike happiness is a regressive and impossible dream; it can 
never be realized in lasting love; or if realized momentarily in passive 
childlike adoration and reverence, it will be quickly replaced by the old 
and restless search for new conquests and stronger satisfactions.
Yet for all the regressive elements that stimulate Don Juan’s 
passion for Dona Anna, one cannot deny the intensity of his feelings 
for her in the final scene of the play, that is, in that last encounter when 
his passion for Dona Anna, one that is manifestly physical as well as 
platonic, leads him to confession. Pushkin calls into question not so 
much Don Juan’s feelings of the moment, however, but the permanence 
of the change he experiences within him.
Dona Anna is the apotheosis of Don Juan’s quest, one in which 
love and death are intertwined. “Well? What? What do you want?” 
Dona Anna asks Don Juan early in their acquaintance. “Death,” he 
replies. “Oh, let me die at your feet” (Nu? Chto? Chego vy trebuete? / 
Smerti. / O pust’ umru seichas u vashikh nog). Don Juan utters a romantic 
cliché, yet one it gives expression to a nature that finds congenial the 
contiguity of love and death. If we are to speak of a permanent change 
in Don Juan’s inner life, then it is only in the sense of the phrase death 
and transfiguration. The dynamics of Don Juan’s nature allow for no 
other denouement. Don Juan’s change can only be anchored in death: 
here is his final metamorphosis; here is where the true unmasking of 
Don Juan takes place.
“Poor Inéz,” Don Juan remarks in scene 1 of a woman who in 
her “strange” beauty, her contiguity with death, anticipates Dona 
Anna. “Well, there were others after her,” says Leporello. “That’s the 
truth,” replies Don Juan. “And if we go on living, there will be others,” 
remarks Leporello. “That too,” Don Juan replies. His “truth” here is 
not only bravado; it is, in Pushkin’s conception, an intuition of his own 
true nature. 
Pushkin’s own attitude toward Don Juan is ambivalent. He 
is drawn to the “improviser of love,” the charming, direct, ebullient 
man of the Renaissance; the life-loving rebel who stands up against 
the stony, life-destroying prescriptive morality of the Middle Ages; the 
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adult-child whose god is freedom and who recognizes no laws except 
those of his own nature. Yet precisely here, the other side of Pushkin’s 
Don Juan emerges: the man of the Enlightenment; the confused child 
of nature who took the philosophers at their word when they made 
a cult of nature; the gambler who stakes his own life upon chance and 
therefore has no qualms about sacrificing others; the man for whom 
life is a series of chance encounters and “eternal tricks”; the hero for 
whom chance is fate.
On the narrative historical plane of Pushkin’s play, Don Juan is 
a man of the Renaissance; but he is also a hero of his time, a product 
of the Enlightenment in his moral-philosophical makeup. Pushkin’s 
attitude, as tragedian, toward Don Juan is one of fascination and 
apprehension, affection and gloom. His Don Juan is in part a joyous 
and liberating answer to a restrictive and constrictive past; like the 
Enlightenment, however, Don Juan embodies the confused answers of 
the age to the questions raised; he is unable to distinguish between 
the demands of liberated individual consciousness and those of the 
community, between the legitimate rights of personality and the limits 
of self-will. Pushkin’s Stone Guest was an attempt to maintain a middle 
ground while at the same time a recognition that for the Don Juans no 
such middle ground existed.
Pushkin’s complex attitude toward his Don Juan might be 
summed up in two lines of Dona Anna at the end of the tragedy, 
lines that embody affection and understanding, and at the same time, 
a recognition of ineluctable necessity. Responding to Juan’s astonished 
question, “So there’s no hatred in your heavenly soul, Dona Anna?” 
Dona Anna responds: “Ah, would that I could hate you!/Nonetheless, 
we must part.” (Akh esli b vas mogla ia nenavidet’!/Odnako zh nadobno 
rasstat’sia nam.)
Turgenev’s “Knock… Knock…Knock!..”:  
The Riddle of the Story1
We regard each other quite indifferently, that is, when we are 
in a good mood . . . We do not know how to love or respect one 
an other, we have not developed within us an attentiveness 
to human beings. Long ago it was said about us, and quite 
correctly: “We are shamefully indifferent to good and evil.”
—Maxim Gorky
As we know, even such an appreciative critic of Ivan Turgenev’s 
writings as Pavel V. Annenkov (1813–1887) placed the Russian writer’s 
“Knock… Knock… Knock!.. A Study” (Stuk….. stuk…. Stuk...! Studiia, 
1871) among his “weak pieces.”2 On the contrary, “Knock… Knock… 
Knock!..” belongs to the strongest works of Turgenev and of Russian 
literature. Complex in its design and brilliant in artistic execution, it is 
a work of psychological and philosophical depth.3
1 Originally published as “Turgenev’s ‘Knock!...Knock!...Knock!..’: The 
Riddle of the Narrator,” Transactions of the Association of Russian-American 
Scholars in the U.S.A , Vol. 28 (1996-1997), 1-24.
2 Letter of Annenkov to M. M. Stasiulevich, May 1, 1871. Cited in the com-
mentary to Turgenev’s story in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem v dvadtsati 
vos’mi tomakh, 28 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: 1960–1968), 10: 501. Turgenev’s 
works and letters (pis’ma) are numbered separately in this 28 volume edi-
tion; letters will be referred to as “PSS, Pis’ma,” followed by volume and 
page numbers. 
3 Mikhail P. Alekseev’s essay “Turgenev and Marlinsky” examines the work 
in the literary-historical context of the 1830s. See “Turgenev i Marlinskii,” in 
Tvorcheskii put’ Turgeneva. Sbornik statei, ed. N. L. Brodskii (Petrograd: 1923). 
Alekseev views Ridel as an autobiographical figure. He does not recognize, 
however, that Ridel’s point of view toward Teglyov, and in general, toward 
the issues raised by Teglyov’s drama, are not those of the mature artist 
Turgenev. In her discussion of the story, L. I. Poliakova follows in the 
footsteps of Alekseev who sees Teglyov as a “victim of literary influence,” 
that is, of A. A. Bestuzhev (pseud. Marlinsky), first of all. She also emphasizes 
autobiographical elements in the story. “Glancing back at the past,” she 
writes, “Turgenev, probably, criticized himself, a passionate champion 
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Turgenev several times stressed the importance of his story, 
though not without his usual admixture of apology and self-
deprecation where his works were concerned. Although he found it 
“a bit awkward to be defending one’s own things,” he nonetheless 
voiced strong objections to A. P. Filosofova’s characterization in 1874 
of his story as an “absurdity.” “‘Just what is it,’ you ask . . . Here’s what 
it is: As strong a study as possible of Russian suicide, something that 
almost always is performed out of pride, narrow-mindedness with 
an admixture of mysticism and fatalism.” Turgenev writes that his 
“study” may not have succeeded, but nonetheless insists that it was 
both “right and legitimate” to examine “purely psychic (not political 
and not social) questions.”4
Three years later, Turgenev offered a similar defense of his story 
in a letter to S. K. Briullova. She had characterized Turgenev’s story 
as one of Turgenev’s “insignificant trifles.” “Do you know,” Turgenev 
replied, “I consider this piece not as one that succeeded—it was, 
perhaps, weak and inadequate in execution—but as one of the most 
serious that I have ever written.” He offers substantially the same 
summary of the story’s theme he had given to Filosofova and adds, 
“This is the study of a suicide, precisely a Russian one, contemporary,
and admirer [in his youth] of Marlinsky, Benediktov, Kukolnik, and lashed 
out at his own weaknesses.” (See L. I. Poliakova, Povesti I.S. Turgeneva 70-s 
godov (Kiev: 1983), 109. Poliakova’s analysis does not extend, however, 
either to a discussion of the narrator, Ridel, a central character in the story’s 
ideological framework, or to the story’s rich philosophical content. In one of 
her studies on Turgenev, Marina Ledkovsky accents the satiric dimension of 
“Knock... Knock…Knock!..” adding, “Despite the biting mockery, Turgenev 
achieves in this story, through the clever blending of satire with the theme 
of forebodings and with skillful nature descriptions, a general effect of the 
inexorability of fate.” See Ledkovsky, The Other Turgenev: from Romanticism 
to Symbolism (Würzburg: 1973), 107. Frank F. Seeley defines Turgenev’s 
story as a “character study.” Like Alekseev, he accents the autobiographical 
nature of the story: “During Turgenev’s student years in St. Petersburg, 
his brother Nikolai was in fact a junior officer in a Guards field artillery 
regiment. Turgenev will have visited him in camp, and Teglyov no doubt 
derives from one of Nikolai’s fellow officers.” Seeley implicitly identifies 
the author Turgenev with Ridel. He focuses mainly on the psychological 
features of Teglyov. (Seeley, Turgenev: A Reading of his Fiction [New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991], 277–280).
4 Letter of August 18, 1874. PSS, Pis’ma 10:282.
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vain, obtuse, superstitious. He again defends the appropriateness of its 
subject for art.”5
“Knock…Knock…Knock!..” is far from being “une bagatelle,” 
as Turgenev himself capriciously dubbed his work on its appearance.6 
What is more, his defense of his work in the above-cited letters, indeed, 
his description of its very theme, is a limited one. The work is far more 
than a “study” of a suicide, though on this level alone it is fascinating. 
On its deepest level, “Knock… Knock… Knock!..” treats the classical 
issues of freedom and determinism, character and fate, the limits of 
will and the imperatives of responsibility. It is concerned with man’s 
age-old passion for certainty in an uncertain and unpredictable world; 
his effort to define his relationship to an essentially indifferent nature 
and universe. Turgenev posits a world that lies beyond the reach of 
absolute human control or mastery, a world in which the play of chance, 
proverbial “fate,” is ever-present and can never be discounted, but 
a world in which responsible human behavior and action is, therefore, 
all the more essential. “People without firm character,” Turgenev wrote 
in a letter of June 10, 1856, to E. E. Lambert, “like to invent a ‘fate’ for 
themselves; this relieves them from the necessity of possessing their 
own will and from responsibility toward themselves.”7 Turgenev is 
critical, then, not only of those who ignore or discount the importance 
of chance on events and presume that everything is in human hands, 
but of those who invest “fate” or external circumstances with too 
much “significance.” Both extremes, Turgenev suggests, result in 
a renunciation of human responsibility.
The sense of uncertainty, of questions that have no definite 
answers, and of answers that provide no absolute feeling of security, is 
embodied in the title of Turgenev’s story, “Knock… Knock… Knock!..” 
The sound of knocking on a door is followed, conventionally, by the 
opening of a door, a reassuring “answer”; somebody presents himself 
and the mystery of the knocking is resolved. In the world of “Knock… 
5 Letter of January 4, 1877. PSS, Pis’ma 12:58.
6 Letter of August 17, 1871. PSS, Pis’ma 9:126. Turgenev wrote this letter in 
French. In a letter of December 15, 1871, to Ludwig Pietsch, the German 
translator of his work, Turgenev again writes deprecatingly about his story: 
“Dieses kleine Ding [‘Toc, toc’] hatte eigentlich gar kein Recht auf eine 
Übersetzung” (PSS, Pis’ma 9:181).
7 PSS, Pis’ma 2:364.
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Knock…Knock!..” nobody is standing outside the door. Or put another 
way, “Nobody” knocks. The ellipses that follow each knock in the 
story’s title appropriately give expression to a sense of suspense, anxiety 
and even dread, the kind that is evoked in Teglyov by the uncanny 
sound produced by Ridel’s drifting hand as it accidentally strikes 
a hollow spot in a beam.8 The knocks themselves have a simple 
explanation, as do other mysterious and seemingly inexplicable 
occurrences that bedevil the life and mind of Teglyov. However, the 
philosophical questions raised by the knocks—What, in a phrase, is “out 
there”? How certain or absolute can our knowledge of reality be? And 
what certainty or security can man find in the world?—have no simple 
answer. Turgenev is singularly twentieth century in his disinclination 
to offer social, scientific or religious assurances to his readers. He 
affirms that reality is not absolutely knowable or predictable and that 
to explain a phenomenon is not necessarily to know it or to be able 
constructively to relate to it. Turgenev, finally, suggests that “modern” 
man, however richly endowed he may be with the powers of reason 
and science, faces essentially the same uncertain reality as did his so-
called primitive counterpart as he looked out on the unknown world 
beyond his enclave.
1
“We all settled down in a circle, and Alexander Vasilevich Ridel, 
a good friend of ours (his name was German, but he was Russian 
through and through), began as follows: ‘I am going to tell you 
a story, gentlemen, of something that happened to me in the 
1830s . . . about forty years ago, as you can see. I will be brief, and 
you must not interrupt me.’”9
8 The title of Turgenev’s story “Knock… Knock… Knock!..” has great literary 
resonance. We may recall moments in Shakespeare that are marked by the 
same element of uncertainty and dread that is evoked by Turgenev’s title: 
the opening words of Hamlet, “Who’s there?” or the line from Macbeth: 
“(Knock) Knock, knock, knock! Who’s there, i’ th’ name of Beelzebub?” 
(II, iii.) “Knock, knock, knock! Who’s there” recurs in Turgenev’s story in 
section 7.
9 Citations from Turgenev’s text are from “Knock… Knock…. Knock!..: 
A Study,” in Ivan Turgenev, First Love and Other Tales. Translated with an 
introduction by David Magarshak (New York: Norton, 1988). For purposes 
of analysis I have emended Magarshak’s translation.
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Ridel tells the story of his friend Teglyov, a limited, superstitious, 
insecure, but headstrong man of the 1830s who dreamed of a high 
Napoleonic “vocation” and ended by committing suicide out of 
guilt after learning of the death of a poor woman, Masha, whom he 
loved but had declined to marry. Ridel’s narrative focuses on the last 
twenty-four hours of Teglyov’s life, a time. July 20, St. Elijah’s Day, 
when the two ac quaintances, by chance, camp together in a hut in the 
country.
The age-old image of a group of people sitting in a circle sets the 
stage for the story and its mythic concerns about man and his world. 
Ridel’s tale, however, has a very precise historical focus: the Russian 
Romantic literary-cultural landscape of the 1830s, one that he limns in 
the opening paragraph of the story. What can be inferred from Ridel’s 
detached and patronizing sketch of this period is the vantage point or 
point of view from which he surveys the romantic landscape of “forty 
years ago”: the rationalistic-positivistic world of the 1870s. These are 
the ideological heights from which Ridel considers the events of the 
story and his relation to Teglyov. What becomes increasingly apparent 
to the reader is that the positions from which Ridel judges the events of 
his tale and its protagonist, Teglyov, are not entirely those of the artist 
Turgenev, the author of “Knock… Knock… Knock!..” In this story, as 
opposed to Ridel’s tale, Turgenev has a double focus: Teglyov and the 
frame-narrator, Ridel.
Ridel’s brisk, somewhat peremptory remark—“I shall be brief, 
and you must not interrupt me”—anticipates a certain rectilinear 
pattern of thinking on his part. His injunction comes to the reader’s 
mind more than once in the course of a narrative that evokes increasing 
questions with respect both to Ridel’s understanding of Teglyov and his 
perception of his own capricious role in his friend’s drama. Ridel is an 
excellent storyteller, but unlike Turgenev, a poor analyst of the problem 
content of his narrative. Indeed, the inquiring reader increasingly 
questions the reliability of Ridel’s narrative.
The story, in short, is a box with a false bottom: the reader who 
mistakes Ridel for the artist Turgenev must inevitably be led astray. 
Such was the case of M. P. Alekseev who writes in an article on Turgenev 
and Marlinsky that the story “is put into the mouth of the narrator of 
the tale, Ridel, while of course, it belongs to Turgenev himself . . . We 
have Turgenev’s own definitive testimony that the story is narrated 
in his person.” Alekseev at this point cites a letter of Turgenev to 
I. P. Borisov dated October 13, 1870, “Meanwhile I dashed off another 
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small little tale under the title of ‘Knock… Knock…Knock!..’ Likewise 
a reminiscence of [my] youth.”10
Without doubt Turgenev in his story was reaching back into the 
literary and personal experiences of his youth. It is possible, too, that 
Ridel embodies certain elements of character of the young Turgenev. 
One must not confuse, however, Ridel’s interpretation of Teglyov and 
his role in Teglyov’s drama with the artistic perspective of the mature 
Turgenev. The artist stands on a far higher level than does Ridel, and 
in deed, makes a judgment of him, and to the extent that Ridel may 
resemble the young Turgenev, the young Turgenev as well.
“But no more philosophizing . . . ,” Ridel remarks after a brief 
literary-historical preface introducing his listeners to the romantic 
world of A. A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky (1797–1837) and Mikhail 
Lermontov (1814–1841) in the 1830s. “I promised to tell a story.” In 
fact, throughout his tale Ridel is unable or unwilling to “philosophize,” 
that is, to look deeply into the meaning of his narrative or to address 
the questions arising from Teglyov’s drama. He leaves it to the reader 
to do his own philosophizing, that is, to interpret Ridel’s tale. There can 
be no understanding of the story, however, without taking note of the 
misleading and evasive character of the narratorial voice.
The reliability of narratorial discourse is one of Turgenev’s central 
concerns in his story. The question is raised by Ridel himself with 
respect to Teglyov. “He was a poor narrator,” he remarks of Teglyov 
after recalling Teglyov’s account of his ill-fated affair with Masha—
an account delivered in a style that was “unnatural, unnecessary, and 
indeed, false” and marked by a propensity for extravagant rhetoric. 
“I was still very young and inexperienced at the time and I did not 
know that the habit of expressing oneself rhetorically, that falsity of 
intonation and manner, can become so much a part of a man that he 
is no longer able to rid himself of it: it is a kind of curse.” Yet Ridel’s 
justified skepticism may be redirected at himself. Is he himself a good 
narrator? Is it only the naïve, confused, and strained rhetoric of banal 
romantic consciousness that can mar the art of storytelling or conceal 
and distort the truth? Or may narrative discourse also be marred by 
the rhetoric of a self-confident and rectilinear “realism,” the kind that 
boldly recites the alphabet of reality, but cannot read its message?
10 See M. P. Alekseev, “Turgenev i Marlinskii,” 170. The citation from Turgenev 
may be found in PSS, Pis’ma 7:285.
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Immediately after criticizing Teglyov as a storyteller, Ridel 
recalls a woman who had once spoken to him about the death of her 
son with such theatrical anguish and such “boundless” grief that he 
could only think: “How affected and untruthful this grand lady is.” 
Yet Ridel recalls a week or so after this incident, she went mad: “After 
that I became much more careful in my judgments and have had much 
less confidence in my own impressions.” Ridel’s reflection serves to 
strengthen the reader’s confidence in his reliability as narrator. Yet by 
the end of his tale, it is clear that forty years after the events of his 
story, Ridel has not yet absorbed the important lesson he purportedly 
learned in his youth. 
An analysis of Ridel’s tale suggests that narrative distortion, lies, 
fabrication, even fantasy, may be entirely devoid of artificial gesture 
and other melodramatic signs of romantic stress and strain; indeed, 
it may take the form of an outwardly objective, sober, and “scientific” 
realism.
Events move with Aristotelian swiftness in the last twenty-
four hours of Teglyov’s life. Yet while classical Aristotelian drama 
presumably excludes chance and accident, Teglyov’s drama is marked 
by an uncanny grouping of chance incidents and coincidences: the 
meeting between Ridel and Teglyov takes place by chance (Ridel’s 
brother happens to be away); it occurs scarcely two weeks after 
Teglyov’s break with Masha and her threat to kill herself; it occurs 
shortly after Teglyov had been reprimanded by the commanding officer 
of his regiment for a proposal he had submitted for improvements of 
parts to the gun carriage. 
By chance, the events take place on July 20, St. Elijah’s Day. 
“It’s St. Elijah’s Day—my name day . . . ,” observes Teglyov. “It is 
always a very difficult time for me.” Again, by chance, a heavy fog lays 
over the land scape on this day—a fog that “put us into the mood for 
the fantastic.” By chance, Ridel strikes a hollow beam that produces 
a weird sound. By chance, precisely at this moment, a voice in the 
fog calls out “Iliusha” (the affectionate diminutive form for Il’ia). By 
chance, Teglyov’s girlfriend Masha, had indeed died unbeknownst 
to Teglyov. Finally, but for the chance foggy night, Ridel might have 
found Teglyov and prevented him from committing suicide.
Chance, by definition, irrational and incomprehensible to mind 
and logic, plays an overwhelming role in the tragedy of Teglov. Is 
Turgenev, then, setting up for the reader a “fate tragedy,” the kind in 
which the individual is a victim of pure accident, a helpless pawn, or 
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a victim of the gods?11 The accumulation of accidental or chance factors 
in the last twenty-four hours of Teglyov’s life would seem to support 
such a view. Yet the causal factors entering into Teglyov’s tragedy 
are varied and complex and include most decidedly Teglyov’s own 
strange and stubborn character. Highly superstitious, predisposed by 
temperament, culture, and personal experience to a belief in fate and 
in his own special destiny; burdened by an agonizing sense of guilt 
over his treatment of Masha, Teglyov, it may be argued, wills his own 
fate, that is, turns chance into fate. His guilty conscience organizes the 
knocks, the whispered words “Iliusha,” the death of Masha and other 
happenings into a pattern that validates his self-destructive course of 
action. He obstinately resists all rational explanations of the knocks 
offered later on by Ridel; he refuses to accept the doctor’s statement 
that the real cause of Masha’s death was cholera and not suicide.
Teglyov is a victim of his own obsession. “Homer’s inventive 
gift,” writes Erich Auerbach, “carries within it . . . the conviction that 
every character is at the root of his own particular fate and that he 
will inevitably incur the fate that is appropriate to him.” “The fate 
of Achilles is Achillean.”12 So too, descending from the grandeur 
of Achilles to the miseries of Teglyov, one might say that the fate of 
Teglyov is—“Teglyovian.” He brings his fate down upon himself. In 
this event there is more than an extraordinary accumulation of chance 
occurrences. Here, in the words of Heraclitus, “a man’s character is his 
fate.”
Yet Turgenev by no means excludes the importance of chance in 
Teglyov’s fate, in particular, the chance factor of Ridel and his actions. 
Like Pechorin in Lermontov’s “Fatalist,” Ridel plays an important role 
in laying the groundwork for Teglyov’s suicide. Ridel’s superstitious 
view that the “hand of fate really did weigh heavily on this man,” that 
“a tragic fate of which he had himself no suspicion really weighed 
on him,” masks both literally and figuratively his own “hand” in the 
drama of Te glyov. Noteworthy in this connection is Ridel’s almost 
11 “Fate tragedy,” Alfred Cary Schlesinger has observed, “should show, if it is 
to be clear and distinctive, that events occur in spite of human character, and 
that human action has no important results.” See Schlesinger, Boundaries 
of Dionysus: Athenian Foundations for the Theory of Tragedy. Martin Classical 
Lectures, 17 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 24.
12 Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular World, translated by Ralph Manheim 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971 [original in German, 1929]), 2.
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complete silence on the extraordinary play of chance in general in the 
last twenty-four hours of Teglyov’s life. His silence is understandable; 
any serious speculation on the chance factor entering into Teglyov’s 
tragedy, indeed, any serious discussion of the theme of chance and 
responsibility, freedom and fate, would have led Ridel inescapably 
to himself, beginning with the mysterious night that he spent with 
Teglyov and his knocks on a hollow beam.
When Ridel finally confesses to Teglyov that he was responsible 
for the mysterious knocks, Teglyov calmly replies that he, Ridel, 
had “nothing to do with it,” that “something else” had moved his 
hand. For Teglyov, that “something else” is a supernatural sign 
from Masha manifesting itself through the hand of Ridel. Turgenev, of 
course, disallows any notion of a supernatural force. But the matter 
does not rest here. Something else does move the hand of Ridel. That 
“something”—a strange tangle of causality and character—Turgenev 
analyzes with great care in the scene leading up to the knocking and in 
the episode of the knocking itself.
2
The origin of Ridel’s knocking, at least of the random energy that 
produced the accidental movement of his hand, would seem to be 
found, first of all, in the fog itself: a fog that envelops the action of the 
preceding twenty-four hours. The night that both men spent together 
in storytelling was both objectively and subjectively disorienting. 
“Everything moved about, became mixed and wrapped up in a strange 
way; distant objects seemed to be close and close objects distant, large 
things small and small things large . . . everything became bright and 
blurred.” “The fantastic appearance of that night had its effect on us; 
it put us into the mood for the fantastic,” Ridel recalls. It carried Ridel 
and his friend Teglyov “into a fairyland kingdom.”
Teglyov’s fantastic stories, rising from the depths of a deeply 
superstitious nature and reflecting his own agitated state of mind over 
Masha, add powerfully to a moment already pregnant with mystery. 
“Whether his stories had excited my nerves or this strange night excited 
my blood, I do not know—only I could not fall asleep.” Affected by 
the night and Teglyov’s stories, restless and unable to sleep, Ridel’s 
mind yields to a fragmented state of drifting and aimless thought. He 
lay with his eyes open, “thinking intensely, God only knows about 
what, of the most senseless trifles.” It is in this empty, restless, indeed 
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haphazard state of mind and body that Ridel, “turning from side to side 
. . . stretched out [his] hand . . .” One of his fingers “knocked against 
one of the beams of the wall. A faint but hollow, and as it were, drawn-
out sound was heard . . . I must have come down on a hollow place 
(popal na pustoe mesto), I accidentally came down upon a spot which 
possessed acoustic properties” (popal na akusticheskuiu zhilku). The 
verb popal (came down on, fell), one might note in passing, underscores 
the aimless passive character of Ridel’s activity.
The first knock is accidental, the result of a random gesture: 
its genesis lies in the fog, in the agitated state of mind produced by 
Teglyov’s stories as well as in the chance presence of a real “hollow 
spot” in a beam. Figuratively speaking, Ridel’s hand strikes one 
of those empty or “hollow” spots that are endlessly present in the 
everyday flow of life. The second and the third knocks, however, are 
no longer accidental; they are deliberate, experimental, the result of 
an elemental, almost scientific curiosity. “I knocked for a second time 
with my finger . . . this time on purpose. The sound was repeated. 
I knocked again.” At this point, Teglyov raises his head and inquires 
about the knocking. Ridel, however—his hand lay hidden under the 
bedclothes—“pretended to be asleep.” Suddenly, Ridel recalls, the 
“desire came over me to make fun of my fatal companion. Anyway, 
I could not sleep” (Vse ravno—mne ne spalos’). It is noteworthy that Ridel 
describes the impulse to make fun of his “fatal” comrade as something 
that “came over me” (mne prishla). Significant and symbolic is his use 
of the impersonal and passive verbal form. Ridel evades the question 
of judgment and responsibility. A moment later, he officially wakes 
up, but stubbornly continues to pursue his practical joke: “knock…
knock…knock! Knock… knock… knock!”
Ridel’s curiosity and experimentation, pure and disinterested 
on his first accidental discovery of the acoustic qualities of the hollow 
beam, now take on the character of deliberate play. The “empty 
spot” with its unexpected acoustic properties turns out no longer to 
be a beam but a human being. Thus, we may read Ridel’s conscious 
or unconscious train of thought—how will Teglyov respond to the 
knocks? What are his acoustic qualities? Ridel’s interests have subtly 
moved into the realm of deliberate psychological experiment, the 
kind that preoccupies Pechorin in A Hero of Our Time (1837–1840) and 
later Dostoevsky’s antiheroes in Notes from the Underground (1864) and 
“A Gentle One: A Fantastic Story” (1876). Ridel’s playful joke arises, 
in part at least, out of boredom and indifference. “Anyway (vse ravno), 
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I could not sleep.” Precisely, vse ravno, literally “everything is equal,” 
“it’s all the same,” “nothing makes any difference.”
Ridel’s joke, half rooted in chance, belongs to the realm of human 
caprice or play, the first cousin of chance. His bit of play consists of 
a deliberate implementation in the social realm of a random piece 
of chance. His character, as in the analogous case of Teglyov, wills 
chance into fate. In moral-psychological terms, Ridel is engaged in 
the same kind of play, challenge to fate, interest in domination, or 
will to power, that we find in the more overtly primitive Teglyov. In 
Ridel’s case, however, this will to power is not accompanied by any 
stated ideological superstructure of “superstition,” any pronounced 
worldview, any preoccupation with, or belief in, the mysterious 
“significance” of chance or fate. In various ways (his gambles on the 
ice floes or with cards), the pathetic Teglyov, inflated with his ego, 
challenges the status quo, tests himself; he would be happy to impose 
his will on reality, to discover his Napoleonic “vocation.” Ridel, on 
the other hand, consciously or unconsciously seeks to impose his will 
directly on Teglyov. In both young men, we discover a curious unity of 
character, despite their apparent outward differences. In a real sense, 
indeed, we may speak of them as “doubles.”
Caprice, the desire to play pranks is linked with the impact 
of the fantastic night and a restless head full of “the most senseless 
trifles.” Yet it is also connected with basic traits of Ridel’s personality. 
Just as the fate of Teglyov cannot be explained entirely in terms of the 
external play of chance and coincidence (inclination and choice is also 
involved), so Ridel’s play cannot be explained entirely by the fog or 
aimless state of mind or by the chance presence of a hollow spot in 
the beam. Chance and choice are both involved. Ridel, in short, brings 
something of his own, a surplus of himself, to the given happening, 
to the chance configuration of events, just as he brings something of 
his own, his subjectivity, to his seemingly objective and matter-of-fact 
narrative forty years later. As in the case of Teglyov, Ridel’s character 
has broad cultural and social di mensions, though like an unexcavated 
archeological site, they remain largely hidden to the naked eye, but not 
to Turgenev’s. Ridel, like Teglyov, is a hero of his time, or one ought to 
say, a hero of “two different times”; in him, two different yet contiguous 
epochs in Russian history (contiguous on the moral-psychological 
plane) are joined: the romantic epoch of the 1830s and the rationalistic 
age of so-called Russian Enlightenment of the 1860s. What unites the 
two Ridels is his weak sense of right and wrong.
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Lermontov signaled the pervasiveness of this mentality in his 
poem “Meditation” (“Duma,” 1838):
Bogaty my, edva iz kolybeli,
Oshibkami ottsov i pozdnim ikh umom,
I zhizn’ uzh nas tomit, kak rovnyi put’ bez tseli.
Kak pir na prazdnike chuzhom. 
K dobru i zlu postydno ravnodushny . . .
[Scarcely out of our cradle, we are rich
In the mistakes of our fathers and their belated wisdom,
And life already oppresses us, like a level path without a goal,
Like a banquet on an alien holiday.
We are shamefully indifferent to good and evil . . .]
The moral-philosophical implications of the episode of the 
“knocks” are clear. On the one hand, the episode suggests the 
impossibility of absolute control over nature or reality: the only 
predictable thing that one can say about chance is that it is unpredictable. 
On the other hand, the episode of the knocking indicates that the so-
called fatality of chance, where human behavior and actions enter 
into the picture, is relative. Much, though not all, depends upon our 
receptivity to the play of chance. Man enjoys a measure of freedom; 
he often has the option of accepting or rejecting, struggling with, or 
yielding to, chance. As Shakespeare’s Cassius cautiously puts it, “Men 
at some time are masters of their fate” (Julius Caesar I:ii).
Ridel exercises his freedom when he wills chance into fate. He 
did not desire evil. Yet his play and long delay in explaining the source 
of the knocks, triggers an uncontrollable chain reaction in the morbid 
consciousness of Teglyov. Turgenev conveys the dread potential of evil-
unloosed in a striking image, one which might serve as a metaphor for 
the action in story. Hearing the knocking, Ridel observes, “[Teglyov] 
kept turning his face to the window, and then to the door. Really it was 
difficult to say where the sound came from: it seemed to fly around the 
room, as though gliding along the walls.” As the events in the story 
demonstrate, the demon of chance, once having broken loose, cannot 
be easily brought under control again, if at all.
3
“Knock… knock… knock!.. ‘Who’s there?’ cried Teglyov. ‘Come in!’ No 
one, of course, answered.” Whatever the philosophical or metaphysical 
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significance of the unanswered knocks in this episode, the ethical 
meaning of this moment is clear: What is lacking in Ridel, both the young 
Ridel who is Teglyov’s companion and the older man who recalls the 
tale, is the capacity to relate warmly and compassionately to his fellow 
man, to “answer” to his needs. “No one, of course, answered,” Ridel 
recalls. Why—“of course” (razumeetsia)? It is razum (reason) hidden in 
the Russian phrase that explains why nobody answered.
“I grew fond of him,” Ridel says of his relation to Teglyov, 
“I grew fond of him, first, because I myself was quite an unsociable 
fellow, and I saw in him a kindred spirit (sobrat); and second, because 
he was a good-natured fellow, and a very simple-hearted one at 
bottom. He inspired a sort of pity in me . . .” Ridel’s pity, however, is 
patronizing; it is not expressed in brotherly solicitude.
The young Ridel considered Teglyov’s behavior toward his 
fiancée, Masha, to be inconsistent and strange: he loved Masha, 
yet he abandoned her. “Why, then, did you not marry her?” Ridel 
asks. “Have you fallen out of love with her?” “No, I still love her 
passionately!” exclaims the distraught Teglyov. Ridel is struck here 
by Teglyov’s irra tionality. He is lacking, however, in any empathy 
with, or psychological understanding of, his friend. He recalls an 
acquaintance who had married an unattractive, stupid woman without 
means. When the acquaintance was asked whether he had married for 
love, he replied, “Not at all for love! I just did it ‘for no reason at all’!” 
(A tak) “And yet here Teglyov was passionately in love with a girl 
and did not marry her,” Ridel adds. “Well, was that too ‘for no 
reason at all’?” There is, indeed, something strange in Teglyov’s 
break with Masha. It is characteristic of Ridel, however, that 
he attributes to Teglyov a kind of irrationality or caprice that 
characterizes his own behavior toward Teglyov. Why does he play 
a practical joke on Teglyov? Was it not also A tak—For no reason at 
all? Why does he stubbornly pursue the joke? Why does Teglyov’s 
credulity about the knocks make Ridel want to laugh at a moment 
when it is clear that the knocks arouse disturbed and dangerous 
feelings in Teglyov? “Why does Teglyov always go on hinting that 
he is going to commit suicide? What rubbish! What theatrics!” Ridel 
remembers thinking to himself. “He refused to marry the girl of 
his own free will . . . he jilted her . . . and now, all of a sudden, 
he wants to kill himself! It makes no human sense! (chelovecheskii 
smysl) He can’t help showing off!” There is, in fact, a great deal of 
human sense in Teglyov’s remorse. However muddled his character 
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and motivations, he is human both in his love for Masha and in his 
feelings of anguish and guilt. The same cannot be said of Ridel in his 
relations with Teglyov. These relations have a whimsical and quirky 
character and are lacking precisely in “human sense.” Ridel is quick 
to blame Teglyov—his “free will” (volia), for his situation, as though 
convinced that human beings are in full rational control of their 
actions. Yet in blaming Teglyov for his dilemma, Ridel conveniently 
ignores his own moral failure.
A residual concern for Teglyov does slowly manifest itself in 
Ridel at the time Teglyov returns from St. Petersburg with news of 
Masha’s death. Yet he continues to conceal from Teglyov the secret of 
the knocks and remains unable to respond earnestly to the emotional 
and psychological distress that lies beneath Teglyov’s rhetoric: “Oh 
the damned phrase-monger!” he exclaims, as Teglyov slips away into 
the fog with a solemn “farewell” and broad hints at suicide. “Always 
trying to show off!” Nonetheless, Ridel’s conscience begins to bother 
him at this point. “Involuntary fear clutched at my heart.” And he runs 
out into the fog to find Teglyov.
4
The fog (tuman) is the central image and metaphor in the 
symbolism and semantics of Turgenev’s story, as it is for Tolstoy 
in crucial battle scenes in War and Peace (1863–1868). It signals the 
ultimately unfathomable character of causality and man’s persistent 
underestimation of the complex nature of things and relations in life and 
nature.
The fog, first of all, is real: it distorts one’s sense of distance and 
proportions; it literally leads people astray and separates them from 
each other. The fog, again, figures as a metaphor for psychological and 
social confusion and blindness, for the human fog that prevents us from 
seeing ourselves completely. It mocks as it were, Teglyov’s inability to 
face reality, to see through the romantic myths that have deluded him. 
The fog ridicules Ridel’s self-assurance, his no-nonsense realism: the 
rational pretensions of a man who cannot get beyond a simplistic view 
of Teglyov’s character or get an understanding of himself and his own 
motivations. The fog, here, is character, and character is fate.
The fog, in short, mocks the effort of immature mind, romantic 
or realistic, mystical or scientific, to “know” reality in any absolute 
or definitive sense. Ultimately, however, the fog testifies, figuratively, 
34 Fate, Freedom, and Responsibility
to people’s inability to find the way in a moral and spiritual sense, 
to find their way to each other’s hearts, that is, to find their way 
home.
The great drama of the fog that dominates chapters 13, 14, and 15 
is a paradigm of human search, error, confusion, and striving. There are 
scenes of immense artistic power not only on the descriptive plane, but 
in the manner in which Turgenev’s own spiritual statement is indirectly 
disclosed through everyday language and imagery. Chapter 13 opens 
with the signal words: “But where to go? The fog embraced me on all 
sides.” Ridel recalls setting out in pursuit of Teglyov who had vanished 
in the fog. “Where to go?” he recalls wondering. The question relates, 
too, to the moral and spiritual issues raised in Turgenev’s story. Blindly 
stumbling about in the fog Ridel cries out: “‘Teglyov!’ ‘Teglyov!’ My 
voice died away all round me without any answer. It seemed as if the 
very fog did not let it go any further. ‘Teglyov!’ I repeated. No one 
answered. I walked straight ahead at random.” The episode echoes the 
knocking scene in chapter 7 when Teglyov cried out, “Who’s there?” 
and Ridel failed to respond. Now, it is Teglyov who does not respond. 
Ridel does what is natural to him and to people in general when life 
provides no answer: he goes ahead “at random.”
Ridel finds Teglyov by chance. After calling out a number of 
times, he hears a “low voice.” “Well, here I am . . . What do you want 
of me?” Teglyov responds. The question is an important one on the 
deeper plane of Turgenev’s narrative concern: What does Ridel want of 
the lonely and tormented Teglyov? The cruel and prolonged practical 
joke he had played on Teglyov had nothing to do with communication 
or friendship. Teglyov’s question, “What do you want of me?”—raises 
the central ethical question of the story and of human relations in 
general: a m  I  my brother’s keeper? “What do you want of me?” is 
also a concealed plea for some kind of sympathy, empathy or help. 
Something deep and human, indeed, awakens at this moment in Ridel. 
“‘Thank God!’—I cried in an outburst of joy and seized both his hands. 
‘Thank God! I had already given up hope of finding you. And aren’t 
you ashamed of frightening me like that! Really [lit. pomiluite—I beg 
you]13, Ilya Stepanych’!” Of course, one may ask, where was Ridel’s 
“shame” earlier when he persisted, and now still persists, in deluding 
13 “Pomiluite”—from the verb “pomilovat’”—spare me, pardon me; “Gospodi 
pomilui!”—“the Lord have mercy.”
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the naïve and nervous Teglyov about the knocks? But there is more in 
these lines than irony. “What do you want of me?” Teglyov repeats. 
As though confronted for the first time with the deeper meaning of 
Teglyov’s question, as though for the first time grasping the hitherto 
unexamined question of man’s relation to his fellow man, Ridel 
hesitates, and as though groping, replies, “I want . . . I want, first of all, 
that you come back home with me. And secondly, I want, I demand, I 
demand of you as a friend that you should at once explain to me the 
meaning of your behavior . . .”
Strange “demands” from Ridel, a person who felt no need to 
provide himself with an account of his own behavior toward Teglyov! 
Yet in this insistence that Teglyov account for his actions as a friend we 
are nonetheless witness to a real, heartfelt, even if momentary, surge of 
feeling, warmth and responsibility in Ridel. This moment in the fog, in 
the open fields—not accidentally does Turgenev evoke King Lear on 
the heath—is a kind of epiphany, profound, moving, and eloquent in 
word, image, and symbol: “Thank God,” “seized him with both hands,” 
“together,” “friend,” “shame,” “behavior,” “despaired,” “joy,” “I beg 
of you,” “home.” All these words, even scrambled, constitute, if not 
a new ethical vocabulary for Ridel, then a direct and human response for 
him, one unmarked by caprice, patronizing reflection, or detachment. 
In his experience of joy at finding the lost Teglyov, we may say that 
the fog, figuratively speaking, parts, as it does, momentarily, for the 
wounded Prince Andrei on the field of Austerlitz in War and Peace. 
Ridel’s genuine feeling and solicitude for Teglyov at this point in the 
story answers the question “But where to go?” Turgenev’s statement 
is the same as Tolstoy’s and Dostoevsky’s: the only infallible guide for 
man on the wild and uncertain heath of human life and history, on that 
field where he wanders about in search of himself, where he seeks the 
way back home, is not reason, not pride, not self-assertion, not play, 
but the dictates of the heart and hearth.
“Let’s go home,” Ridel says. “Let’s go,” replied Teglyov. “But 
how are we going to find the way in this fog?” This is the central and 
unstated question of Turgenev’s story. “There’s a light in the window 
of our cottage and we’ll make straight for it. Come along.” “You go 
ahead,” replied Teglyov. “I’ll follow you.” Ridel, of course, is no Virgil, 
and Teglyov is no Dante. Yet Turgenev’s world is marked by symbol, 
allusion, and irony. “We set off. We walked for about five minutes, and 
the light which should have served us as a beacon did not appear; at 
last it gleamed in the distance in two red points.” The two red points 
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in the symbolic design of this episode are ominous. It is at precisely 
at this moment, Ridel recalls, that “in a fit of repentance and a sort of 
superstitious fear . . . I confessed to him that I had produced last night’s 
mysterious knocking . . . and what a tragic turn my joke had taken! 
Teglyov confined himself to remarking that I had had nothing to do 
with it, that something else had moved my hand.”
Teglyov’s tragic movement toward suicide seems almost 
irreversible now. Was it facilitated in some unconscious way by Ridel’s 
confession of his cruelty? In any case, when Ridel and Teglyov arrive 
at the cottage, Teglyov succeeds in slipping off for a second and last 
time into the fog, into that mysterious element that seems so congenial 
to his fantastic nature. “And why did I let him out of my hands,” Ridel 
asks himself. Why, indeed, did Ridel, figuratively speaking, let go of 
Teglyov’s hand? What inner fog prevented him from reaching out to 
Teglyov in the cottage at night?
For a second time, now with his servant Semyon, Ridel sets out 
in search of Teglyov, stumbling about with lanterns that were of no use. 
“The fog confused us (sbival nas s tolku), so much so that we wandered as 
though in a dream . . . The fog seems to have made its way into my very 
brain, and I wandered about befogged.” Ridel and Semyon wander in 
confusion, circling around the dim landscape. “We turned back again . 
. . Fields, fields, endless fields . . . I nearly cried . . . The words of the fool 
in King Lear came to my mind: ‘This night will finally drive us mad.’”14 
“Where are we to go? I said to Semyon in despair.” “The wood demon 
must have led us astray, sir,” the bewildered servant replied. “There’s 
something behind this. I’m sure, sir, the devil is mixed up in it.”
The opening line of chapter 15 signals the tragic universe of 
“Knock…Knock… Knock!..” “It is impossible to describe how we 
wandered about in it [the fog], how we kept losing our way!” (Kak my 
s nim bluzhdali, kak putalis’, to peredat’ nevozmozhno!) The line echoes the 
opening of Dante’s Inferno: “Midway in the journey of our life/ I found 
myself in a dark wood,/ for the straight way was lost./ Ah, how hard it 
is to tell/ what that wood was, wild, rugged, harsh;/ the very thought 
of it renews the fear.”15
14 The line in King Lear reads: “This cold night will turn us all to fools and 
madmen” (III, iv).
15 Dante’s Italian text reads: “Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita/ mi ritrovai 
per una selva oscura,/ che la diritta via era smarrita./ Ahi quanto a dir qual 
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“The straight way was lost.” Turgenev, like Dante and Shakespeare, signals 
the true path, but the night ends tragically for Teglyov. As for Ridel, 
the moment of epiphany, his feelings of “repentance” in the fog, are 
not accompanied either at the time of the event or later by any sense 
of shame or soul-searching. At the end of his tale, he fails to draw any 
conclusions about his own role in Teglyov’s tragedy or to reflect on the 
moral-philosophical implications of the events. He remembers meeting 
the doctor with whom Teglyov conferred in St. Petersburg at the time 
of Masha’s death. The doctor recalls his conversation with Teglyov:
That gentleman came to see me—that was the first time I ever 
saw him—and began insisting that that girl had poisoned herself. 
“Cholera,” I said. “Poison,” he said. “No,” I said, “it was cholera.” 
“Oh, no,” he said, “it was poison.” I could see that the man was 
behaving like a lunatic. He had a broad back to his head, which 
meant that he was a stubborn fellow. Kept pestering me. “It’s all 
the same (vse ravno),” I thought, “after all, the subject’s dead.” 
“Well,” I said, “she poisoned herself, if that makes you happy.” 
He thanked me, even shook hands—and disappeared.
The doctor, in short, also lets go of Teglyov’s hand, that is, lets 
Teglyov hold on to his delusions. “‘It’s all the same’ (vse ravno), 
I thought, ‘after all, the subject’s dead.’” Of course, everything is not “all 
the same.” Actions and attitudes, even trivial ones, have consequences, 
often quite unanticipated ones. In this case, the doctor’s indifferent 
acquiescence to Teglyov’s delusions about the nature of Masha’s death, 
provides further motivation for Teglyov to commit suicide.
Ridel tells the doctor that Teglyov shot himself that same day. 
“The doctor didn’t turn a hair, merely observing that there were all 
sorts of eccentrics (chudaki) in the world. ‘So there are,’ I agreed.” The 
narrator Ridel, years later, still echoes the doctor in assessing Teglyov’s 
action as that of an eccentric.
era è cosa dura/ esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte/ que nel pensier rinova 
la paura!” I use here Charles S. Singleton’s translation in Dante Alighieri, 
The Divine Comedy: Inferno, translated, with a commentary by Charles S. 
Singleton, Bollingen Series 80 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1970), 2–3.
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This theme of the “eccentric” is established in an important 
incident earlier when Ridel is searching for Teglyov in the fog. At one 
point in his search, Ridel encounters a drunken officer who had run 
into Teglyov:
“Did Teglyov say anything to you?” I asked. “Why, of course he 
did! I said to him, ‘Greetings, brother!’ And he to me, ‘Farewell, 
brother!’ Farewell! Why farewell? ‘Because,’ he says, ‘I want to 
shoot myself in a minute with this pistol.’ ‘An eccentric!’ My 
breath [Ridel recalls] failed me. “You say, he told you . . . ‘An 
eccentric!’” the officer repeated, and staggered off.
“An eccentric,” says the doctor; “an eccentric,” says the officer 
in the fog; “an eccentric,” agrees Ridel. An eccentric in the popular 
conception is an accidental case, a person who does not fit the norm, 
a person for whom one is presumably not responsible.
In the last line of his story, Ridel remarks apropos of eccentrics: 
“Yes, someone has said truly about suicides: when they do not carry 
out their intention, no one believes them; when they do, no one is sorry 
for them.” This observation, of course, is wholly consistent with Ridel’s 
attitude toward Teglyov.
In contrast to Ridel, Teglyov emerges as a human being for 
whom, in spite of his eccentricities, one can feel compassion. Teglyov, 
it is noteworthy, “did not let a single beggar pass without giving 
alms.” Behind the facade of this “fatal,” self-important, posturing little 
man we see a troubled and insecure person, an orphan who craved 
affection, a man who was incapable of creating any friendships or 
lasting relationships, an individual whose veiled threats and warnings 
about suicide, though preposterous to the casual Ridel, conceal a plea 
for help. This caricature of a little Napoleon is constantly complaining 
that “fate has persecuted him.” He is forever seeking to prove himself, 
to demonstrate his self-determination and self-mastery, to take his 
fate into his own hands—something he does, finally, when he shoots 
himself.
Yet whatever else one can say about Teglyov, one cannot deny 
that he is a man of feeling. The strange pathos of this half-Gogolian, 
half-Dostoevskian “little man” emerges in the final sealed letter he 
writes just before his suicide to “the important personage who had 
at that time been commanding the whole corps of guards.” Teglyov 
writes how he is about to appear “before our universal, incorruptible, 
noble-minded Judge, before the Supreme Being, before a Being who 
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is of infinitely greater importance than even your Excellency, and 
I will appear before Him without formality, in my greatcoat and even 
without a cravat round my neck.” This last phrase, Ridel remarks, 
created “a painful and unpleasant impression” on him. Ridel rightly 
observes that Teglyov had used “all the accumulated epithets and 
amplifications à la Marlinsky that were fashionable at that time.” He 
finds the letter “rather vulgar,” but fails to respond completely to 
the letter’s pathos. “He [Teglyov] went on to mention his ‘fate,’ his 
persecution, his vocation which remained unfulfilled, a mystery which 
he would take to his grave with him.”
Forty years later, Ridel patronizingly imagines the “disdainful 
look of perplexity of the high personage to whom [Teglyov’s letter] 
was addressed; I can imagine the tone of voice in which he uttered the 
words, ‘A worthless officer! Clear the weeds out of the field!’” It was 
only at the very end of the letter that a sincere cry escaped Teglyov’s 
heart. “Oh, your Excellency I am an orphan. I had no one to love since 
I was a child and everyone shunned me and I myself destroyed the only 
heart which gave itself to me!” The pathos of Teglyov is Dostoevskian. 
Teglyov, without question, is an “eccentric,” but an eccentric with 
a soul.
Whatever Teglyov’s confusions, delusions, and posturings, he 
was not indifferent like Ridel; he did not, like Ridel, act as though 
“nothing makes any difference (vse ravno).” He did not look upon 
himself or others with a soulless realism. He was not, in Lermontov’s 
phrase, “shamefully indifferent to good and evil.” He believed in love, 
and in part at least, dies because of it; although “fainthearted,” Teglyov’s 
servant insists, Teglyov “loves [Masha] too much.” He not only feels 
guilt, but experiences shame—something that cannot be said of Ridel. 
Teglyov’s model of the world, though a romantic construct, has a mo- 
ral core. In contrast, Ridel’s rationalistic model signals an essentially 
meaningless universe, a world in which man is disconnected from 
nature and his fellow man. Teglyov, for his part, believes, albeit naïvely 
and primitively, in some kind of epic unity between man and nature, 
the individual and the happenings around him. “In a word, Teglyov 
believed . . . in the significance of life.”16 He is a descendent, and at the 
16 Of interest here is Turgenev’s remark to E. E. Lambert in a letter of December 
12, 1859: “I recall how in my youth I wanted every moment of my life to 
be significant… A bold and hardly innocent longing!” (PSS, Pis’ma 3:386). 
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same time, a parody of those people of the past about whom Pechorin 
speaks in Lermontov’s “Fatalist”: “What strength of will made them 
confident that the entire sky with its innumerable inhabitants was 
looking upon them with at least mute, but still unchanging sympathy.”
“Knock… Knock… Knock!..” is a story about two characters, 
Teglyov and Ridel. It is a story about the 1830s and the 1870s. Both 
men constitute a kind of unity of opposites. One invests reality with 
mysterious “significance” and “fatality,” the other ignores or negates the 
role of unpredictable and arbitrary forces on the life of the individual. 
The outlooks of both men lead to a renunciation of responsibility. 
Teglyov’s deep guilt, anguish, and suffering indicate, however, that 
human nature does not necessarily follow the prescriptions of ideology. 
Similarly, for all Ridel’s failure to take stock of himself and to inquire 
into the real issues surrounding Teglyov’s tragedy, we recognize in 
him not only moments of real, if incompletely realized, friendship 
and concern, but a lingering and troubled feeling of guilt. His tale, 
in the final analysis, is but the surfacing of a festering memory, an 
indirect acknowledgment of guilt and responsibility, in short, a kind of 
unconscious confession. Ridel’s tale is not overtly a mea culpa. The tale 
is evasive. Yet here, narrative itself is confession.
The moral axis of the story is a double one involving a juxtaposition 
of Teglyov’s relation to Masha, on the one hand, with Ridel’s relation 
to Teglyov, on the other. Teglyov’s moral failure with Masha, a woman 
whom he loved but failed to marry as he had promised, contrasts with 
Ridel’s relation to Teglyov, a man about whom he speaks warmly, but 
toward whom he behaves indifferently. Teglyov’s moral failure in his 
relations with Masha fills him with guilt and remorse; it distresses him 
to the point of delusions and leads him finally to his poignant, albeit 
grotesque, confession: “I myself destroyed the only heart that gave itself 
to me.” Teglyov’s suicide is a form of self-punishment. Moral failure 
Turgenev certainly respected this youthful longing. In Fathers and Children, 
Arkady murmurs “thoughtfully” at one point: “One should structure life so 
that every moment is significant.” The youthful longing to give significance 
to every moment is rooted, perhaps, in man’s earliest—and indeed naïve—
efforts to give meaning to his life and to the unknown world that surrounded 
him. Teglyov’s nature with its belief in the occult would seem to reflect, as in 
a crooked mirror, that “naïve” moment in humanity—a moment, however, 
that Turgenev sees repeating itself in the hubris of nineteenth century 
reason and science.
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in Ridel’s case is not accompanied by conscious remorse or any overt 
expression of guilt. He suppresses his awareness of the consequences 
of his actions. Ridel, forty years later, is still unable forthrightly to 
assess and judge his behavior toward Teglyov. Yet moral truth forces 
its way to the surface in the veiled form of a story directed, as in the 
case of Teglyov’s letter, at an audience.
6
At the end of his tale, after clearing up some of the mysteries of the 
last twenty-four hours of Teglyov’s life, including the question of the 
identity of the mysterious “Iliusha,” Ridel remarks, “So that’s who 
‘Iliusha’ was, I thought, sinking into philosophical speculations which, 
however, I will not impose on you [his circle of listeners] because I do 
not want to prevent anyone from believing in fate, predestination and 
other fatalities.”
Ridel patronizingly does not consider the issues raised by his 
story to be deserving of further reflection on the part of sober-minded 
people. He considers it superfluous to share his “philosophical 
speculations” with the reader. His stance is clear. The conclusions are 
self-evident to him. He has told a tale about a ridiculous past when 
people believed in preposterous things like predestination and even 
the supernatural. No sensible person, he seems to suggest, can view 
the issues as other than settled. Yet the moral-philosophical issues 
of the story have not been settled on the surface plane of Ridel’s 
storytelling.
Entirely different is the case with Turgenev, the real author of the 
story. Here, too, there are no philosophical speculations in the sense that 
we are accustomed to find them in Tolstoy or Dostoevsky. Yet Turgenev’s 
literary text is a masterpiece of indirect moral and philosophical 
discourse. Turgenev’s art, rivaling that of his great master Pushkin, 
lies in his ability to be philosophical without philosophizing, that is, 
to embed philosophy in language and image, in the juxtaposition of 
materials, in the interplay of character and situation. It is through these 
means that he solves the riddle of Ridel (the narrator’s name itself is 
a piece of ironic word play on the part of Turgenev) and deconstructs 
Ridel’s text. Ridel’s unconscious subtext is Turgenev’s most important 
artistic text.
Turgenev places man in an unknown and unsettling universe: 
he posits a world, as we have suggested at the outset of the discussion, 
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in which chance is ever-present, one that will not submit to exact 
control or absolute computation. Yet he does not posit a world in 
which man is completely at the mercy of chance or fate. Turgenev is 
close in his outlook to Ralph Waldo Emerson on the question of fate. 
“For if Fate is so prevailing,” Emerson wrote, “man is also part of 
it, and can confront fate with fate . . . If there be omnipotence in the 
stroke, there is omnipotence of recoil.” But Emerson adds, “Fate is 
only parrying and defense: there are also the noble creative forces.”17 
These words could serve to define Turgenev’s outlook in “Knock… 
Knock… Knock!..” Man’s exercise of his freedom, he suggests in his 
story, is maximally effective and responsible only when he is fully 
cognizant of the permanently uncertain and problematic character 
of nature and reality, only when he acknowledges the permanent fog 
that defies any absolute naming or prediction of reality, personal or 
historical.
Man attains the greatest maturity, however, only when he gives 
expression to those “noble creative forces” chief among which are love 
and compassion, that is, only when he recognizes that he is, indeed, 
his brother’s keeper, that he is morally and spiritually free to strive for 
ethical truth. Both Teglyov and Ridel, each in their own way, are far 
from these goals. Like the rest of mankind, they are stumbling about 
not far from home. “We turned back again . . . Fields, fields, endless 
fields . . . I nearly cried . . . ,” Ridel recalls. But as he rightly says at one 
point—and we may interpret his words figuratively as well as literally, 
“It’s true that there’s such a fog outside that it’s impossible to make 
anything out a few yards ahead, but all the same (vse ravno), we must 
make an effort.” This vse ravno unlike the earlier vse ravno—mne ne 
spalos’ (Anyway, I could not sleep), one that serves as a rationalization 
for caprice, contains a margin of hope; this “all the same we must make 
an effort” is Turgenev’s message to man lost in the fog.
7
In her memoirs, Lydia Chukovskaya recalls a conversation in which 
the Russian poet Anna Akhmatova (1889–1966) gave expression to 
her literary likes and dislikes. After praising the nineteenth-century 
17 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Fate,” in Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. 
Stephen E. Whicher (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 340–341.
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Russian writers, M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin and Alexander Herzen, 
Akhmatova adds:
“Yet there are inflated reputations, Turgenev’s reputation, for 
example” (I am ecstatic [writes Chukovskaya parenthetically] 
over our shared dislike). “How badly he wrote! How badly! Do 
you remember ‘Knock… Knock… Knock!..’? Dostoevsky was 
right: merci through and through. And with what aristocratic 
disdain (I kak po-barski) he depicts people: superficially, 
contemptuously.”18
Akhmatova’s judgment of Turgenev’s story is superficial and 
badly flawed. One thing is clear: she, like M. P. Alekseev, confuses the 
narrator, Ridel, with Turgenev. In so doing, she reduces Turgenev’s 
complex tale to a monological text. “They are accustomed to seeing the 
mug of the author in everything, but I didn’t show mine,” Dostoevsky 
wrote to his brother Mikhail, February 1, 1846, apropos of his hero 
Devushkin in his first novel Poor Folk. The artist Turgenev might have 
said the same of Ridel in his story.
With respect to reading Turgenev, the Russian critic Sergey An-
dreevsky observed at the turn of the nineteenth century:
Only after pondering every epithet chosen by Turgenev, every 
color laid down by him, every thought expressed by him will 
you uncover all the secret wealth of that devilishly light and 
musical prose—a prose resembling the verse of Pushkin the 
profound inner content of which only an extremely few people 
were able to disclose, and then at a very late date. [The poet E. A.] 
Baratynsky (1800–1844), after going through Pushkin’s papers 
after the death of the poet, was first to note in a letter to one 
of his friends: “Do you have any idea what amazes me most of 
all in all these poems? The abundance of thoughts! Pushkin— 
a thinker! Could one have expected this?!” Precisely the same 
could be said of Turgenev and his elusively delicate and airy way 
of expressing himself.
[Tol’ko togda, vdumyvaias’ v kazhdyi izbrannyi im epitet, v 
kazhduiu polozhennuiu im krasku, v kazhduiu vyskazannuiu 
18 Lidiia K. Chukovskaia, Zapiski ob Anne Akhmatovoi, 1 (Paris: YMCA Press, 
1975), 23–24.
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im mysl’, vy raskroete vse tainye bogatstva etoi predatel’ski-
legkoi i muzykal’noi prozy, podobnoi stikham Pushkina, v 
kotorykh lish’ ves’ma pozdno i ves’ma nemnogie sumeli raskryt’ 
glubochaishee vnutrennee soderzhanie. Baratynskii, razbiravshii 
bumagi Pushkina, uzhe posle ego smerti, v pis’me k odnomu iz 
svoikh priiatelei, pervyi skazal: “Mozhesh’ ty sebe predstavit’, 
chto menia bol’she vsego izumliaet vo vsekh etikh poemakh? 
Obilie myslei! Pushkin myslitel’! Mozho li bylo ozhidat’?” Takov 
zhe tochno i Turgenev s ego mnimym-delikatnym i vozdushnym 
izlozheniem.]19
19 A. A. Andreevskii, “Turgenev: Ego individual’nost’ i poeziia,” Literaturnye 
ocherki (St. Petersburg, 1902); quoted in Sobranie kriticheskikh materialov 
dlia izucheniia Turgeneva, ed. V. Zelinskii (Moscow, 1910), 124. Andreevsky 
inaccurately cites Baratynsky’s remark—possibly drawing from an 
imperfect version of the letter first published in 1869. Baratynsky writes to 
A. L. Baratynskaya in February 1840, “Can you imagine what distinguishes 
all [Pushkin’s] last plays? Power and depth! He was just coming into his 
own” (Vse poslednie p’esy ego otlichaiutsia, chem by ty dumala? Siloiu i glubinoiu! 
On tol’ko chto sozreval). See Geir Kjetsaa’s selection of and commentary on 
Baratynsky’s letters in his study Evgenii Baratynskii. Zhizn’ i tvorchestvo (Oslo-
Bergen-Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), 623. In his speech on unveiling 
of Pushkin’s memorial in 1880, Turgenev quotes Baratynsky’s lines on 
Pushkin, also inaccurately. See “Rech’ po povodu otkrytiia pamiatnika 
A. S. Pushkinu v Moskve,” PSS, 15:72. 
Polina and Lady Luck in Dostoevsky’s the Gambler1
Lucky in cards, unlucky in love.
—English saying
In a letter written to the literary critic and philosopher Nikolai N. 
Strakhov (1828–1898) from Rome in September 1863, Dostoevsky 
projected the idea of a story that was to evolve later into the novel, The 
Gambler (From the Notes of a Young Man) (1866). The story, he wrote, 
would reflect the “contemporary moment (as far as possible, of course) 
of our inner life.” The central character would be “a certain type of 
Russian abroad”:
I take a straightforward nature, a man, however, well-educa- 
ted, but in all respects immature, who has lost his faith and not 
daring not to believe, rebels against the authorities and fears them. 
He sets his mind at rest with the thought that he has nothing to 
do in Russia and hence the bitter criticism of people in Russia 
who summon back our Russians living abroad . . . He’s a live 
character . . . The main thing is that all his living juices, forces, 
impetuosity, daring have gone into roulette. He is a gambler, and 
not a mere gambler, just as [Alexander] Pushkin’s miserly knight 
is not a simple miser . . . He is a poet in his own way, but the point 
is that he himself is ashamed of this poetry, because he deeply 
feels its baseness, although the need for risk also ennobles him 
in his own eyes . . . If [Notes from the] House of the Dead drew the 
attention of the public as a depiction of the convicts whom no-
body up to then had depicted graphically, then this story without 
1 From Robert Louis Jackson, The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and Nocturnes 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 208-236.
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fail will attract attention as a GRAPHIC and detailed depiction 
of the game of roulette.2 
Dostoevsky’s comparison of this story with his Notes from 
theHouse of the Dead is of particular interest. The link between The 
Gambler and the earlier work goes beyond the fact that both works 
provide engaging descriptions of novel institutions: the worlds of the 
prison and the gambling house. In his letter to Strakhov, Dostoevsky 
hints at a deeper relationship between these two institutions, or in any 
case, between the people who inhabit them. “The piece perhaps is not 
at all bad. After all, Notes from the House of the Dead was of real interest. 
And this is a description of a special kind of hell, a special kind of 
prison ‘bath.’”3
The allusion to the world of the gambler as a kind of hell points 
to the basic metaphysical similarity in the situations of the convict and 
the gambler: both are prisoners in what appears to be an enclosed fate-
bound universe. But whereas the convict lives in a prison world not of 
his own choice, a world from which, moreover, there is really no way 
out, the gambler lives in a dead house, or underground, of his own 
making. In the gambler’s world, everybody is possessed by the illusion 
of freedom, but nobody is really free. Through chance, risk, the turn of 
the wheel, the gambler challenges fate and seeks to escape its tyranny. 
Alternatives are offered to Dostoevsky’s gambler, Aleksey Ivanovich, 
in his friend Polina, and in lady luck. But in the end, he condemns 
himself to hurling himself eternally against the walls of his universe. 
He becomes an inveterate gambler, doomed to permanent unfreedom 
and to an endless process of trying to change his lot.
The tragedy of the gambler in Dostoevsky’s view is that of a man 
who has uprooted himself from his nation and people and who has 
lost faith in God. “The cause of evil . . . is lack of faith,” Dostoevsky 
insisted in a letter to A. F. Blagonravov on December 19, 1880, and “he 
2 Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v tridtsati tomakh, 30 vols. (Leningrad: 
Nauka, 1972-1990), 28(2): 51. Henceforth this edition will be referred to as 
“PSS.” Volumes 28, 29, and 30 of this 30 volume edition are divided each 
into two separate books. Future footnotes to these particular volumes will 
indicate, as above, first the volume number, then the book number, 1 or 2, 
in parentheses, and finally the page number. 
3 Ibid.
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who negates the folk element also negates faith.”4 The gambler finds 
a surrogate father or mother in fate, chance, luck. Yet the abandonment 
of self to fate is an unmitigated moral and spiritual disaster 
for man.
The amoral character of gambling is posited by Dostoevsky 
on three levels. First, gambling is directly equated with the capitalist 
market. “Why,” asks Aleksey, “should gambling be worse than other 
means of making money—for instance, commerce?” Everything is 
relative, a “matter of proportion. What is a trifle to Rothschild is really 
wealth to me, and as for profits and winnings, people everywhere, 
and not only at roulette, are doing nothing but gaining or taking away 
something from each other. Whether profits and gain are vile is another 
question. But I’m not trying to resolve it here.”
Gambling is evil, in the second sense, in that it awakens predatory 
instincts, chiefly greed and the desire for power. The casino strikes 
Aleksey as “dirty, somehow morally disgusting and dirty.” He notes 
the greedy faces around him. But since he himself was “overcome by 
the desire for gain, all this covetousness, and all this covetous filth, if 
you like, were in a sense natural and congenial to me as soon as I en- 
tered the hall.”
Yet the ultimate evil that preoccupies Dostoevsky in gambling 
is the evil that is immanent, psychologically speaking, in the gambling 
itself. The very act of gambling becomes a conscious or unconscious 
affirmation of the meaninglessness of the universe, the emptiness of all 
human choice. “All’s nonsense on earth!” declares one of the seconds 
before Pechorin kills Grushnitsky in a duel in Lermontov’s A Hero of Our 
Time (1840). “Nature is a ninny, fate is a henny and life is a penny.”5 The 
gambler is a fatalist. Moreover, he challenges the very fate he affirms 
and seeks to find out if he is favored or unfavored by it. The game, the 
gamble, the risk itself is by its very nature a dangerous inquiry into the 
sources of power and an arrogant form of self-assertion; making chance 
king, the gambler in essence strives to become the king of chance.
4 PSS, 30(1):236. 
5 The Russian reads: “Natura—dura, sud’ba—indeika, a zhizn’—kopeika.” 
(Nature is a fool, fate—a turkey [hen], and life—a kopeck.” Vladimir 
Nabokov’s translation. See A Hero of Our Time. A Novel by Mikhail 
Lermontov, trans. Vladimir Nabokov in collaboration with Dmitri Nabokov 
(Garden City: 1958), 169.
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The moral correlative of the belief that everything is possible is 
that all is permissible. Not without reason does the folk language of 
the market speak of “making a killing.” Dostoevsky’s gambler speaks 
of his “hidden moral convictions,” but insists that in the gambling 
halls “there is no place for them.” “I notice one thing that of late it 
has become repugnant for me to test my thoughts and actions by any 
moral standards whatsoever. I was guided by something else.” That 
something else is fate.
1
The action of The Gambler takes place in a kind of no man’s land or hell, 
Roulettenburg.6 As the fictitious name suggests, the city is nowhere or 
anywhere in Europe. The mixed French and German components of the 
name suggest the illegitimate and rootless character of the place. This 
is the land of Babel, a place without a national language or culture. The 
gambling salon, the heart of Roulettenburg, is situated, symbolically, 
in a railway station where people are coming and going, where all 
is in continuous movement. Everything is in flux in this city: people, 
languages, currencies, values.
Roulettenburg is the classical city of capitalism: the market is 
supreme and everyone is engaged in accumulation. Everyone risks 
money to make money, and what he wins or loses wipes out what he 
has staked; there are no absolute values, material or moral; everything 
is relative and changing. Even people, like stakes at the table, move 
upward or downward in the eyes of other people according to the 
value judgment of the roulette wheel. Nowhere is the “cash nexus” 
that Marx discovered in human relations and affairs in bourgeois 
society more nakedly visible than in Roulettenburg. Aleksey hopes to 
redeem himself in the eyes of Polina by winning at roulette. “Money 
is everything,” he declares. “It’s nothing more than that with money 
I shall be a different person to you, not a slave.” He is convinced that 
Polina despises him, sees him as a “cipher” and a “zero.” To “rise 
from the dead” to him means to become a millionaire and to reverse 
6 Dostoevsky originally entitled his novel “Roulettenburg,” but his publisher 
insisted on a more Russian title “for the public.” He reluctantly changed 
the title to The Gambler. See PSS, 29(1):213. In a legal contract signed in 1874, 
however, Dostoevsky still referred to his novel as “Roulettenburg.” 
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the slave-master relationship that he feels exists between Polina 
and him.
There are no permanent plateaus in social or psychological 
status in Roulettenburg, however. There are no social realities that are 
not subject to change. Nothing is what it seems. General Zagoryansky, 
considered by everybody an extremely wealthy magnate, is in fact not 
a magnate at all; he is a pompous muddled man who dyes his beard 
and moustache and is heavily in debt. The Marquis de Grieux is not 
a marquis, but an imposter. Madame Blanche de Cominges is not 
a respectable woman, but a courtesan masquerading as a de Cominges. 
Polina’s Russian name is Praskovya, but she uses the Latinized form of 
her name. The inner Praskovya is not quite the same as the outer Polina. 
She has been in love with the Marquis de Grieux, but has taken his 
outer refined form for his inner soul. Aleksey sees through de Grieux, 
but takes Polina for somebody else.
At the outset, Aleksey seems to be an objective and trustworthy 
observer of this strange world. The prestige of the narrative voice is 
overwhelming and, initially, we accept his version of Polina as cruel 
and manipulative and of himself as a jilted lover. But our confidence is 
misplaced. Midway in his notes, he remarks upon the “whirl” that has 
caught him up and suggests what we have already begun to suspect—
that his view of things, people, and events, has not been lucid or 
wholly rational: “Wasn’t I really out of my mind last month, and wasn’t 
I sitting all that time in a madhouse somewhere, and am I not still there 
perhaps—so that it only seems to me to have happened, and still only 
seems so?” The whirl of events, at the center of which, both figuratively 
and literally, is the whirling roulette wheel, has jolted him “out of all 
sense of proportion and feeling for measure,” and sent him “spinning, 
spinning, spinning.” Nothing is what it seems in Roulettenburg. All is 
deception.
Roulettenburg lies in the shadow of Schlangenberg, that is, “Snake 
Mountain,” the highest elevation in the area. The ominous allusions of 
the mountain’s name are not out of place. The city, in the symbolism 
of the novel, is in the power of the devil: people have lost their moral 
and spiritual freedom here. Belief in fate has replaced belief in God, 
and people are continually yielding to temptation in their pursuit of 
gold. Furthermore, Dostoevsky identifies the act of gambling or risk 
with a suicidal leap or “plunge.” In Notes from the House of the Dead, he 
speaks of the murderer’s feverish delirium and enjoyment of the “most 
unbridled and limitless freedom.” He adds, significantly, that all this 
50 Fate, Freedom, and Responsibility
is “perhaps similar to the sensation of a man who gazes down from 
a high tower into the depths below until finally he would be glad to hurl 
himself headlong down, as soon as possible, anything to put an end to it 
all!” In his delirium, in his craving for risk, the gambler, like the raging 
murderer or rebellious convict challenging their fate-bound universe, 
is overcome by the same passion for the abyss. At the gambling tables, 
Aleksey experiences an “instant of suspense, perhaps, sensation for 
sensation similar to that experienced by Madame Blanchard in Paris 
when she plunged to the earth from the balloon.” He offers to leap off 
the Schlangenberg, a one-thousand-foot drop, if Polina but gives the 
word. “Someday I will pronounce that word,” she remarks, “if only to 
see how you will pay up.”
She tests him later when she suggests that he publicly insult 
the Baron and Baroness Wurmerhelm, an act that for Aleksey is 
psychologically analogous to leaping off the Schlangenberg: “You 
swore that you would leap off the Schlangenberg; you swear that 
you are ready to murder if I order it. Instead of all these murders 
and tragedies I want only to laugh.” Aleksey accepts her “challenge” 
and agrees to carry out that “crazy fancy.” “Madame la baronne,” 
he exclaims in the confrontation scene, “j’ai I’honneur d’être votre 
esclave.” “The devil knows what urged me on?” Aleksey writes of 
this incident. “It was as though I were flying down from a mountain.” 
“I can’t understand what has happened to me,” Aleksey writes again in 
imagery that recalls the convict or murderer who runs amok, “whether 
I am really in a frenzied state or simply have bolted from the road and 
am carrying on in a vile way until I am tied up. Sometimes it seems to 
me that my mind is disturbed.”
Aleksey’s reference to the devil (he is mentioned a number of 
times in The Gambler) is not without deeper significance in the novel’s 
symbolic religious-philosophical context. The devil, indeed, may be 
said to have prompted Aleksey to abandon all sense of measure and 
control and make his leap into the abyss, his irrational underground 
challenge to fate. Later, he suggests, significantly, that he committed his 
capricious act out of “despair.”
The deeper meaning of this episode may be illuminated in part by 
reference to the second temptation of Jesus in the legend of the Grand 
Inquisitor. The devil suggests that Jesus cast himself down from the 
pinnacle of the temple to prove that he is the son of God, “because it is 
said that the angels would take hold and lift him up and he would not 
fall and hurt himself.” But Jesus refuses to prove his faith in this way, 
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and thus buy men’s allegiance. “O, Thou didst know then,” declares the 
Grand Inquisitor, “that in taking one step, in making one movement to 
cast Thyself down, Thou wouldst be tempting God and have lost all 
thy faith in Him and wouldst have been dashed to pieces against the 
earth which Thou didst come to save.” But the Grand Inquisitor insists 
that there are not many like Jesus. “And couldst Thou believe for one 
moment that men, too, could face such a temptation?” In refusing to 
leap, in refusing to tempt God and buy men’s faith with miracle, Jesus 
affirms the “free decision of the heart,” the principle of freedom that 
Dostoevsky found at the core of Christian faith.
Aleksey stands in relation to Polina as Jesus to the devil. Yet 
Aleksey fails the test that Jesus passes. “The devil knows what urged 
me on?” he wonders apropos of his irrational underground behavior 
in the confrontation scene with the baron and baroness. Polina, like the 
devil in the “legend,” certainly plays the role of temptress. Even if we 
assume (as does the Englishman Astley who may, indeed, reflect Polina’s 
view) that she does not anticipate that Aleksey will “literally carry 
out her jesting wish,” her suggestion nonetheless has the character of 
a challenge, and Aleksey is put to the test. But while Polina may be the 
devil’s advocate, the ultimate responsibility rests with Aleksey. He asks 
his deity, his devil, to tempt him; and when she gives the command, 
he leaps—and falls. Aleksey’s leap symbolizes his renunciation of 
free will. It is an act of despair that is comparable in its psychological 
and philosophical content to the Underground Man’s ir rational revolt 
against his “twice two is four” universe. It is an indication of his loss of 
faith in God, and therefore, in a universe in which man is free to choose 
between good and evil.
In a conversation with his employer, General Zagoryansky, who 
is outraged by Aleksey’s behavior toward the baron and baroness, 
Aleksey bridles at the idea that he is answerable in his conduct to the 
general, “I only wish to clear up the insulting suggestion that I am 
under the tutelage of a person who supposedly has authority over my 
free will.” The irony of Aleksey’s remark (and Dostoevsky’s intent is 
quite clear) is that he is lacking precisely in free will; in all his acts and 
behavior, he is caught up in an underground syndrome of negation 
and self-negation. His remark to the general signals indirectly his 
psychological dilemma: his subservience to Polina, and at the same 
time, his resentment over that state. “Please observe that I don’t speak 
of my slavery because I wish to be your slave,” he remarks to her, 
“but simply speak of it as a fact that doesn’t depend upon me at all.” 
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Aleksey relates to Polina in the same rebellious yet rationalizing way 
that the Underground Man relates to the laws of nature that have been 
humiliating him.
As the English critic D. S. Savage has observed, Aleksey “invests 
Polina with an authority which he refuses to invest in God. Polina must 
become God in relation to him or he must become God in relation 
to Polina—and God is the fatal demiurge of cosmic Necessity.”7 We 
need only add that this god, in Dostoevsky’s view, is not the God 
of Christianity, but the devil. And in fact, Polina has become for 
Aleksey the surrogate for an implacable deterministic fate and as such 
arouses in him the opposing feelings of love and hate, adoration and 
revenge. Aleksey is a person who has forfeited his freedom to fate, 
and his underground relationship with Polina defines that disaster. 
His symbolic leap from Schlangenberg anticipates his leap at the 
gambling tables, his transformation into a compulsive gambler and 
convinced fatalist. At the end of his notes, the penniless gambler, who 
has renounced “every goal in life excepting winning at roulette,” has 
driven even his memories from his head. He insists, “I shall rise from 
the dead.” But there can be no future without a past. And just as Polina 
is not the devil—that is Aleksey’s illusion—so Aleksey has no hope of 
salvation. He will never, like Jesus, “rise from the dead.” He will never 
escape the tyranny of his self-created dead universe.
2
“Polina Aleksandrovna, on seeing me, asked why I had been so long, 
and without waiting for an answer went off somewhere. Of course, she 
did this deliberately,” remarks Aleksey at the end of the first paragraph 
of the novel. “All the same, we must have an explanation. A lot of things 
have accumulated.” The movement of The Gambler, on levels of plot, 
theme, character, and psychology, takes the reader from accumulated 
mystery and complication (“a lot of things have accumulated”) 
through tension and expectation to release and disclosure. The center 
of everyone’s concern is the accumulation of money.
At the outset of the novel, everyone in General Zagoryansky’s 
“retinue”—Polina, the Marquis de Grieux, Blanche de Cominges, 
7 D. S. Savage, “Dostoevski: The Idea of The Gambler,” in The Sewanee Review 
58 (1950): 296.
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and others—is waiting “in expectation” for news of the death of 
“Grandmamma” in Moscow and of a windfall legacy. Grandmamma 
arrives in place of the anticipated telegram, however, and loses huge 
sums of money at roulette, but she leaves the gambling tables at last 
and returns to Moscow. Zagoryansky’s little retinue then begins to 
disintegrate. Blanche, who had been pre paring to marry into a fortune, 
abandons the general and attaches herself to Aleksey who has made 
colossal winnings at the tables. The Marquis de Grieux, who had been 
anticipating Polina’s legacy and had hoped to get back money he 
loaned to the general, deserts her. Polina, ill, goes off with the family 
of the Englishman Astley to live in the north of England. And the now 
confirmed gambler Aleksey, after a period of dissipation in Paris with 
Blanche and a “number of absurd blows of fate,” finds himself back at 
zero, dreaming of rising from the dead “tomorrow”: “Let Polina know 
that I can still be a man.”
Grandmamma is the structural and ideological center of The 
Gambler. She appears on the scene in the ninth chapter—the exact center 
of the novel—and dominates everybody around her. Like the roulette 
wheel, she is the center of attention of the main characters in the general’s 
retinue, from the beginning to the end of the novel. All are gambling, 
as it were, on her death, hoping to resurrect their flagging fortunes. 
“Il a du chance,” Blanche remarks apropos of the general toward the end 
of the novel. “Grandmamma is now really quite ill and will certainly 
die.” Fate and death are joined in everybody’s aspirations. The idea of 
hope in death in the fate-ruled universe of Roulettenburg parodies, of 
course, the truth of death and resurrection in Dostoevsky’s Christian 
universe. But there is no resurrection for anybody in Roulettenburg; 
there is only moral and spiritual death, immersion in the river of Lethe 
where all memories are washed away.
Grandmamma is the only person in the novel who, figuratively 
speaking, rises from the dead. Her unexpected appearance on the 
scene, alive, foreshadows her ultimate escape from Roulettenburg and 
its moral and spiritual chaos. A dominating, imperial figure to all, she is 
humbled, finally, in her willful attempt to conquer fate at the gambling 
tables. “Truly,” she remarks, “God seeks out and punishes pride even in 
the old.” But in her naïve, simple, and earthy Russian way, she survives 
the storm of gambling pas sions, masters her own fate, and returns to 
Russia, where, significantly, she vows to carry out a promise she had 
made—to build a church. Like nature, she is full of excess, but also full 
of the powers of restoration. Grandmamma is, for Dostoevsky, both 
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symbol and embodiment of Russia’s wild abundance, its “breadth,” 
and at the same time, its rootedness and residual spiritual health.
The relationship between Aleksey and Polina forms the axis of 
the novel. The work begins with the enigma of their relationship and 
ends with its clarification. Their lives are complex and portrayed in 
a moment of crisis and transformation. At the outset of the novel, the 
two characters are enigmas not only to the reader but to each other. 
Aleksey is continually puzzled by Polina’s personality and behavior 
toward him: “Polina has always been an enigma to me.” In turn, Polina’s 
repeated questioning glances at Aleksey point to her deep puzzlement 
over his character and motivations as they pertain to her. In a certain 
sense, Aleksey speaks for both of them when he confesses that “there 
was scarcely anything precise and definite” that he could say about his 
relations with her. The reader who turns to The Gambler for the first time 
would certainly share Aleksey’s view of the relationship as “strange” 
and “incomprehensible.” Yet there is no confusion in Dostoevsky’s 
understanding of his characters.
At the outset of the story, Aleksey and Polina face remarkably 
similar situations and relate to each other in quite similar ways. Both 
are in a state of dependency in the retinue of General Zagoryansky; 
both are in need of money, though for different reasons; and both 
place their hopes in roulette. Aleksey is hateful to Polina, but she 
needs him and is drawn toward him. Polina is hateful to Aleksey, but 
he is irresistibly drawn toward her and needs her for some deeper 
psychological reasons.
Polina, robbed of monies rightfully hers by her stepfather General 
Zagoryansky, in debt and in some kind of psychological or emotional 
bondage to de Grieux, is in desperate need of money: “I need some 
money at all costs; it must be got; otherwise I am simply lost.” “I place 
almost all hope on roulette,” she remarks pensively at one point. She 
has evidently borrowed some money and wants to return it. Polina’s 
belief that she will win at roulette is linked with her feeling that she 
has “no other choice left.” She wishes to settle accounts, literally and 
figuratively, with de Grieux, a man whom she had loved and idealized, 
but whom “for a long, long time” she has found “detestable.” “Oh, 
he was not the same man before, a thousand times no, but now, but 
now!” she exclaims to Aleksey when she brings him the letter in which 
de Grieux as a parting gesture crudely pays her off, as it were, with 
a 50,000 franc IOU note. Could she have expected any other outcome, 
Aleksey asks. “I expected nothing,” she replies in a quiet but trembling 
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voice. “I made up my mind long ago; I read his mind and knew what 
he was thinking. He thought I would seek . . . that I would insist . . . 
I deliberately redoubled my contempt for him.”
Wounded pride, contempt, and disillusionment (still touched 
by the dying fires of an infatuation) mark Polina’s attitude toward de 
Grieux. Her reliance on roulette derives not only from her objective 
plight, but from the despair of disillusionment. This despair is the 
origin of her need for Aleksey on the deepest level of their relationship. 
“Some time back, really a good two months ago,” Aleksey notes, 
“I began to notice that she wanted to make a friend and confidante 
of me, and to a certain extent really made a try at it. But for some 
reason things never took off with us at that time; in fact, we ended up 
instead with our present strange relations.” In seeking a friend and 
confidante in Aleksey, Polina made a first step toward self-knowledge 
and recovery of her inner freedom. Yet it was not a friend that Aleksey 
sought in Polina. And her cool and at times even cruel behavior toward 
him was in large part a recognition of this, as it was also in part a reflex 
of the resentment and frustration she experienced in her relations with 
another egotist, de Grieux.
Aleksey, like Polina, sees in roulette his “only escape and 
salvation.” For him, as for Polina, winning seems the “only solution.” 
His need for money, too, is linked with a deep feeling of humiliation 
and entrapment. Polina’s relationship toward de Grieux finds a parallel 
in Aleksey’s toward Polina. But his sense of bondage and need for 
liberation has a particularly disturbing character; it points to a profound 
feeling of weakness and inadequacy. He seeks in roulette a “radical and 
decisive change” in his fate. Money for him is not an end in itself, but 
a means. What he seeks in gambling is the restoration of a lost sense 
of being, self-determination, and mastery. Through money, through 
gambling, he imagines he will become a different man to Polina; he will 
no longer be a zero and a slave. Yet it is precisely the craving for power, 
the need to “challenge fate,” that poisons his relationship with Polina.
Dostoevsky, then, emphasizes the similarities in the psychological 
states of Aleksey and Polina. Both find themselves deeply humiliated: 
Polina before de Grieux and Aleksey before Polina and fate over 
which he wishes to triumph. Both are drawn toward each other, but 
the relationship is disfigured by psychological wounds, humiliations, 
and resentments on both sides. The key to a positive relationship lies 
in overcoming wounded pride, self-assertion, and the desire to inflict 
pain. The denouement of the story indicates that Polina is capable of 
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taking this step. Aleksey, however, is doomed forever to remain in his 
underground.
3
It is possible to single out in the first pages of The Gambler Aleksey’s two 
unconsummated passions: the first, his feverish passion for Polina; the 
second, his obsession with roulette (like Hermann in Pushkin’s “Queen 
of Spades,” Aleksey has never gambled before). Put simply, however, 
we might say that Aleksey has an affair with Polina and an affair with 
lady luck. Toward the end of the story both affairs are consummated: 
Aleksey momentarily conquers lady luck in what amounts to an 
orgy at the gambling tables, and he spends a night with Polina. Both 
victories are fleeting, however, and they end in reversal and disaster 
for Aleksey. These two affairs or passions constitute in their interaction 
the psychological drama of Aleksey.
The reader easily distinguishes between Aleksey’s two passions. 
What is far less apparent, initially, is their overlapping character in 
Aleksey’s subconscious, that is, the manner in which Polina is drawn 
into the orbit of Aleksey’s gambling obsession and made to serve as 
a surrogate for the lady luck he seeks to conquer. In a word, the image 
of Polina that emerges in Aleksey’s notes is not merely a biased one; it is, 
as it were, clouded over by somebody else. “When awake we also do as 
we do in our dreams,” remarks Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil, “we 
invent and make up the person with whom we associate—and right 
away forget it.”8 The idea of Polina as a surrogate for an imperious, 
tantalizing, and at the same time, cruelly inaccessible lady luck or fate, 
is broadly hinted at the end of the first chapter in The Gambler. Aleksey 
ruminates on the nature of his feelings for Polina:
And now once more I ask myself the question: do I love her? And 
once more I am not able to answer it, that is, rather, I answered 
once more for the hundredth time that I hated her. Yes, she had 
become hateful to me. There were moments (and precisely at the 
8 “Wir machen es auch im Wachen wie im Träume: wir erfinden und erdichten 
erst den Menschen, mit dem wir verkehren—und vergessen es sofort.” 
Aphorism No. 138, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Friedrich Nietzsche. Werke in 
Zwei Bänden. Auf Grund der dreibändigen Ausgabe von Karl Schlechta 
(Munich: Hanzer, 1967), 2:69 
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end of every one of our conversations) when I would have given 
half my life to strangle her! I swear if it had been possible slowly 
to sink a sharp knife in her breast, I think I would have seized it 
with pleasure. And yet I swear by all that is holy that if on that 
fashionable peak of the Schlangenberg she had indeed said to 
me, “cast yourself down,” I should have done so immediately 
and with pleasure. I know this. One way or another the matter 
must be settled. She understands all this amazingly well, and 
the thought that I am clearly and thoroughly conscious of all 
her inaccessibility to me, of all the impossibility of fulfillment 
of my dreams—this thought, I am sure, gives her the most 
extraordinary pleasure; otherwise, could she, cautious and clever 
as she is, be on such terms of intimacy and frankness with me? 
I think that up to now she has looked upon me in the manner of 
the ancient empress who would disrobe in the presence of her 
slave, not considering him a man . . . 
Aleksey’s psychological portrait of Polina scarcely accords with 
the real Polina. Her efforts, two months earlier, to establish more 
intimate and frank relations with him were certainly not based on 
a desire to humiliate him. She had sought in him a friend and confidante, 
but had found instead a man who neither respected himself nor her, 
who cast himself in the role of an obedient yet deeply resentful slave. 
“I can’t endure that ‘slave’ theory of yours,” she remarks. Aleksey is in 
the grip of an obsession that only nominally involves the real Polina. 
He regards her as inaccessible. She is, of course, not inaccessible to the 
Aleksey she imagines or hopes him to be. But she is certainly inaccessible 
to the Aleksey who cannot relate to her in any other way than that of 
a slave or despot. She certainly finds hateful the vindictive slave who 
sees in her an almost impersonal object of love and hate, an imperious 
ancient empress who has been humiliating him, and whom he must 
vanquish in order to become a different man. That ancient empress 
is not some Cleopatra, but fate—lady luck who flaunts her riches 
before the rabble. Aleksey’s passion for this empress psychologically 
structures and defines his erotic passion for Polina.
Abjectly and resentfully, characteristically in Joban terms, 
Aleksey speaks of his relationship with Polina, “Since I am her slave 
and completely insignificant in her eyes, she feels no offense at my 
coarse curiosity. But the point is that while she permits me to ask 
questions, she does not answer them. At times she doesn’t even take 
notice of them. That’s how things are between us!” That is how things 
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are between the despairing Job and God. But while Job ultimately 
recognizes the true face of God, Aleksey in his spiritual rebellion and 
psychological blindness never really recognizes the real Polina, at least 
not until the fatal resolution of his crisis when it is too late.
The psychological character of Aleksey’s relationship to Polina 
and the ancient empress, fate, may be elucidated against the background 
of Hermann’s relationship to the old countess and her ward Lizaveta in 
Pushkin’s profound and seminal work, “The Queen of Spades” (1833). 
The impact of this work upon The Gambler is at least as deep as it is 
upon Crime and Punishment.9 At the center of Pushkin’s story is an affair 
that Hermann—an ambitious but parsimonious officer who has the 
“soul of a gam bler”—has with a servant girl and with fate. In Pushkin’s 
story, fate is incarnated in the figure of an aged countess (the image of 
a grotesque card queen of spades) who possesses the secret of three 
winning cards. In order to gain entrance to the bedroom quarters of 
the old countess, Hermann strikes up an outwardly passionate, though 
spurious love affair with the countess’s ward, Lizaveta. In a midnight 
encounter with the countess (the result of arranging a rendezvous with 
Lizaveta), Hermann implores her to give him her secret of the winning 
cards, importunes her, waves his pistol before her, but to no avail. The 
countess dies of fright. Later, she comes to him in a dream and tells 
him the secret. The story ends with Hermann’s defeat—following two 
victories—at the gambling tables. “The queen of spades signifies secret 
ill will,” reads Pushkin’s epigraph to his story.
The amoral character of Hermann’s gambling passion is 
manifested not only in his encounter with the old countess, a meeting 
that discloses his disordered psychology and utilitarian outlook, but 
in his heartless manipulation of the feelings of Lizaveta. “You are 
9 For a general discussion of the impact of Pushkin’s “The Queen of 
Spades” upon Dostoevsky’s work, see A. L. Bem’s article, “Pikovaia dama 
v tvorchestve Dostoevskogo,” in О Dostoevskom (Prague, 1936), 37–81. 
Bem discusses Pushkin’s story and The Gambler on pp. 62–69. He finds 
the link between the two works in the authors’ “moral condemnation” 
of the hero who violates the love of a girl who has given herself to him. 
Such a link indubitably exists. But Bem has nothing to say about the deep 
connections between the two works on the psychological and philosophical 
planes. Dostoevsky had a profound understanding of Pushkin’s story, as 
is indicated by the new synthesis he gives to Pushkinian materials in his 
novel.
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a monster!” she cries to him in their arranged tryst immediately after 
the countess’s death. His motives have become apparent to her. “I did 
not wish her death,” he replies, indifferent to the girl who but a little 
while earlier had been the object of passionate avowals of love. For the 
egotist Hermann, Lizaveta is but an incidental sacrifice in his quest for 
power and wealth. This “hardened soul” feels no pangs of conscience 
either for the old countess or for Lizaveta.
Hermann masks his gambling passion under a simulated 
passion for Lizaveta. He quite consciously employs this deception to 
gain entrance to the dwelling of his real lover—lady luck, fate, the 
old countess. The object of Aleksey’s passion is also lady luck, but she 
is not incarnated in any independent figure or symbol in his drama 
(there is an allusion to her, of course, in the reference to the ancient 
empress). Pushkin’s play with the fantastic, or play with the real and 
fantastic, becomes pure theater of the un conscious in Dostoevsky. What 
Dostoevsky does in The Gambler is endow Polina with the function of 
a fate-figure in Aleksey’s unconscious. Lizaveta and the old countess, 
as it were, merge into one person.
Aleksey’s relation to Polina as a fate-figure is almost identical 
with Hermann’s relation to the mysterious countess. Both Polina 
and the countess, in the view of their suitors, withhold their favor. 
Aleksey’s comparison of Polina with the imperious ancient empress 
who expresses her contempt for her slave by calmly undressing in 
front of him defines what he feels to be Polina’s attitude toward him 
as a lover, and on the plane of his unconscious, as a fate-figure. This is 
an obvious reminiscence on Dostoevsky’s part of the midnight scene in 
“The Queen of Spades” in which Hermann, concealed in the countess’s 
bedroom, is witness to the “repulsive mysteries of her toilet” as she 
undresses before her mirror.
In a variety of ways, Pushkin brings out the unconscious erotic 
dimension in this episode; indeed, Hermann is compared to a lover of 
the countess’s youth. Hermann, now slavishly petitions the countess 
on his knees, now despotically threatens her with his pistol in his quest 
for a “favor,” the “happiness of his life,” the secret of the three cards. 
He appeals to the countess as “wife, lover, and mother.” Though he 
recognizes that her secret may be linked with a “terrible sin, with the 
ruination of eternal bliss, with a devil’s contract,” he announces that 
he is prepared to take on her sin. As we have noted, the countess does 
not yield her riches to her impassioned and frustrated suitor. He is not 
rewarded at this moment by lady luck any more than Aleksey’s erotic 
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interests are rewarded immediately by Polina. Hermann is rewarded 
by the countess when she comes to him in a dream and tells him the 
secret of the three cards. Aleksey, too, wants his “empress” to come to 
him. “I was not at all troubled by her fate,” he remarks about Polina 
apropos of the moment Grandmamma was about to gamble away her 
fortune. “I wanted to fathom her secrets. I wanted her to come to me 
and say, ‘I really love you.’” Polina will, indeed, come to Aleksey and 
provide the psychological motive for him to rush off confidently to the 
gambling tables and make his colossal winnings. His erotic strivings 
will be consummated when he returns to his room where Polina is 
waiting for him.
In outwardly different but psychologically analogous ways, then, 
Pushkin and Dostoevsky recognize the interaction of the erotic and 
gambling impulses in their heroes. In The Gambler, the psychosexual 
dimension of Aleksey’s gambling passion is openly expressed in his 
relationship with Polina. Yet in the deepest sense, Aleksey’s passion 
for Polina is no greater than Hermann’s interest in Lizaveta. Hermann 
simulates a passion for Lizaveta; when she no longer serves as an 
accessory to his gambling passion, he becomes indifferent to her. It 
seems to Aleksey that he is in love with Polina and that he cannot live 
without her. But in fact, she is only a stand-in for lady luck. When he 
recognizes lady luck, that is, when he recognizes his gambling passion 
and succumbs to it at the tables, his passion for Polina vanishes. He no 
longer needs the real Polina. He has found lady luck.
4
The dramatic outcome of Aleksey’s affair with Polina and lady luck 
is as brilliant in execution as in conception. At a critical moment in 
Polina’s destiny, after Grandmamma’s huge losses at the tables and at 
the time de Grieux abandons Polina, Aleksey pens the following note 
to her:
Polina Aleksandrovna, I see clearly that the denouement is at 
hand which will of course touch on you too. For the last time 
I repeat: do you or do you not need my life? If I can be of use, 
be it in any way—dispose of me as you see fit, and meanwhile 
I will remain in my room, most of the time at least, and not go 
out anywhere. If it is necessary, write or send for me. 
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Shortly after this note is delivered, Polina turns up in Aleksey’s 
room, pale and somber. He cries out, startled, amazed. “What’s the 
matter? What’s the matter?” Polina asks. “You ask what’s the matter?” 
he replies. “You? here, in my room!” Aleksey’s expression of amazement 
inaugurates a scene, the climax of their relationship, which is marked 
by a dramatic reversal of his whole notion of her attitude toward him. 
“If I come, then I come in my entirety,” Polina remarks. “It’s a habit 
with me.”
The scene is a significant one. At a critical moment in Polina’s 
life, Aleksey impulsively offers her everything that a lover could offer, 
the maximum of devotion: his life. In turn, Polina comes to him in her 
entirety and offers him her life. In the language of the gambling tables 
both are staking or risking all. But are the wagers equal in value? The 
action that follows points to the radically different values of the wagers. 
Polina’s gamble, at its deepest level, involves a throwing off of pride, 
a breaking out from the underground tangle of her relationship with 
de Grieux and Aleksey, an attempt to find salvation not in roulette, but 
in a human relationship based upon mutual respect. Her earlier offers 
to share her winnings at the gambling table were symbolic of the kind 
of relationship she sought. In coming to Aleksey she is making herself 
vulnerable, the sine qua non in any genuine human relationship; she 
is risking annihilation to gain a friend, that is, to win Aleksey. Her 
gamble contemplates neither a play for power nor the annihilation of 
somebody else’s wager or personality.
Aleksey’s gamble, on the other hand, on the psychological plane, 
turns out to be the same as all his other gambles: an affirmation of 
ego. He wishes only a signal from Polina and he will make his suicidal 
and murderous leap. His offer to help Polina only masks his desire to 
win the favor of lady luck and obtain a momentary illusion of freedom 
and power. Recalling his triumphant win at the gambling tables, he 
remarks significantly, “I staked my whole life.” His pledge of his life 
to Polina, then, involves not only a symbolic self-annihilation but the 
annihilation of Polina, her hopes and her high stakes, her last desperate 
gamble on his love. 
In his room, Polina shows Aleksey the letter from de Grieux in 
which he offers her stepfather’s IOU note to be used against him. “Oh,” 
Polina cries out, “with what happiness would I now throw into his vile 
face those fifty thousand francs and spit at them . . . and grind the spit 
in!” Aleksey, groping for ways in which Polina can settle accounts with 
de Grieux, comes up with, among other things, the proposal that she 
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turn to Astley for 50,000 francs. “What, dost thou thyself really want me 
to go from thee to that Englishman?” she cries, looking into Aleksey’s 
face with “a piercing glance” and smiling bitterly. “She called me ‘thou’ 
for the first time in my life,” he recalls. “It seemed to me that she was 
dizzy with emotion at that moment, and she sat down suddenly on the 
sofa, as if worn out.” Aleksey remembers thinking at this point, “Why, 
she loves me! She came to me and not to Mr. Astley.” The inner content 
of Polina’s gamble for Aleksey is manifested, of course, in her use of 
the familiar pronoun “thou.” But the desperate nature of her gamble is 
evidenced by her dizziness; literally, “her head was spinning.”
Aleksey’s notion that Polina is hostile to him is shattered here. 
The foundations are laid, we might imagine, for a positive development 
of this strange relationship: the slave is loved and there is no longer 
any need for self-assertion. Yet Aleksey’s actions at this crucial point 
only confirm that his conception of himself as a slave and of Polina as 
some kind of arrogant ancient empress is rooted in deep, ineradicable 
psychological necessities. He does not want the love of Polina on 
the terms of equality that she offers. He does not wish a real human 
partnership. “She came to me,” he recalls. “I still don’t understand 
it.” Like the Underground Man, Aleksey can understand love only 
as a slave or despot. In part, Aleksey had invented Polina. He had 
mistaken the surface Polina for the real Praskovya, just as Polina had 
mistaken de Grieux, in the sarcastic words of Aleksey, for the “Apollo 
of Belvedere.”
In order to distinguish “beauty of soul and originality of 
personality,” Aleksey rightly observes, a person needs “independence 
and freedom.” The inexperienced and basically unsophisticated 
Russian girl Praskovya is attracted to the external elegance and form 
of the counterfeit Marquis de Grieux even though this beauty is only 
a part of her imagination. She “takes this form as his own soul,” Aleksey 
remarks, “as the natural form of his heart and soul, and not as dress 
that he has inherited.” But this elegant, “finished, beautiful form,” 
in the deepest spiritual sense, is “no form at all.” Aleksey correctly 
diagnoses the debacle of Polina’s affair with de Grieux: she has been 
carried away by a false notion of beauty and form, what another hero of 
Dostoevsky, the Ridiculous Man (in “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” 
1877) has called the “beauty of the lie.” “It is only among Frenchmen,” 
Aleksey remarks sarcastically, “that form has been so well defined that 
it is possible to appear with extraordinary dignity and yet be quite 
a scoundrel.”
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Polina’s near loss of identity in the face of the assault of superficial 
Western culture, her spiritual immaturity, and to a certain extent, her 
corruption are signaled in the novel by her use of the Latinized form of 
her name, Polina. Yet in the case of the Russian heroine, authentic form, 
all that relates to organic Russian nature and intelligence, lies within. 
Significantly, it is Grandmamma, the only character in the novel who 
embodies the element of Muscovite directness and naturalness, who 
addresses Polina as “Praskovya.” “I might get fond of you, Praskovya 
. . . You’re a fine girl, better than all the others, and you sure have 
a strong will, I’ll say! Well, I have a will, too; now turn around: that’s 
not a switch you’re wearing, is it?” Polina answers that it is her own 
hair, and Grandmamma puts in, “Good, I don’t like the silly fashions 
that are current. You’re very pretty. I would fall in love with you if 
I were a young gentleman. Why don’t you get married?”
It is Grandmamma who recognizes the authentic Praskovya 
beneath the surface Polina. Aleksey, who perceives that Polina was 
taken in by de Grieux’s elegant form, ironically is unable to respond to 
the authentic Praskovya when she turns to him for help. Polina seeks 
out in him a friend and confidante at a moment when her relationship 
with de Grieux is crumbling; later, she turns to him in desperation and 
reveals her attraction to him. But in her moment of crucial need, he 
deserts her. Polina is necessary to Aleksey, ultimately, only as ground 
for a limitless egoism. Thus, when she reaches out to him in need and 
offers him the possibility of love, he instinctively interprets her gesture 
as a signal from his deity to make his long-awaited leap for power. 
A “wild idea” flashed through his mind: “Polina! Give me only one 
hour! Wait here only an hour and . . . I will return! It’s . . . it’s necessary! 
You will see!” Aleksey’s idea, significantly, is linked with an inner 
feeling of something “fatal, necessary, predestined.”
Polina, of course, has already offered Aleksey his hour by 
publicly compromising herself and coming to his room. But what 
Aleksey wants is an hour with lady luck. What he wants is what only 
gambling can give him: the momentary illusion of power. In essence, 
Aleksey exchanges happiness with Polina for luck at the tables.10 “And 
I rushed out of the room without answering her astonished, questioning 
glance; she called out something after me, but I did not go back.” 
That questioning glance is one of many that Polina directs at Aleksey, 
10 The Russian word schast’e signifies both happiness and luck. 
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particularly in their last meeting. These glances reveal the extent of 
Polina’s own perplexity over the nature of Aleksey’s strange behavior 
and psychology. More than any words, they reveal to the reader 
not a domineering ancient empress sadistically bent on tormenting 
a passionate lover, but a confused and troubled Russian girl who has 
not yet fully learned to look beneath surface appearances into the 
moral-psychological underground.
5
Aleksey’s state of mind at the gambling tables is frenzied to the 
point of madness. There is an intoxicated, orgiastic quality about 
these moments. His winnings are colossal. This kind of storming of 
the heavens evokes fear in those around him. Two Jews, standing 
by him, warn him to leave, “You are bold! You are very bold!” But 
Aleksey, like the Underground Man, rushing off in pursuit of his 
tormentor Zverkov, is “driven on by fate”; he speaks of the “arrogance 
of chance,” the “craving for risk.” As he sets off for the hotel, finally, 
in the darkness, staggering under the sheer weight of the gold he is 
carrying, he has no thoughts in his head: “I experienced only some 
kind of fearful sense of pleasure—of success, victory, power.” He is 
conscious that he is going back to Polina, but only “to tell her, show 
her . . . but I scarcely remembered what she had been saying to me 
a while ago, and why I had gone, and all those recent feelings of just 
an hour and a half before seemed to me now something long past, long 
since taken care of, obsolete, which we would no longer remember 
because now everything would begin anew.”
Aleksey is not thinking as he emerges from the gambling halls. 
Rather, he is feeling the sum total of his experience. The image of 
Polina, significantly, rises out of the sensations of success, victory, 
power; he is going to show her the gold, the symbol of his achievement, 
the evidence that he is no longer a zero. There is an infantile, and 
a hidden erotic, exhibitionism about Aleksey’s actions here. There 
is also a sense of change in his life, as though the experience at the 
gambling tables had been traumatic and had opened up a new phase 
in his psychic existence. The words “now everything will begin anew” 
are ambiguous: seemingly directed toward Polina, they actually point 
toward an awareness of a radical internal crisis and transformation. 
Not without reason does Aleksey later remark, “My life has broken 
into two.”
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Returning to his hotel room, Aleksey throws the money on the 
table before Polina. “I remember she looked into my face with frightful 
intentness.” These words, which open chapter 15, strike the keynote for 
the unfolding scene as far as Polina is concerned: her increasing doubt 
about Aleksey and about the real nature of his feelings and words. Her 
glance literally pursues Aleksey throughout their last encounter. As he 
rushes about, almost completely oblivious of her, tidying up his piles of 
money and gold, Aleksey notes, she is “attentively” watching him, with 
a strange expression on her face. “I did not like that look! I do not err in 
saying that there was hatred in it.” When Aleksey suggests that Polina 
take 50,000 francs and throw it in de Grieux’s face, she does not answer 
but bursts into the kind of mocking laughter that had always greeted 
his “most passionate declarations.” Her laughter, always defensive in 
character, now points to her growing disillusionment and despair with 
Aleksey. At last, he writes, she stops and frowns, looking at Aleksey 
sternly. De Grieux had sought to cancel his sense of obligation to Polina 
with an IOU note. Aleksey’s proposal, in turn, seems to put the cash 
sign before their relationship. “You think you can buy my respect with 
money, if not me myself,” Polina had remarked to Aleksey in an earlier 
episode in the novel. Polina refuses the money.
Aleksey seems incapable of understanding Polina’s refusal, 
however. Puzzled by her response, he counters, “I offer it to you as a 
friend; I offer you my life.” But life is not to be measured by the weight 
of gold or the gambler’s bravado at the tables. Again, Aleksey notes, 
“She looked at me with a long and searching glance, as if she wanted to 
transfix me with it.” Polina is not a commodity to be bought and sold. 
“You are setting a high price,” she says with a bitter smile, “de Grieux’s 
lover is not worth fifty thousand francs.” “Polina, how can you talk 
that way with me?” Aleksey cries reproachfully. “Am I de Grieux?” 
Of course, that is precisely the question Polina has been trying to 
resolve: is he any different from de Grieux? “I hate you! Yes . . . yes!” 
she exclaims. But then she equates him with de Grieux in another way. 
“I don’t love you any more than I love de Grieux.” Her paradoxical 
manner of expressing her hate reveals her deeply conflicting feelings 
over Aleksey, and indeed even over de Grieux, the man toward whom 
she had “redoubled her contempt.”
In this last encounter with Aleksey, however, it is not hatred, 
contempt, or even wounded pride that emerges as the dominant note, 
but a desperate appeal for love, for support, for a genuine human 
partnership. This is not the Polina that the reader first perceived through 
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the eyes of Aleksey at the beginning of his notes. In this last encounter 
with him, she seems delirious, ill. For a brief moment, under the strain 
of an emotional crisis as profound as that of Aleksey’s, she reveals both 
her inner wounded pride and her deepest, hitherto concealed, hopes. 
“Buy me! Do you want to? Do you want to? For fifty thousand francs, 
like de Grieux?” she gasped between convulsive sobs. But significantly, 
she continues to use the familiar form “thou.” Aleksey embraces 
her, kisses her hands, feet, falls on his knees before her. Her hysteria 
passes. “She placed both her hands on my shoulders and examined me 
intently; it seemed that she wanted to read something in my face . . . An 
expression of concern and contemplation appeared on her face.” Polina 
draws him toward her, and then pushes him away, and again “took up 
examining me with a somber look.” Then she suddenly embraces him: 
“But you do love me, you do love me, don’t you?” she said; after 
all, after all you . . . you wanted to fight with the baron for me!” 
And suddenly she burst out into laughter, as though something 
amusing and nice suddenly flickered in her memory. She was 
crying and laughing all at once. Well, what could I do. I was 
myself almost delirious. I remember she began to say something 
to me, but I could understand almost nothing of what she said. 
It was a kind of delirium, a kind of incoherent babble, as though 
she wanted to tell me something as quickly as possible, delirium 
interspersed with the gayest of laughter, which began to frighten 
me. “No, no, you are dear, dear!” she repeated. “You are my 
faithful one!” And again she put her hands on my shoulders, 
again began looking at me closely and repeated: “You love 
me . . . love me . . . You will love me?” I did not take my eyes 
off her; I had never before seen her in these fits of tenderness 
and love; it is true, of course, that this was delirium, but . . . 
on noticing my look of passion she suddenly began to smile 
slyly. 
This dramatic scene lays bare the pro and contra of Polina’s 
feelings toward Aleksey. Her words express tenderness and love, but 
her questioning glances express her deep doubts and uncertainties, 
all that she had previously masked in coldness and contempt. Polina’s 
swan song of love, for that is what it is, is full of a frenzied will to 
believe something that she knows in her heart to be false; it is a last 
delirious gamble, a last gambler’s illusion that forms a counterpart 
to Aleksey’s delirious gamble at the tables—his passionate wooing of 
lady luck. For his part, Aleksey can understand almost nothing of what 
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she is saying. But his problem in understanding is not merely due to 
Polina’s incoherence; it is deeply rooted in a neurotic gambling passion 
that has consumed all his psychic energies.
Polina’s half-believing, half-despairing lovemaking evokes 
no reciprocal mood of love or tenderness in Aleksey, only a “look 
of passion.” The protestations of love, the impulsive gestures of 
tenderness, the physical advances come almost entirely from Po lina. 
Except for one moment when he tries to calm her and falls on his 
knees before her (the gesture is symbolic), his behavior is passive and 
his mood almost disbelieving. “I wanted her to come to me and say, 
‘I really love you,’” Aleksey confided earlier in his notebook. “And if 
not, if this madness is unthinkable, well then . . . well, what was I to 
wish for? Do I really know what I wish? I’m like a person without any 
perspectives; all I want is to be near her, in her aura, in her radiance, 
eternally, always, all my life. More than this I don’t know! And could 
I possibly go away from her?” Polina does come and say “I love you.” 
But Aleksey goes off to gamble, and when he returns for the last time, 
he does not understand her words. Aleksey’s whole response to Polina 
in this episode suggests that he has confused her with the aura of 
radiance of somebody else, that is, with the dazzling ancient empress, 
lady luck.
At one point in the episode, Polina impulsively embraces Aleksey 
and exclaims, “We’ll go away, we really will go away tomorrow, 
won’t we? And we’ll catch up with Grandmamma, don’t you think?” 
To catch up with Grandmamma, of course, is to go back to Moscow, 
back to Russian soil, Russian nationality, Russian identity, and away 
from the artificial, rootless, spiritually dead world of Roulettenburg. 
Russia, in Dostoevsky’s ideological design, means spiritual salvation. 
Polina’s hope that Aleksey will take her back to Russia is an illusion. 
He will be heading not to Moscow, but to the Sodom and Gomorrah 
of Paris, and not with Polina, but with the radiant Blanche. Polina is, 
indeed, delirious, on the brink of illness. After another fit of laughter, 
Aleksey writes, “She suddenly was kissing and embracing me again, 
passionately and tenderly pressing her face to mine. I no longer thought 
of anything or heard anything. My head was spinning . . . I think it was 
about seven in the morning when I came to my senses.”
The night of sex does not dissolve the underlying tensions 
between Aleksey and Polina: conjunctive physically, it gives expression 
to a thoroughly disjunctive emotional relationship. For both, it is the 
denouement of a delusion in which each has mistaken the other for 
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somebody else. In the morning, after three minutes of looking out of 
the window, Polina turns to Aleksey with loathing and fury, flings the 
money in his face, and leaves. This action not only points eloquently 
to the tragedy of loveless sex, but climaxes a relationship that on every 
level must be considered a paradigm of human misunderstanding. 
Aleksey, characteristically, does not comprehend her behavior. He 
can only conclude that Polina is “out of her mind.” Was it “wounded 
pride” or “despair,” he wonders, that brought her to him. Vanity, he is 
sure, prompted her “not to trust in me and to insult me.” And then, of 
course, it all happened in a “state of delirium.”
Aleksey’s ponderings are deeply evasive, egotistical, and lacking 
in any insight into Polina. What is chiefly noticeable is the absence of 
any feeling for her. His last act before leaving his room—he hurriedly 
tucks his whole heap of gold into his bed and covers it—symbolizes 
the change that has taken place in him since winning at the gambling 
tables. When he later learns of Polina’s illness and of the possibility of 
her death, he takes account of the change in himself:
I was sorry for Polina, I swear, but it’s strange: from the very 
moment I touched the gambling table last night and began to 
rake in packs of money, my love retreated, as it were, into the 
background. I say this now, but at the time I still didn’t see all this 
clearly. Is it possible that I really am a gambler, is it possible that 
I really . . . love Polina so strangely? No, to this day I still love her, 
as God will witness. 
Aleksey’s orgy at the gambling tables engulfs him completely. 
He becomes an obsessive gambler. He discovers his true passion, the 
pursuit of lady luck, and with that discovery, his driving passion for 
Polina vanishes.
Aleksey’s gamble for lady luck and his emotional crisis are 
paralleled by Polina’s gamble for Aleksey and her ensuing crisis and 
illness. Yet the outcomes of these crises are different. Aleksey wins 
his gamble at the tables and “breaks in two”; the conflict between the 
man with hidden moral convictions and the pathological gambler ends 
in the victory of the latter. In a certain sense, Aleksey does become 
a different man. Polina, for her part, loses her gamble for Aleksey but 
retains her integrity. At the very moment Aleksey ceases to regard her 
as a fate-figure, the incubus of demonism is lifted from her. The hopeful, 
though by no means optimally positive resolution of her drama—for 
Dostoevsky this would mean a return to Russia and to her roots—is 
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suggested by her joining the family of the eminently decent Astley in 
England, and later, in Switzerland.
In contrast, the psychological and spiritual catastrophe of 
Aleksey is symbolized by his capitulation to the courtesan Blanche, 
a carnivalesque embodiment of lady luck, a new fate-figure in his life. 
He goes with her to Paris, where he spends much of his time lying on 
a couch. “Is it possible I am such a child?” he wonders at the end of his 
notes. The slave of Polina becomes the “vil esclave,” the “fils,” and the 
“bon enfant” of Blanche, the truly infernal woman of the novel. Not 
without reason does Aleksey refer to Blanche as a “devil” and speak 
of her face as “diabolical.” She is indeed the very incarnation of the 
beauty of the lie. Aleksey, who perceives that Polina had been taken in 
by the superficial elegance and form of de Grieux, is himself taken in 
by the demon of emptiness and banality, Blanche. She was “beautiful to 
look at,” Aleksey observes. But he remarks further that “she has one of 
those faces that can be terrifying . . . her eyes are black, with yellowish 
whites, her glance is bold, her teeth extremely white, and her lips 
always painted; her perfume is musky . . . She sometimes laughs aloud, 
showing all her teeth, but usually sits silent with an insolent stare.”
Aleksey’s capitulation to Blanche symbolizes on the religious-
philosophical plane of the novel his falling away from God. “For as 
soon as the human soul despairs of God,” Vyacheslav I. Ivanov has 
written, “it is irresistibly drawn to chaos: it finds joy in all that is ugly 
and warped, and is greeted, from the deepest ravines of Sodom, by the 
smile of a beauty that seeks to rival the beauty of Our Lady.”11
Aleksey, now basically indifferent to anything outside of 
gambling, does not stay long with Blanche. In a final encounter with the 
Englishman Astley, Aleksey learns that Polina had loved him. “You are 
a lost man,” Astley tells him. “You’ve grown numb, you have not only 
renounced your life, your own interests, and those of society, your duty 
as a citizen and a man, your friends . . . you have not only renounced 
every goal except that of winning, but you have even renounced your 
memories.” The special mention of memory is significant. “Insofar 
as it is ‘forgotten,’ the ‘past,’ historical or primordial, is homologized 
with death,” Mircea Eliade has written in connection with the ancient 
Greek understanding of memory and forgetting. “The fountain Lethe, 
11 Vyacheslav [I] Ivanov, Freedom and the Tragic Life, ed. S. Konovalov, trans. 
Norman Cameron (New York: Noonday Press, 1952), 32. 
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‘forgetfulness,’ is a necessary part of the realm of Death. The dead are 
those who have lost their memories.”12 For Dostoevsky, loss of memory 
implies a static view of the universe and, ultimately, moral and spiritual 
death. In turn, restoration of memory, recollection, is linked with 
a dynamic understanding of human destiny and, ultimately, a vision of 
Christian truth and a perception of eternal renewal.
Aleksey’s renunciation of his memories is symptomatic of his 
spiritual disintegration. He speaks of himself as dead but can conceive 
of resurrection only in terms that parody Christian theological reality. 
“Tomorrow,” he insists, “I can be resurrected from the dead and once 
again begin to live.” But he is dying in a spiritual sense. “Is it possible 
that I do not realize that I myself am a lost man?” The terminology 
of Christian salvation, however, returns to his lips (in the deepest 
regions of his unconscious, of course, he has not forgotten the vision of 
truth). He is certain that he can “rise again.” “In one hour I can change 
my whole fate.” He has in mind, however, salvation at the gambling 
tables, a new challenge to fate. His final words and the final words 
of the novel, “tomorrow, tomorrow all will be over,” testify to his 
determination once again, like the Underground Man, to hurl himself 
against the wall of fate. But on the deeper plane of the novel’s meaning, 
these same words signify the despair of unbelief and the unconscious 
recognition that in a fate-ruled universe, there is no tomorrow, but only 
a meaningless finality: death without resurrection. Not without reason 
did Dostoevsky speak of the gambler’s world as “a special kind of hell, 
a special kind of prison ‘bath.’”
12 Mircea Eliade, “Mythologies of Memory and Forgetting,” History of Religions 
2, no. 2 (Winter 1963): 333.
Pierre and Dolokhov at the Barrier:  
The Lesson of the Duel1
The focus of our discussion is the duel between Dolokhov and Pierre 
(book 2, part 1, chapter 5) in War and Peace. We will present what 
happens in the duel; consider its outcome against the background of 
the psychology of the protagonists; and finally, ask what bearing the 
duel has on the general theme of chance and design in War and Peace.
1
The duel takes place at a moment when the wounded Prince Andrei, 
in Austria, has been declared a “hopeless case” by Napoleon’s 
physician, Dr. Larrey. Pierre, in Moscow, also appears to be a hopeless 
case: not so much physically as morally, psychologically. Sad and 
depressed, he has been helplessly flopping around in high society, 
engulfed in an atmosphere of subservience to his wealth and position. 
Subservience also defines his relation to wife, Helene. On her orders, 
he has abandoned his spectacles. Glasses are an obvious sign of the 
need to see. One needs them to look about and know what is going on 
in one’s presence. Helene’s professional activity is men. At this time, 
she is cultivating Dolokhov. Pierre is cast in the role of cuckold. He 
sees and yet does not see what is going on about him. He has no love 
for Dolokhov, but he cannot quite believe what he senses to be true. 
However, Pierre recognizes in the indestructible Dolokhov a bully and 
a cold killer type.
“Yes, he’s a bully . . . it means nothing for him to kill a man. 
He must think that everyone is afraid of him, and this must 
1 From Scando-Slavica 39 (1993): 52-61.  
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be pleasant to him. He must think that I too am afraid of him. 
And, in fact, I am afraid of him,” Pierre reflected, and with 
these thoughts he again felt as though something terrible and 
monstrous were rising inside him.
We know how Dolokhov at dinner in the English Club insults 
Pierre to his face: “Here’s to the health of all beautiful women, Petrusha, 
and to their lovers.” Pierre challenges Dolokhov to a duel, and the latter 
accepts the challenge. Here is how Tolstoy describes the duel:
“One! Two! Three!” angrily cried [Denisov], and went off to 
the side. Both men advanced along the trodden tracks, coming 
closer and closer, recognizing one another through the fog. 
The combatants had the right to fire when they liked as they 
approached the barrier. Dolokhov walked slowly, not raising 
his pistol, his clear, sparkling eyes peering into his opponent’s 
face. His mouth wore its usual semblance of a smile. At the word 
“three” Pierre moved quickly forward with rapid steps, straying 
off the beaten path (sbivaias’ s protoptannoi dorozhki) and stepping 
into untrodden snow. He held the pistol at arm’s length in his 
right hand, obviously afraid of killing himself with it. His left 
arm he carefully held behind him because he felt inclined to use 
it to support his right arm, which he knew he must not do. After 
advancing half a dozen paces and straying off the track into the 
snow (sbivshis’ s dorozhki v sneg), Pierre looked down about his 
feet, glanced rapidly again at Dolokhov and, pulling his finger as 
he had been taught, fired. Not at all expecting so loud a report, 
Pierre started at the sound, then smiled at his own sensations 
and stood still.
Pierre, as we know, wounds Dolokhov who, staggering forward, shoots 
at Pierre, but misses his mark.
Why does Dolokhov lose the duel? Why does Pierre win it? Or 
as with a lottery, are such questions irrelevant to the action? We can 
distinguish at the outset two radically different psychological attitudes 
toward the duel on the part of Dolokhov and Pierre, each of which 
contributes toward the outcome. Throughout War and Peace Dolokhov, 
the archetypal gambler, embodies and propagandizes the notion that 
one can challenge fate and win; that one can control one’s own destiny 
and dominate the lives or fate of others; that one can, at will, and to one’s 
advantage, turn chance into fate. While offering some evidence that 
such an outlook provides Dolokhov with a psychological advantage 
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over others, an analysis of Dolokhov’s major adventures throughout 
War and Peace suggests that his efforts often lead to unexpected and 
surprising results—quite different from those anticipated. In any case, 
Dolokhov approaches the duel with absolute trust in the power of will 
and skill; with the confidence of the archetypal gambler who believes 
he is in touch with some ground principle. Dolokhov’s philosophy of 
dueling may be summed up in the words: have the will to kill, and lock 
your eyes onto your victim. The “secret of dueling,” as he puts it, is to go 
into the duel with no thought that you might be killed, but rather “with 
the firm intention of killing your man as quickly and surely as possible, 
then everything will be in good order.” So far as Dolokhov actually 
practices what he preaches, he in fact does meet danger and critical 
situations with an exceptional, one might say “fateful” advantage over 
others. The strange viability of Dolokhov has a real foundation. Pierre 
is perfectly right in sensing the psychology of the killer in Dolokhov, 
that is, the psychology of a man who has banished all fear and acts with 
nerveless composure. Dolokhov typically remarks in connection with 
his secret of dueling: 
As our bear-hunter from Kostroma used to say to me: “A bear,” 
he’d say, “why, who’s not afraid of a bear, but once you’ve set 
eyes on him your fear’s all gone, and your only thought is not to 
let him get away!” Well, that’s how it is with me.
Pierre, the bear, approaches the duel as he approached his 
father’s funeral and all the incomprehensible events surrounding it: as 
a man of instinct, not of intellect; as a person who follows rather than 
leads; as a person who listens to his deepest, most organic responses. 
Just before the duel, Pierre’s second, Nesvitsky, tries to get Pierre to 
apologize to Dolokhov for losing his temper at the dinner party, but 
Pierre finds nothing to talk about. “It’s all the same” (vse ravno), he 
says with the curious indifference or resignation of a man caught up 
in something that he does not fully understand, but cannot avoid. 
“Only tell me where I am to go, and where to fire,” he asks, inquiring 
at the same time about the working of the trigger, as he had never held 
a pistol in his hands before.
How could it happen that the awkward and inexperienced 
Pierre, a complete novice at dueling, could succeed against Dolokhov? 
How could Dolokhov, the professional duelist and archetypal gambler, 
fail? Let us answer the last question first. Dolokhov, the gambler, is 
no fool. In all situations of danger, he calculates his odds with care. 
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He does not mindlessly jump into an affair. He does not court danger 
for its own sake, though he certainly enjoys tempting fate. Toward the 
end of War and Peace, he repeatedly warns Anatole that he is playing 
a dangerous game in trying to elope with Natasha. “This is a dangerous 
business and, when you come to think of it, a foolish one.” After all, 
Dolokhov’s chief aim, like that of every true gambler, is to put chance 
out of the game. Though fearless, he knows a losing game when he sees 
one. And Dolokhov likes to win. It is impossible, however, to calculate 
everything—one of the central moral-philosophical postulates of 
Tolstoy in War and Peace. In this case, Dolokhov, like his historical 
counterpart Napoleon in the duel with Kutuzov, left the strange and 
erratic behavior of the bear out of his calculations.
Accident, chance, an element of surprise does enter the duel: 
Pierre, instead of moving slowly toward the barrier, as does the 
confident but cautious Dolokhov, moves rapidly forward; instead of 
keeping to the well-trodden path Pierre strays off into the deep wet 
snow. Dolokhov, following the bear-hunter’s advice, looks calmly into 
his opponent’s face as though to lock Pierre into his sights, to immobilize 
him with his eyes alone. He is so confident that he does not even raise 
his pistol. Ninety-nine out of a hundred novices, perhaps, would 
have quailed before Dolokhov’s gaze and brazen self-assurance, but 
Pierre who has given up his glasses does not appear even to meet that 
gaze. Most important, he accidentally, though not really accidentally 
if one considers Pierre’s nature and life style, strays off into the deep 
wet snow. Tolstoy does not say so directly, but the implication is that 
Pierre’s wandering off or going astray (Tolstoy uses the verb sbit’sia 
twice in the description of the duel) gives Pierre an advantage, that 
is, it momentarily distracts Dolokhov, disrupts his plan, his scenario, 
his timetable. It was impossible to calculate the possibility of Pierre’s 
wholly unconventional and awkward movements in advance. “Once 
you’ve set eyes on him your fear’s all gone, and your only thought is 
not to let him get away!” The bear, however, gets away.
It remains to consider not only the unexpected action that throws 
Dolokhov off balance, but the reason for the success of the novice 
Pierre in winging Dolokhov. Pierre, we are told, looked down about 
his feet, then glanced rapidly at Dolokhov and fired. The bullet found 
its mark. Proverbial wisdom would say that Pierre was lucky, that 
is, that he was the recipient of accidental good fortune. “The person 
who’s lucky, well, he’s just lucky.” (Komu povezet—tak uzh povezet.) To be 
sure, Dolokhov’s miscalculation, that is, his complete trust in will and 
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calculated knowledge, is an important factor in Pierre’s success. There 
is more to the matter, however.
There is the curious phenomenon of “beginner’s luck,” a fact 
that is verifiable in many areas of activity and endeavor.2 The 
explanation for beginner’s luck is rooted in psychological reality or 
truth. The beginner or novice is not preoccupied with technique; he is 
free to be unorthdox, unconventional, a fact that in games, for example, 
can rattle the more experienced player who is used to professional 
opponents with known techniques. Moreover, the beginner is less likely 
to be encumbered by the tension or anxiety that may accompany the 
fear of losing or not doing well. He is less likely to be goal-oriented. In 
this respect, the mental state of the novice is comparable, paradoxically, 
to that of the Zen master who is totally at ease and at one with his mind, 
body and task. In his book, Zen in the Art of Archery, Eugen Herrigel 
recalls that his Japanese Zen teacher exclaimed at one point, “Don’t 
think of what you have to do, don’t consider how to carry it out! The 
shot will only go smoothly when it takes the archer himself by surprise. 
It must be as if the bowstring suddenly cut through the thumb that held 
it. You mustn’t open the right hand on purpose.”3 Pierre’s state of mind 
in the duel in much reminds us of both novice and master. He is first 
looking at his feet. His glance at Dolokhov is apparently sudden and 
unthinking. He does not appear to take aim, but clearly his arm, hand 
2 Dr. Edmund Bergler in his discussion of the pathological gambler advances 
psychoanalytical explanations for the phenomenon. See his discussion in 
“The Psychology of Gambling,” The Psychology of Gambling, eds. Jon Halliday 
and Peter Fuller (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 197. The phenomenon of 
beginniner’s luck has been noted in other areas of activity besides gambling. 
For example, Charles Chaplin writes in his autobiography: “To an artist 
complete freedom to do the unorthodox is usually most exciting, and that 
is why many a director’s first picture has freshness, and originality.” See 
Film Makers on Film Making, ed. Harry M. Geduld (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1970), 71. Neil Jordan, the writer and director of “The 
Crying Game” which stars Jaye Davidson, an amateur playing in his first 
film, observed that Davidson’s lack of experience may even have been an 
advantage. “When you get someone who’s never acted before, what you see 
is their inner dignity. Their spirit is what comes through, because they’ve 
got no technique—all they’ve got is themselves.” Quoted by Janet Maslin, in 
“A Star to Match a Mystery Role,” New York Times, Home Section C, Decem- 
ber 17, 1992.
3 See Eugen Herrigel, Zen in the Art of Archery, introduction by D. T. Suzuki, 
trans. R. F. C. Hull (NewYork: Pantheon, 1974), 48.
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and eye almost unconsciously line up with the target. His shot takes 
him by surprise. “The right art,” cried the Zen Master to his pupil, “is 
purposeless, aimless! The more obstinately you try to learn how to shoot 
the arrow for the sake of hitting the goal, the less you will succeed in the 
one and the further the other will recede. What stands in your way is 
that you have a much too willful will. You think that what you do not do 
yourself does not happen.”4
The master’s words go to the core of Pierre’s psychological 
relation to his goal or target in the duel. If we expand the idea of target 
to something broader than the archer’s or the dueler’s target, that is, to 
life itself, then it becomes apparent that Pierre’s orientation to life is not 
too different from his orientation to his target Dolokhov. In Pierre’s life, 
we are witness to an organic, groping process of living, something that 
is curiously without a “willful will”; if there is achievement, a forward-
movement in Pierre’s life, it is always accompanied by an abundance 
of backward and side movement, much wandering off the track, much 
“straying,” in the literal and figurative sense of the Russian phrase 
“sbit’sia s dorogi.” Yet this is not aimless or chaotic movement. There 
is in Pierre an ultimately sure, artistic, instinctive consciousness of 
inner seeking and direction; there is, one might say, some inner moral-
spiritual compass that directs him toward true north.
To return to the opening question and to the philosophical 
questions underlying the duel: why does Dolokhov lose the duel and 
why does Pierre win it? Did chance, accident play a role in the fateful 
outcome? Yes, various chance factors did enter into the duel: in the first 
instance, fog and snow, and in the second instance, at least as far as 
Dolokhov was concerned, an inexperienced, awkward player—Pierre. 
These factors, if not in some absolute sense incalculable, certainly 
were unforeseeable for Dolokhov, a person whose overweening self-
confidence and contempt for his opponent could only be self-blinding. 
The Dolokhovs cannot calculate their own natures, or to put it another 
way, they do not know enough to know that at times to calculate is 
to miscalculate. Pierre, too, fortunately, did not know himself in this 
situation, did not know enough to walk in a straight line with his eyes 
on his opponent. Like the Russian people in its duel with Napoleon, 
Pierre simply did not follow the rules. In this sense, Pierre’s partial 
defeat of Dolokhov in the fog and snow of an empty Russian field is 
4 Ibid., 51.
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emblematic of the nature of the triumph of Russia and Kutuzov over 
Napoleon.
2
Chance, then, plays a role in the duel between Pierre and Dolokhov. 
After looking closely at the duel, however; after analyzing the duelists’ 
psychology in this given situation; after acknowledging that we, too, 
approached the duel unable to predict its outcome (if, indeed, we 
happened to read War and Peace for the first time); after duly considering 
everything, we nonetheless conclude that though unexpected, it was 
not entirely accidental that Dolokhov in this duel lost his gamble and 
that Pierre, just as he half-blindly slogs his way through the chronic 
crises of his life, fumbled or humbled his way to a successful shot. An 
underlying design in the action is there for all to see.
“In general,” Chekhov wrote to a correspondent who had sent 
him a poem to evaluate, “there is no logic to the acts of your hero. In art, 
as in life, too, nothing accidental takes place.”5 Chekhov did not mean to 
say that the creative process or process of living is without accident or 
chance. The accidental very much enters into artistic creation and life; 
without it there would be no freedom. What the artist selects, however, 
his acceptance or rejection of the incidental or accidental, is governed 
in the long run by his developing inner design (such is the case in life, 
though the process is more fragmentary, less visible than it is in art, and 
of course, incomplete—until it is complete).
The consistency we come to recognize in Prince Andrei’s character, 
in his psychology and development, is also no accident. “Man does not 
live his life, but composes himself, self-composes himself,” Dostoevsky 
wrote in his notebook in 1880.6 Andrei’s life could have been different at 
any moment not merely because Tolstoy might have willed it so (as he at 
one point willed Andrei to survive Austerlitz and die a later death), but 
because of the essential ingredient of freedom he bears within him. Yet 
the reader, who has read through War and Peace like the author, perceives 
Prince Andrei simultaneously in movement and in completion. As we 
5 See Chekhov’s letter to B. A. Sadovsky, May 28, 1904, in A. P. Chekhov, 
Polnoe sobranie sochenenii i pisem v tridtsati tomakh, 30 vols. (Moscow: 1974–
1983), Pis’ma 12:108.
6 Dostoevskii, PSS, 27:59.
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ponder Andrei’s total “composition” in War and Peace, we are confronted 
by the paradox of a freely chosen fate, that is, a limited something that 
has grown out of the material of life and the sum of choices: not what 
had to be, but what finally was—Shakespeare’s “hatch and brood of time.” 
The life of Andrei bears out the Greek dictum “A man’s character is his 
fate,” so much so that Andrei’s casual remark at opening of the epic—“je 
suis un homme fini”—bears a mysterious significance to the reader of 
War and Peace. The reader must first have read through War and Peace to 
appreciate this detail—this dark hint of character and its inner fatality. 
Here, the reading of Andrei’s “history” is comparable to Tolstoy’s ideal 
reading of history at large:
History is concerned with the lines of movement of human wills, 
one end of which is hidden in the unknown while at the other 
end men’s consciousness of freedom in the present moment 
moves on through space and time and causation. The more this 
threshold of movement opens out before our eyes, the more evident do 
the laws of the move ment become. To grasp and define these laws 
is the problem of history (my italics—RLJ; Second Epilogue, 
chapter 11).
It is the task, too, of the reader of War and Peace. Thus, the more 
the “threshold of movement” of character, incident, and event open 
out before our eyes, “the more evident do the laws of the movement 
become,” laws which Tolstoy apprehends in his own way, to be sure, 
but laws or regularities nonetheless.
“In art, as in life, too, nothing accidental takes place.” What 
Chekhov meant is that in art every stroke, every incident, every detail, 
has meaning and inner logic. This is certainly true of Tolstoy’s War and 
Peace. In this respect, I am only in qualified agreement with Gary Saul 
Morson when he maintains in his landmark study of War and Peace that 
the “recognition of radical insignificance of many incidents in War and 
Peace is fundamental to an understanding of the work’s structure,” 
a structure, he adds, that is “emblematic of the historical process as 
Tolstoy conceived it.”7 Peripheral incidents and characters, and there 
are certainly many of these in War and Peace, may be said to demonstrate 
7 See Gary Saul Morson, Hidden in Plain View: Narrative and Creative Potentials 
in War and Peace (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 148, 
150.
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that there are loose threads in history. Plot structure or anti-structure, 
however, is only one aspect of War and Peace. In the broadest sense, there 
are no loose threads in War and Peace. The seemingly insignificant or 
“unnecessary” incidents and characters have other tasks to perform, and 
have their function in the tapestry of artistic coherence and linkage. To 
take one character from our discussion: Dolokhov. This man, “the most 
striking example of disproportionality to the plot,” as Morson rightly 
notes, nonetheless is dramatically and quintessentially important in 
his every act to the exposition of moral-philosophical questions that 
lie at the center of War and Peace; he is vital to the development of the 
Napoleonic theme. This little Napoleon8 (Tolstoy identifies Dolokhov 
with Napoleon in his drafts) is no more able to dominate the scene than 
the big Napoleon. And this fact, indeed, is “emblematic of the historical 
process as Tolstoy conceived it.” Yet Dolokhov, this descendent of 
Pushkin’s Hermann and Lermontov’s Pechorin, is one of the important 
avenues to an understanding of the psychology of Napoleon and of 
his epoch—that vast revolutionary upheaval which introduced so 
much of chance into the historical agenda of whole classes as well 
as individuals, which gave social situation and life at that time its 
peculiarly precarious character.9 What is more, in Dolokhov, we have 
the opportunity to observe the Napoleonic type at close quarters and to 
ponder him outside the framework of caricature.
8 In his essay “Napoleon: or, The Man of the World,” Emerson observed, “If 
Napoleon is France, if Napoleon is Europe, it is because the people whom 
he sways are little Napoleons.” Emerson’s essay delighted Tolstoy. See my 
discussion of Tolstoy’s attitude toward Napoleon, and the significance for 
Tolstoy of Emerson’s ambivalent point of view, in my essay, “Napoleon 
and Russian Literature,” in Yale French Studies, 26 (Fall-Winter 1960–1961): 
106–118.
9 See, for example, Napoleon’s letter to his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, August 
12, 1795: “Personally, I hardly care what happens to me. I watch life almost 
indifferently. My permanent state of mind is that of a soldier on the eve 
of battle: I have come to the conclusion that, since a chance meeting with 
death may end it all at any minute, it is stupid to worry about anything. 
Everything disposes me to face my destiny without flinching. At this rate, 
my friend, I shall end by not stepping out of the way of a passing carriage. 
As a reasonable man I am sometimes astonished at this attitude; but it is 
a natural tendency produced in me by the moral state of the country, and 
by the habit of running risks.” See Napoleon’s Letters, ed. and trans. J. M. 
Thompson (London-New York: J.M. Dent, 1954), 44.
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I have singled out Dolokhov for attention because, along with 
Pierre, he is at the center of our discussion of chance and design. Yet 
Tolstoy has endowed even the most seemingly irrelevant, peripheral or 
seemingly enigmatic passages, incidents and details with relevance and 
meaning, with what Goethe once called the “dignity of significance.”10
The paradox of War and Peace—a work in which Tolstoy ridicules 
the possibility of foreseeing, controlling, making sense out of events 
and history; a work in which chance plays havoc with everybody’s 
well-laid plans—is that we conclude our reading with a consciousness 
of freedom; a sense of the exhilarating openness of life, experience and 
history; an awareness of the vast play of chance; yet at the same time, 
we come away from the book with an overwhelming and astounding 
sense of the deep regularities and rhythms not alone of art, but of 
nature, human experience; we come away with a sense of infinitely 
complex threading, “linkage,” significance, overarching design in 
life, and yes, even in history. We have a sense, I would suggest, not of 
Tolstoy versus Aristotle,11 but of a strange and novel blending of the 
two: we are witness not to the exclusion or negation of the irrational or 
contingent,12 but rather to its integration into self-regulating processes 
of life, strange stories and legends of higher meaning and destiny lived 
out by human beings in their unpredictable and zig-zagging ways; we 
are witness, one might say, taking a leaf from Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky 
notebook, to “the activity of God in His relation to man.”13
10 In his notes to a translation of Diderot’s “Essai sur la peinture,” Goethe 
wrote “Art sticks to the surface of natural phenomena; but it has its own 
depth, its own power; it crystallizes the highest moments of these superficial 
phenomena by recognizing in them the character of lawfulness . . . 
the dignity of significance (die Würde der Bedeutung).” Sämtliche Werke. 
Jubiläums-Ausgabe in 40 Bänden (Stuttgart und Berlin: 1892), 33: 214–215.
11 See Morson’s discussion, “Tolstoy vs. Aristotle” in Hidden in Plain View, op. 
cit., 144.
12 I  have in mind Aristotle’s observation that “within the action there must be 
nothing irrational. If the irrational cannot be excluded, it should be outside 
the scope of the tragedy. Such is the irrational element in the Oedipus of 
Sophocles.” See Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, translated and with 
Critical Notes by S. H. Butcher, with a Prefatory Essay by John Gassner, 4th 
ed. (New York: Dover, 1951), 57.
13 See Appendix 2 in Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. 
and trans. by Caryl Emerson, Introduction by Wayne C. Booth, Theory and 
History of Literature, 8 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 
285.
Chance and Design:  
anna karenina’s First Meeting with Vronsky1
In chapter 18, part 1 of Anna Karenina, some seventy pages from the 
beginning of the novel, Tolstoy introduces Anna to the reader for the 
first time in person. The scene is a Moscow railroad station. Stepan 
Oblonsky is there to meet his sister Anna who is arriving from St. 
Petersburg; Vronsky, to meet his mother who is arriving on the same 
train. All four meet, exchange amenities, and prepare to leave the 
station; momentarily, a disturbing incident draws their attention: 
a railroad guard has been crushed by one of the cars. After a brief delay 
(Vronsky leaves some money for the guard’s family), the group departs.
Chance seems to rule this occasion: Vronsky and Oblonsky, 
though acquainted, have met by chance at the station. Anna, it turns out, 
had been entrusted by her husband to Vronsky’s mother at the station in 
St. Petersburg and they have made the trip together. Vronsky’s meeting 
with Anna, then, is fortuitous. The death of the guard, apparently, also 
is an accident.
A view of the surface, or visible structure, of this chapter reflects 
the unplanned or “natural” character of the action: people alight from 
a train and greet other people; bits of conversation seem to advance 
in a kind of meandering movement—in short, build up a sense of 
the ritualistic, yet banal and basically unstructured character of most 
meetings and departures at railroad stations. The dramatic incident, 
the death of the guard, which takes up the final portion of this chapter, 
1 From The Disciplines of Criticism: Essays in Literary Theory, Interpretation, and 
History, ed. Peter Demetz, Thomas Greene, and Lowry Nelson, Jr. (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 315-329.
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explodes the sense of the casual and ordinary; it provides a momentary 
focus of attention for the characters. Yet its sudden and alarming 
intrusion into the casual routine serves only to increase our feeling 
of the unplanned in chapter 18. Our impression of the unplanned, 
however, is precisely an impression: on closer analysis, it gives way to 
a sense of organized movement and design. The action, seen from the 
artist’s point of view, is coherent and saturated with content.
The unifying element in the chapter, indeed its axis, must be 
sought in Anna. She is the primary focus of the artist’s attention; her 
embryonic relationship with Vronsky constitutes the motive force for 
the inner action of the chapter. In this action, Anna’s character is free to 
attract, magnetize, and in this sense, introduce “order” in the field of 
personalities around her; but in this action, too, character is revealed as 
a determined shape, as an embodiment of an already existing fate. We 
may define Tolstoy’s purpose in chapter 18, then, as twofold: to disclose 
those elements of character in Anna which will emerge as her fate, and 
to capture that moment when, under the impact of character and the 
changes brought about through encounter, the elements of chance 
group themselves into coherent design. To present this whole action 
without allowing its inner dynamics to obtrude upon or overwhelm, 
the “natural” and free flow of surface action—here is the real art of 
Tolstoy.
At the opening of chapter 18, Vronsky steps up to the door of 
a train compartment and stops in order to make way for a lady who 
is coming out. He glances “at the exterior of this lady” who obviously 
belongs to the upper classes, begs her pardon, and is about to enter 
the carriage when he feels the need to have another look at her, “not 
because she was very beautiful, not because of the elegance and modest 
grace which were evident in her whole person, but because there was 
something particularly caressing and tender in the expression of her 
lovely face when she passed him.” 
Not so much exterior beauty or elegance as a certain compelling 
interior richness of being, a refined sensuousness defines Anna. Tolstoy’s 
emphasis here is carried over into the crucial characterization of Anna 
as seen through Vronsky. Anna turns to look at Vronsky, and her dark 
eyes rest momentarily upon him in a friendly, attentive manner. She 
then turns to the approaching crowd as if in search of someone.
In that brief glance Vronsky had time to notice a restrained 
animation which played over her face. It was as though her 
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nature were so brimming over with an abundance of something 
that against her will it expressed itself now in a radiant look, 
now in a smile. She deliberately shrouded the light in her eyes, 
but it gleamed against her will in a barely perceptible smile.
Tolstoy has drawn Vronsky, and the reader, into the interior 
of Anna’s being. He now calls attention to the welling up from it of 
a vital life force: animation (ozhivlenie), a key word used three times 
in chapter 18 in descriptions of Anna. It is, however, “restrained 
animation”; it is held back by “will” and yet makes itself felt “against 
her will.” Precisely, this force of energy, this vitality, this almost animal 
animation is a distinguishing mark of Anna. At the moment Vronsky 
meets Anna, these opposite forces of animation and restraint are in 
a delicate equilibrium. At the end of the chapter, when Anna leaves the 
station, that equilibrium has been lost.
Contradiction, conflict, tension, between opposite elements, 
then, are evident in Anna’s nature from the outset; they also enter into 
her social perspective. Tolstoy brings this out obliquely in the scene 
under discussion. Vronsky, after exchanging glances with Anna, steps 
into the train, greets his mother, and, while talking with her, overhears 
a conversation of a woman (Anna) with a man outside the door.
“All the same (vse-taki), I do not agree with you,” said the voice 
of the woman.
“That’s the Petersburg way of looking at it, Madame.”
“Not the Petersburg way, but simply a woman’s way.”
“Well, anyway, permit me to kiss your hand.”
These are the first words uttered by Anna in the novel. We do not 
know the subject of dispute, but this makes it possible for the words 
to produce a more general impression upon us. Almost the first word, 
vse-taki firmly establishes that singular quality of contrariety which 
will define, in a sense, Anna’s whole stance before society; vse-taki (all 
the same, nonetheless, however that maybe) is a word which indicates 
some kind of concession, perhaps, in the sphere of logic, but at the 
same time implies a stubborn adherence to one’s own point of view in 
spite of logic or of convincing counterargument.2 The little colloquy we 
2 Tolstoy’s use of the word vse-taki recalls another occasion on which he uses 
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have quoted serves also to raise the problem content of Anna’s nature 
to a general intellectual and social level, the level of action of the novel 
as a whole. What emerges from the colloquy is the image of a woman 
of tenacious viewpoint, one who rejects identification, significantly, 
with a “Petersburg” outlook, and who firmly embraces the “woman’s” 
point of view. The opposition between Petersburg and the “woman’s” 
point of view anticipates the major confrontation of Anna in the novel.
Assertiveness, decisiveness, a readiness to take the lead are 
essential qualities of Anna, and they are manifested throughout her 
relationship with Vronsky. Tolstoy, at the very first appearance of Anna 
in the novel, signals these qualities. Vronsky introduces himself to 
Anna, “You probably don’t remember me.” “On the contrary,” Anna 
replies.
“I should have recognized you—your mother and I, it seems, 
talked of nothing but you the whole journey,” she said, at last 
allowing the animation that sought release to express itself in a 
smile. “But still no sign of my brother.” “Do go and call out for 
him, Alyosha,” said the old countess. Vronsky went out onto the 
platform and shouted, “Oblonsky! here!” But Madame Karenina 
did not wait for her brother and, as soon as she caught sight of 
him she stepped down from the train with a resolute step. And 
as soon as her brother reached her she flung her left arm around 
the neck of her brother, with a movement that struck Vronsky 
by its resoluteness and grace, and drawing him quickly to her 
warmly kissed him. Vronsky could not take his eyes off her and, 
without knowing why, smiled. But recollecting that his mother 
was waiting for him, he went back again into the train.
this word to give expression to a sense of deep contradiction or disjunction 
in consciousness. In War and Peace (Vol. 1, Part Three, Sect. 12), on the eve 
of the Battle of Austerlitz, Prince Andrey dreams of his happy moment of 
glory, of his “Toulon.” Tolstoy presents his consciousness as a dialectic of 
voices—one dreaming of glory, the others reminding him of the price: death, 
wounds, suffering. But the initial voice stubbornly insists that it would give 
everything for a moment of glory, for triumph over people, for people’s 
love, the people out there. And as Andrey reflects, some good-hearted 
banter between two peasant-soldiers outside drifts into his consciousness. 
This bit of small talk, in its simplicity and humanity, clearly strikes at the 
egoism and vanity of Audrey’s aspirations. The implicit challenge of this 
small talk is recognized but rebuffed. Andrey’s reflections conclude: “Yet all 
the same (vse-taki) I love and value only a triumph over them all, I value this 
mysterious power and glory which now swirls about me in this mist.”
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Animation,3 decisiveness, directness are expressed as well in 
Anna’s physical actions and being. What is equally striking in this 
episode, however, is Tolstoy’s emphasis upon Anna’s independence. 
Her readiness to initiate action, significantly, contrasts with the merely 
responsive action of Vronsky. He steps out onto the platform in response 
to his mother’s request; Anna, on the other hand, “did not wait for her 
brother.” Further, it is in this passage that Tolstoy calls attention to a 
pattern in Vronsky’s relationship with his mother. The final line in the 
passage cited—“But recollecting that his mother was waiting for him, 
he went back again into the train”—is the first indication, however 
slight, of a motif sounded at the conclusion of chapter 17, part 1: the 
external obeisance and respect Vronsky accords his mother.4 
This mother-motif, which Tolstoy weaves into the very texture 
of the most casual actions of Vronsky,5 forms a brilliant, yet eminently 
natural prelude to the exchange between Vronsky and his mother on “le 
parfait amour.” Vronsky’s mother lets fall a veiled hint apropos of the 
value of a liaison with a woman like Anna, coupling it with an indirect 
disapproval of his courting of Kitty. Though Vronsky is irritated by 
his mother’s remarks, he in fact does break off his courtship of Kitty 
and strikes up an affair (though not in the cynical spirit of his mother) 
with Anna. The motif of Vronsky’s social attachment to his mother’s 
person rises to the surface once again in the exchange which follows 
between Anna and Vronsky’s mother on the question of getting along 
without their sons. Vronsky’s mother tells Anna not to worry about her 
son, “You cannot expect never to be parted,” a remark, of course, that 
would be better directed to herself and her own obvious concern over 
Vronsky’s apparent interest in Kitty.
3 From “restrained” animation to animation finally released in a smile, Tolstoy 
moves (in chapter 29, part 1) to the “irrepressible joy and animation” which 
shows on Anna’s face when she meets Vronsky during the train trip back to 
St. Petersburg.
4 “In his heart he did not respect his mother and, though not acknowledging 
this to himself, did not love her; but in accordance with the ideas of his 
set and of his education, he could not imagine any other relations to his 
mother than those dutiful and respectful to the highest degree, and the 
more externally dutiful and respectful he was, the less he respected and 
loved her at heart.”
5 It is noteworthy that on three different occasions in chapter 18, Vronsky’s 
contemplation of Anna is interrupted by a shift of attention to his mother. 
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The final episode of the chapter serves to bring into sharper relief 
the characters of Anna and Vronsky. Anna and her brother, as well as 
Vronsky and his mother, prepare to leave the station when they learn 
of the guard’s accident. Vronsky and Oblonsky follow the crowd to 
find out about the accident. They return:
Oblonsky and Vronsky had both seen the disigured corpse. 
Oblonsky, plainly, was suffering. His face was distorted and he 
seemed ready to burst into tears.
“Oh, what a horror! Oh, Anna, if you had seen it! Oh, what a hor-
ror!” he kept repeating.
Vronsky was silent and his handsome face was serious, but 
perfectly tranquil.
“Ah, if you had seen it, Countess,” said Stepan Arkadich. “And 
his wife is here. It was awful to see her. She threw herself on 
the body. They say that he supported a huge family. There’s the 
horror of it all!”
“Can’t something be done for her,” Anna said in an agitated 
whisper.
Vronsky looked at her and immediately left the train.
“I’ll be right back, Maman,” he added, looking around in the 
doorway.
The passage deftly discloses something essential to the character 
of all participants. “Oblonsky, plainly, was suffering. His face was 
distorted and he seemed ready to burst into tears.” There are no 
profundities to Oblonsky, yet his reaction is typical of his open, good-
hearted, though somewhat two-dimensional nature. His emotions are 
near the surface and are easily, if not permanently, touched. Anna’s 
“agitated whisper” and her immediate practical concern for the wife 
of the guard reveal both the depths of her responsiveness to human 
misfortune and the generosity of her nature. Both Oblonsky’s and 
Anna’s reactions have a direct verbal and even physical character. In 
striking contrast, Vronsky is silent and his handsome face, though 
serious, “perfectly tranquil.”
Is there a dimension of human experience closed to Vronsky, 
this eminently decent and honorable gentleman? Unquestionably, 
there is. What is involved here is a certain shallowness, broadly 
cultural, perhaps, and not one of basic intelligence; even more, 
a certain unconscious yet organic egoism which prevents him from 
communicating, or empathizing, with the full depth of feeling of 
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another. The only moment when Vronksy’s face will definitely lose 
its physical composure, a tranquillity which seems to underscore his 
limitations, is in his final appearance, after Anna’s suicide, at a railroad 
station. Koznyshev scans the “obviously suffering face of Vronsky.” Is 
Vronsky responding, here, to the tragedy of Anna? Has Anna’s action 
finally broken through the composure of his face and being? It is 
difficult to answer this question with a yes or a no. It is of paramount 
significance, however, that Tolstoy observes of Vronsky on this occasion 
that “a gnawing toothache impeded his speech.” Tolstoy’s own point 
of view is clear. He has lowered the threshold of Vronsky’s suffering, 
yet not arbitrarily, not maliciously, but fully in accord with the essential 
nature of Vronsky.
Anna asks whether something could be done for the family of 
the guard. “Vronsky looked at her and immediately left the train.” 
But the glance is not one of common sentiment; it is only a glance of 
recognition of Anna’s request. He does not share Anna’s deep response 
to the disaster, and he will never understand or reach Anna at that 
deeper level on which her question was formulated. This is one of the 
elements in Anna’s tragedy. 
Vronsky, gentleman that he is, goes of to fulfill Anna’s request, but 
person that he is, he characteristically leaves the money with an official 
without indicating that it should be used for the family of the deceased 
guard. As he leaves to fulfill his duty, he remarks, “I’ll be right back, 
Maman.” In a sense, Vronsky’s whole relationship with Anna opens 
on a note of his mother’s approval and ends with a return to mother. 
How important Tolstoy viewed the motif of Vronsky’s concern for his 
mother may be judged alone by the reemergence of this motif in full 
force at the moment of Vronsky’s final break with Anna:
“It’s a matter of complete indifference to me what your mother 
thinks and how she wants to marry you of,” she said, putting 
down the cup with a trembling hand. 
“But we’re not talking about that.”
“No, precisely about that. And let me assure you that I have no 
interest in a heartless woman—whether she be an old lady or 
not, your mother or somebody else—and I don’t want to have 
anything to do with her.”
“Anna, I beg you not to speak disrespectfully of my mother.
“A woman whose heart does not tell her wherein lies the 
happiness and honor of her son—such a woman has no heart.”
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“I repeat my request that you do not speak disrespectfully about 
my mother, whom I respect,” he said, raising his voice and 
looking at her severely. 
“You don’t love your mother. Those are all words, words, words!” 
she said looking at him with hate. 
The theme of respect for his mother, in short, the problem of comme 
il faut behavior and morality, points to a permanent concern of Tolstoy: 
the disjunction between form and content (and the atrophy of the 
latter) in the aristocractic, Petersburg world. Vronsky’s unwillingness 
and inability to come to terms with this hypocrisy in his relations with 
his mother points to the permanent ambiguity that marks his attitude 
toward Anna’s rebellion, on the one hand, and society on the other. It 
is because Anna, both in her essential nature and her actions, refuses 
to tolerate this disjunction of form and content, this rule of hypocrisy 
and façade, because she insists on full integrity in choice and action, 
that she pays the price of vengeance. “You’re very much a whole man 
(tsel’nyi chelovek), Oblonsky remarks on one occasion to Levin. “It’s 
your virtue and your short coming.” The same words, of course, may 
be applied to Anna.
At their last meeting, Vronsky fails to measure the depth of Anna’s 
anxiety and despair and goes away thinking: “‘I’ve tried everything . . . 
only one thing remains, to pay no attention,’ and he began to get ready 
to go to the city, and then to his mother’s again, to get her signature on 
the power of attorney.” Do we not find here the solution to the enigma 
of Vronsky’s composure at the scene of the accident? In the face of an 
event or situation that does not yield to rational endeavor, or of one 
that is beyond the reach of one’s feelings—to pay no attention?
The conclusion of chapter 18, centering on Anna’s reaction to 
the accident of the guard, provides a brilliant psychological climax 
to the chapter. Anna gets into the carriage, her lips trembling, barely 
restraining her tears. Her brother asks her what is the matter.
“It’s a bad omen,” she said.
“What nonsense!” said Stepan Arkadich. “You’ve come, that’s 
the main thing. You can’t imagine how I count on you.”
“And have you known Vronsky for a long time?” she asked.
“Yes. You know we hope that he will marry Kitty.”
“Really?” Anna said quietly. “Well, now let’s talk about you,” 
she added, shaking her head as though she wanted physically to 
drive away something extraneous, oppressive.
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How are we to interpret Anna’s remark “It’s a bad omen”? Of 
central importance in any analysis is the fact that the remark is evoked 
in the context of her meeting with Vronsky. A major preoccupation 
of Tolstoy throughout chapter 18 is to record the mutual interest of 
Vronsky and Anna in its embryonic, at first almost unconscious phase. 
This interest, which first manifests itself almost entirely in terms of 
basic physical instinct, then rises to the conscious game of “coquetry,” 
suddenly is recognized for what it is by Anna (“she, obviously, did not 
want to continue in this tone”) and suppressed, driven underground, 
only to reappear again, almost involuntarily, in another seemingly 
irrelevant context. 
Anna’s remark “Have you known Vronsky long?” at the time 
of the accident, suddenly makes us aware that the appearance of 
Vronsky has upset the internal equilibrium that seems to have been 
manifest in the tension of animation and restraint. The impact of the 
accident in the context of her encounter with Vronsky has aroused in 
Anna a disturbing and pessimistic awareness of her own situation. 
The thoughts that she wishes to drive away are, of course, not at all 
“extraneous” to her nature, but of its very essence. Oblonsky’s twice-
repeated remark at this juncture that he is very much counting on Anna 
to resolve his marital difficulties, have, in retrospect, an irony to them.
It is obvious that Anna’s remark, “it’s a bad omen,” is drawn 
from the depths of her nature. It reflects a feature of her personality 
which the reader often notes: what Dolly calls Anna’s “too gloomy” 
way of looking at things, or what Princess Betsy suggests is Anna’s 
“tendency to look at things too much in a tragic light.” There is even 
a kind of Greek fatality to the character and outlook of Anna. Restlessly, 
actively, almost physically, she seeks out and creates her own reality, 
or realm, to play out her drama. The play of chance, such play as we 
noted at the outset, seems more of an illusion than reality. For such 
a type as Anna, moreover, the opportunity of chance only provides 
a consciously or unconsciously anticipated opening;6 for such a person 
6 No doubt, too, many combinations or circumstances would have led to 
a break or crisis in Anna’s life, provided an opening gambit to the fulfillment 
of her nature. Moreover, all the “chance” elements we have noted are very 
far from being pure chance. Consider the closely interknit family and social 
relations of all the characters involved: the encounter between Vronsky and 
Anna could easily occur again in other circumstances. And in fact, Tolstoy 
lets us know that Vronsky and Anna actually have met before this occasion.
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(Lermontov explored a very extreme example of this type in Pechorin) 
chance is fate. Anna’s comment—“it’s a bad omen”—is a perfect 
illustration of this active, willed transformation into fateful actuality of 
one of those infinite, and endlessly drifting bits of chance that reality 
holds in continual reserve.
For his part, Vronsky responds to Anna’s comment on the level 
of his own ache, the domestic drama which brings Anna to Moscow. 
He finds it ridiculous to see in the accident of the guard a “bad omen” 
for the resolution of his problems. His response—“what nonsense!”—
reflects more than just the sober approach of the reasonable man to 
an admittedly quite subjective, and outwardly at least, superstitious 
reaction: it serves also to distinguish for us, albeit in a rudimentary 
and preliminary way, the ordinary consciousness from one with depth 
and tragic potential. Tolstoy’s instructive juxtaposition of Anna and 
Oblonsky in this interchange, of course, is part of his whole contrast 
between Anna’s tragic drama and Oblonsky’s bourgeois domestic 
drama or melodrama.
Chapter 18, then, constitutes in microcosm the action of the novel 
as a whole as it pertains to Anna. The movement of the chapter from the 
buoyant, physically animated, and emotionally surcharged Anna, who 
steps down from the train, to the emotionally distraught, inward Anna 
of the chapter’s conclusion paraphrases the fall of Anna in the novel 
at large; it lays the psychological and social groundwork for her real 
suicide toward the end of the novel. At the end of chapter 18, the purity 
of Anna’s animation has been compromised and the tragic interiority 
of her nature revealed; by the end of the novel, Anna’s “tendency to 
look at things too much in a tragic light” has become a pathological 
phenomenon enveloping in darkness her entire worldview. 
The principle of realism guiding Tolstoy in this chapter, as 
elsewhere in his work, is one which Chekhov will develop to perfection: 
the view that our casual everyday appearance, behavior, conversation, 
in short, our everyday character and configurations, contain, reflect, 
anticipate the larger shape of our destiny. An old notion, of course, and 
one simply expressed by Heraclitus, “A man’s character is his fate,” but 
one rarely embodied in art with consummate artistic mastery. Much 
of what will be recognized as the typical behavior and action of both 
Anna and Vronsky is discernible in embryonic form in this opening 
phase of their relationship.
The beauty of the chapter lies in Tolstoy’s ability to maintain 
a primary focus upon the “natural” movement of surface action, of 
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ordinary, of casual encounter and conversation, while at the same time, 
disclosing in this seemingly rough and routine material, the texture 
of a dynamic reality rapidly acquiring design and shape. The themes 
of Anna, and also to some extent, those of Vronsky, culminate in the 
episode of the accident. Here, we have an explosion, inaudible and 
almost invisible, that momentarily smashes the “natural” calm of 
everyday life and behavior and brings to the surface the full, usually 
hidden, content of reality: in a single stroke, Tolstoy reveals the tragic 
outlines of the future. The significance of the chapter as it pertains to 
Anna is summed up in its final episode: the death of the guard signals 
the birth of the tragic Anna.
Indeed, the problem of the accident of the guard, Tolstoy’s whole 
choice of the railroad station as a stage to introduce Anna, deserves 
discussion. The fact that the image of the guard recurs to Anna, and 
that she ultimately commits suicide in the same fashion as the guard, 
only points to Tolstoy’s vital preoccupation with the psychological 
motivation of Anna’s suicide. But why, specifically, the death of 
a railroad guard, why a railroad station? Here, Tolstoy’s concern is not 
only with the dramatic and psychological potential of his material, but 
also with its social content and implications. 
The accident of the guard is a symbol and an embodiment, in 
Tolstoy’s novelistic worldview, not of some irrational, metaphysical 
factor in existence that may at any moment strike us down, but of 
the rational disorder of modern social and economic existence. It is of 
cardinal significance that two or three of the most traumatic moments 
of Anna’s existence are played out in interaction with the harsh and 
discordant rhythms of the railroad. The iron railroad or jarring train, 
as a symbol of dislocation of life, as an embodiment of new forces 
ruthlessly destroying the old patterns of patriarchal existence, becomes 
in Anna Karenina (as it does later, in a didactic way, in The Kreutzer 
Sonata) a symbol for the disorders of individual and family existence.
The accident of the guard is not an occurrence of chance (except 
in the sense that it happens today and not tomorrow, to this guard and 
not to that one); it emerges, as a concrete possibility, from the actuality 
of an emerging capitalist existence, that “external civilization”7 which 
7 Levin’s phrase in Anna Karenina, see chapter 25, part five, where he 
enumerates the features of this “European” civilization carried over into 
Russia: “in particular the means of communications, the railroad, which 
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increasingly alienates man from the products of his labor; from the 
sense of “usefulness” of his labor, and from those organic harmonies 
of man and labor which Tolstoy extols in his famous collective mowing 
scene in the novel. (When Levin asks that “we try to think of labor 
not in the European way,” not as “abstract man power, but as the 
Russian peasant with his instincts,” he is appealing also for a rational 
humanization of the labor process, a return to the “useful” labor of 
a patriarchal, agricultural existence.) Anna’s suicide, likewise, is a final 
result of an alienation which for Tolstoy is rooted socially in the same 
dislocations and contradictions that the railroads bring to Russian 
life, dislocations which somehow acquire a unique and terrifying 
embodiment, in all its abstraction and senselessness and brutality, in 
the accident or suicide of the guard . . ..8
Yet Anna’s tragedy is firmly rooted in her own peculiar nature: 
her decision to commit suicide, as well as her choice of a particular 
form of suicide, may and must be explained in terms of her nature 
and of her unique personal history in which chance plays a role 
(though a minimal one). In short, there had to be a particular person 
of the nature of Anna Karenina and a particular combination of 
personal circumstances for there to have been a tragedy of the kind 
we have in this novel. But it is no less true that the Anna we know is 
inseparable from the problem content of the Russian society in which 
she lives; her rebellion, indeed the specific character of that rebellion, 
is in large part marked by the society which is the object of her 
rebellion. 
In the light of these considerations, chapter 18 emerges as one 
of the most important and decisive ones in the novel. Here we have 
brought about centralization in the cities, the growth of luxury and as 
a result—to the detriment of agriculture—the development of industry, the 
credit system with its concomitant—speculation on the Stock Market.”
8 Tolstoy, it should be noted, is somewhat ambiguous on this point. As 
omniscient author he writes: “The guard, either because he was drunk or 
too muffled up against the bitter cold, had not heard the train shunting 
back and had been crushed.” The bystanders, however, have a different 
impression: “What?.. What?.. Where?.. Threw himself under!.. was 
crushed!.. people passing by were heard saying.” The notion of the suicide 
of the guard, therefore, is planted, rightly or wrongly, in Anna’s mind— 
a psychological detail that neatly enters into the general motivation of her 
suicide. 
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both “complication” and denouement. For the death of the guard and 
the death of Anna in the stupendous social perspective of Tolstoy are 
neither mutually detached phenomena nor accidents of chance, but—
the one inert, the other conscious—ineluctable phenomena of a society, 
like the obsessed Ahab, rushing toward catastrophe on iron rails.
In the final summation, one recognizes a distinct parallel and 
ultimate convergence in the lines of personal, that is, psychological, 
and also social motivation or fatality in Anna Karenina. It is precisely 
the convergence and organic unity of these lines that provides the 
tragedy of Anna with its depth, its amplitude, in the final analysis, its 
grandeur. Yet in positing the overwhelming elements of psychological 
and social fatality, one does not deny the indispensable elements of 
freedom in Anna’s tragedy. This freedom lies in the conscious choice of 
a tragic destiny. This will to meet one’s destiny (which for the novelist 
Tolstoy is always concrete, social, historical) is a will to reach out and 
exemplify one’s personal fate through an exploration of the limits of 
one’s reality. A character exercises his enormous potential of freedom, 
and there are moments of critical choice, when he chooses to explore 
these limits, whether out of a sense of a lofty ideal, a sense of personal 
injustice, or a feeling of incompleteness. Such a character, on the 
subjective plane, tests his freedom and discovers his inherent fatality. 
But objectively, such a character rises above the purely individual and 
pedestrian precisely because his discovered fate embodies more of the 
necessity of social existence. Anna, of course, is revealed in this unique, 
tragic perspective, one which, through its total illumination of reality, 
seems to transcend fatality itself.
Breaking the Moral Barrier: 
anna karenina’s night Train to st. Petersburg1
Dante’s dramatic situations are not lapses from his subject; 
they are his moral subject given in images of action . . . The 
“scenes” in Hell are the true demonstrations of the nature of 
error. They are “experience”—and as such properly contain 
the clues to all general ideas.
—Irma Brandeis, 
The Ladder of Vision: A Study of Dante’s Comedy
Anna’s night journey to St. Petersburg (part 1, chapter 29) is one of the 
great transitional moments in her drama. Her experience dramatizes 
a state of intense moral and psychological conflict in which a powerful 
passion crashes through a barrier of will and conscience. Tolstoy’s 
account of this internal experience is remarkable for its representation 
of Anna’s epic crisis. The battle engages her entire being, physical, 
psychological, moral, and spiritual, drawing in her immediate 
surroundings and nature in the broadest sense of the term.
In Tolstoy’s view, we are never separate from the world around 
us. We are in extricably a part of reality: we relate to it consciously and 
unconsciously; it participates in our moods, choices, and decisions. 
There is the fatality of individual human character, to be sure, but chance 
and circumstance, playing at its edges, ever seeking an entrance, probe 
and test our defenses, our strengths and weaknesses, our uncertainties 
and ambiguities, thus measuring what we are and defining our ever-
shifting margins of freedom. We are free but within limits. Tolstoy’s art 
and vision are based on this recognition.
Anna is free and therefore responsible. Yet as this scene discloses 
almost from its first line, she is increasingly ravaged by the opposite 
1 The essay published here appeared under the title of “The Night Journey: 
Anna Karenina’s Return to Saint Petersburg,” in Approaches to Teaching 
Tolstoy’s ‘Anna Karenina’, ed. Liza Knapp and Amy Mandelker (New York: 
MLA, 2003), 150-160. An earlier version of the essay appeared in Life and 
Text: Essays in Honour of Geir Kjetsaa on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday, ed. 
E. Egeberg, et al. (Oslo: 1997), 159-168.
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pulls of her nature: overflowing energy and moral awareness, a sense 
both for what is right and good and for what she feels is good for her. 
In this respect, she embodies the human dilemma of all people at all 
times. One thing is certain: for Tolstoy, actions have consequences.
Anna’s journey into the night begins with the words “Well, that’s 
all over, thank God!”2 Anna is referring to her encounter with Vronsky in 
Moscow. Two thoughts come to mind with respect to this exclamation: 
first, nothing is ever completely over or finished, least of all when a pas- 
sion or obsession is involved. Where temptation and moral conflict are 
concerned, the moment of imagined freedom is often the moment of 
greatest vulnerability and danger. Such is the case with Raskolnikov in 
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment when, after his nightmare, he says 
to himself, “Thank God, it’s only a dream!” and, a short while later, 
exclaims, “Freedom, freedom! He is free from that spell . . . from the 
temptation.”3 Yet he is not free, as his fervent prayer for help attests, 
“Lord! . . . Show me my way, and I’ll renounce this cursed . . . dream of 
mine” (part 1, chapter 5). God helps those who help themselves.
Anna thanks God a second time at the end of the first paragraph, 
“Thank God, tomorrow I shall see Seryozha and Alexei Alexandrovich 
again, and my good and accustomed life will go on as of old.” Here, 
again, her feeling of release or freedom from the passion that has taken 
root in her is deceptive. She has not reflected seriously on her real 
feelings for Vronsky, on her actions in Moscow, or on what lies beneath 
her “good and accustomed life.”
Every aspect of ourselves, even the slightest gesture, Tolstoy 
believes, belongs to a unity of self. Anna is playing a cunning game 
with herself. The narrator mentions her “deft (lovkii) little hands” as 
they reach into her red bag. “Lovkii” here may variously be translated 
as “deft, dexterous, agile,” but the word may also suggest “cunning.” 
Anna’s deft hands (in this scene, her hands are very expressive of her 
feelings) at this moment suggest something of her evasive state of 
mind, her inability to face her feelings squarely. These same deft hands 
2 Quotations are from the Louise and Aylmer Maude translation of Anna 
Karenina. For purposes of analysis I have occasionally amended this 
translation.
3 We have here an interesting version of Dostoevsky’s use of the indirect 
narrative style, one that in this instance underscores Raskolnikov’s distance 
from the reality of his inner, unrecognized inclinations.
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take out from her bag “a paper knife and an English novel,”4 both of 
which will play a role in her inner drama.
She settles down and tries to read the novel. But to grasp fully 
her slow descent into a state of profound, if momentary, mental and 
physical turmoil, one must take into account not only what is on her 
mind or just beneath its surface, but also the somewhat eerie and 
disorienting environment in which she finds herself: surroundings 
that seem at once to impress themselves on her inner world, and 
increasingly, to express what is going on in that world.
The “semi-light” or “semidarkness” (the narrator uses both 
phrases) of the train compartment mimics a marginal world of 
consciousness, one precariously balanced between reality and dream. 
The invalid and two other women in the compartment; the noise 
of the train and the bustle of people passing through; the muffled 
conductor on his way through the train covered with snow on one 
side; the maid Annushka with her broad hands and a hole in one of 
her gloves; the snatches of conversation; the movement of the cars; 
the erratic changes in heat and cold in the compartment; and the talk 
of “an awful snowstorm . . . raging outside”—all this not only distracts 
Anna, but also enters into her anxious mental state. As though to 
underscore the unsettling impact of her surroundings, the narrator 
reiterates:
And so it went on and on: the same jolting and knocking, the 
same beating of the snow on the windowpane, the same rapid 
changes from steaming heat to cold, and back again to heat, the 
gleam of the same faces through the semidarkness, and the same 
voices—but at last Anna began to read and to follow what she 
read. 
“My good and accustomed life will go on as of old,” Anna had 
remarked com placently as she settled down in her seat. However, 
the unsettling experience of the train and the railroad itself, of this 
invention of modern industrial capitalism tearing into and tearing up 
the old agricultural and patriarchal way of life of Russia, an essential 
ingredient in Tolstoy’s conception of the tragedy of Anna in general, 
portends a different outcome.
4 “Razreznoi nozhik”—a little paper knife or paper cutter (nozhik is a diminu-
tive for nozh [knife]).
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Seated in the semidarkness of the compartment, Anna tries to 
make her way into the uncut pages of an English novel. “At first she 
could not read” and only later “began to read and to follow what she 
was reading.”5 Anna is not actively reading or only a part of her is 
reading. Her attention is drawn to what is going on around her. Finally, 
however, “she read and understood, but it was unpleasant to read.” 
Anna wants to live. “She was too eager to live herself.” This phrase 
in Russian (ei khotelos’), an impersonal reflexive form of the verb “to 
want” that is used four times6 not only underscores Anna’s desire 
but also suggests a drive to live that is almost outside her. “But there 
was nothing to be done, so she forced herself to read, while fingering 
(perebiraia) the smooth little paper knife.”
The paper knife first appears as a utility tool that cuts a path into 
the romantically engaging English novel. The instrument, however, 
fits Anna’s hands, as it were, lending itself to her deep psychic needs 
and desires. Her restless fingering of the paper knife speaks of her 
frustrated desire to make her way into a novel or romance of her own 
life. “She was too eager to live herself . . . But there was nothing to be 
done.”
What she desires arouses in her a feeling of shame. The question 
of shame comes up in connection with the English novel and its hero. 
“The hero of the novel had nearly attained to his English happiness of 
a baronetcy and an estate, and Anna wanted to go off to the estate with 
him, when suddenly she felt that he must have been ashamed, and 
that she was ashamed of the same thing—but what was he ashamed 
of? ‘What am I ashamed of?’” asks Anna, opening up a dialogue with 
herself. Tolstoy, master of the interior monologue, so often consisting 
of a dialectic of inner voices disclosing and advancing conflict, opens 
the processes of Anna’s troubled consciousness and conscience.
She conflates the hero and heroine in the English novel with 
herself and Vronsky. She challenges herself over her shame; indignant, 
she asks herself, “What am I ashamed of?” “She put down her book, 
5 The use of impersonal or passive constructions (chitalos’, chitaemoe) in 
the Russian original accents the passive character of Anna’s reading, her 
distraction or detachment.
6 On this point see Richard F. Gustafson’s discussion in his study, Leo 
Tolstoy, Resident and Stranger: A Study in Fiction and Theology (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univeristy Press, 1986), 304-305. 
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leaned back, and clasped the paper-knife tightly in both hands. There 
was nothing to be ashamed of,” comes the answer. Appropriately, this 
declaration of her freedom from shame directly follows the observation 
that she was clasping the paper knife tightly in both hands, an advance 
beyond merely fingering it.
The paper knife in Anna’s hands now seems to give expression 
not only to her restlessness and impatience, but also to her will to self-
empowerment. The gripping hands point to the destructive character 
of her passion.7 What is implicit here is not only the defiance of social 
convention, but the destruction of family life as a consequence of 
arbitrarily making her way out of family life and entering another 
novel or romance of adultery. The pen knife as metaphor unites 
Anna’s physical and mental action of reading, the narrative action of 
the English novel, and her overpowering will to life, a will that in the 
nature of things must involve the cutting of bonds.
On the note of no shame, Anna sorts through (perebrala) her 
Moscow recollections. “They were all good and pleasant.” Tolstoy’s 
use of the verb perebrat’—earlier used in its imperfective form to 
describe Anna fingering or toying with the paper knife, but now used 
in the related sense of sorting out or sifting through recollections—
is not accidental. Anna undergoes a process of remembering or more 
tangibly working her way toward the source of her restless feelings 
and desires: her passionate attraction to Vronsky.
The Anna who has just expressed her freedom from shame now 
recalls her “good and pleasant” Moscow stay.
She recalled the ball and Vronsky and his humble, enamoured 
gaze, and their relations with one another; there was nothing to 
be ashamed of. And yet at that very point of her recollections 
when she remembered Vronsky, the feeling of shame grew 
stronger and some inner voice seemed to say to her, “warm, very 
warm, hot!” “Well, what of it?” she finally said to herself with 
decision, changing her position on the seat. 
Increasingly, Tolstoy suggests the interaction of heat in the 
compartment and erotic heat in Anna’s consciousness. The heat on the 
train seems to prompt her words and passion as she moves closer to 
7 See the discussion of the paper knife in Edward Wasiolek, Tolstoy’s Major 
Fiction (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 135.
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the source of her alternating feelings of shame and defiance. Again, 
Tolstoy, master psychologist, points to the subtle interplay of the 
objective and subjective worlds, of the physiological and psychological. 
He also points to the sometimes imperceptible pressures that external 
experience or phenomena, at critical moments and in the way of chance, 
may have on the subtle oscillations of an inner conflict.
“Warm, very warm, hot”: to this conventional phrase that in the 
ubiquitous guessing game announces that the player is getting closer 
and closer to the truth, that is, closer to guessing some place, object, or 
phenomenon; to this inner voice Anna, resolutely shifting in her seat, 
answers with a phrase that suggests that she knows very well what 
the matter is about but doesn’t care: “Nu, chto zhe?”—an expression 
in Russian that may be translated as “Well, so what?” or “Well, what 
of it!” 
The guessing-game words do not prelude a disclosure. They 
constitute the disclosure: erotic heat, passion. (“Hot” here is a trans-
lation of the Russian goriachii, a word that may also be translated as 
“burning” or “passionate.”)
Anna’s “Well, so what?” or “What of it?” both concedes the reality 
of her erotic interest and defiantly embraces it. And yet with a degree of 
uncertainty Anna still asks herself at this point, “What does this mean? 
Am I really afraid to look straight at it?” And again, as though taking 
a good look at the matter, she responds again, “Well, what of it?” She 
then discloses what is on her mind: “Is it possible that there exists, 
or could exist, between me and this officer-boy any relations differing 
from those with other acquaintances?” She smiles “disdainfully and 
again took up her novel; but now she absolutely could not understand 
what she was reading.” The narrative of her own life has blotted out the 
fictional world of reading. A relationship between a married woman 
and an officer boy strikes her as incongruous. Yet incongruities lie at 
the root of life. Anna herself wishes to relive her youth.
She asks whether sexual relations exist or could exist between 
her and Vronsky. The use of the present tense in the first part of the 
phrase suggests that an erotic relationship already exists between her 
and Vronsky, that is, she clearly has experienced an erotic attraction to 
him.
She smiles disdainfully at the idea, yet thoughts, emotions, 
questions, and answers follow rapidly on each other in her mind. 
Her smile dissolves almost instantly into another kind of feeling, 
an awareness that marks a resolution of her internal dialogue. This 
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new feeling is accompanied by a gesture with the paper knife: “She 
passed her paper knife over the window-pane, then pressed its cold 
smooth surface against her cheek and almost laughed aloud, suddenly 
overcome with unreasoning joy.” 
The paper knife, which at first served a concrete function as 
a paper cutter, then served figuratively as an embodiment of her 
restless desire to open a way to a romance of her own, then made 
manifest the destructive implications of her passion and will to self-
empowerment, now in an organic way conveys to Anna the heat of her 
passion. Whether the warmth of her cheeks is the flush of shameful 
erotic awareness, the warmth of her body or both—Tolstoy indeed 
is pointing again to the responsiveness of two temperatures to each 
other—the message is clear.
The testing of the cold blade against the warmth of her cheeks 
signals the moment when the heat of passion, the object of passion, 
and the acceptance of passion merge in Anna’s consciousness. Anna 
embraces her shame, and shame becomes shameless. Her loud but 
suppressed cry of almost primitive, orgiastic joy preludes her breaking 
through the barrier of her inner sense of what is good or right (all that 
motivates her sense of shame) to her egoistic sense of what she feels is 
good for her. Ethical reality is momentarily lost in an esthetic or sensual 
reality. The ideal unity between the good and the beautiful is sundered 
when the pull of passion triumphs. 
The focus here is not primarily on the paper knife as a phallic 
object or image. Tolstoy recognizes the universal sign and its 
significance in the realm of the subconscious. He is not concerned 
with sexual imaging, however, but with relationships. He is interested, 
in this final appearance of the pen knife, in the way it mediates the 
relation between mind and body, between the sensuous and sensual, 
between the storm outside and the storm within; he is concerned with 
depicting that moment when sexuality, suffusing Anna’s whole being 
and consciousness, makes its age-old claims. It is the sublimation 
of the sexual object, of phallic imaging, not its actualization or 
realization in explicit imaginative terms that gives this episode its 
power.
Anna’s deliriums, her hallucinations, or what we might, for 
convenience’s sake, call her nightmare, follow on her recognition and her 
joyful acceptance of her sexuality, her shame, her passion for Vronsky. 
Her passion is the focal point of her nightmare, but the nightmare 
itself centers on the conflict this passion arouses in her, with her inner 
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awareness of the consequences of her passion for Vronsky. What we 
are witness to are the convulsions of conscience. The emotional climax 
of those convulsions is both a vicarious experience of sexuality and 
a premonition of death—a premonition linked with her encounter with 
Vronsky at the railroad station and her troubled reaction to the death 
of the guard. 
There is, finally, the biological link that Tolstoy establishes 
between the procreative sexual instinct and death: he alludes to it, for 
example, in “Father Sergius” (1891). In the temptation scene of that 
story, the beautiful widow Makovkina calls out to Father Sergius in 
his cell, “For God’s sake! Oh, come to me! I am dying, oh!” A moment 
earlier Sergius formulated the temptation he is prey to with an image 
that shares with Makovkina’s words a common subtext: “a solitary 
couch is a coffin.”8 In the deepest biological sense, then, Tolstoy 
perceives the sexual drive as beyond good and evil; it serves the laws 
of nature, the ineluctable rhythms of life and death. Procreation, not 
pleasure, governs sexuality, Tolstoy insists in Anna Karenina. Yet in the 
same breath, he recognizes that his beloved Anna, like every human 
being, moves freely about within the iron triangle of desire, conscience, 
and the law of life.
Anna’s struggle for and against her passion (her nightmare 
is about this struggle) is complex. It is presided over by a living 
conscience; it is marked by what Anna’s sister-in-law Dolly Oblonsky 
calls Anna’s “too gloomy” (slishkom mrachno) way of looking at things 
and by what Princess Betsy (a person wholly disinclined to meditate 
on moral issues) with irony calls Anna’s inclination “to take things too 
tragically.” This complexity, Anna’s whole nature, one that includes 
a fully awakened sexuality, manifests itself in her delirious inner 
turmoil. In respect of this deep and essentially tragic nature, Anna is 
much the opposite of her brother Stephen Oblonsky (his dalliance with 
a former French governess is a focus of attention at the beginning of 
the novel), a person of good heart but shallow nature, a man in whom 
the erotic drive is also powerful, but unlike in Anna, transparent and 
trivial.
Anna’s experience of joy quickly passes into an experience of 
disorientation, delirium, and terror. Tolstoy conveys the implications 
8 For full discussion of this episode, see my essay, “Father Sergius and the 
Paradox of the Fortunate Fall,” in Russian Literature 40 (1996): 469-472.
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of her distress in lines of extraordinary artistic and psychological 
power and depth:
She felt that her nerves were being stretched like strings drawn tighter 
and tighter round pegs. She felt her eyes opening wider, her fingers 
and toes nervously moving, and something inside her stopping her 
breath, and all the forms and sounds in the swaying semidarkness 
around struck her with unusual vividness. Momentary doubts kept 
occurring in her mind as to whether the train was moving forwards 
or backwards, or standing still. Was it Annushka who was sitting 
beside her, or a stranger? “And am I here, myself? Am I myself or 
another?” She was afraid of giving way to this oblivion (zabyt’e). 
Something seemed to draw her to it, but she could at will yield to 
it or resist. To get over it she rose, threw off her wrap, and took off 
the cape of her coat. She came to her senses for a moment, and knew 
that the lean peasant in the nankin coat with a button missing who 
had come into the compartment was the carriage stoker and was 
looking at the thermometer, and that the wind and snow rushed in 
when he opened the door; but afterwards everything again became 
confused . . .9
The transition in Anna to a new perception of herself and life, 
the overcoming of moral resistance in herself to her involvement with 
Vronsky, takes on the form of violent and chaotic sensations that seize 
her entire being. The implications of her passion are traumatic. She 
experiences her choice in the form of an almost delirious disorientation. 
The storm of sensory experience around her, like the furious wind and 
snow that bursts into the train in the wake of the peasant-stoker who has 
come to check the thermometer, not only symbolizes her disorientation 
but also contributes to her inner turmoil.
In all this chaos of dying and birth, it would seem that Anna is 
at the mercy of an implacable determinism, at the mercy of elements, 
internal and external, driving her into a new world of judgment and 
experience. Yet the elements that participate in this upheaval (and 
chance plays a role here) express both her elemental breakthrough to 
a new state of consciousness and her conflict and resistance. Anna is 
9 Zabyt’e (oblivion) is linked etymologically with zabyt’ (to forget); it may 
refer to a half-conscious state, oblivion, a drowsy state, or a moment of 
distraction or separation from surroundings, as when in excitement people 
lose track of their whereabouts or of what is going on around them.
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not a victim. She is conscious of her freedom throughout.10 “She was 
afraid of giving way to this oblivion. Something seemed to draw her 
to it, but she could at will yield to it or resist (i ona po proizvolu mogla 
otdavat’sia emu i vozderzhivat’sia).
I have translated Tolstoy’s “po proizvolu” as “at will.” Proizvol 
has roughly three distinct though related meanings in Russian: one’s 
own choice, desire; self-will (svoevolie); arbitrariness. Tolstoy’s use of 
this phrase is marked by calculated ambiguity. In the context, Anna can 
freely choose to yield to oblivion (zabyt’e) or to resist it. Yet the phrase 
also suggests that yielding to oblivion involves a certain anarchic self-
will. If, as we read the passage silently or out loud, we take in as a 
unity the first semantic unit—“ona po proizvolu mogla otdavat’sia 
emu”—we become aware of the meaning of proizvol as “self-will” or 
“arbitrariness” (thus, we might translate, “out of self-will she could 
yield to [oblivion]”). As we read on, however, and take in the phrase 
“i vozderzhivat’sia” (or resist), thereby forming a new and larger 
semantic unit, our understanding of the word proizvol reverts to the 
idea of “at will,” that is, to the idea of freedom to choose.
Using the Russian phrase po proizvolu with its variant meanings 
to convey Anna’s thought processes, Tolstoy encapsulates the 
conflicting pulls in her, strains that find expression as we have noted, 
in such strange sensations as “whether the train was moving forwards 
or backwards,” or in her wondering who was sitting beside her or 
whether she was herself or somebody else. Anna fears giving way to 
this oblivion, that is, to the condition of a person who has lost a sense 
of her whereabouts or relation to what is going on around or in her. 
The Russian word for oblivion also evokes the terror of forgetting that 
she is married.
Anna, then, still possesses moral freedom, though this freedom 
(as with all freedom) is not unconditional, not absolute.11 It is manifested 
in her awareness that she can yield to or resist the forces drawing her 
into the abyss, but it is also—her moral consciousness, her agonizing 
choice—the storm she experiences, her disorientation, her terror.
10 Gary L. Browning also makes this point in “The Death of Anna Karenina: 
Anna’s Share of the Blame,” Slavic and East European Journal 30 (1986): 
329. 
11 Tolstoy broadly develops this idea in his historical-philosophical discourse 
in the second epilogue of War and Peace.
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“But afterwards everything again became confused . . .” (no potom 
opiat’ vse smeshalos’ . .  ): these words form the gateway to the dramatic 
and ominous climax of Anna’s nightmare. The first time the narrator 
uses the phrase vse smeshalos’ (everything was confused) is in the 
second paragraph of Anna Karenina: “Everything was [in confusion] 
in the Oblonsky’s household” (Vse smeshalos’ v dome Oblonskikh). The 
painful dismemberment of the family (the body, the body of the family 
household; on the symbolic plane, the church and its congregation) 
constitutes the subtext of the opening two paragraphs of the novel, 
which introduce, as we have noted, the infidelity of Stephen Oblonsky 
and its familial consequences.12 Not without reason do the words 
“everything was in confusion” prelude the ominous ending of Anna’s 
hallucinations, one marked by a sense of almost apocalyptic chaos, 
dismemberment, and destruction.
Everything was in confusion . . . The peasant in the long coat 
started gnawing at something on the wall; the old woman began 
stretching her legs the whole length of the carriage and filled it 
with a black cloud; then something squeaked and clattered in a 
dreadful manner, as if someone were being torn to pieces; then 
a blinding red light appeared, and at last everything was hidden 
by a wall. Anna felt as if she had fallen through the floor. But all 
this did not seem dreadful, but gay. The voice of a man wrapped 
up and covered with snow shouted something just above her ear. 
She rose and came to herself. 
These lines—the images of the black cloud and the red fire, the 
dreadful screech and clatter, the sense of somebody “being torn to 
pieces,” and the wall (death) blanking out everything—clearly point 
back to the terrible accident at the railroad station an accident that so 
morbidly affected Anna (“It is a bad omen”) precisely in the context 
of her nascent interest in Vronsky. In this accident, a muffled guard on 
the tracks is caught unaware and crushed by a train. The same lines 
depicting Anna’s hallucination also point forward to the “darkness” 
(mrak) of her state of mind before her suicide and to her dismemberment 
12 See my discussion of the first and second paragraph of Anna Karenina, “On 
the Ambivalent Beginning of Anna Karenina,” in Semantic Analysis of Literary 
Texts: To Honour Jan van der Eng on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, ed. Eric 
de Haard, et al. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1990), 345-352.
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at a railroad station. Her death is closely linked with the unraveling 
of her relationship with Vronsky and with the destruction of the 
family.
Death images dominate the climax of Anna’s hallucinations. 
Every detail in Tolstoy’s art carries meaning. The mysterious old 
lady (starushka) of Anna’s hallucination “began stretching her legs 
the whole length of the carriage.” The Russian phrase “protiagivat’ 
nogi”—to stretch out, to extend one’s legs (forward)—also may mean, 
colloquially, “to turn up one’s toes,” that is, to die. Stretched out the 
full length of the railroad carriage, the old lady lies as in a coffin. The 
symbolic message of the old woman of Anna’s hallucination and of the 
black cloud is death.
Tolstoy’s image of the old woman is probably an allusion to Baba 
the Bony-Legged One, the notorious sorceress of Slavic mythology. 
Baba Yaga, as she is known, lives in a forest in a hut that stands on 
chicken legs; it is surrounded by a fence of human bones and skull 
heads. She likes to eat people, and is consequently, continually trying 
to stuff them into her oven. The folklorist Vladimir Propp suggested 
that the reason Baba Yaga’s head, body, and legs fill the hut is not 
because she is large, but because, appropriate to her role as guardian 
of the realm of death, she lives in a coffin. The old woman of Anna’s 
hallucination echoes the fat woman who at the beginning of part 1, 
chapter 29, talks about the heat as she wraps up her legs. The railroad 
carriage is of course coffin-shaped; as we have noted, the railroad in 
Anna Karenina (as in Tolstoy’s later work The Kreutzer Sonata) is both 
as symbol and social phenomenon, an embodiment of death and 
destruction.
Anna instinctively comprehends the images of death in her 
dream, but their full message does not reach her in her conscious state. 
After a massive inner conflict over her passion, she falls. Figuratively 
speaking, she dies; her death, however, is also rebirth, but in a fallen 
state.
Her recognition of her desire for transgression begins with 
“unreasoning joy” and is quickly replaced by feelings of terror; in turn, 
her terror, at the end, abruptly is replaced by an unnatural sense of 
gaiety. This strange levity would seem simultaneously to symbolize 
both her denial of and delight in her fall. “But all this [experience of 
falling] did not seem dreadful, but gay.” The account of her night 
journey ends on not a falling but a rising note. Her state of mind seems 
artificially illuminated, like the station platform.
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The train arrives at a station. Anna steps out onto the platform 
where the whistling wind disputes with her over whether she should 
go out of the door of the carriage or whether it, the wind, should go 
in. “And this too struck her as gay.” She steps out into the fresh air: 
the wind whistles gaily “and tried to seize and carry her off.” We have 
here a final reminder of what Anna’s internal storm has accomplished 
and of the euphoric feelings it has paradoxically engendered in her. 
She has arrived at a new station in her life. “With enjoyment she drew 
in full breaths of the snowy, frosty air as she stood beside her carriage 
looking round at the platform and the lighted station.” Does she, like 
Raskolnikov after his nightmare, feel inwardly free of her temptation 
and obsession? Whatever the answer, her meeting with Vronsky on the 
same station platform only moments later makes it clear that she is not 
at all free. “Her face beamed with a joy and admiration she could not 
repress.” 
What connection, we may ask in conclusion, is there between 
the beginning of chapter 29—“Well, that’s all over, thank God!”—and 
its end? We can, indeed, say at the end of the chapter that everything 
is over: not her relations with Vronsky, however, but her “good and 
accustomed life,” a life that until now has taken a routine and familiar 
course. That particular chapter in the novel of her life has come to an 
end. A new chapter will open, just as a new one has begun for Vronsky, 
a man who, unlike Anna, is not inclined to view things tragically. This 
new drama, involving Anna, Vronsky, Karenin, and her son Serezha, 
among many others, will be not routine or simple in character but 
fatefully complicated; it will bring Anna into conflict with society and 
herself; it will finally lead her to the realization that one cannot get 
away from oneself. 
For the moment, however, “all this did not seem dreadful, but 
gay,” remarks the narrator immediately after her fall. We have a hint 
of the future in the line that follows this remark, “The voice of a man 
wrapped up and covered with snow shouted something just above her 
ear.” What this man, a conductor or trainman, literally shouts into her 
ear is not of significance to us; what this same cloaked man, clearly 
a fate-figure in the novel, shouts into her unhearing ear she will learn 
in the final moments of her life, when “the candle, by the light of which 
she had been reading that book filled with anxieties, deceptions, grief, 
and evil, flared up with a brighter light than before, lit up for her all 
that had before been dark, flickered, began to grow dim, and went out 
for ever.” 
uzhas in the subtext: 
Tolstoy’s the death oF ivan ilych1
He is a god of art.
—F. M. Dostoevsky
1
“Andreyev says, ‘Boo!’ but I am not afraid,” Leo Tolstoy once remarked 
apropos of some of Leonid Andreyev’s tales of horror and death. 
Tolstoy had a very keen sense of the distinction between melodrama 
and drama. His Death of Ivan Ilych (Smert’ Ivana Il’icha, 1886) is a case in 
point. There are disturbing moments in this tale’s treatment of illness 
and death, but the elements of horror or terror (uzhas)2 in the story do 
not belong to melodrama. Tolstoy’s purpose is not to say “Boo!” to the 
reader, that is, to frighten him to death, but rather to wake him up to life. 
Yet a part of the story’s intense power does rest in Tolstoy’s presentation 
of the general sense of horror, fear, and fright that contact with death 
typically arouses in people, if not on the plane of consciousness, where 
all sorts of defensive mechanisms are at work, then in the subconscious 
where the horror is stored. 
1 First published under the title of “Text and Subtext in the Opening and 
Closing Lines of The Death of Ivan Ilych, or, Phonetic Orchestration in the 
Semantic Development of the Story,” in Tolstoy Studies Journal, 4 (1997): 11-24.
2 “Uzhas”—the feeling or state of a very strong sense of fright or terror. As 
a noun it may be translated as “horror” or “terror.” As a verb the word 
appears in some Slavic languages, including Russian, in the sense of “to 
frighten” (uzhasat’ / uzhasnut’). “A difficult word,” the linguist Max Vasmer 
remarks apropos of the etymology of “uzhas.” He suggests that “uzhas” 
may be connected with “gasit’” (to extinguish), a word rooted in the Indo-
European. See Max Vasmer, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Russischen 
Sprache (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1950-1958), 175. “Uzhas” and its cognate 
“uzhasno” are key words on the semantic plane of The Death of Ivan Ilych. 
The subtext In Tolstoy’s use of “uzhas” in the story invariably alludes to 
death.
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The first sentence of The Death of Ivan Ilych opens with the words 
“In a large building of the law courts”—followed by a reference to 
Ivan Ilyich’s law colleagues who are in a room discussing whether 
a particular case is or is not subject to their jurisdiction. One person 
argues that it is not subject, another argues that it is. A third judge who 
takes no part in the discussion, but who has been leafing through the 
most recent issue of the newspaper, “Vedomosti” (News), breaks in: 
“Gentlemen!” (gospoda)3 he said, “Ivan Ilych has died.”
“Really!” (Neuzheli)
“Here, read it yourself,” he said to Fyodor Vasilevich, handing 
him a paper damp off the press (svezhii, pakhuchii eshche nomer—
literally, “a fresh, still-smelling issue or number”). [1]4
The lordly members of the court are deciding questions of 
jurisdiction. At this very moment, information about the Supreme 
Judgment, as it were, is handed down to one of its members: death. 
Ivan llych has been struck down. How do the little earth gods respond? 
The news is received with incredulity: “Neuzheli?”—“Really?” We 
shall return to this response and to the word in particular.
Noteworthy at this point is the manner in which Tolstoy 
structures the opening lines of the story and the way in which words 
and images echo each other so as to deepen our perception of the 
world of Judge Ivan Ilych. Two paragraphs of descriptive material are 
separated by three lines of dialogue at the center of which is the pivotal 
word “Neuzheli?” The first sentence, opening with the words “In 
a large building” is followed, as we have noted, by a brief account of the 
deliberations of Ivan Ilych’s colleagues. The second paragraph opens 
with the words “Surrounded by the black border was printed . . .”; 
these words are followed by a conventionally worded obituary: 
“Praskovya Fyodorovna Golovina, with profound sorrow, informs 
3 “Gospoda,” the plural of “gospodin”—gentleman, master. In Russian, the 
word is etymologically connected with the word “Gospod'”—the Lord.
4 Roman numerals after quotations refer the reader to the chapter of 
The Death of Ivan Ilych in which the quotation appears. In this essay 
I use Louise and Aylmer Maude’s translation of The Death of Ivan 
Ilych (London: Oxford University Press [The World’s Classics], 1935). 
For purposes of analysis I have in a number of cases amended the 
translation.
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relatives and friends of the demise of her beloved husband, a member 
of the Appellate Court,” etc.
The two paragraphs or worlds stand in direct relation to one 
another. The world of the law court and the world of the obituary 
notice are “dead” institutions in which everything works to exclude 
feeling and humanity. The rituals of law, like the rituals and rites 
involving death, not only encase people in a formulaic way, but serve 
to obscure or mask meaning and essence. The “large building” housing 
the Appellate Court, like the black-bordered obituary and the world it 
signifies, Tolstoy suggests, is a dead house.
The two paragraphs are linked on the semantic plane in various 
ways. At the end of the first paragraph, Pyotr Ivanovich, one of Ivan 
Ilych’s colleagues, is leafing through the latest number of Vedomosti. 
The last words of the second paragraph refer to the vynos tela, literally, 
the “car rying out of the body” or funeral of Ivan Ilych. Such is the latest 
and oldest “news” (Vedomosti) or knowledge (vedoma). Death. “Gospod’ 
vedaet”—“the Lord knows.” Vedomost’ may also mean “register” or 
“list.” The juxtaposition of the first and third lines of the dialogue “Ivan 
ll’ich-to umer” and “svezhii pakhuchii eshche nomer” (my italics—RLJ) 
serves to accent on the symbolic semantic plane of the narrative the 
fact that Ivan Ilych is not only on the Lord’s list, but that he is a “freshly 
smelling” “number” or issue.5 This is a colossal put-down for the little 
earth god. 
Pyotr Ivanovich and his colleagues are all on the Lord’s list. 
The general response of Ivan IIych’s friends to his death, however, is 
one of evasion, suppression and denial: “Neuzheli?”—a word that 
may be translated as “Really?” “Is it possible?” “You don’t say?” and 
literally as “already?” “not already?” (ne uzhe li). The interrogative 
particle “neuzheli” here expresses a psychological evasiveness, an 
unwillingness to recognize or face death. The “uzh” in the word 
“neuzheli,” phonologically points to the “uzh” in “uzhas”6— 
5 The allusion to a “freshly-smelling” body turns up in the scene of the wake. 
We are told that Gerasim “scattered something over the floor,” while Pyotr 
Ivanovich “sensed a slight odor of a decaying corpse” (I). Ultimately, the 
noxious smell of the corpse and of the sick room will be contrasted with the 
“clean, fresh” Gerasim, pleasantly smelling of tar and the “fresh winter air,” 
who gladly undertakes the task of caring for his master’s bodily functions.
6 “Neuzheli” is accented on the third syllable. In his classic dictionary, 
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a frequently used word in the text; on the semantic plane of Tolstoy’s 
narrative it points to a lurking, barely acknowledged sense of “horror” 
(uzhas) in the response to death.7
Tolstoy’s linkage of “neuzheli,” the death-bearing word “uzhas” 
and “uzhasno,” is first signaled overtly in the conversation between 
Pyotr Ivanovich and Ivan Ilych’s widow during the wake. Ivan Ilych’s 
widow remarks:
—He suffered terribly (on uzhasno stradal) the last few days. 
—Did he suffer very much? asked Pyotr Ivanovich. 
—Oh, terribly (uzhasno)! He screamed unceasingly, not for 
minutes but for hours. Three days in a row, with no alteration in 
Vladimir Dal’ places the accent on the second syllable, thus, “neUzheli.” 
See his Tolkovyi slovar’ zhivago velikorusskago iazyka, 4 v. (Moscow: Gosizdat, 
1955 [reprint 1881 edition]), 2: 540. If the word is pronounced with the 
stress on the second syllable the phonetic link between “neuzheli” and 
“uzhas” becomes even more perceptible on the phonological-semantic 
plane of Tolstoy’s artistic endeavor. Thus, “uzhe” and “uzha” would be 
indistinguishable in pronunciation.
7 Tolstoy’s sensitivity to aural and visual imagery, as well as his use of 
sound-formations in words in the development of meaning, have been well 
illustrated in another context by Richard F. Gustafson. See his analysis of 
the manner in which sound, the phonetic components of words, external 
and internal reality (memory), interact in the drowsy subconscious of 
Nicholai Rostov (War and Peace, Part I, iii, xiii) to provide a complex tapestry 
of meaning with respect to Nicholai’s “quandary of identity and vocation” 
(Richard F. Gustafson, Leo Tolstoy, Resident and Stranger: A Study in Fiction 
and Theology [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986], 298–302). I 
direct special attention in my discussion to Tolstoy’s use and integration 
of three etymologically unrelated words—“neuzheli,” “uzhas,” and 
“zhalko”—in the development of semantic dominants in the story. Tolstoy 
utilizes the purely accidental phonetic relationship of syllables within these 
words to underscore the complex and shifting attitudes of Ivan Ilych and 
others toward death. The everyday use of language, Tolstoy suggests, is 
a continuously creative one: we not only draw upon already established 
meaning in words, upon recognized etymological relationships, but actively 
invest the raw material of sound with meaning. Chekhov once spoke of the 
“affinity between full-bodied Russian verse and artistic prose” in Russian 
literature. (See A. P. Chekhov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v tridtsati tomakh, 
30 vols. [Moscow: Nauka, 1974–1983], Pis’ma 12: 177. Two discussions of The 
Death of Ivan llych that focus on language and style may be mentioned here: 
C. J. G. Turner, “The Language of Fiction: Word-Clusters in Tolstoy’s The 
Death of Ivan Ilych,” The Modern Language Review 65 (1970): 116–121, and M. 
M. Girshman, Izbrannye stat’i (Donetsk: Lebed, 1996), 82–84.
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his voice, he screamed. It was unendurable. I cannot understand 
how I endured it; you could hear it three rooms off. Oh, what 
I endured! 
—Is it possible that he was conscious?” (I neuzheli on byl v 
pamiati?) asked Pyotr Ivanovich. 
—Yes—she whispered—“till the last minute.”
Ivan Ilych’s colleagues do not openly give expression to 
their sense of distress and dread of death, but “uzhas” literally and 
figuratively lurks in their conventional response, “Neuzheli?” Pyotr 
Ivanovich, significantly, utters the word “neuzheli” a second time in 
connection with the account Ivan Ilych’s widow gives of the sufferings 
of Ivan Ilych. Hearing about Ivan Ilych’s “terrible sufferings” (on 
uzhasno stradal), Pyotr Ivanovich focuses not on the inescapable reality 
of death, but on Ivan Ilych’s awareness of his impending death. “And 
is it possible that he was conscious?” (I neuzheli on byl v pamiati?) 
Pavel Ivanovich asks. The idea of being conscious of one’s impending 
death, that is, of facing it directly, is something alien and frightening 
to him. The “uzhas” or horror people experience in the presence of 
death, Tolstoy emphasizes, leads precisely to their attempt to suppress, 
evade, turn away from its reality. “Neuzheli,” a word that hides and 
harbors “uzhas,” gives expression to this inclination to evade the truth 
of death.
The evasiveness of “neuzheli” and its hidden horror (uzhas) of 
death is fully disclosed when Ivan Ilych, recognizing for the first time 
that the issue of his illness is a matter of “life and death,” remarks to 
himself, “I won’t be, so what will be? Nothing will be. So where will 
I be when I will no longer be? Can this really be death? No, I don’t 
want [it]” (Menia ne budet, tak chto zhe budet? Nichego ne budet. Tak 
gde zhe ia budu, kogda menia ne budet? Neuzheli smert’? Net, ne khochu). 
“Can this really be death?” (Neuzheli smert’?) he repeats a moment 
later. “Again terror (uzhas) seized him” (V). Again and again, Ivan 
Ilych accents the word “to be” (byt’) in its forms “budu” and “budet,” 
struggling with the existential concepts of being and nonbeing, much 
as Goethe’s Werther a century earlier in The Sufferings of the Young 
Werther (Die Leiden des Jungen Werthers, 1774), anguishes over death 
and the meaning of the words “sterben” and “vergehen” (to die, to 
perish, to pass away). “No, Lotte, no! How can I perish? How can 
you perish? We are! [Wir sind ja!—that is, we exist]—to perish!—what 
does that mean? Once again that’s a word.” Ivan Ilych, like Werther 
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before him, finds it difficult to break through limitations of the egoism 
of life8 (my italics—RLJ). 
The “truth” begins to press on Ivan llych. He seeks to “screen 
off the thought of death,” but without success. “Is it really possible 
(neuzheli) that it alone is true?” And pondering his condition a few 
moments later he asks: “What is it all for?” And answers: “It is true 
that I lost my life over this curtain, as though storming a fort. Really 
(Neuzheli)? How terrible (uzhasno) and how stupid! This cannot be! It 
cannot be, but it is.” (VI). “Neuzheli” squarely expresses Ivan Ilych’s 
continued resistance not only to the idea that the curtain and his fall 
8 The entire passage reads: “Die! What does that mean? You know, we are 
dreaming when we talk about death. I have seen many people die; yet so 
constricted is human nature that it has no sense of the beginning and end of 
its own being. At this moment I am my own. Thine! Thine, o, beloved! And 
in a moment—parted, severed—perhaps for ever?—no, Lotte, no—how can 
I perish? How can you perish? We are!—perish!—what does that mean? 
Once again that is a word, an empty sound, without meaning for my heart.” 
(Sterben! Was heißt das? Siehe, wir träumen, wenn wir vom Tode reden. Ich habe 
manchen sterben sehen; aber so eingeschränkt ist die Menschheit, daß sie für ihres 
Daseins Anfang und Ende keinen Sinn hat. Jetzt noch mein, dein! Dein, o Geliebte! 
Und einen Augenblick—getrennt, geschieden—vielleicht auf ewig?—nein, Lotte, 
nein—wie kann ich vergehen? Wie kannst du vergehen? Wir sind ja!—vergehen!—
was heißt das? Das ist wieder ein Wort, ein leerer Schall, ohne Gefühl für mein 
Herz). In the spirit of Werther, Ivan Ilych says to himself: “If I had to die like 
Caius, I should have known it was so, an inner voice would have told me 
so, but there was nothing of the sort in me; and I and all my friends—we 
understood that our case was quite different from that of [mortal] Caius. 
Yet now here it is! (A teper’ vot chto!) It cannot be. It cannot be, but it is (ne 
mozhet byt’—a est’)! . . . How is this? How is one to understand it?” [VI] Both 
Goethe and Tolstoy underscore the intangible, abstract, elusive, character 
of the concept of “death” and the linguistic paradoxes attending any 
attempt to conceptualize it. Werther defines death, nonbeing, negation only 
through opposing it to life, existence, affirmation: “Nein, Lotte, Nein” . . . 
“Wir sind ja!”—“We are! [i.e. we exist]. In contrast to unacceptable “death” 
(vergehen), the negation of life, “ja” is not “just a word” to Werther: it 
denotes presence (as in the everyday German expression “Da ist er ja!”—
“here he is now”). Ivan Ilych’s “Ne mozhet byt’—a est’” (‘It cannot be, but 
it is’!) offers an interesting parallel to Werther’s “nein”—“ja” formulation, 
with this difference: the word “est’!,” in contrast to Werther’s affirmative 
“ja,” announces not life and being, not something that is, but the arrival of 
something that “is not,” that is, the void of death. “A teper’ vot chto!”—“yet 
now here it is!” 
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from the ladder is the cause of his death, but to the inexorable truth 
and reality of death itself. “Is it possible that it alone is true?” “Is it 
really true that this is death?” (Neuzheli pravda, chto smert’) Ivan Ilych 
asks himself after a night of frank and brutal self-interrogation. “And 
an inner voice answers: ‘Yes, it is true’” (X). With the recognition that 
the “truth” is “death,” that death is the inexorable “reality” (VIII), 
the evasive word “neuzheli”—but not “uzhas,” not “uzhasno”—
understandably disappears from the Ivan Ilych’s vocabulary and from 
text of the story. “Uzhas” (horror, terror) moves to the foreground.
In his final days and hours, Ivan Ilych is fully conscious of the 
“horror,” of the truth and reality of death for himself. In those days, he 
endured not only its physical horror, but the agony of contemplating 
the possibility of a life that was badly lived. “Yes, everything was 
wrong” (Da, vse bylo ne to—not right, not the right way, wrong [XII]). 
“Oh! Oh! Oh!” (U! Uu! U!), he cried in various intonations, three days 
before his death. “He had begun by screaming, Ne khochu (I don’t want 
[it], I won’t), and continued to scream on the letter and sound “U” 
(XII). The final prolonged “U! Uu! U!” is humanly, conceptually, and 
phonologically fitting at this moment; for the evasive “neuzheli?” has 
been reduced to “uzhas,” and “uzhas” itself to the primordial scream 
of mortality: “U! Uu! U!”—the interjection for pain in the Russian 
language. This is not yet the moment of acceptance of death on the 
part of Ivan Ilych; here, there is not only terrible pain, however. On the 
conceptual plane, one hears a reflex of the childlike “Ne khochu!”— 
“I don’t want [it].”
2
Tolstoy is engaged in unsmiling satire or parody in his story, 
particularly in the opening pages and chapters of the work. 
Foreshadowing certain emphases of Martin Heidegger in Being and 
Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), he explores the deepest realms of human 
consciousness and its stratagems of defense and denial in the face 
of death.
Ivan Ilych’s colleagues, we are told in the third paragraph of the 
story, “were fond of him,” but on learning of his incurable illness, they 
immediately were taken up with the question of the impact Ivan Ilych’s 
death might have on the disposition of openings or positions (mesta) in 
the ranks, matters that used to occupy Ivan Ilych himself in his life. “Ivan 
Ilych’s post had been reserved for him,” but on learning of his death, 
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the thoughts of his colleagues turned to “the significance this death 
might have on transfers (peremeshcheniia) or promotions (povysheniia) of 
the members of the court themselves or their acquaintances.”
The discussion of positions, transfers, and promotions, that is, 
consideration of the “significance” of Ivan Ilych’s death, resonates 
ironically in the narrative’s subtext. Ivan Ilych’s colleagues consciously 
ignore precisely the deeper question of the “significance of this 
death,” just as they fail to connect their preoccupation with future 
positions or slots (mesta) with the fact that Ivan Ilych has been shifted 
(peremestit’sia) to the ultimate slot or “place (mesto) in the cemetery” 
that has been reserved for him; just as they fail to weigh the significance 
of their earthly activities against the background of Ivan Ilych’s final 
“promotion,” that is, fail to give consideration to the deeper questions 
of the moral and spiritual meaning of life that are posed by mortality. 
Yet at the same time, the language Ivan Ilych’s colleagues use to 
discuss their mundane concerns, to express their banal thoughts and 
preoccupations, unconsciously mimics their lost spiritual estate.
“I shall be sure to get Shtabel’s place [mesto]9 or Vinnikov’s,” 
thought Fyodor Vasilevich. “I was promised that long ago, and the 
promotion [povyshenie] means an extra eight hundred rubles a year for 
me besides the allowance.” “Now I must apply for my brother-in-law’s 
transfer [perevod] from Kaluga,” thought Pyotr Ivanovich. “My wife 
will be very glad, then she won’t be able to say that I never do anything 
for her relations.” “I thought he would never rise from his bed again 
[Ja tak i dumal, chto emu ne podniat’sia],” said Pyotr Ivanovich out loud. 
“A pity” (I).
The play on the words perevod (transfer, but also translation) and 
podniat’sia (get up, but also to rise, to ascend), as well as the concern for 
“distances” in the final phase of the conversation between Ivan Ilych’s 
colleagues, points to a residual, but nonetheless restless concern with 
the reality of death and its physical and metaphysical mysteries.
The linkage between death and property has a history almost 
as long as history itself. The genu ine, if repressed, anxiety of Ivan 
9 “Shtabel” in Russian means stack or pile; things evenly laid out.; thus, one 
may speak of a pile of railway sleepers or ties (stabel’ shpal), a pile of bricks, 
etc. Certainly, Tolstoy’s choice of this particular surname is not accidental: 
Shtabel’ and his colleagues, busily preoccupied with promotions, will all 
ultimately be lined up, as it were, in their coffins and in the grave.
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Ilych’s colleagues over illness and death finds expression not only 
in their concerns for their own material well-being, but in property 
and possessions per se. The illusion, in general, that property gives 
of solidity, substantiality, and continuity serves psychologically as 
a surrogate for the sense of the fullness of existence and of the values 
and beliefs, moral and spiritual, that traditionally contribute to that 
sense of wholeness. Death, thus, puts a premium on property in 
the bourgeois world of the Ivan Ilychs. Ivan Ilych’s colleagues have 
a strong interest in whether he left anything behind. Indeed, the idea 
of paying a visit to his widow seems spurred not so much by pity for 
a woman who has lost her mate as by the realization that her husband 
had apparently left little behind in the way of possessions or property. 
“I think his wife had a little. But something quite trifling. Yes, we shall 
have to see her, but they live so terribly (uzhasno) far away” (I). 
Tolstoy strikingly illustrates the complex intertwining in the 
subconscious of the triple concern for illness, death, and property 
through his juxtaposition of two questions: the first, put by one of Ivan 
Ilych’s colleagues, and the second, asked a few lines later by another 
colleague:
Da chto u nego, sobstvenno, bylo?
[Just what, exactly, was the matter with him] 
Chto, u nego bylo sostoianie?
[Tell me, had he any property?]
Da chto u nego, sobstvenno, bylo? The speaker’s dominant interest 
here is the exact nature of Ivan Ilych’s illness (Pyotr Ivanovich has just 
observed that he did not expect Ivan Ilych to recover), but property (in 
Russian, sobstvennost’) is clearly on the mind of the speaker (though 
the word sobstvenno can only mean “exactly” or “precisely”). The same 
sentence removed from context, could also lean in the direction of an 
inquiry about possessions, that is, “What exactly did he have or own?”
The second question, in any case, picks up on the undercurrent 
of the first one. What is on everybody’s mind, property, now surfaces 
in sostoianie (possessions, property). “Chto, u nego bylo sostoianie?” 
(Tell me, had he any property?) At the same time, the double meaning 
of the word sostoianie (“possessions,” “property,” but also “state,” 
“condition”), points to the speaker’s deep underlying interest in Ivan’s 
illness, his “condition” or “state” at the time of his death.
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In his conversation with Ivan Ilych’s widow, as we have noted, 
Pyotr Ivanovich is very much concerned with Ivan Illych’s condition, 
his general state of mind at the time of his death. “And was he really 
conscious?” (I neuzheli on byl v pamiati?—literally, “in memory”). Indeed, 
Ivan Ilych was not merely conscious, but precisely “in memory,” that 
is, reviewing his entire life, seeking to cope with the issues raised by it, 
trying to give meaning to or find meaning in his death.
In a subtle play with words, Tolstoy demonstrates how two 
intimately related currents of thought—the one involving property 
and the other, illness and death—become entangled on the level of 
the subconscious and invade and subvert the language and thought of 
even the most propriety-minded people.
The amount of property Ivan Ilych left behind, we learn, was 
trifling. But what is left of Ivan Ilych? Where is Ivan Ilych? Where has 
he gone? Even for nominally religious persons (and that is the most 
that can be said of Ivan Ilych and his colleagues); even for atheists or 
agnostics, as Dostoevsky demonstrated in his satiric tale, “Bobok”; 
even for the Ivan Ilych, anxiety over death lies just beneath the surface 
of consciousness. The seemingly idle, good-humored banter about 
“distances” in a final exchange between Ivan Ilych’s colleagues gives 
evidence of profound anxiety and restlessness.
“Yes, we shall have to see her, but they live so terribly (uzhasno) 
far away.”
“Far away from you, you mean. Everything’s far from you.”
“You see he can never forgive my living on the other side of the 
river,” said Pyotr Ivanovich smiling at Shebek. And they began 
to talk about the distances between different parts of the city as 
they returned to the Court. (I)
People have held various views on where the dead go, but 
mythic consciousness almost invariably has insisted on correlating 
death with distance. The deceased may not be “here” or “there,” but 
he has gone somewhere, “terribly far away,” “beyond the river.”10 Here, 
10 Forced to come to grips with the actuality of his own death, however, Ivan 
Ilych struggles more directly to grasp the problem of being vs. nonbeing; 
he, too, in part, tries to understand the problem of life and death in spatial 
terms. Ivan Ilych poses the question in the form of a dialogue with himself, 
one in which the future of the verb “to be” (byt’) significantly is employed 
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the unconscious pondering of Ivan Ilych’s colleagues comes to a halt, 
but not the troubled awareness that Ivan llych’s journey is one that 
they, too, will be obliged to make. What is “terribly far away” (uzhasno 
daleko)—the use of the word uzhasno is noteworthy—is in reality, for all 
of us, just around the corner. The reluctant words, “Yes, we’ll have to 
go,” the whole casual dialogue about distances, have as their subtext 
the reluctant awareness that all of us, ultimately, will have to undertake 
Ivan Ilych’s journey “beyond the river.”
The linkage between the “journey” and “death” is echoed later 
on in the story in a more pointed way at the moment Ivan Ilych’s wife, 
his daughter Liza, and her fiancé are standing silently, guiltily, and 
uncomfortably by his sick bed. Their silence, of course, bespeaks their 
knowledge of the truth, but also their unwillingness to utter it.
The silence somehow had to be broken, but for a time no one 
dared to break it and they all became afraid that the conventional 
deception would suddenly become obvious and the truth become 
plain to all. Liza was the first to pluck up courage and break that 
silence, but by trying to hide what everybody was feeling, she 
betrayed it. “Well, if we’re going, then it’s time (Odnako, esli ekhat’, 
to pora),” she said (Tolstoy’s italics; VIII).
In the context, the phrase “esli ekhat’, to pora,” means “if we’re 
going, then it’s time to go”; yet in the context of Ivan Ilych’s dying, 
the words may be read “if you are going to go, then go, [i.e., die], it’s 
time!” With his italics, Tolstoy alerts the reader to the ambiguity of 
Liza’s remark. The real thoughts of Liza and the rest of the family are 
not lost on Ivan Ilych.
So too, the carefree but anxious banter of Ivan Ilych’s colleagues 
about distances gives evidence of their concern with death. Their 
five times: “I won’t be, so what will be? Nothing will be. So where will 
I be when I will no longer be?” (Menia ne budet, tak chto zhe budet? Nichego ne 
budet. Tak gde zhe ia budu, kogda menia ne budet?) (V). Ivan Ilych’s rapid-fire 
declaration and negation of his “being” and “nonbeing” itself is a kind of 
psychological device to “capture, as it were” “being,” that is, his existence, 
the nature of his existence, existence itself. One recalls his early work, 
Boyhood (Otrochestvo, 1854) where Tolstoy’s alter ego in his preoccupation 
with metaphysical questions of existence reached “such a state of insanity” 
that he sometimes “looked rapidly in the opposite direction, hoping to 
catch unawares emptiness (le néant) where [he] was not” (Boyhood, xix). 
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dominant and overt interests, however, remain the worldly interests of 
rank, promotion, upward mobility (mesto [position], perevod [transfer], 
peremeshchenie [relocation], povyshenie [promotion], podniat’sia [rising, 
advancing]—all concerns, as Tolstoy’s language suggests, that mimic 
the long journey “beyond the river” and heavenward.
Beside considerations as to the possible transfers and promotions 
likely to result from Ivan Ilych’s death, the mere fact of the death 
of a near ac quaintance aroused, as usual, in all who heard of it 
a feeling of gladness (radost’)11 that “it was he who is dead and 
not I” (I).12
11 In their translation, Louise and Aylmer Maude write here that the news 
of Ivan Ilych’s death “aroused . . . the complacent feeling that ‘it is he who 
is dead and not I,’” (my italics). Tolstoy wishes to emphasize here that 
Ivan Ilych’s colleagues experience an organic thrill of being alive, that is, 
something akin to joy or gladness (radost’). 
12 This sentiment is echoed later on by Pyotr Ivanovich at the wake: “‘Three days 
of terrible [uzhasnykh] suffering and then death. Why that might suddenly, at any 
time, happen to me,’ he thought, and for a moment felt terrified. But—he did 
not himself know how—the customary reflection at once occurred to him that 
this had happened to Ivan Ilych and not to him” (I). “Everydayness,” observed 
Martin Heidegger in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927) “has already stowed 
away an interpretation for this event [death]. It talks of it in a ‘fugitive’ manner, 
either expressly or else in a way which is mostly inhibited, as if to say, ‘One 
of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to 
do with us.’” The death of another (the “Other”) “gives the assurance still 
more plainly that ‘oneself’ is still ‘living.’” See Heidegger, Being and Time, 
translated from the German by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San 
Francisco: Harper, 1962), 297, 298. Heidegger, as has been often noted, found 
close points of coincidence between his existential analysis of death and 
Tolstoy’s artistic thought in The Death of Ivan Ilych. In a footnote to Being and 
Time, he writes: “In his story The Death of Ivan Ilych Leo Tolstoy has presented 
the phenomenon of the disruption and breakdown of having ‘someone 
die.’” For a discussion of Heidegger and Tolstoy, see Jens Kulenkampff, “Der 
Tod des Ivan Iljitsch: Sterblichkeit und Ethik bei Heidegger und Tolstoi,” in 
Sterblichkeitserfahrung und Ethikbegründung. Ein Kolloquium für Werner Marx. 
Hrsg. Walter Brüstle/Ludwig Siep. SOPHIA. Schriften zur Philosophie. Band 
2 (Essen: Der Blaue Eule, 1988): 164–179. The Heidegger-Tolstoy connection 
is also briefly mentioned by Zolltan Haynady, “Ivan Ilyich and Existence 
Compared to Death: Lev Tolstoy and Martin Heidegger,” in Acta Litteraria 
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, ed. G. Tolnai: 27 (Budapest: 1985) nos. 1–2: 
3–15. 
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In referring to the gladness that Ivan Ilych’s colleagues felt, 
Tolstoy is only underscoring the psychological truth he had variously 
explored in earlier works, for example, in his story “Three Deaths” (Tri 
smerti, 1858–1859), or more extensively, in War and Peace, namely the 
idea that the organic egoism of the life instinct stands in the way of 
a direct and full recognition or acknowledgement of death; unless, as 
in the case of Tolstoy’s ideal peasants (including Gerasim in The Death 
of Ivan Ilych), the individual in his total being directly and squarely 
accepts death (his own, in the first place) and yields himself up freely 
to the total life process. In this respect, Gerasim is emblematic for 
Tolstoy of the right attitude toward death; an attitude rooted in a total 
engagement with life; an attitude that views death as neither welcome 
nor unwelcome, but as a simple fact of life and nature.
Quite different is the attitude of Pyotr Ivanovich who leaves 
Ivan Ilych’s wake to go off to his card game. “Well, friend Gerasim?” 
said Pyotr Ivanovich so as to say something, “A pity, isn’t it? (Zhalko)” 
(I). This off-hand “zhalko” is devoid of any real emotional feeling or 
genuine pity; it serves to distance the speaker from Ivan Ilych and 
death. This is a matter for poor Ivan Ilych, Pyotr Ivanovich’s remark 
seems to suggest, but not us. A moment later, however, as he sets off 
to his card game (Ivan Ilych’s wake had kept him from his game), he 
observes, “It’s not late” (ne pozdno)—a remark that has an anxious 
subtext.13 Tolstoy’s implicit reply is, it’s later than you think. The game 
of cards, the play with chance, symbolizing the fundamental escapism 
and moral-philosophical irresponsibility of Pyotr Ivanovich and his 
colleagues, will offer no refuge from death. Gerasim’s response to Pyotr 
Ivanovich’s evasive “Zhalko?” on the other hand is straightforward, 
“‘It’s God’s will. We shall all come to it some day,’ said Gerasim, 
displaying his teeth—the even white teeth of a healthy peasant—and 
like a man in the thick of urgent work, he briskly opened the front 
door, called the coachman, helped Peter Ivanovich into the sledge, 
and sprang back to the porch, as if in readiness for what he had to 
do next.” 
13 The subtext, of course, is Pyotr Ivanovich’s worried thought that what 
happened to Ivan Ilych could happen to him. See the beginning of note 11 
where his concerns are cited.
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Gerasim’s acceptance of the fact that we will all die is devoid 
of any false commiseration or evasive banter. It frees him for direct 
and unaffected action, unimpeded by feelings of guilt or fear. During 
Ivan Ilych’s illness, Gerasim holds the ailing, helpless Ivan Ilych as 
a mother might hold a sick child or as a grown son might hold his 
ailing father or mother. His responsive actions, marked by a vigor and 
“joy of life” (radost’ zhizni) flow from a direct organic participation 
in the life process, and from a full-hearted response to the needs and 
requirements of the moment. 
Such is not at all the case with Ivan Ilych’s colleagues. Their inner 
feeling of gladness, of the joy of life on hearing of Ivan Ilych’s death 
takes on the character of a half-conscious celebration not of a freedom 
to life and living, but of a freedom from death; an intrinsically anxious 
and superstitious celebration marked by evasiveness and dread. Such 
is the case with Pyotr Ivanovich who enters Ivan Ilych’s house during 
the wake, “feeling uncertain, as is always the case, of what he would 
have to do. All he knew was that at such times it is always safe to cross 
oneself.” (I). Pyotr Ivanovich’s gesture, his sign of the cross, gives 
expression not to religious faith, but to a primordial feeling of dread.14 
Another example of anxiety and evasiveness, one marked by grotesque 
levity, is presented by Ivan Ilych’s colleague, Schwartz: “[He] was just 
coming downstairs, but on seeing Pyotr Ivanovich enter he stopped 
and winked at him, as if to say: ‘Ivan Ilych has made a mess of things—
not like you and me!’”
3
Tolstoy signals Ivan Ilych’s recognition, though not acceptance, of death 
in a linguistically remark able way. We have noted that “neuzheli” in 
Tolstoy’s story—a signal for evasiveness and denial—marks Ivan Ilych’s 
attitude toward death almost until the last hours of his life. Yet uzhas, 
like some dread incubus, inhabits neuzheli; it is uzhas that permeates 
and poisons Ivan Ilych’s whole being as death approaches; it penetrates 
the spirit of all who surround him in the last days of his illness: 
14 So too, as he approaches the hermitage where Father Zosima is living, 
the blasphemer and buffoon, Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov, “vigorously 
crosses himself before the saints painted on the sides of the gate.”
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“You feel better, don’t you?”15 Without looking at [his wife] he 
said “Yes.” Her dress, her figure, the expression of her face, the 
tone of her voice, all revealed the same thing. “Not right. All 
you have lived for and still live for is falsehood and deception, 
hiding life and death from you.” And as soon as he admitted 
that thought, his hatred and his agonizing physical suffering 
again sprang up, and with that suffering a consciousness of the 
unavoidable, approaching end. And to this was added a new 
sensation of grinding shooting pain and a feeling of suffocation. 
The expression of his face when he uttered that “yes” was 
dreadful [uzhasno]. Having uttered it he looked her straight in 
the eyes, turned on his face with a rapidity extraordinary in his 
weak state and shouted: “Go away! Go away, leave me!’ From 
that moment the screaming began that continued for three days, 
and was so terrible that that one could not hear it through two 
closed doors without horror [uzhas]. At the moment he answered 
his wife he realized that he was lost, that there was no return, 
that the end had come, the very end, and his doubts were still 
unresolved and remained doubt. “U! Uu! U!” he cried out in 
various intonations. He had begun by screaming: “I don’t want 
to!” [Ne khochu] and continued screaming on the letter “U.” (XI–XII)
It would seem, indeed, that the “uzhas” of death, formerly 
concealed and buried, conceptually and phonologically, in “neuzheli,” 
has finally broken loose, triumphed, and instituted a reign of terror that 
is not to be mastered. Yet a radical shift occurs at the end of the third 
day of Ivan Ilych’s agony, an hour before his death, when, struggling 
in a “black bag,” he himself acknowledges, finally, that his life has not 
been a good one. The shift in point of view is simultaneous with an 
internal physical “blow” (sila) experienced in his chest and side. At 
15 “[The] evasive concealment in the face of death,” writes Heidegger in what 
could be a gloss on this scene and several others in The Death of Ivan Ilych, 
“dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in Being with one another, 
the ‘neighbors’ often still keep talking the ‘dying person’ into the belief that 
he will escape death and soon return to the tranquillized everydayness 
of the world of his concern. Such ‘solicitude’ is meant to ‘console’ him. 
It insists upon bringing him back into Dasein, while in addition it helps 
him to keep his own most non-relational possibility of Being completely 
concealed. In this manner, the ‘they’ provides a constant tranquilization about 
death. At bottom, however, this is a tranquilization not only for him who is 
‘dying’ but just as much for those who ‘console’ him” (Heidegger, op. cit., 
297–298).
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the time, Ivan Ilych’s son had crept quietly into the room and gone 
up to the bed of the screaming Ivan Ilych. His flailing hand fell on the 
head of his son; the latter seized it, pressed it to his lips, and burst into 
tears. That was when Ivan Ilych fell through the “black hole” and “saw 
light, and it was revealed to him that though his life had not been what 
it should have been, this could still be rectified.” He asked himself, 
“What is the right thing?” and grew, still listening. 
Ivan Ilych’s moment of discovery begins with a blow to the chest; 
it is something physical, but it is also a moral jolt. It is accompanied by 
the experience of light (svet); but it is also an experience with the world 
(svet) outside of himself—his son, in the first instance. For we do not 
see light, we only experience it in its interaction with the world. That 
is the essence of Ivan Ilych’s getting out of himself at this moment, of 
his experience of giving, of his interrelation with others. To give is to 
be at one with the world (svet) and light (svet). Ivan Ilych experiences 
the world around him, first of all, through touching, listening, feeling, 
exchanging glances, seeing in the deepest sense of the word. To see truly, 
for Tolstoy, is to know deeply; the act of two people deeply looking at 
or into each other is, for Tolstoy, an ethical act.16 In the lines that follow 
seeing of light, Ivan Ilych sees looks of pity and distress on the faces 
of his family and, in turn, feels pity for those about him. The word 
“zhalko” (sorry, pity) is used five times:
Here he felt that somebody was kissing his hand. He opened 
his eyes and glanced at (vzglianul) his son and felt sorry for him 
(emu stalo zhalko ego). His wife approached him. He glanced at 
(vzglianul) her. She was looking (smotrela) at him open-mouthed 
with undried tears on her nose and cheek and a despairing 
expression on her face. He felt sorry for her (emu zhalko stalo 
ee). “Yes, I am making them wretched,” he thought. “They are 
sorry (im zhalko), but it will be better for them when I die.” He 
wished to say this but had not the strength to utter it. “Besides, 
why speak? I must act,” he thought. With a look (vzgliadom) at his 
wife he indicated his son and said: “Take him away… sorry [for 
him]…[sorry] for you too… (uvedi… zhalko… i tebia…).” He tried 
16 On the problem of “looking” in its ethical context in Tolstoy, see “The Ethics 
of Vision III: The Tolstoyan Synthesis,” in Robert Louis Jackson, Dialogues 
with Dostoevsky: The Overwhelming Questions (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 55–74. In particular, see my discussion of Pierre 
Bezukhov’s encounter with General Davoust (59-61).
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to add “forgive me” (prosti), but said “let me through” (propusti), 
and no longer having the strength to correct himself, waved 
his hand, knowing that he who needed to understand would 
understand. And suddenly it grew clear to him that what had 
been oppressing him and would not leave him was all dropping 
at once from two sides, from ten sides, and from all sides. He was 
sorry for them (zhalko ikh), he must act so as not to hurt them (my 
italics—RLJ; XII)
The weakened Ivan Ilych, of course, has slurred the word prosti 
(“forgive,” but a word that also means “farewell”), so that it emerges 
as propusti (let me through). By adding, in his physical weakness, the 
syllable “pu” he forms the word propusti—a word very much on his 
mind—for he has been struggling in the “black bag” to get through 
to the light.17 This slip of the tongue marvelously underscores the 
solemnity, significance, and simultaneity of his physical and spiritual 
passage from life to death, darkness to light.
Equally marvelous, too, is the manner in which Tolstoy signals 
the transition in Ivan llych from the sense of horror (uzhas) to the 
experience of pity (uvedi . . . zhalko . . .). Noteworthy is the sudden 
disappearance of the terrible sounds and words “U,” “uzhas,” and 
“uzhasno” that dominate the end of chapter 11 and the beginning of 
chapter 12.
Where have these words gone? These words and sounds do not 
so much disappear as become absorbed in another word and sound. 
Just as the evasive “neuzheli” ultimately falls away and discloses 
“uzhas,” thus marking Ivan Ilych’s recognition of temporal truth, of 
the ineluctable, and of horror-filled truth of death, so the decisive 
movement from temporal to moral-spiritual truth in the last chapter is 
marked by the transition from uzhas to zhalko, a movement involving 
the near phonetic absorption of uzhas into zhalko: Emu . . . zhalko . . . zhalko 
ikh, etc. “Zhalko,” the sense of pity or compassion, unlike “neuzheli?” 
does not evade or deny death; acknowledging death, “zhalko” reaches 
out: it is, for Tolstoy, an expression of love. “In the language of the 
people,” Tolstoy wrote, “‘to take pity on’ means ‘to love’ (zhalet’ znachit 
17 For a general discussion of the ending of The Death of Ivan Ilych, see Gary 
R. Jahn, “The Role of the Ending in Lev Tolstoi’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich,” 
Canadian Slavonic Papers 24 (1982): 229–238. 
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liubit’). This is a correct definition of that kind of love which more than 
anything else unites people and evokes their loving activity.” Tolstoy 
speaks of the “love of a lower being for a higher one,” and continues, 
“There is also a love, and it is most necessary, which is the transferal 
of self into another, suffering person, compassion, the desire to help 
him. This is the love that takes pity on.”18 This is the kind of love, or 
more accurately, the kind of “transferal of self” that Ivan experiences 
on his death bed. Pity, not for himself, but for another, overcomes fear, 
overcomes horror (uzhas), overcomes death. Neuzheli?—Uzhas!!—
Zhalko. On interacting semantic and phonological planes, Tolstoy 
tracks the fear of death from denial of, and rebellion against, death, 
through anger and acceptance, to the sublimation of horror in pity-
love.
The journey from uzhas to zhalko, however, is a long one. People 
in Ivan Ilych’s immediate surroundings do not feel authentic pity or 
compassion for one another. Exceptions are the peasant Gerasim who 
“understood Ivan Ilych’s situation and pitied him” (zhalel ego; VII) 
and Ivan Ilych’s son, Vasya, who “understood and felt pity (ponimal 
i zhalel); Gerasim’s pity, it may be noted, is not expressed in words of 
commiseration: simply and directly, he feels and acts—he “lifts,” “holds,” 
“embraces” Ivan Ilych. Vasya’s pity, too, is not expressed verbally, but 
in “a compassionate look” (soboleznuiushchii vzgliad). “Zhalko” in the 
vocabulary of Pyotr Ivanovich, however, is a worn phrase that masks, 
albeit poorly, his own anxious relation to the death of Ivan Ilych 
(“I never thought he would rise from the bed again. It’s a pity [Zhalko]”). 
As an official or family man, Ivan Ilych shows no pity or compassion 
for others (for his wife, for example, when she is pregnant). When 
he himself is sick, on the other hand, he pities himself or wishes that 
others would pity him as one might pity a “sick child” ([emu] khotelos’ 
togo, chtob ego, kak ditia bol’noe, pozhalel by kto-nibud’) (VII). 
Self-pity lies concealed behind Praskovya Fyodorovna’s and 
Liza’s conventional expressions of pity and solicitude: they plainly wish 
that Ivan Ilych would take pity on them. “I’m sorry for papa, but why 
18 See L. N. Tolstoi, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Iubileinoe izdanie), 91 vols., 
ed. V. G. Chertkov, et al. (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928–1958), 55: 278–279. See 
Richard Gustafson’s discussion of this passage (I use his translation) in the 
context of Tolstoy’s understanding of “love of” and “love for” (Gustafson, 
Leo Tolstoy: Resident and Stranger, op. cit., 186–187). 
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does he have to torment us?” (Mne zhalko papa, no za chto zh nas muchit?) 
asks Ivan Ilych’s daughter (XI). Concealed beneath this self-pity, Tolstoy 
observes, there slumbers the demon of irritation, resentment, hatred, 
and poisonous wishes. At the very outset of Ivan Ilych’s illness, as he 
grows more and more irascible, we learn the following about the state 
of mind of his wife, Praskovya Fyodorovna:
Having come to the conclusion that that her husband (muzh) 
had a terrible nature (uzhasnyi kharakter) and had made her life 
miserable, she began to pity herself (zhalet’ sebia). And the more 
she pitied herself (zhalela sebia), the more she hated her husband 
(muzh). She began to wish (zhelat’) he would die, yet she was 
unable to wish (zhelat’) that because then his salary (zhalovan’e) 
would cease. And this irritated (razdrazhalo) her against him even 
more. She considered herself fearfully unhappy just because 
not even (dazhe) his death could save her, and she became 
irritated (razdrazhalas’), concealed it, and this concealed irritation 
(razdrazhenie) intensified his irritation (razdrazhenie). (IV)
This astounding bit of prose is remarkable for its subtle linguistic 
play with a restricted range of sounds and syllables (“zh,” “zha,” 
“zhal,” “zhe,” and “uzh”); the four lines offer a veritable labyrinthe 
of phonetic-semantic linkages and psychological allusions. The awful 
(uzhasnyi) behavior of her husband leads Praskovya Fyodorovna to 
self-pity (zhalet’ sebia), hatred, and the wish (zhelat’) that her husband 
would die. She does not really want this to happen, however, because 
she would no longer have his salary (zhalovan’e). “And this irritated 
(razdrazhalo) her more.” Tolstoy implies that this thought “stings” or 
bites her. The idea of “sting” (zhalo) is buried, though not etymologically, 
in “zhalovanie” (salary, something that is freely received or granted, but 
the absence of which is painful).19 “Zhalo” is immediately picked up in 
“razdrazhalo,” and then again in the next line (ona razdrazhalas’).
19 Money, of course, is high on the priority list of both Ivan Ilych and his 
wife. Ivan Ilych is loath to invite Dr. Leshchetitsky, a specialist, to examine 
him at home because they would have to be “unsparing” in expenditure. 
(Eto znachit znamenitogo doktora priglasit’ i ne pozhalet’ deneg; V). The use of 
the verb “pozhalet’”—usually “to take pity”—is idiomatic here. Tolstoy’s 
use of this idiom is deliberate: Ivan Ilych, who has little pity for others, 
takes “pity,” as it were, on his own money where expenditures are con- 
cerned.
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A wife (zhena) cannot pity such a husband (muzh). She cannot 
kill him, true, but she can at least desire (zhelat’) his death, that is, wish 
to sting or bite him dead. “Zhena da muzh—zmeia da uzh” (husband 
and wife—viper and snake), goes a Russian folk saying.20 Pity (zhalko), 
Tolstoy demonstrates, transformed into self-pity, degenerates into 
resentment, hatred, and a poisonous sting (zhalo). The primordial 
serpent’s poisonous sting lurks barely concealed in dissembling 
solicitude and pity (zhalo in zhal[k]o). Too, a shift in stress from the 
second to the first syllable of the verb zhalet’ results in the word “zhalit,” 
“to sting”—which is exactly what the zmeia (viper) does to deadly 
effect and what the “zmeia-zhena” (viper-wife), in this case Praskovya 
Fyodorovna, wishes (zhelat’) to do to her “uzh-muzh” (snake-husband). 
Zhalit’ (to sting), finally, echoes zhalit’sia (to take pity on)—a sentiment 
that in Ivan Ilych’s family conceals deadly resentment.
In death, as in life, then, Ivan Ilych promises to be a torment to his 
wife. “Even (dazhe) Ivan Ilych’s death could not save her.” Meanwhile, 
wife and husband can only experience unhappiness in this viper’s 
nest, that is, experience a constant irritation (razdrazhenie—the word 
is repeated four times), perpetual self-laceration, mutual stinging, 
torment (“drazhit,” the core of “razdrazhenie,” suggests “teasing,” 
“tormenting”). In short, wife and husband are condemned to a kind of 
connubial living-death, a situation that will end only when Ivan Ilych 
dies. At that moment, for Ivan Ilych, at least, “pity” is experienced 
not as self-love, but as genuine solicitude for another person, as 
a “transferal of self into another, suffering person,” as something 
equivalent to “zhalovanie” (salary), something that is freely given and 
freely received.
In his dying moments, however, Ivan Ilych does not in the 
conventional sense suddenly “love” those around him any more than 
Gerasim loves Ivan Ilych when he helps him in his needs. Like Gerasim, 
Ivan Ilych simply and directly, and with a sense of immediacy, feels—
20 “Zmeia”—a snake, usually poisonous; it is also used in referring to a cun-
ning, evil person. “Uzh” is usually a name for certain nonpoisonous snakes; 
it is also used metaphorically in the phrase “polzti uzhom,” to flatter, to 
toady—literally, to crawl like a snake. Vladimir I. Dal’ in his dictionary of 
the Russian language cites a Russian proverb—“zhena da muzh—zmeia 
da uzh”—a saying in which the wife is identified with the often poisonous 
snake (zmeia), while the husband is identified with the nonpoisonous one 
(uzh). See Dal’, Tolkovyi slovar’, op. cit., 4: 476.
127Uzhas in the subtext: Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych
he “feels sorry,” wants to “do something,” and acts; and having acted 
he feels good. “How good and how simple” (kak khorosho i kak prosto), 
he thinks. “Kak khorosho” expresses a pleasurable sense of something 
that is remedial, salutory, tonic, contributing to the well-being of 
body and spirit. This good feeling, however, certainly embodies an 
unarticulated awareness that what has been done is good in the ethical 
sense; for the phrase, “how simple” (kak prosto), clearly refers to Ivan 
Ilych’s awareness that the source of his good feelings was his direct, 
unpremeditated, “simple” giving of himself, pitying others and not 
merely himself; doing something to “deliver them and free himself 
from these sufferings.”
Yet whatever the implicit, purely ethical significance of these 
gestures in this Tolstoyan parable of everyman, Ivan Ilych’s condition 
in these final moments of his life is certainly not that of a person who 
has been converted to a set of ethical or religious beliefs, not that of 
somebody who has been, as it were, “spiritually reborn”; Tolstoy 
avoids denoting the change that Ivan Ilych experiences in such terms, 
rather it is the condition of a dying man who, reading suffering on the 
faces of those around him, without reflecting does what his heart tells 
him should be done, and having done it, has an organic, pervasive, and 
reconciling sense of having done the right thing. Ivan Ilych does not 
end his life reflecting on lofty moral or spiritual transfiguration; rather 
at the moment of dying, he returns to what is simple and natural: he 
comes down, literally and figuratively, to earth. In this sense, and only 
in this nonreligious sense, can we say that the dying Ivan Ilych is born 
again to light (svet) and to the world (svet).
The turning of attention away from his own suffering to the 
suffering of others seems to bring, if only for a moment, the final 
moment of dying, a lessening of Ivan Ilych’s own suffering; even more, 
fear and death disappear, and “in the place of death there is light. ‘So 
that’s what it is!’ [tak vot chto—here, an exclamation of stupefaction, 
surprise, discovery], he suddenly said aloud. ‘What joy! (kakaia radost’)” 
(Xll). The joy that Ivan Ilych experiences here, in contrast to the joy 
that his colleagues experience on hearing of his death, is not that of 
a freedom from death, but of a freedom to death or dying. In contrast 
to the self-oriented “joys” he experienced in his death-in-life existence.21 
21 See, at the end of chapter III, the listing of “joys” (radosti) that Ivan Ilych 
experiences in his bourgeois life: the “joys of ambition,” the “joys of vanity,” 
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Ivan Ilych experiences a momentary consciousness of selfless life in 
death. 
“To him all happened in a single instant, and the meaning of 
that instant did not change. For those present his agony continued for 
another two hours.” (XII) A verbal, as opposed to a graphic, description 
of what Ivan llych experiences can only present the happening as 
a sequence of separate moments.22 Yet in fact, there is no development 
of thought or experience, no cogitation, no drawing of conclusions. The 
transferal of self into the suffering of others and the literal dying of the 
self; the sensation of light and sense of enlightenment, are essentially 
one experience and the experience of one moment, a moment whose 
“significance” does not change. “There was no fear because there was 
no death.” In biblical terms, “there was no more time.” For the observer, 
Ivan Ilych’s agony continued another two hours. This distinction 
between empirical time (as experienced by Ivan Ilych’s body and by 
those observing it) and phenomenological time (as experienced by Ivan 
Ilych and recognized by the reader) mark the earthly and unearthly 
end of Ivan Ilych.
“‘It’s finished (koncheno),’ said someone above him. He heard 
these words and repeated them in his soul. ‘Death is finished 
(‘konchena smert’),’ he said to himself. ‘It is no more.’ He drew in 
a breath, stopped in the midst of a sigh, stretched out, and died.” 
The last moment of Ivan Ilych’s life is one in which resolve, 
action, and accomplishment constitute a unity; it is the condition of 
a man who, in the personal acceptance of his mortality, is no longer 
in conflict with himself or his surroundings; the state of a man who, 
like his servant Gerasim, is neither looking backward nor forward, but 
the “joys of cards,” etc. “So they lived”—comments the narrator.
22 Tolstoy overcomes this problem of depicting simultaneous sensations or 
actions in the dying Ivan Ilych—to the extent that it can be overcome in 
words—by the device of repeating descriptions of Ivan Ilych’s actions or 
feelings, each time adding new detail or expanding the context, thus providing 
a sense of overlapping experience. The reader, used to logical “horizontal” 
progression in the text, undergoes a sense of time-disorientation at this 
“vertical” piling up of sensation-experiences—a calculated inconvenience 
that effectively introduces him into the hyperactive, non-Euclidian world of 
the dying psyche.
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is at one with the moment and its requirements. Here, action fills the 
space of a single moment. Again, what in words appears as a sequence 
of actions in reality constitutes one resolute taking-possession of one’s 
death: Ivan Ilych listens, repeats, draws in a breath, lets out a sigh, 
stretches out, and dies. The verb potianut’sia, with the idea of “stretching 
oneself,” “stretching out,” but also “reaching out,” would seem to sum 
up Ivan Ilych’s unimpeded resolve, his resolution of his life. The final 
word umer (died), that is, death itself, follows as something oddly 
superfluous, a shell, discarded, harmless. “Death is over. It is no more.”
Death in Tolstoy’s story is not an ending, it is a beginning. The 
finishing of death is also the finishing of the end of the story, of the idea 
of an end. The Death of Ivan Ilych is open-ended in form and content. The 
end is the beginning and the beginning is the end. Thus, the end of the 
story, the death of the Ivan llych, carries the reader back to the beginning 
of the story where he first learns about the death of the protagonist; 
it brings him back to the beginning which is the end of Ivan Ilych; it 
returns him to the lines: “Ivan Ilych has died! Really? Here, read it.” 
And with this invitation to the reader, with the return of “neuzheli”—
but now with a new dimension of the surprise just experienced—we 
are off again, attending to the chronicle of Ivan Ilych’s life and death, 
beginning and end, end and beginning, and so on, ad infinitum. 
“What Time Is It? Where are We Going?”
Chekhov’s cherry orchard: The story of a Verb1
As before, so now during rehearsals of The Cherry Orchard, 
one almost had to use pliers to drag out of Anton Pavlovich 
any comments and advice on his play. His answers resembled 
riddles, and one had figure them out . . . “But I’ve written 
it all out,” he would say on such occasions. “I’m really not 
a director, I’m a physician.” 
—Konstantin S. Stanislavsky, My Life in Art2
They require that every hero, heroine be scenically effective. 
But really, people in life are not every moment shooting or 
hanging themselves, or declaring their love. Nor are they 
are saying clever things every moment. For the most part 
they are eating, drinking, running after each other, talking 
nonsense. Now that has to take place on the stage. We have 
to create a play where people come, go, eat, talk about the 
weather, play cards, not because the author wants it that way, 
but because that’s the way it is in real life . . .
Let everything on the stage be just as complex and at the 
same time just as simple as in life. People dine, just dine, and 
at that moment their happiness is being shaped and their 
lives are being smashed. 
—Anton Pavlovich Chekhov 3
“The train has arrived,” “They’re coming!” “They’re coming!” 
“They’re coming!” “Let’s go and meet them,” “Come through 
here . . . the nursery!” “Time is marching on!” “Sleep well. 
There’s a way out. The railroad passed nearby.” “Go to sleep,” 
“I’m going, I’m going,” “Let’s go to bed . . .  Let’s go.”(Act 1)
1 A version this essay was published in Russian under the title “Kotoryi chas? 
Kuda my idem? Vyshnevyi sad kak istoriia glagola,” in the Moscow theater 
journal, Teatr. Literaturno-khudozhestvennyi zhurnal 2 (2006): 145–150. 
2 See Konstantin S. Stanislavskii, Moia zhizn’ v iskusstve in Sobranie sochinenii 
v deviati tomakh, 9 vols. (Moskva, 1988), 1: 344–345. 
3 The two comments by Chekhov are cited by Alexander P. Skaftymov in his 
study, Stat’i o russkoi literature (Saratov: Saratovskoe izdatel’stvo, 1958), 317. 
The first comment is taken from the memoirs of D. Gorodetsky published 
in Birzhevye vedomosti, No. 364 in 1904; the second comment is recorded in 
the memoirs of Ars. G. (I. Ia.Gurliand) in Teatr i isskusstvo, No. 28 in 1904.
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“Our’s [our children] are coming,” “Epikhodov is coming,” 
“Somebody is coming,” “Can I go through here directly to the 
station?” “Let’s go, everybody, it’s time for supper,” “To avoid 
[literally, “go around,” or “bypass”] everything petty and 
illusory  that interferes with being free and happy, that’s the 
goal, the meaning of our life,” “Mankind is coming,” “Here it is, 
happiness. Here it comes,” “Let’s go down to the river, it’s lovely 
there.” (Act 2)
“Oh, that all this would go by quickly, that somehow our 
awkward, unhappy life would change quickly,” “A new 
landowner is coming, the owner of the cherry orchard!” “Go 
with me, let’s go away from here, my dearest, let’s go!” (Act 3)
“I’ll come, my golden on,” “Forty six minutes is all that remain 
before the train [leaves],” “It’s time to go,” “Life . . . is going by,” 
“Let’s get going,” “Winter will pass, spring will arrive,” “We 
must be going,” “Time to go!” “Let’s leave,” “Come along now!” 
“The train is coming,” “See you in the spring. On your way, 
everybody,” “Coming!” “They’ve gone,” “Life’s gone by.” (Act 4) 
“Prishel poezd,” “Edut!” “Edut!” “Edut!” “Poidem vstrechat’,” 
“Proidemte zdes’ . . . detskaia!” “Vremia idet!” “Spite sebe 
spokoino. Vykhod est’. . .  Vozle proshla zheleznaia doroga,” 
“Idite spat’,” “Idu, idu,” “Poidem v postel’ku . . . Poidem!”  (Act 1)
“Nashi idut,” “Epikhodov idet,” “Kto-to idet,” "Mogu li ya proiti 
zdes’ priamo na stantsiiu?" “Idemte, gospoda. Skoro uzhinat’,” 
“Oboiti to melkoe i prizrachnoe, chto meshaet byt’ svobodnymi 
i schastlivymi,” “Chelovechestvo idet,” “My idem . . . k iarkoi 
zvezde,” “Vot ono schast’e, vot ono idet,” “Poidemte k reke, tam 
khorosho.”  (Act 2)
“O, skoree by vse eto proshlo, skoree by izmenilas’ kak- 
nibud’ nasha neskladnaia, neschastlivaia zhizn’,” “Idet novyi 
pomeshchik, vladelets vishnevogo sada!” “Poidem so mnoi, 
poidem, milaia, otsiuda, poidem!” (Act 3)
“Priedu, moe zoloto,” “Do poezda ostalos’ vsego sorok shest’ 
minut,” “Pora ekhat’” “Zhizn’ . . . prokhodit,” “Ekhat’ by nam,” 
“Proidet zima, nastanet vesna,” “Nado ekhat,” “Pora ekhat’!” 
“Uedem,” “Idemte!” “Poezd pridet,” “Do vesny. Vykhodite, 
gospoda . . .” “My idem!” “Uekhali,” “Zhizn’-to proshla.” (Act 4)
132 Fate, Freedom, and Responsibility
The phrases joined together here, making use of the going and 
coming verbs “idti” and “khodit’” (to go, to come, or to travel, primarily 
on foot) and its derivatives, but occasionally also making use of the 
verb “ekhat’” (go, come, travel—used for persons traveling in some 
conveyance, all point in the direction of a coherent line of thought and 
action in The Cherry Orchard (Vishnevyi sad, 1904). These verbs describe 
not only ordinary physical movement or action in the everyday life of 
the characters, but also give expression to the play’s central theme of 
time: actual, historical, metaphysical, and religious. 
In our discussion, we are concerned with how Chekhov draws 
these verbs into the orbit of his artistic-symbolic thought; how they 
become, as it were, the means of transportation for the various motifs 
of coming and going, arrival and departure, farewell and reunion, sleep 
and awakening, death and resurrection; how they give expression 
to them in all the banal and profound, comic and tragic ways in 
which these realities are perceived and experienced in human expe- 
rience. 
The theme of time and of the going and coming verbs (here 
“priidti”—to arrive, or come, and “poezd” [train], cognate of 
“poezdit’”—to travel about) make a joint appearance in the opening 
line of the play, when Lopakhin, a former serf, but now merchant, 
remarks: “The train has arrived, thank God. What time is it?” (Prishel 
poezd, slava Bogu. Kotoryi chas?) With these words, the clock starts 
ticking in The Cherry Orchard. Time is running out for the estate and its 
cherry orchard, and in particular, for Lyubov Andreyevna Ranevskaya 
and her family. Everybody seeks refuge from the present in the past or 
future, in plans for happiness or dreams of luck (the word “schast’e,” 
happiness, also means luck). Nobody in Lyubov Andreyevna’s family 
or entourage is able to focus sensibly on the present, on its needs and 
deadlines, on the impending auction at which the cherry orchard will 
be sold—nobody, that is, except Yermolai Lopakhin, and even he has 
lapses with respect to time, and experiences tensions between the past 
and present, and the present and future. 
Lopakhin lives by the clock. He is the timekeeper in the play, 
a friendly, but indefatigable man of action, constantly on the move with 
his own affairs, but with a plan of salvation for the estate. It is given to 
him not only to buy the estate and chop down the cherry orchard, but 
succinctly to express the profound wrench and disjointedness of the 
present moment; to express in one sentence not only the dislocation, 
the pain, the suffering that the present represents to everybody, 
133“What Time Is It? Where are We Going?”
including himself, but to define what it is that gives that experience its 
tragi-comic character. 
Oh, that all this would pass quickly, that somehow our awkward 
(neskladnaia), unhappy (neschastlivaia) life would change quickly.
That which is “neskladnyi”—awkward, without logical 
sequence or connection, disjointed, disconnected, inharmonious, 
awkward, disproportional, or irregular, can give rise to “neschast’e”—
unhappiness or misfortune; but that which is “neskladnyi” is also the 
essence of the humorous, the ridiculous, or the absurd. Life for Lyubov 
Andreyevna’s gentry family has long run out of regularities, almost 
nothing is left, as it were, but “twenty two misfortunes” (dvadtsat’ dva 
neschastiia).4 Whatever their number, the family’s misfortunes, large 
or small, comic or tragic, or both add up to an unhappy life. These 
misfortunes, like Charlotta Ivanovna’s magic tricks, are paradigmatic 
of a life in which chance is king, all is in limbo, and up for auction. 
In the larger existence which makes up reality, or realities, however, 
there are regularities, or necessities tha make themselves felt, and play 
a determining role in life. The so-called passage of time uncovers them 
and, in turn, moves people to act or not to act. 
The opening line of The Cherry Orchard, “The train has arrived, 
thank God. What time is it?” brings into focus one such regularity. The 
first line announces the arrival of the train carrying Lyubov Andreyevna 
Ranevskaya, her brother Leonid Andreevich Gaev, her daughter, Anya, 
and the lackey Yasha. The same train, however, is also bringing to the 
country merchants, businessmen, and dachniki, or summer people, 
who are all changing the social and economic landscape of the old 
agricultural and gentry world of Russia. The train is late. Indeed, the 
arrival of the railroad itself, like many other historical developments 
in Russian history, is late.5 It has arrived, however, and its arrival is 
4 “Twenty two misfortunes”—the nickname of the clerk, Epikhodov. 
5 Russian railways made a slow start in comparison with the networks of the 
industrialized nations of Europe. By 1880, however, the Russian railway 
network was nearly on a par with the networks of European nations. 
By 1900, it had surpassed every European country with the exception of 
Germany. 
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apocalyptic for rural Russia.6 On the everyday plane of the play’s 
action, Lopakhin’s “thank God” (slava Bogu) signifies familial feeling 
at the arrival his former owner, Lyubov Andreyevna; on the deeper 
symbolic plane of the play’s action, it also may be said to mark the 
satisfaction of the merchant at the arrival of the train of history.
The play’s opening line, then, in an unobtrusive way, introduces 
the theme of time, everyday and apocalyptic, into The Cherry Orchard, 
while simultaneously, and again unobtrusively, announcing Chekhov’s 
poetics of everyday language and talk. The specificity of Chekhov’s 
poetics emerges clearly when one compares the opening line of The 
Cherry Orchard, “The train arrived . . . What time is it?” with a passage in 
Dostoevsky’s The Idiot with which Chekhov was undoubtedly familiar. 
In Dostoevsky’s novel, the seventeen-year-old Ippolit Terentiev, 
planning to commit suicide, in conversation juggles with everyday 
time and apocalyptic time. “What time is it? (Kotoryi chas?),” he asks, 
and replies, “But never mind, I know what time it is.” He has in mind, 
of course, apocalyptic time, as his next words make plain: “The hour 
is at hand [prishel chas, literally the hour has arrived]. Now is the time 
(Teper’ samoe vremia) . . . . Tomorrow [with this word, Ippolit reverts 
to everyday time, only to follow it with a stock biblical reference to 
apocalyptic time], ‘there shall be no more time.’” A moment later, he 
reverts to everyday time. “But don’t worry. It won’t take me more than 
forty minutes to read—oh, an hour (chas) at most [that is, an everyday 
hour], and then eternity [absolute time].” The reader immediately 
recognizes the interplay play of two kinds of time in Ippolit’s remarks. 
Everything is in full view. Chekhov, unlike Dostoevsky, conceals the 
play with time in commonplace talk. 
Some perfectly ordinary talk of Lopakhin in act 1 provides an 
example of Chekhov poetics of everyday talk, in this case what we may 
call his silent interplay of everyday and apocalylptic time. Lopakhin 
remarks that he wants to tell the Ranevsky family “something 
nice, cheerful. (Glancing at his watch). No, I’m going off now [“uedu 
seichas,”—literally, I am going off this hour]. There’s no time to talk 
6 The perception of the development of the railroad as an apocalyptic event 
was ubiquitous in European literature and culture in the nineteenth century. 
See, in particular, Dostoevsky’s The Idiot and Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina and 
The Kreutzer Sonata. Chekhov’s use of the railroad in The Cherry Orchard 
follows in the tradition of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky.
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(Nekogda razgovarivat’) . . . Well, alright, in two or three words. As you 
know, the cherry orchard is being sold for debts. The auction is set 
for the twenty-second of August. But don’t you worry, my dear, have a 
tranquil sleep (spite spokoino). There’s a way out (vykhod est’).” Lopakhin’s 
“cheerful” advice, his “way out,” involves sudden death for the 
orchard in quite ordinary time. Spite spokoino (have a tranquil sleep), in 
the context of his plans for the orchard, awakens sleep as a metaphor 
for death, thus introducing the timelessness of the long sleep.7
Lopakhin has overslept. One might think that this merchant-
peasant, whose skill as a business man depends upon being on time 
and in time, is out of step with time. The opposite is the case. He is 
out of step only with the old masters’ time: a spirit of time which 
(according to the maid Dashenka) the dogs gave expression to by 
staying awake all night in expectation of the arrival of their masters. 
Though Lopakhin has affectionate feelings for the Ranevskaya family, 
though he is “vexed” that he overslept, though his yawn is perfectly 
natural, that same yawn signals the seismic shift that has displaced 
master’s time (most recently master-serf time) in favor of merchant’s 
time.
“What time is it?” is certainly the wake-up call in act 1 of The 
Cherry Orchard, one in which sleep and sleepiness is on everybody’s 
minds. “What time is it?” is a prelude to Lopakhin’s constant and 
insistent reminders to Lyubov Andreyevna and her family that they 
must take action if they are not to lose the estate and its orchard. Yet in 
a larger sense, the question also points to the dislocation of time, the 
absence of any real sense for the present, the absence of structuring 
temporal regularities. 
Time in The Cherry Orchard is multidimensional, and its various 
levels intersect with one another to form a very unstable present: 
master’s and serf’s time; romantic pastoral time redolent of the Golden 
age; congealed gentry-intelligentsia time with its complete loss of any 
creative promotive power; energetic capitalist time and the theme 
of bourgeois salvation secured through the market process; student-
7 For discussions of time in Ippolit’s “My Explanations,” see Robin Feuer 
Miller, Dostoevsky and The Idiot: Author, Narrator, and Reader (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 206–210; and David M. Bethea, The 
Shape of Apocalypse in Modern Russian Fiction (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), 96–98.
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socialist utopian time with its “bright star” in the distant future; and 
buried in people’s consciousness, the apocalyptic time of Revelations, 
where death and destruction is a prelude to the vision of “a new 
heaven and a new earth” (Rev. 21:1). On the deepest level of the play’s 
meanings, Lopakhin’s “What time is it?” signals both taps and reveille.
“Vot proidemte zdes’” (pass through here), we hear a voice say 
in the background of an empty stage at the beginning of act 1. And 
“passing through,” with all the suffering that such passage entails, is 
what The Cherry Orchard is about. “Pass through here” (Proidemte zdes’) 
Lyubov Andreyevna’s daughter Anya repeats, as Lyubov Andreyevna 
and her entourage pass through halls or rooms and enter the nursery 
or children’s room (detskaia) where Lyubov Andreyevna ecstatically 
greets her childhood world. 
It is as though Lyubov Andreyevna were passing through 
a birth canal to the nursery; or viewing this passage from a different 
perspective, passing back through the birth canal to wombland, the 
primal nursery. “My darling nursery, my beautiful room . . . I slept here 
when I was a child . . . And now I am like a child . . .” 
Lopakhin’s question “What time is it?” is asked again early into 
act 1 by sleepy and dreamy Anya, Lyubov Andreyevna’s seventeen-
year-old daughter. “The birds are singing in the garden. What time 
is it now?” This is an everyday question in an everyday time context, 
and it is natural between two or three in the morning, after a long trip, 
to ask the time. Yet the birds twittering in the cherry orchard also hint 
at sacred time, an innocent pre-fall world or Garden of Eden. Indeed, 
what time is it for Anya? 
Lopakhin’s constant reminders, his prodding words about the 
impending sale of the estate, “decide,” “think it over,” contribute to an 
urgent sense of passing time and impending misfortune. It is people, 
of course, and not time that move or stand still, act or remain inert. 
“The future stands firm . . . it is we who move in endless space,” as 
the German poet Rainer Maria Rilke put it.8 Yet the contrary notion 
of time as something that moves or passes is a stubborn one. Through 
a play on the plain phrase, “vremia idet” (time is passing), Chekhov 
both parodies and dramatizes this idea of passing time. Thus, in 
8 “Die Zukunft steht fest . . . wir aber bewegen uns im unendlichen Räume.” 
Rainer Maria Rilke, Briefe an einen jungen Dichter (Frankfurt am Main und 
Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1992 [first published in 1929]), 43.
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response to Gaev’s remark, “And now I’m already fifty-one year’s old, 
strange as it may seem,” Lopakhin replies in a matter-of-fact way, “Da, 
vremia idet” (Yes, time passes). Gaev retorts, “Kogo?” (what, but also 
who) And Lopakhin repeats, “Vremia, govoriu, idet” (Time, I say, is 
passing). 
English translations of The Cherry Orchard usually translate 
“vremia idet” as “time is passing” or “time flies.” Gaev’s “kogo?” 
however, awakens the sleeping metaphor, “vremia idet”; it 
anthropomorphizes “vremia,” turning “time” into a kind creature on 
the march, or an incarnation of “horror” (uzhas), to borrow a word 
the Russian theater, opera, and film director Vsevolod E. Meyerhold 
(1874–1940) used to define what he perceived as the unseen presence 
of death in act 3 of Cherry Orchard.9 
Ronald Hingley’s translation, “time marches on,” effectively 
awakens the sleeping metaphor in “vremia idet.”10 To Lopakhin’s 
“Time, I say, is marching on” (Vremia, govoriu, idet), Gaev responds 
with a complete non sequitur, “And here it smells of pachouli.” His 
remark is followed by Anya’s “I’m going to sleep” (Ia poidu spat’). Gaev 
completely shuts out time with his nonsense. Anya, on the other hand, 
deals with the issue by going off to sleep. Chekhov’s point, of course, is 
that time is not sleeping. “Time won’t wait” (vremia ne zhdet), Lopakhin 
says later on, “Time is marching on!” (Vremia idet!) 
No detail is without meaning in Chekhov’s poetic drama. Early 
in act 1, Chekhov, through an exchange between Dunyasha and 
Lopakhin, hints at the arrival of the creature time or “misfortune” and 
what it has in store for Lyubov Andreyevna and her family. 
Dunyasha: He [Epikhodov] is an unfortunate man, every day 
there’s something. They tease him around here: twenty two 
misfortunes. 
Lopakhin (listening): I think they’re coming (edut) now. 
Dunyasha: “They’re coming! (edut!) What’s the matter with me . . . 
I’m cold all over. 
Lopakhin: They’re really coming (edut). Let’s go and meet them. 
9 Letter of Meyerhold to Chekhov, May 6, 1904. See V. E. Meierkhol’d, Stat’i. 
Pis’ma. Rechi. Besedy (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1968), 85. 
10 See The Oxford Chekhov: Uncle Vanya, Three Sisters, The Cherry Orchard, The 
Wood-Demon, ed. and trans. by Ronald Hingley (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), 3: 151.
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Dunyasha. I’m going to faint now . . . Oh, I’m going to faint! (my 
italics—RLJ)
Lopakhin’s words, “I think they’re coming now” announce the 
arrival of the family. Yet this exchange has an important subtext: The 
thrice-repeated word, “edut,” directly picks up on “something” (chto-
nibud’), “unhappy person” (neschastlivyi chelovek), and finally, “twenty 
two misfortunes” (dvadtsadt’ dva neschast’ia). In a word, misfortunes are 
on the way, they’re coming, coming, coming (Edut, Edut, Edut).
There is a good deal of talk about sleep, “going to sleep.” in act 
1. This is understandable: people are tired. They are also asleep on the 
question of the fate of the cherry orchard. Not surpirisingly, Chekhov 
is interested in the metaphorical associations of the word “sleep.” Anya 
early on hints at the age-old connection of sleep (in Russian—“son”) 
with death, and with dream (in Russian, also “son”). “Home again!” 
she exclaims shortly after her arrival back at the estate. Tomorrow 
I’ll get up, I’ll run into the orchard . . . Oh, if only I could fall asleep! 
I couldn’t sleep on the way” (Zavtra utrom vstanu, pobegu v sad . . . 
O, esli by ia mogla usnut’!”). Anya wishes to go to sleep the sooner to 
wake up in the morning in her paradise, the fabulous cherry orchard. 
Not accidentally does Chekhov place trailing ellipses after the word 
“orchard” (sad).11 Anya’s words echo the “mystery” of Corinthians, 
“We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed (ce, tainu vam 
glogoliu: vsi bo ne uspnem, vsi zhe izmenimsia) . . . the dead will be raised 
incorruptible, and we shall be changed” (I: Cor. 15:51–52). The veiled 
allusion here to Corinthians lays the groundwork for Anya’s passionate 
effort, following the auctioning of the estate, to persuade her mother to 
“go away” with her to plant a new cherry orchard. 
The linkage of sleep with death is also evoked by variant meaning 
of the word “pokoinaia” (calm, restful, but also deceased). “If only we 
could marry you to a rich man, and I could then be at peace (ia by togda 
byla pokoinoi), I’d go myself to a hermitage,” says Lyubov Andreyevna’s 
foster daughter to Anya. “Pokoinaia” here must be translated as “at 
11 The use of trailing ellipses, three periods closely following each other after 
the end of a phrase or sentence, is common in Russian writing. The ellipses 
may be used to direct the reader’s attention to something obvious that 
deserves note but has not been emphasized in the preceding sentence, or to 
stress some underlying authorial attitude—irony, a sense of tragedy, awe, 
etc. with respect to what has been said. 
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peace,” “content,” “at ease,” but in its alternate meaning, “deceased,” 
it alludes to Varya’s stiffness and coldness; she will later in the text be 
identified with Shakespeare’s ill-fated Ophelia. Toward the end of act 
1, Anya several times uses the word “pokoinyi” (content) in ways that 
awaken its alternate meaning, “I am now content! I am now content, 
I am happy” (Ia teper’ pokoina! ia pokoina, ia schastliva), Anya exclaims 
after hearing Gaev’s plan, in reality a totally empty one, for rescuing 
the cherry orchard and the estate. Yet Anya’s spirituality has a conge-
niality for life and happiness beyond death. 
Gaev’s is irritated by Firs’s vexed effort to get him to go to sleep, 
“I’m going, I’m going, you go to bed [i.e. lie down].” “Right away, right 
away (seichas, seichas, literally this hour, this hour), Gaev responds to 
Firs, but immediately begins to utter clichés about his generation of the 
1880s, thus confirming Gaev’s readiness for the long sleep. “I’m going, 
I’m going,” Gaev says again to Firs, “you go to bed [i.e. lie down—
lozhites’]”—the first hint in the play of what will be Firs’s last action at 
the play’s end: lying down. Is he falling asleep, dying, or dead? 
In the last several lines at the end of act 1, “poidem” (let’s go, 
come along) is frequently used. “Let’s go to bed . . . Come along! Come 
along . . . My angel has fallen asleep! Let’s go . . . ,” says Varya. The 
stage direction “Idut” (they go off) that accompanies Varya and sleepy-
dreamy Anya as they go to bed also leads the spectator or reader into 
a dreamy pastoral scene. “In the distance beyond the orchard a shepherd 
is playing on a pipe. Petys walk across the stage, and seeing Anya, 
stops.” Typically, the pastoral is an imitation of rural life, usually the 
life of an imaginary Golden Age. This is the world that draws Anya. 
The seamless transition from the sleepy end of the act 1 to 
the bleak and funereal mood of the setting of act 2 underscores the 
connection between two “sleeps” that are ever-present in The Cherry 
Orchard: the everyday sleep with its dreams and dodges of reality, and 
the dreamless sleep of death. 
Chekhov’s stage directions in act 2 accent images of emptiness, 
breakdown, death, and decay; a field, an abandoned little chapel 
(chasovenka), and next to it, a well, and remnants of what was once 
a cemetery; “large stones that evidently were once grave stones,” and 
an old bench. Chekhov concludes with words that constitute a caption 
to the setting: “The sun is about to set” (Skoro siadet solntse).
The type of little chapel or “chasovenka” (the root of the word 
is “chas” or “hour”) that is mentioned was typically a small wooden 
structure with icons where pilgrims could pray, read psalms or verses 
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at prescribed hours, that is, observe the canonical hours (sluzhit’ chasy). 
The abandoned chapel is a reminder of the dislocation of time in the 
world of The Cherry Orchard, not only of temporal time, but also of 
absolute time. The mention of a large stones that “evidently” once were 
grave stones contributes to the sense of both material and spiritual 
desolation. It is significant that Chekhov twice insisted in letters to the 
directors of the play that the scene is not set in a cemetery, but that 
there had been one a long time ago.
The meditative and somber pastoral garden scene in the light 
of the setting sun approaches its denouement at the end of act 2 
with the “mournful” sound of a breaking string, a sound identified 
with “misfortune” (neschast’e). In the “There goes Epikhodov, there 
goes Epikhodov” (Epikhodov idet . . .), “The sun has set.” “Suddenly 
a distant sound is heard, as if out of the sky, the sound a breaking 
string, dying away, mournful.” The sound is followed by Firs’s 
mention of the “misfortune” (neschast’e). “The same thing happened 
before the misfortune.” “Before what misfortune?” Gaev asks, and Firs 
responds, “Before the freedom (volia),” that is, the emancipation of 
the serfs. 
Lyubov Andreyevna’s response to this happening is immediate, 
“You know, my friends, let’s go. Night is falling” (Znaete, druz’ia, 
poidemte, uzhe vechereet). Turning to Anya, she says, “You have tears 
in your eyes . . . What is it, child?” Anya replies, “Nothing, Mama, it’s 
okay” (Eto tak, mama. Nichego). The student Petya Trofimov remarks at 
this point, “Somebody is coming” (Kto-to idet). His words call attention 
to the approach of the frightening and ill-omened “prokhozhii” 
(passerby). In him, as in Epikhodov, we find a member of the “khod” 
family, a “prokhozhii” (the word has as its etymological root, “khod”—
motion, movement, going, etc.). Both the designation of the stranger as 
a “prokhozhii,” one who is passing through, and his question, “Can 
I go straight through here to the station?” (Mogu li ia proiti zdes’ priamo 
na stantsiu?), aptly awakens the underlying and disturbing theme of 
change or passage (prokhod). 
(The words immediately follow Anya’s “nichego,” thus 
suggesting a subtext of “[Nichto] idet”—“Naught is coming”—quite in 
the spirit of the mysterious and frightening sound which Firs links with 
“misfortune.” The device Chekhov uses here is similar to his linking 
of “chto-nibud’” [something] and “neschast’e” [misfortune] with 
the thrice-repeated verb “edut!” [they are coming] at the beginning 
of act 1.) 
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Petya’s “somebody is coming” (kto-to idet) focuses on the approach 
of the frightening and ill-omened “prokhozhii” (passerby). In him, as 
in Epikhodov, we find a member of the “khod” family, a “prokhozhii” 
(the word has as its etymological root, “khod”—motion, movement, 
going, etc.). Both the designation of the stranger as a “prokhozhii,” one 
who is passing through, and his question, “Can I go straight through 
here to the station?” (Mogu li ia proiti zdes’ priamo na stantsiu?), aptly 
awakens the underlying and disturbing theme of change, or passage 
(prokhod). 
It is not by chance that Lopakhin associates the appearance of 
the passerby with the word and concept of “bezobrazie” (ugliness, 
but also deformation, desecration of beauty and form shapelessness). 
“Bezobrazie”—such is the essence of the arrival of a new social 
and economic order, or disorder’ such is the nature of the historical 
“passage” of the railroad across the gentry land of Vishnevyi sad. 
The theme of “coming” or “going” of “passage,” of closure, and 
of death, as it relates to the famed cherry orchard, becomes insistent 
and marked in the play. The “idet” theme emerges as the theme of 
approaching disaster: time, unhappiness, “twenty-two misfortunes,” 
merchants, speculators, somebody, something is coming. 
Petya Trofimov’s triumphant theme, “chelovechestvo idet” 
(mankind is coming, or mankind is on the march), might appear, at 
first glance, as the cheerful counterpoint to the ominous “idet” theme 
of time and change. Petya’s “mankind is coming,” however, belongs 
typologically not to what has been brewing for a long time and is about 
to overwhelm the present, such as the merchant Lopakhin and all the 
social and economic changes his coming portends, but rather to what 
is coming down the chute of the utopian socialist future.
Chekhov, however, finds no special promise in the collective 
arrival of “humanity” or in Petya Trofimov’s qualifications as a leader 
of this new army. “There aren’t any generals. He’s raving,” Lyubov 
Andreyevna remarks in act 1 apropos of Gaev’s hope that there’s 
a general in town who might offer the family a loan. At this very 
moment, Gaev, observing the approach of the young people, Petya, 
Varya, and Anya, remarks, “Our young people are coming” (Nashi 
idut)—a remark that in the play’s ironic subtext at this point conflates 
the Petyas, Anyas, and Varyas with generals. Yet there are no generals 
or leaders in Chekhov’s dreamy young generation. 
Petya nonetheless childishly speaks in the militant voice of 
a general whose troops are on the march: “Mankind is marching 
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forward” (Chelovechestvo idet vpered), he declares. One might say that 
this new mankind, in contrast to Lopakhin’s time on the march, is still 
a monster in the making. Right now, as Petya explains, mankind is 
only “perfecting its forces.” But he is confident; “I have a premonition 
of happiness (schast’e), I see it already . . .” The future indeed is 
approaching, and like Lopakhin’s “vremia” (time), it is approaching 
on foot; “Happiness, here it comes, it’s approaching nearer and nearer, 
I already hear its footsteps” (Vot ono schast’e, vot ono idet, podkhodit vse 
blizhe i blizhe, ia uzhe slyshu ego shagi), Petya says at the end of act 2. 
Chekhov, too, hears these steps, but recognizes in “schast’e” 
(happiness) the same old approaching “neschast’e” (misfortune), but 
now in a new disguise. “Ia uzhe slyshu ego shagi” (I already hear its 
steps). The word “uzhas” (horror) is hidden in Petya’s words: “UZH[e]
S[lyshu]”—“I hear horror.” Not happiness, but horror is coming, not 
only from the past, but from the future, “Ours are coming” (nashi idut). 
At the very least, Chekhov in his parodic rendering of Petya would 
seem to suggest that the new generation is afoot with old illusions. 
The alarming “distant sound,” Firs’s mention of the “misfortune” 
(neschast’e) on hearing it, and finally, the appearance of the passerby—
all generate a sense of fear, premonition of disaster. Chekhov marks it 
with a flurry of frightened “goings.” “My friends, let’s be going, evening 
is setting in” (Druz’ia, idemte, uzhe vechereet), Lyubov Andreyevna 
remarks immediately after Firs’s mention of the “misfortune.” “I’m 
going, I’m going” (Ia idu . . . ia idu . . .), exclaims the frightened Varya. 
“Let’s go, everybody, it’s time” (Poidemte, gospoda, pora), Lopakhin jests 
with respect to Varya. “Okhmelia [Ophelia], be off to the nunnery,” 
(Okhmelia, idi v monastyr’), jests the unfrightened Lopakhin about Varya. 
“Let’s go, everybody” (Idemte, gospoda), says Lyubov Andreyevna again. 
And if the approaching “twenty-two misfortunes” of Epikhodov have 
been forgotten, Lopakhin indirectly reminds us of their presence and of 
a really threatening event in the life of the Ranevsky family when he 
declares that on the “twenty-second of August” the estate will be up 
for auction. What time is it? Time is on the march! 
In the midst of these “goings,” and as if responding to the sense of 
alarm in the air, Petya’s grandiose utopian theme of the future becomes 
more militant, his voice more shrill and commanding: “Forward! We 
are marching (my idem) irresistibly to a bright star that is glowing in 
the distance! Forward! Do not lag behind, friends.” Anya’s response 
to Petya’s rhetoric, clapping her hands—“How well you put it!”—only 
deepens our sense of the human comedy.
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Lyubov Andreyevna’s characterization of Petya’s behavior at one 
point as “ridiculous”—“You are ridiculous,” “a ridiculous oddity,” 
“a ridiculous man” (“smeshnoi vy,” “smeshnoi chudak,” “smeshnoi 
chelovek”)—parodies a character in Dostoevsky’s writings. Petya’s 
lofty rhetoric, his flaming idealism, his “premonition” of “happiness,” 
his “bright star,” his insistence that we do everything to help everyone 
“who is searching for the truth”—all this indeed recalls the hero of 
Dostoevsky’s fantastic tale, “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man” (“Son 
smeshnogo chelovekа,” 1877). 
The Ridiculous Man recounts his dream-visit to a bright “star,” 
one that turns out to be the earth’s mythic pre-fall paradise. Here, on 
one of the islands of a pastoral “Greek Archipelago,” he celebrates the 
“beautiful” “children of the sun,” and then sexually corrupts them. 
Awakening from his dream, he foregrounds not his corruption of 
paradise, but his earlier idyllic experience and vision of an “an earth 
not corrupted by the sin of the fall,” a vision of truth (istina). It is this 
vision that he sets out to preach to the world.
Through his allusion to the “Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” 
Chekhov foregrounds the central metaphysical theme embodied in 
the cherry orchard and its fabulous beauty—a yearning for the Garden 
of Eden, a yearning for paradise lost; in one form or another, and on 
the deepest level of their being, Petya, Anya, Lyubov Andreyevna, 
Lopakhin, and even Firs, experience that painful yearning for the lost 
Garden of Eden, that is, they experience the suffering of change.12 
Chekhov, however, seeks not to idealize Petya. In spite of Petya’s 
awareness of social evil in Russia’s tragic history of serfdom, he has 
not learned the lesson of the past: the permanent presence of evil in 
human existence; he remains a naïve idealist in his effort to realize 
social utopia on earth.
It is rather Lyubov Andreyevna who emerges, paradoxically, 
as a positive “ridiculous” heroine in the play. She does not preach 
12 Francis Fergusson speaks of The Cherry Orchard as a “poem of the suffering 
of change”; he notes that each person suffers the loss of his or her cherry 
orchard. I emphasize here, however, the suffering of change that unites all 
these people: Chekhov’s underlying metaphysical theme of man’s expulsion 
from the Garden of Eden. For his formulation of the matter, see Fergusson’s 
essay, “The Cherry Orchard: A Theater Poem of the Suffering of Change,” 
reprinted in Chekhov: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Louis Jackson 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 147–160.
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or philosophize, but she embodies in her life, albeit in impractical, 
irrational, indeed, ridiculous ways, the fundamental virtues of 
magnanimity (velikodushie), of unselfishness (a quality that she finds 
markedly absent in Petya), self-sacrifice, liberality, and above all, 
kindness and compassion.13 She is neither “above love,” or below it, 
but embodies both Eros and agape.
The last two lines of act 2, spoken against the background of the 
sad strains of Epikhodov’s guitar, have an air of innocence:
Anya: Let’s go down to the river (poidemte k reke). It’s lovely there. 
Trofimov: “Let’s go” (Poidemte).
Chekhov follows this exchange with the stage direction: idut 
(they go off, exit). Anya and Petya are going down to the river, the 
same river where Lyubov Andreyevna’s son, Grisha, had drowned. 
The river is mythically associated with death; it is also associated with 
a crossing over into knowledge and experience. Petya and Anya have 
yet to cross that river. In this broad context, Anya’s comment, “It’s lovely 
there” is as innocent as is her rapturous response to Petya’s rhetoric 
a moment earlier: “How well you put it!” Innocence and naïveté, rather 
than knowledge, marks these two young people.
Act 3 opens with the landowner, Boris Borisovich Semionov-
Pishchik’s mention of his “two strokes” (dva udara) and concludes 
with a final blow: Lopakhin’s announcement of auctioning of the 
estate. The stamping feet of triumphant Lopakhin replace Petya’s 
“footsteps” of approaching “happiness.” It is no longer “Time is on 
the march!” (vremia idet!) for Lyubov Andreyevna and her family, but 
“here comes the new landowner (Idet novyi pomeshchik), proprietor of 
the cherry orchard!” Time is at hand, the apocalyptic time of Revelations 
has arrived, and is incarnate in the person of Lopakhin, the new owner 
who has just “bought an estate more beautiful than anything in the 
world.” He “accidentally” bumps into a small table and nearly knocks 
over the candlesticks as he announces the “new life” that will follow 
the destruction of the cherry orchard. In the new order, however, more 
13 In a “Little and Bold Friends of Humanity” in the January 1876 issue of his 
Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky pointedly asserts that he is “terribly fond” of 
those so-called “comic” or “ridiculous” heroes and idealists who act for 
good in concrete and unselfish ways. (See Dostoevskii, PSS, 22:25). 
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than artifacts of gentry life will be in danger. The new owner “will take 
an ax” to his beautiful orchard and hack out the new order. 
In the stupendous finale of act 3, in the accelerating and feverish 
rhythms of Lopakhin’s narrative of the auction, real and historical time 
becomes apocalyptic time, a time of destruction, but a time also for 
sorrowful and plangent lament—one first articulated by Lopakhin 
himself, “Oh, that all this would go quickly, that somehow our 
awkward, unhappy life would quickly change.” 
Lopakhin’s poignant words fail to make any impact on Pishchik, 
except to arouse his desire to get away from the scene. “Lyubov 
Andreyevna is weeping . . . Let’s go into the hall (Poidem v zalu) let 
her be alone . . . Let’s go . . . (Poidem).” Quite different in ethical mood 
from Pishchik’s desire get away from Lyubov Andreyevna’s tragedy is 
Anya’s repeated “let’s go” (poidem) to her mother in her final lines at the 
end of act 3. She not only showers her mother with sympathy and love, 
but seeks passionately to lead her into a new life.
Mama! Mama, you’re crying? My dear, kind, good mama, my 
beautiful one, I love you . . . I bless you. The cherry orchard has 
been sold, it exists no longer, that’s the truth, the truth, but don’t 
cry, mama, life remains for you ahead, your good, pure soul 
remains . . . Come with me, let’s go away from here, my dearest, 
let’s go! We will plant a new orchard, more splendorous than this 
one, you will see it, you will understand, and joy, a quiet, deep 
joy will descend on your soul, like the sun at the evening hour, 
and you will smile, mama! Let’s go, my dearest! Let’s go! 
[Milaia, dobraia, khoroshaia moia mama, moia prekrasnaia, ia 
liubliu tebia . . . ia blagoslovliaiu tebia. Vishenevyi sad prodan, 
ego uzhe net, eto pravda, pravda, no ne plach’, mama, u tebia 
ostalas’ zhizn’ vperedi, ostalas’ tvoia khoroshaia, chistaia dusha 
. . . Poidem so mnoi, poidem, milaia, otsiuda, poidem! My 
nasadim novyi sad, roskoshnee etogo, ty uvidish’ ego, poimesh’, 
i radost’, tikhaia, glubokaia radost’ opustitsia na tvoiu dushu, 
kak solntse v vechernii chas, i ty ulybnesh’sia, mama! Poidem, 
milaia! Poidem!] 
On the surface, Anya’s tender and lyrical words to her mother 
urge a simple and sensible adaptation to the catastrophe: the estate 
with its garden, its orchard, has been sold; you have the rest of your 
life to live; let’s go away; we’ll plant a new orchard, and you will rest 
content in the evening of your years. 
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Yet Anya’s appeal to her mother is markedly elegaic. On her knees, 
she pleads with her mother to leave the estate with her, but addresses 
her almost as though she were dying. She loves and blesses her mother. 
“Life remains for you ahead, your good, pure soul remains . . .” What 
is “left” for Lyubov Andreyevna up ahead? The disembodied life of 
a “pure soul” in a new orchard that will be more “splendorous” than the 
cherry orchard that has just been sold. The new orchard recalls Petya’s 
vision of “all Russia as our orchard”; yet that orchard, for Anya, seems 
a stand-in for the Garden of Eden. Anya’s language in her peroration 
has a dreamy, eschatological dimension. She promises her mother that 
she “will see” and “will understand,” and that a “quiet, profound joy 
will descend on [her] soul, like the sun at evening dusk, and [she] will 
smile.”
Anya is a person of markedly religious temperament. It is no 
accident that Gaev and Varya speak of her as an “angel.” Her words 
in act 1 echoes the “mystery” of Corinthians (I: Cor. 15:51-52). The 
day has been is a momentous one. August 22 is the date of the sale 
of the estate to Lopakhin and his declaration of a “new life”; it is also 
the eve of closing day of the Eastern Orthodox Feast of the Dormition,14 
a fixed holiday commemorating the “falling asleep” (as indicated by 
the Russian word for “dormition”—uspenie), that is, the death of the 
Virgin Mary and her passing from earthly to eternal life.
Chekhov, then, has juxtaposed at the end of act 3—the traditional 
turning point or peripeteia in classical drama—two strangely connected 
events: the passing of the cherry orchard from life into death, and back 
into memory, on one hand, and the passing of the Virgin Mary from death 
into eternal life, into the promised paradise, on the other. Both of these 
events occur off stage, yet both are marked by feasts or rituals on stage: the 
first feast, as it were, profane, and the other, sacred in spirit:15 Lopakhin’s 
triumphal utterances and celebrations, with its subtext of anguish over 
14 The Feast of Dormition (Prazdnik Uspeniia), one of the fixed Great Feasts 
of the Eastern Orthodox church, is celebrated between August 15 and 
August 23 (Old Style), and corresponds to Assumption in the Western 
church. 
15 These two feasts are accompanied by music played by a Jewish orchestra: on 
the one hand, the cheerful music marking Lopakhin’s celebration (Lopakhin: 
“Orchestra, strike it up!”); on the other, “quiet” music (Chekhov’s stage 
direction reads: “the orchestra plays quietly”) marking Anya’s ecstatic but 
elegaic pleading-speech to her mother. 
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the wrenching “awkward and unhappy” event of the transition, and 
Anya’s invitation to her mother to accompany her on a journey into 
a more “splendorous” orchard (Russia), figuratively speaking, into the 
eternal life promised by the gospels and Revelations.
A sense of irony pervades Chekhov’s representation of Lopakhin’s 
and Anya’s “feasts.” The real estate wonder and the “new life” that 
Lopakhin hails is a parody of the Promised Land. Yet his compassion 
for Lyubov Andreyevna, his empathetic lament over the unhappiness 
and awkwardness of the suffering of the transition or change strikes 
a profound note. Anya’s consoling thought about her mother smiling 
in misfortune echoes an earlier line, vaudevillian in character, by 
Epikhodov in act 1, “Every day some kind of misfortune happens 
to me. And I don’t complain and even smile.” Epikhodov utters the 
same line in a somewhat altered form toward the end of act 3, “I have 
a misfortune every day, and I, allow me to so express it, only smile, 
even laugh.” 
The repetition by Anya of the motif of a smile in misfortune 
undercuts the lofty spiritual drama that Anya creates around Lyubov 
Andreyevna. Yet Anya’s empathy with her mother’s grief is moving, 
even as Lyubov Andreyevna seems ill-chosen for a role in the great 
Feast of the Dormition—the unconscious subtext of Anya’s address to 
her mother.
Lyubov Andreyevna’s life, to begin with, is far from over. There is 
little about her Parisian gambols, past and anticipated, that puts her in 
the category of the Virgin Mary or even a repenting Mary Magdalene. 
She has a visceral will to live in spite of the humiliating and degrading 
forms her return to Paris will involve. She will in any case leave her 
Garden of Eden, not return to it. The notion of Lyubov Andreyevna 
as Virgin Mary is thus as delusionary as Liubov’s own vision of her 
mother dressed in white moving about in the cherry orchard. Yet 
Chekhov’s parody has its limits. The name “Liubov” (love) is not an 
accident: in all her dilapidated life style and idiosyncratic behavior 
Liubov’s abundance of elemental goodness and kindness and human 
sympathy places her at least in the circle of the Virgin Mary’s spiritual 
charisma.
Act 4 is replete with the coming and going verbs “idti” (to go 
on foot) and “ekhat’” (to ride in a vehicle). The die is cast. The estate 
and its orchard have been sold. People are going off, not to die, but 
to live out their lives, for better for worse. The exuberant mood of the 
departing family, however, belies a sense of a world irrevocably lost. 
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Even Petya seems to be grasping at straws when he declares again, 
almost desperately, that “mankind is marching toward the highest 
truth, the highest happiness, such as is only possible on earth, and I am 
in the first ranks!” 
To Lopakhin’s skeptical retort, “Will you get there?” (doidesh’?), 
Petya answers, after a pause, “I’ll get there . . . or I’ll show others the way 
to get there.” Chekhov’s stage note at this point reads, “The sound of an 
ax striking a tree is heard in the distance.” Lopakhin’s ax is destroying 
the old world. The positioning of Chekhov’s stage note suggests, too, 
that Petya’s brave, new world may also rely on the ax. 
“Well, good-bye, my dear. It’s time to go” (Nu, proshchai, golubchik. 
Pora ekhat’), Lopakhin responds to Petya.16 “We turn up our noses at each 
other, but life goes on its own way” (My drug pered drugom nos derem, 
a zhizn’ znai sebe prokhodit). Gaev’s words, a moment later, echo that 
sentiment, but with a hint at apocalyptic time, “Let’s get going (Ekhat’ by 
nam). Only a little time is left.” Lyubov Andreyevna’s words—“Winter 
will pass (proidet zima), spring will come but you [dear house] will no 
longer be, they will smash you up”—reflects an underlying sense of an 
ending of the old world. “My treasure, you are beaming, your eyes are 
dancing like two diamonds,” she remarks to Anya. “Are you happy?” 
“Very!” answers Anya. “Our new life is beginning, Mama!” Anya, as 
always, has her head high in the clouds. That is evident in the way 
she expresses her concern for her mother’s well-being. She urges her 
mother, who is setting out again for Paris, to return soon: 
Mama, you’ll return quickly, quickly . . . isn’t that true? . . . Mama, 
we’ll read all sorts of books . . . Isn’t that true? (Kisses her mother’s 
hands). On autumn evenings we’ll read, we’ll read all sorts of 
books, and a new, marvelous world will open up before us . . . 
(Dreamily). Mama, come back . . . (Mama, priezhai . . .)
The marvelous world that she holds out before her mother, the 
world to which she wishes her mother to return “quickly, quickly,” is 
essentially the same world of the Golden Age where there is no time. 
Lyubov Andreyevna’s answer is tender, but her choice of words makes 
it clear that she is immune to the fantasies of her daughter. “I’ll come, my 
golden one” (Priedu, moe zoloto), she remarks—this time, unconsciously 
16 “Good-bye, my dear.” Lopakhin’s use of the word “golubchik” (diminutive 
of “golub’” or dove), here translated as “my dear,” comes across ironically. 
149“What Time Is It? Where are We Going?”
substituting the word “zoloto” (gold, but here, “golden one”) for the 
word “treasure” (sokrovishche) that she had used a moment earlier in 
addressing Anya.
The play draws to a close with a chorus of “goings” and good-
byes. “We must be going” (Nado ekhat’), says Lyubov Andreyevna; 
“We’re off!” (V dorogu!) exclaims Anya joyously; “Time to go!” (Pora 
ekhat’) calls out Petya; “We are going and not a soul will remain here . . .” 
(Uedem—i zdes’ ne ostanetsia ni dushi . . .), says Lyubov Andreyevna. “Till 
spring,” replies Lopakhin, a man whose “spring” will bring the activity 
of many living souls. “Come now, into the carriages . . . The train will is 
arriving momentarily [literally, this hour the train will arrive!]” (Idemte 
sadit’sia v ekipazhi . . . Seichas poezd pridet!), calls out Petya, and again, 
“Let’s go, everybody! (Idem, gospoda!) Let’s go! (Idem!),” says Lyubov 
Andreyevna. “Let’s go!”(Idem!) exclaims Lopakhin again. “Until spring. 
On your way, people . . . Till the station (Znachit, do vesny. Vykhodite, 
gospoda . . . Do svidantsiia),” says Lopakhin. He wanted to say “do 
svidania” (good-bye) but unconsciously conflates the word “stantsiia” 
(station) with “svidanie (meeting), thus suggesting “until the station,” 
rather than “until we meet again.” For Lopakhin, spring cleaning has 
begun, and his de facto connection with the past ends where the play 
began: at the railroad station.
“There’s a way out” (Vykhod est’), Lopakhin had pleaded earlier 
with respect to his plan to save the estate financially. The “way out,” 
for the family, in the end turns out to be, “On your way . . .” or simply, 
“Out with you!”
Farewell to Eden
In the penultimate scene of the play, we are witness to an expulsion from 
Eden.17 Lyubov Andreyevna’s last words addressed to her “garden,” 
her “life,” her “happiness,” are interrupted at intervals by impatient 
17 It is interesting to note that in one of his first and saddest stories, “Za 
iablochki” (About Little Apples, 1880), Chekhov uses the biblical scene of 
the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden scene as a frame 
of reference for sharp social satire. That motif appears in other stories 
of Chekhov, such as “A Trifle from Life” (Zhiteiskaia meloch’, 1886). For 
a discussion of “About Little Apples,” see my chapter, “Dostoevsky in Chekhov’s 
Garden of Eden” in Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky: The Overwhelming 
Questions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 83–103.
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calls from Anya and Petya (“Mama!” “You-hoo”) who have already 
left the house. Her final words “We’re coming!” (My idem!), though 
they belong to a category of responses standard for the occasion, 
nonetheless, rise above pedestrian meaning.
Anya’s and Petya’s calls echo, as it were, their earlier sophomoric 
“aoo’s” and appeals to “Mamma” to follow them in their march toward 
the “bright star” of future. However, Lyubov Andreyevna’s “my idem!” 
has nothing in common with the heady social utopia of Petya’s or with 
Anya’s paradise anymore than it connects with Lopakhin’s real-estate 
man’s plan for the “salvation” of the estate. “There’s a way out” (Vykhod 
est’), he had assured Lyubov Andreyevna. “I congratulate you, you are 
saved. A marvelous site (mestopolozhenie chudesnoe), a deep river.” Is 
this a place for vacationers from the city? Or is it the Promised Land 
by the river Jordan, or the Garden of Eden with its river? Lopakhin has 
his dream, but he must first chop down the cherry orchard and clear 
the land before he can develop this marvelous site. Yet destruction is 
essential part of the prophecy of Revelations, as is the “new heaven and 
the new earth” that follows it (Rev. 21:1). 
Lyubov Andreyevna has formed her own Edenic ideal: she has 
recognized in the cherry orchard her childhood paradise, one watched 
over by “heavenly angels.” Yet her Eden is not a world she dreams of 
returning to. Innocence for her is no longer an option. Her spirited “We 
are coming!” (My idem!) includes her ill-omened decision to return to 
Paris and to her shattered love-life. This course of action will be fatal, 
yet it is driven by love, however irrational, and compassion; it is, finally, 
a choice of life.
One cannot but ask, in this connection, whether Chekhov has 
not invested Liubov’s last words, “My idem!” with something of the 
exhilarating existential challenge that we find in the dream-chant “My 
idem!” (We keep going!) of Lesnitsky and Loshadin in Chekhov’s story, 
“On Official Business” (“Po delam sluzhby,” 1889). Lesnitsky dreams 
he is singing and marching side by side with the simple and plain 
Loshadin, the central figure in the story. Earlier in the narrative, it is 
the blizzard that seems to sing a song of suffering and pain. Now, the 
two men pick up the chant of the blizzard that circles around them: 
“We keep going, we keep going, we keep going . . . We bear the whole 
burden of this life, ours and yours.” (My idem, my idem, my idem . . . My 
nesem na sebe vsiu tiazhest’ etoi zhizni, i svoei, i vashei). 
Lesnitsky’s and Loshadin’s endless march with its chant, “my 
idem!” is not sustained by a vision of an earthly or religious paradise or 
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ideal, or spiritual goal, any “bright star”; yet it is full of value-oriented 
spirit of endurance. Something of this existential challenge to fate, like 
the myth of Sisyphus, would seem to inhere in the final “My idem!” of 
Lyubov Andreyevna and in her orientation to life. 
At the end of a note to his friend and correspondent Lydia A. 
Avilova, a few months before he died, Chekhov pens some lines that 
seem applicable, as one Russian critic has suggested, to the philosophical 
core of his, Chekhov’s, characterization of Lyubov Andreyevna: 
All the best to you, chiefly—be cheerful, don’t look on life too 
subtly; probably things are really far more simple. Indeed, 
does this life which we do not know deserve all the tormenting 
reflections with which our Russian minds wear themselves out—
that’s still a question.18 
18 Letter to Lydia A. Avilova, February 14, 1904. See A. P. Chekhov, Polnoe 
sobranie sochinenii i pisem v tridtsati tomakh, 30 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1974–
1983), Pis’ma, 12:34–35. See Boris I. Zingerman’s characterization of Lyubov 
Andreyevna in his study Teatr Chekhova i ego mirovoe znachenie (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1988), 330, 337. 
 The essential issue concealed in Chekhov’s casual remark to Avilova—the 
tension between living and philosophizing, between the life process and 
preoccupation (here:  a Russian one) with the meaning of life —is not a new 
one for Chekhov. It is present in the peasant girl Lipa’s anguish, in the story 
“In the Ravine” (1900), over the death of her baby boy.  To her question—
“And tell me, grandfather why should a little one be tormented before his 
death, why a little one, when he has no sins? Why?”—her interlocutor, an 
old peasant, answers: “Who knows about such things? . . .  As much as 
[man] needs to know in order to live, so much he knows.” “Life is long, 
there will be good and bad, there will be everything.” The peasant speaks 
of his losses, his trials and tribulations;  echoing the Karamazov thirst for 
life, however, he wants to live “another twenty years . . . which means,” 
he adds, that “there’s more of the good [than the bad] in the world.” Lipa 
is responsive to the old peasant’s kindness and compassion, to his vision 
of life.  In the end, unlike  Ivan Karamazov, she does not take the path of 
rebellion and indignation. She embraces life over the meaning of life.   
   These issues turn up in The Three Sisters  (1903), a play in which there is 
a great deal of philosophizing about life and the meaning of existence. “Look 
it’s snowing. What’s the meaning of that?” asks Tusenbach. Masha retorts: 
“It seems to me a person must have faith or must search for it.  Otherwise 
life is empty, empty… To live and not know why the cranes are flying, why 
children are born, why there are stars in the sky…  Either one knows why 
one lives or everything is nonsense, rubbish.”  It is Olga at the play’s end 
who reduces Masha’s all-or-nothing demand to the poignant and pleading, 
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The double ending of the play, Lyubov Andreyevna’s farewell to 
Eden, her spirited “My idem!” and Firs’s dispirited “They’ve gone . . . 
life has gone by” (Uekhali . . . Zhizn’-to proshla), provide complementary 
views on the questions the play has posed, as well as complementary 
aspects of Chekhov’s own worldview. 
On the one hand, there is the elementary truth of life, of being, of 
being in the world, of love, of instinctual movement forward into life 
regardless of what this life has in store for us; time marches on (vremia 
idet!), time is bearing down on us, but in spite of everything, we live, 
love, keep going: “my idem!” 
On the other hand, there is the all-regulating truth of death, the 
truth of passage, one that Chekhov makes audible and amplifies in the 
distant, mysterious, and melancholy sound of the breaking string that 
resounds in the middle of the play and again, “as if from the sky,” at 
the play’s end; a sound that brings the audience and reader back to 
the opening line of the play and to a question that lies hidden in full 
view; a question, moral and spiritual at its foundations, that shakes up 
all priorities, arouses anew all sorts of “tormenting reflections,” and 
moves to the foreground the ultimate question of the meaning of this 
life we live, its purposes, its direction, and its dreams: “What Time is 
it?”—“Kotoryi chas?”
“If only we knew, if only we knew” – this in contrast to Chebutykin’s 
“nothing makes any difference.”  It is Masha, however, in spite of all losses, 
who counters with a new imperative: “We must go on living…  we must go 
on living.” This imperative of life over philosophizing appears to have been 
on the mind of the dying Chekhov when he wrote to Lydia Avilova: “All the 
best to you, chiefly—be cheerful, don’t look on life too subtly.” 
t wo K inds oF be aut y
Two kinds of Beauty1
“Beauty will save the world. Two kinds of beauty,” Dostoevsky 
observes without further explanation in one of his notebooks to The 
Idiot.2 This condensed set of idea-signals points not only to the problem 
content of The Idiot, but to the complex dialectic of Dostoevsky’s 
esthetic thought. The first phrase, “Beauty will save the world,” is 
a model of syntactic precision and order; it promises direct, unimpeded 
action. But the second phrase is disruptive; it shatters the integrity of 
the beauty-savior and bogs down the action in ambiguity and enigma. 
“Is it true, Prince, that you once said that ‘beauty will save the world’?” 
Ippolit Terentiev asks Myshkin in The Idiot, and then mockingly asks, 
“What kind of beauty will save the world?” “The world will become the 
beauty of Christ,” Dostoevsky answers in one of his notes to The Devils.3 
Myshkin, however, does not answer Ippolit; elsewhere in the novel he 
remarks, “It is difficult to judge beauty; I am still not ready. Beauty is an 
enigma.” Dmitry Karamazov in The Brothers Karamazov also posits the 
enigma of beauty, its ambiguity, and finds it “indefinable.”
1 From Robert Louis Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form: A Study of his 
Philosophy of Art (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 
40-70. I have supplemented this shortened version of my essay with some 
material from other essays in Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form.  
2 Dostoevsky’s notebook to The Idiot, PSS, 9:222. “Dva obrazchika krasoty” 
(Two kinds of beauty). “Obrazchik” (from “obraz”—form, model, kind, but 
also “icon”). The use of the suffix “chik” adds a touch of irony to the phrase. 
Thus, the phrase could be translated: as “two nice little kinds of beauty” or 
“two nice little types of beauty.” 
3 PSS, 11:188. 
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Where is Dostoevsky in this esthetic confusion? Is he the one 
who believes in a single omnipotent beauty? Or does he acknowledge 
more than one kind of beauty? It is to be noted at the outset that when 
Dostoevsky, as critic or journalist, and speaking for himself, uses the 
word “beauty,” it is invariably in the antique or neo-Platonist and 
Christian sense of ideal Beauty. It is this kind of beauty which will save 
the world; it is, to Dostoevsky, a beauty which finds embodiment in 
concrete form, one governed by definite formal esthetic principles. 
Philosophically, Dostoevsky gives de jure recognition only to this 
classical beauty. At the same time, in his belles lettres, he explores, or 
one might say poses the problem of, two kinds of beauty. Here, he 
recognizes de facto a category of the beautiful or of the experience of 
the beautiful, which is the very antithesis in both formal attributes and 
moral content to classical beauty; he recognizes, in short, a judgment of 
beauty of which the determining principle is wholly subjective. What 
is the relationship between these two categories of esthetic thought in 
Dostoevsky’s outlook?
We cannot arrive at an understanding of Dostoevsky’s esthetic 
position without recognizing one paradoxical notion: it is not beauty 
which is ambivalent, but man who experiences two kinds of beauty. 
“But really to them (and indeed to many) this madness seems not 
a monstrosity,” Dostoevsky wrote to the critic N. N. Strakhov, May 18, 
1871, “apropos of the destructiveness of the Paris Commune, but on 
the contrary, beauty.” He went on, “And thus the esthetic idea in the 
new humanity is beclouded. A moral foundation of society [taken from 
positivism] not only gives no results, but cannot even define itself, is 
confused in its desires and ideals.”4 Dostoevsky’s position is clear: man 
in his moral obloquy finds pleasure in ugliness, violence, bloodshed, 
and falsely calls it beauty. The “esthetic idea” alone, however—the 
idea of beauty which for Dostoevsky in the post-exile period, if not 
earlier as well, is always a religious idea—though beclouded in man’s 
consciousness remains universal and absolute.
We must distinguish, then, between Dostoevsky’s point of view 
and the point of view of some ofhis characters. This is not to deny that 
Dostoevsky enjoys a certain complicity with his heroes, even the most 
morally or ideologically questionable ones; and these may often in 
one way or another reflect his point of view; but it is always within, 
4 PSS, 29 (1):214.
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and in relation to, a clearly defined structure of ideas and beliefs. 
It is especially important to distinguish this basic structure where 
Dostoevsky’s esthetic thought is concerned.
Dostoevsky first set forth publicly his view on the role of beauty 
in the life of man in his critique of utilitarian esthetics in his article, 
“Mr. [Dobrolyu]-bov and the Question of Art” (1861). His essay on 
the critical views of the radical critic Nikolai A. Dobrolyubov (1836–
1861) may be said to constitute a major formulation of his higher 
esthetic (among other issues), but with the important qualification 
that he conceals from his audience the deeply Christian foundation 
of the esthetic outlook had formulated in Siberia. At the end of his 
Diary of a Writer in 1873, Dostoevsky wrote of his early childhood 
immersion in the gospels and his efforts in general to return to the 
“light and truth,” adding that “it would be very difficult to write about 
my rebirth of convictions,” that is, in the spiritual realm, about the 
resurgence of Christian religious faith.5 These convictions harmonized 
completely with his ideas on the role of art and literature in history 
and contemporary society. He wrote his friend, A. E. Wrangel, April 13, 
1856, little more than two years after his release from prison in Omsk, 
that he was preparing an article, “Letters About Art,” which was the 
“fruit of decades of careful thought. I conceived it all to the last word 
as far back as in Omsk.” His article, he wrote, was “essentially on the 
significance of Christianity in art.”6 Dostoevsky did not publish this 
essay, nor has it been preserved, but its ideas resonate in the subtext of 
his critique of Dobrolyubov’s utilitarian esthetic, and more explicitly, in 
his letters and notebooks and other writings in later years. 
5 “We in our family knew the Gospels practically from our earliest childhood 
years . . . It would be very difficult to speak of my rebirth of convictions 
[pererozhdenie moikh ubezhdenii],” he wrote at the end of “One of Today’s 
Falsehoods” in his 1873 Diary of a Writer. More precisely Dostoevsky, using 
the plural, spoke of a change in “our view, our convictions and hearts.” PSS, 
21:133-134. 
6 PSS, 28(1):229. Dostoevsky’s interest in the significance of Christianity in 
art was certainly an early one. “Yes,” he replies to his brother Mikhail in 
a letter to his brother October 31, 1838. “Write me about the main idea 
of Chateaubriand’s Génie du Christianisme”—a highly influential work 
published in 1802 in which the French writer defends Christianity against 
the attacks of the Enlightenment and strongly accents its esthetic-spiritual 
beauty and insight. See my essay, “Chateaubriand and Dostoevsky: 
A Posing of the Problem,” Scando-Slavica 12 (1966): 28–37. 
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Dostoevsky’s unique synthesis of classical and Christian esthetic 
posits a striving for beauty in man’s life, art, and history. The highest 
and most unattainable beauty man seeks, in Dostoevsky’s view, is the 
beauty and moral perfection of Christ. 
In 1861, however, Dostoevsky was addressing in his article not 
only Dobrolyubov, but a highly radicalized and materialistic-minded 
generation of young people, a group that in 1861 hailed him as a hero 
returning from exile. In his defense of art against utilitarian criticism, 
Dostoevsky thus chose to veil his Christian views, though not the 
underlying moral-spiritual essence of his positions or his central thesis 
that beauty and art are organic to man’s moral-spiritual strivings.7 Art, 
Dostoevsky writes in his critique of Dobrolyubov, is as organic a need 
for man as eating and drinking: 
The need for beauty and the creation which embodies it is 
inseparable from man, and without it man, perhaps, would not 
want to live in the world. Man thirsts for it, finds and accepts 
beauty unconditionally, and just because it is beauty; and he bows 
down before it with reverence, without asking what it is useful 
for and what one can buy for it. And, perhaps, precisely in this 
consists the greatest secret of art, that the image of beauty created 
by it immediately becomes an idol unconditionally. And why does 
it become an idol? Because the need for beauty develops most 
at the moment man is in discord with reality, in disharmony, 
in struggle, that is, when he is alive most of all; because man 
lives most of all when he is seeking something and striving; 
at such moments he feels within himself a most natural desire 
for everything harmonious, for tranquility, and in beauty there 
is both harmony and tranquility . . . But when man finds what 
he has been striving for, then for a time life, as it were, slows 
up for him, and we have seen examples in which man, having 
achieved the ideal of his desires, satiated and not knowing what 
further to strive for, falls into a kind of anguish, even foments in 
himself this anguish, seeks out another ideal in his life and, in 
an extreme surfeit of pleasure, not only ceases to value what he 
had enjoyed, but quite consciously turns from the direct path, 
7 Dostoevsky stresses the huge importance of art and literature in the moral 
and spiritual development of the individual and peoples. The “usefulness” 
of art and beauty is intrinsic to art; it cannot arise, Dostoevsky adamantly 
insists in his critique of Dobrolyubov, from a deliberate, intentional desire 
on the part the artist to be “useful.”
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exciting in himself alien tastes, unhealthy, sharp, inharmonic, 
sometimes monstrous ones, losing measure and esthetic feeling 
for healthy beauty, and demanding exceptions in its place. And 
therefore beauty is immanent in everything healthy, that is, in 
that which is most alive, and is a necessary need of the human 
organism. It is harmony; in it lies the guarantee of tranquility; it 
embodies the ideals of man and of mankind.8
This is an esthetic-philosophical credo, at once a view of beauty 
with a capital “B,” and a dynamic spiritual definition of the human 
condition. The striking aspect of this whole exposition is the central 
place given to the esthetic element in the life of man; with it, in its 
“healthy” form, are associated all man’s noblest ideals and aspirations; 
in its so-called unhealthy form, however, the esthetic element enters 
man’s being as a disfigured, destructive force.
Dostoevsky’s point of departure is the same as Plato’s in The 
Symposium: the concept of love of beauty as necessarily love of 
something that is wanting to man; the concept of beauty as absolute. The 
conception of an absolute ideal beauty emerges from the postulation 
of man as incomplete, at variance with himself, and therefore ever 
seeking completion, unity, wholeness, and harmony. “Man strives on 
earth for an ideal which is contrary to his nature,” Dostoevsky observes 
in his important notebook commentary of April 16, 18649—a line that 
encapsulates his view of man’s tragic human condition. At the core of 
his esthetic and spiritual outlook is a tragic idealism, a view of man’s 
relation to himself and human existence as one marked by permanent 
inner contradiction or discord—one never resolved, yet subliminated, 
as it were, in a permanent tension toward the ideal.10 
8 PSS, 18:94. 
9 PSS, 20:175.
10 Friedrich Schelling repeatedly emphasizes in the last chapter of his System 
des transzendentalen Idealismus that art is born in contradiction. “The artistic 
drive must emerge from a similar feeling of inner contradiction” (So muss 
auch der künstlerische Trieb aus einem solchen Gefühl des inneren Widerspruchs 
hervorgehen). This feeling is resolved in a “feeling of endless harmony” 
(im Gefühl einer unendlichen Harmonie). Cf. F. W. J. Schelling, Werke, ed. 
Otto Weiss, 2 (Leipzig, 1907), 293–298. I. I. Lapshin notes this parallel in 
Estetika Dostoevskogo (Berlin: Obelisk-Verlag, 1923), 47–48. Important for 
Dostoevsky’s general philosophical outlook is that man’s permanent 
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When, however, that tension toward ideal beauty lessens or 
vanishes from man’s life, as we have seen, man loses his moral-spiritual 
equilibrium and the reverence for “healthy beauty” is replaced by 
demands for “exceptions.” In “Response to Russkii Vesnik” in 1861, 
apropos of the poetic improvisation, “Cleopatra e i suoi amanti” in 
Pushkin’s story “Egyptian Nights,” Dostoevsky dramatizes man’s 
moral crisis. All hope and faith have disappeared from Cleopatra’s 
decadent society; it is at the edge of an abyss.
Life is choked because of the absence of a goal. There is nothing 
in the future; one must demand everything from the present; one 
must fill life with the immediate alone. Everything passes into the 
body, everything plunges into physical debauchery, and, in order 
to fill in for the higher spiritual impressions which are lacking, 
people excite their nerves, their body with everything that can 
possibly arouse sensations. The most monstrous aberrations, 
the most abnormal phenomena little by little become customary. 
Even the feeling of self-preservation disappears. Cleopatra is the 
representative of this society.11
discord and striving for the ideal of beauty is a simultaneously an esthetic 
and spiritual one. 
11 PSS, 19:135–136. The phenomenon of a sensualism or sensuality that 
invades and corrupts the realm of beauty is an issue in two early works 
of Dostoevsky—“The Landlady” (1848) and “Netochka Nezvanova” 
(1849). In the latter work, Netochka comments on the dazzling beauty of 
her childhood friend, Katya: “Perhaps for the first time the esthetic sense 
was aroused in me, the sense of the artistic awakened by the beautiful was 
revealed for the first time and—that was the source from which my love 
[for Katya] arose.” Yet both the “element of the beautiful” in Katya and the 
feeling it evokes in Netochka are torn with conflict. The beautiful in Katya 
was enveloped in a “false form” of pride which distorts and perverts it; 
and the sensual feelings that it gave rise to in Netochka are characterized 
as “abnormal.” In this strange and feverish episode, Dostoevsky explores 
the phenomenon of “beauty in Sodom,” as Dmitry Karamazov puts it in 
The Brothers Karamazov. The beauty of Katya is perceived as corrupt; evil is 
a part of her nature “Everything about her,” says Netochka, “was beautiful; 
not a single of her vices was born in her—all were engrafted and all were 
in a state of conflict. Everywhere was visible a beautiful element which had 
taken for a time a false form.” It is no accident that Dostoevsky in “Netochka 
Nezvanova” parodies the name of Jean Jacques Rousseau and the theme 
of education in the figure of Madame Leotard. Dostoevsky does not share 
Netochka’s Rousseaesque framework for her remark about Katya, but her
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Dostoevsky avoids the use of the word “beauty” in his discussion 
of man’s taste for “another ideal”; he does not explicitly state here that 
man conceives and experiences this other ideal as beauty. Yet the idea of 
unhealthy beauty is suggested by the very notion of a “healthy beauty.” 
What is involved here is the notion of a counter-ideal in the life of man, 
one that contrasts with the ideal of absolute beauty in that it is both 
temporal and accessible, and full of the force of violence, disharmony, 
and unrest. There is no question of any ethical “good” embodied in 
this other ideal. The phenomenon evoked here, in Dostoevsky’s view, 
is esthetically attractive evil, in its most radical form—sensuality.12 This 
is the “ideal of Sodom,” as opposed to the “ideal of the Madonna,” 
about which Dmitry speaks in his peroration on “beauty” in The 
Brothers Karamazov (1880); it is the phenomenon of beauty in Sodom. 
These two ideals, taken in their organic relationship to one another in 
man, constitute the enigma that is beauty to Dmitry. On the esthetic 
plane, love of beauty in Sodom is posed in The Brothers Karamazov as 
the discordant element in man’s inner being. Even in this condition, 
however, man does not renounce the ideal of absolute beauty, the ideal 
of the Madonna. It is precisely in the context of his inner discord, in 
struggle, in disharmony, and in disfiguration that the need and quest 
for harmony, order, and form is felt. 
The problem of beauty in Sodom, esthetically, the problem of 
ugliness, disfiguration, deformation of the norm, is Dmitry’s point of 
departure in his dramatic peroration on the enigma of beauty in The 
Brothers Karamazov: here is man’s condition, his dilemma, his struggle 
viewed in its earthly aspect. Dostoevsky’s point of departure in his 
article on beauty in “Mr.—bov and the Question of Art” is absolute 
beauty toward which man strives: here is man’s struggle seen in the 
aspect of his highest destiny, in the aspect of eternity. The concept 
of absolute beauty as the highest good and the eternal truth and the 
corresponding notion of an ideal form which symbolizes harmony, and 
therefore, beauty, constitute the unalterable foundation of Dostoevsky’s 
higher esthetic.
concept of beauty taking a false form anticipates his later poetics of higher 
beauty.
12 “Cruel sensuality,” declares Dostoevsky’s Ridiculous Man in “The Dream of 
a Ridiculous Man” (1877), “which befalls almost everybody on our earth, all 
and everyone, serves as the sole source of almost all the sins of our human 
race.” (PSS, 25:113)
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The unity of moral and esthetic categories of the good and 
beauty is characteristic of Dostoevsky’s higher esthetic in all periods of 
his creative life. The dreamer in his confusion loses that “moral sense 
with which man is capable of evaluating all real beauty,” Dostoevsky 
writes at the beginning of his career in a feuilleton in the “Petersburg 
Chronicle” in 184713; and at the end of his career, shortly before his 
death, in his notebook for 1881: “Moral is only that which concides with 
your feeling of beauty and with the ideal in which you embody it.”14 
Beauty is immanent in everything healthy. Art, embodying 
beauty, is an embodiment of moral health. Artistic creation forms an 
“image of beauty” before which man bows; he bows before this image 
precisely in its incarnation of his ideal—the purity and good for which 
he strives. Dostoevsky, in his reply in 1861 to the journal Russkii Vestnik, 
stresses the moral purity (tselomudrennost’) of the sculpture images 
of the Venus of Medici and Venus of Milo. “These images produce 
a lofty, divine impression of art precisely because they are works of 
art. Here reality is transfigured, passing through art, passing through 
the fire of a pure, chaste inspiration and through the artistic thought 
of the poet. This is the secret of art and every artist knows about it.”15 
Art is transfiguration. The very act of creation, the creation of form, 
is a creation of moral value. The need for beauty, therefore, is a need 
for moral transfiguration. Even art, Dostoevsky nonetheless cautions, 
will not have its “whole influence” on an “unprepared or undeveloped 
nature, or on a coarse and debauched soul. The more cultivated, the 
better the soul of man, the more complete and authentic will be the 
impression of art upon it.”16
Beauty in its incarnation of the moral ideal is also truth. George 
Sand, Dostoevsky noted in “A Few Words about George Sand” in the 
June 1876 issue of Diary of a Writer, was entranced in her works by the 
beauty of the truths she preached.17 The visionary hero of “The Dream 
of a Ridiculous Man,” recalling his vision of earthly paradise (one 
imbued with the harmony and tranquility of pure beauty), repeatedly 
13 PSS, 18:34.
14 PSS, 27:57.
15 “Otvet russkomu vestniku” (1861), PSS, 19:134.
16 Ibid.
17 PSS, 23:37.
162 Two kinds of Beauty
speaks of his discovery of the truth. “I saw the truth, I saw and know 
that people can be beautiful and happy without losing the capacity to 
live on earth.” The truth here is ideal moral reality; it is moral truth 
embodied in real forms. “The real images and forms of my dream, that 
is, those which I in fact saw at the very moment of my dream, were 
filled with such harmony, were so entrancing and beautiful, and were 
so truthful, that on awakening I wasn’t able to embody them in our 
weak words.” 
The dream of the Ridiculous Man is a vision of formal beauty 
itself; he has seen a “living image,” he stresses, and he wishes to go 
forth and preach the truth of his revelation. It is the actuality of an 
esthetic experience, the experience of ideal form, of pure beauty, that 
he wishes to preach. Yet art acts on man “plastically and through the 
image,” Dostoevsky wrote in “The Stories of N. V. Uspensky” in 1861.18 
The Ridiculous Man’s dream acted upon him as a work of art, and it is 
as a work of art that he would act upon people; hence, his frustration 
with “our weak words.” The Ridiculous Man, however, is not a writer; 
he lacks the ability to embody his vision in verbal imagery. In “Old 
Reminiscences” in the January 1877 issue of Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky 
recalls Belinsky’s excited praise of his first work, Poor Folk (1846): it had 
conveyed in one stroke, “in an image,” Belinsky exclaimed, the very 
essence of what the publicists and critics try to explain “in words.” This 
is the secret of artistry, “here is truth in art!”19
Truth exists in the language of the critic or philosopher, but in 
art, whether plastic or verbal, truth exists only in the image, in the form 
that embodies it. The problem of conveying truth in art, therefore, is 
a problem in the creation of form, one that only genuine artistry can 
solve. There can be no truth in a work that scorns artistry, Dostoevsky 
insists in “Mr. —bov and the Question of Art.” The truth of a work, 
its living truth and therefore its “usefulness,” is destroyed through 
18 PSS, 19:182.
19 PSS, 25:30–31. In an article on the play Wit Works Woe (Gore ot uma, 1823-
1824), by Alexander S. Griboyedov (1795–1829), Belinsky wrote, “The 
poet thinks in images; he does not prove (dokazyvaet) truth, but shows it 
(pokazyvaet).” See V. G. Belinskii, “Gore ot uma,” in Sobranie sochinenii v trekh 
tomakh, 3 vols., ed. F. M. Golovchenko (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1948), 1:464 . It 
is noteworthy that Dostoevsky recalls Belinsky as saying that one might 
almost “feel the image [obraz] with one’s hand.” 
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poor craftsmanship. And “there is no idea, no fact, which could not be 
vulgarized and presented in a ridiculous way.”20 On the other hand, 
in his article on N. V. Uspensky, “The artistic finish of a work gives to 
thought clarity, relief, palpability, and truth; and artistic power consists 
just in truth and in its vivid representation.”21 Truth, then, is not just 
a reflection of nature or social reality in a work of art; truth is an attribute 
of the work of art itself, the end result of an artistic transfiguration of 
reality. 
The centrality of “obraz” (“image,” “form,” “shape,” but also the 
iconographic image or icon; in Russian Orthodoxy, the visible symbol 
of the beauty of God) as an esthetic and religious idea and symbol is 
dominant in Dostoevsky’s thinking on art throughout his life. “Obraz” 
(form, shape, image, but also icon) is the “axis of Beauty in the Russian 
language.”22 In a letter to the poet Apollon Maikov, December 11, 1868, 
Dostoevsky admires the poet’s poem “At the Chapel” (“U chasovni”), 
at the center of which is an icon. He is troubled only by Maikov’s tone: 
“You seem to apologize for the icon, justify.” Dostoevsky goes on to 
indicate his deep and feelingful religious reverence for the icon, and 
asks, “Do you believe in the icon or not!”23 The icon, particularly the 
iconographic representation of the Madonna, appears in Dostoevsky’s 
artistic universe as a religious esthetic symbol of great importance, 
a concrete image of beauty toward which man turns in reverence and 
longing. “Her eyes were dimmed by a mute, tormenting anguish,” 
Dostoevsky writes of the heroine Katerina in “The Landlady” (1847). 
“She slowly rose, took two steps forward, and with a piercing wail 
fell down before the image of the Madonna.” Dostoevsky’s whole 
20 “G.—bov.” PSS, 18:90. 
21 “Rasskazy N. V. Uspenskogo.” PSS, 19:183–184.
22 “L’image, dans la langue russe, est l’axe de la Beauté.” See Lydie Krestovsky, 
La laideur dans L’art a travers les ages (Paris: Seuil, 1947), 36. 
23 PSS, 28 (2):333. In a conversation with E. Opochinin, Dostoevsky speaks 
with great warmth and sympathy of the cult of the icon among the Russian 
people. “One must believe, strive toward the invisible God, but also worship 
Him on earth through a simple native custom. They can tell me that such 
faith is blind and naïve, but I answer that such faith must be. After all, not 
everybody can become a theologian.” See F. M. Dostoevskii v vospominaniiakh 
sovremennikov v dvukh tomakh (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 
1990), 2:387.
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conception of the role of beauty in the life of man is conveyed in 
his conception of Katerina: a woman torn between her voluntary 
enslavement to a corrupt passion and an anguished yearning for purity 
and unity. Man is created in the image and likeness of God, Dostoevsky 
repeats in his writings; his highest striving is to “imitate the perfection 
of that image.”
In his moving letter to N. D. Fonvizina in late January or early 
February 1854 following his release from prison, Dostoevsky presents 
Christ as his supreme esthetic-spiritual ideal. He speaks of moments 
in prison when he thirsted for faith as the “withered grass” thirsts for 
it, and found it just because truth dawns in misfortune. He speaks of 
being “a child of the century, a child of disbelief and doubt,” and of his 
agonizing thirst to believe
which is all the stronger in my soul in the face of opposite 
proofs. And yet God sometimes sends me moments in which 
I am completely tranquil; in those moments I love and find that 
I am loved by others, and in just such moments I have formed in 
myself a symbol of faith in which everything is clear and sacred 
to me. This symbol is very simple, here it is: to beliieve that 
there is nothing more beauiful, deeper, more sympathetic, more 
meaningful, more courageous and perfect than Christ, and not 
only is not, but I say with jealous love, can never be. Even more, 
if somebody proved to me that Christ was outside of the truth, 
and it really was so that the truth was outside of Christ, then 
I would rather remain with Christ than the truth.24 
Dostoevsky speaks of his “thirst for faith” in the context of 
a permanent legacy of “doubts and disbelief.” The choice to remain 
with Christ is the face of “opposite proofs” is the leap of faith that brings 
him back into the circle of Christian truth—a leap that denotes the 
permanent essence of his being and striving. This concept of yearning 
for the beauty of Christ constitutes a kind of subtext to Dostoevsky’s 
essay on Dobrolyubov in 1861, one in which Dostoevsky posits man’s 
yearning for absolute beauty. Some years later, in his notebook entry 
of April 16, 1864, Dostoevsky writes of Christ as “final ideal on earth,” 
the eternal ideal toward which man strives and must strive according 
to the laws of nature. “Christ’s paradise— all history, all mankind, and 
24 PSS, 28 (1):175.
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in part every individual, is only development, struggle, striving and 
achievement of this goal.”25 For Dostoevsky, the law of eternal striving 
toward the ideal, the tension toward the ideal, one that is moral, esthetic, 
and spiritual, lies at the basis of human existence.
Dostoevsky’s moral-esthetic spectrum begins with “obraz” and 
ends with “bezobrazie,” literally and figuratively with that which is 
“without image,” shapeless, disfigured, ugly. Man finds pleasure (he 
also calls it beauty) in “bezobrazie,” in the disfiguration of himself and 
others, in cruelty, violence, and above all, sensuality—and “sensuality 
is always violence.” Esthetically, “bezobrazie” is the deformation of 
ideal form (“obraz”).26 The humanization of man is the creating of an 
image, the creating of form. The verb “obrazit’,” Dostoevsky writes in 
the “Russian Association for the Protection of Animals” in the January 
1876 issue of Diary of a Writer, “ is a folk word that means to re-form 
oneself, to restore one’s human image.” “One has always said to the 
drunkard, reproachfully, ‘You ought to reform yourself.’ I heard this 
from the convicts.”27
God created man in His own image. Man’s violence against 
man, in the final analysis, is a deformation of the divine image. Zosima 
25 PSS, 20:174–175.
26 In its broadest sense, the word “bezobrazie” is used by Dostoevsky to 
define any kind of ugliness (moral, spiritual, esthetic); very frequently, 
however, it appears in the context of sexual passion or outrage. Rogozhin in 
The Idiot is referred to as a “bezobraznik”—one who enjoys “bezobrazie;” 
his sensuality is described as a “bezobraznaia strast’”—a monstrous or 
disfiguring passion. “It was impossible to imagine anything more monstrous 
(bezobraznee),” Stavrogin marks apropos of his rape of a young girl. We 
learn that in Fyodor Karamazov’s “bezobraznyi dom”—house of iniquity, 
literally, his disfigured or monstrous house—his first wife was surrounded 
by “bezobrazie”—all kinds of shamelessness; Fyodor himself “liubil 
bezobraznichat’ s zhenskim polom”—liked to debauch with the feminine 
sex, that is, literally, to act without any sense for form, purity, or for the 
sacred, to defile in word or deed. The pleasure a human being experiences 
in moral “bezobrazie” is characterized in Dostoevsky’s novelistic world, 
as we have noted, by delight in the exceptional, inharmonic, disfigured, 
abnormal. Only the monstrous, abnormal, malignant can stimulate the 
bored soul of Cleopatra, writes Dostoevsky in his “Reply to Russkii Vestnik.” 
“She has already learned all the secrets of love and pleasures, and before 
her the Marquis de Sade might seem like a child.” PSS, 19:136.
27 PSS, 22:26. 
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recalls how, as a young man, in a moment “disfiguring and monstrous” 
(svirepyi i bezobraznyi) he struck his servant in the face; he remembers 
how he then reproached himself for his act of violence against another 
being created, like himself, “in the image and likeness of God.” The 
extremes in brutalization, disfiguration of men are reported in Notes 
from the House of the Dead (1861–1862). The narrator of this work writes 
of sensualists akin to the Marquis de Sade and Marquise de Binvilliers 
who obtain an esthetic delight in flogging others, in inflicting the last 
degree of humiliation “upon another being bearing in himself the image 
of God.” Such a sensualist is the guard Lieutenant Zherebyatnikov 
who “passionately loved the art of execution and loved it solely for 
the art. He enjoyed it, and like some jaded Roman patrician of the 
Roman empire running out of pleasures, invented for himself various 
refinements, various unnatural variations, so as in some way to 
stimulate and pleasurably titillate his soul lapped in its fat.”
In his profound despair over the brutalization of men, Ivan, 
symbolically, is prepared to discard Dostoevsky’s vital distinction 
between “obraz” and “bezobrazie” in the definition of man. 
Commenting upon man’s bestial and supremely “artistic” cruelty to 
his fellow man, he declares, “I think if the devil does not exist, and 
therefore, man created him, he created him in his own image.” Here, 
the dialectical character of man’s nature vanishes, and the inner 
spiritual countenance of man is replaced by “bezobrazie.” Ivan, in his 
near atheism, essentially advances the notion that man is created in the 
image of the devil. 
The desecration of the iconographic image, the icon, or the 
religious is symbolic in Dostoevsky’s Christian universe of the deepest 
crime. Peter Verkhovensky’s desecration of the icon in The Devils 
parallels on the symbolic plane the murder of Stavrogin’s saintly 
wife. Stepan Verkhovensky, outraged at those who would place 
a pair of boots above Shakespeare or Raphael, wishes to speak out 
at the literary quadrille against the “stinking and debauched lackey 
who first will mount the ladder with a pair of scissors in his hands 
and slash the divine countenance of the great ideal” (a reference to the 
Sistine Madonna, one of Dostoevsky’s favorite paintings). Rogozhin’s 
sensual “bezobrazie” in The Idiot ends up by his slashing Myshkin’s 
“image of pure beauty,” the Madonna-like Nastasya Filippovna, with 
a knife. Fyodor Karamazov lasciviously blabbers in the chapter “Over 
the Brandy” about his favorite topic—women, and concludes with 
a description of how he once spat on his wife’s icon of the Madonna.
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Sensual “bezobrazie,” as we have noted, is for Dostoevsky, the 
central area in which man disfigures both himself and his ideal. The 
Ridiculous Man’s corruption of paradise with its beautiful forms and 
images and harmonious existence is on the same plane as Stavrogin’s 
rape of a young girl. In both cases, “cruel sensuality” consists in a dis- 
figuration of innocent beauty, the ideality of “obraz”. Ugliness 
disfigures, ugliness kills. After reading Stavrogin’s “confession,” 
Tikhon remarks that he finds something ridiculous in the “essence” as 
well as the “form” of the confession. “Ugliness will kill it,” he whispers 
to Stavrogin. “Ugliness! What kind of ugliness?” asks Stavrogin. “Of 
the crime,” answers Tikhon.28 
The disfiguration of another is simultaneously a self-
disfiguration—a loss of image, form, humanity. The body of Dmitry 
hunches up into a deformed position when he utters the terrible 
words: “Why is such a man alive?” (Dostoevsky significantly titles the 
tumultuous episode in which these words are spoken: “A monstrous 
Scene”—“Bezobraznaia stsena.”)29 “Insane cruelty had long ago 
distorted this divine soul to the likeness of a beast,” Dostoevsky writes 
of Pushkin’s Cleopatra in reply to Russkii Vestnik, “and already had 
often degraded her to the likeness of a wild animal.”30
The Underground Man’s moral and physical violation of the 
compassionate Liza is in the deepest sense a despairing act of self-
mutilation, a deliberate defacing of his own cherished ideal out of 
a feeling of its unattainability, a conscious laceration of his own nature, 
his own image. Man’s being, then, is crucified by the opposite strivings 
of his divided nature: his corporeal self, with its destructive, carnal 
28 PSS, 11:145. 
29 It is indicative, again, of the tremendous importance of the esthetic element 
for Dostoevsky that he has Dmitry Karamazov express a deep loathing for 
the ugly physical features of his father’s face (the objective embodiment, 
one might say, of his moral “bezobrazie”). Indeed, Dmitry says at one point 
that he fears it will be precisely these repulsive features that will “at the last 
moment” induce him to kill his father.
30 “And not only to that level: an insane cruelty had long ago disfigured this 
divine soul. Concealed in this beautiful body of hers is the soul of a dark-
fantastic, fearful serpent: here is the soul of a spider, the female of the kind 
that devours its mate at the moment of mating.” Note that Dostoevsky 
refers to Cleopatra’s soul as disfigured, not, as Ivan Karamazov might 
suggest, created in the likeness of the devil. PSS, 19:136.
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drives, and his spiritual self, with its higher strivings. The pleasure 
man finds in “bezobrazie,” in the ideal of Sodom, coexists in lacerating 
contact with his higher ideal; at the same time, the striving for that 
higher ideal is itself an effort to sublimate the forces of sensuality. 
(Fyodor Karamazov indirectly gives expression to this idea when he 
calls Father Zosima a “sensualist.”) The drama of Dmitry Karamazov, 
of course, provides the most vivid example of this ceaseless interplay 
of opposites in man’s nature as Dostoevsky conceives it. 
The feeling of the beautiful that man experiences in the 
contemplation of higher beauty is for Dostoevsky esthetically and 
morally of an entirely different order from the feeling of pleasure man 
experiences in his moral “bezobrazie.” There can be no fusion of these 
two orders of esthetic sensation. Yet man in his degeneration may lose 
the perception of the difference between these two antithetical moral-
esthetic experiences. “Is it true,” Shatov asks Stavrogin in The Devils, 
“that you maintained that you know no difference in beauty between 
some sensual, bestial act and some worthy deed, for example, even 
the sacrifice of one’s life for humanity? Is it true that in both extremes 
you found a coincidence of beauty?” Stavrogin finds this question 
“impossible to answer” and remains silent. Shatov continues, “I also 
don’t know why evil is vile while good is beautiful, but I know why 
the perception of this difference is erased and lost in such gentlemen as 
the Stavrogins.” “You have lost the distinction between evil and good 
because you have ceased to know your people.” 
 It is essential to note that Stavrogin does not experience two 
kinds of beauty. The “coincidence of beauty” is the obliteration of 
distinction between esthetic categories; it signifies the loss of esthetic 
criteria, of measure and feeling for healthy beauty. The faculty of taste 
in Stavrogin has atrophied; the feelings he obtains from both a good 
deed and an evil act, he confesses, are “too petty.” He has fallen into 
indifferent debauchery, and it is on this level of moribund moral-
esthetic consciousness that he weakly registers esthetic experience. 
His inability to answer Shatov’s question is indicative of his central 
dilemma or void: he does not know what he feels (like a man who has 
lost the sense of taste). The distinction between the good deed and evil 
act is for him an academic one; he doubtlessly knows, intellectually, that 
the feelings of beauty in these two different acts relate to two entirely 
different esthetic categories. There is a certain fatal logic in Stavrogin: 
the same contradictions (of which he is fully conscious) that drive him 
to suicide compel him to silence in his critical exchange with Shatov. 
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Dostoevsky’s conception of the normal and the abnormal, of 
moral health and moral sickness, turns not on a distinction between 
good and evil (evil is everywhere and in all men), but on a distinction 
between a spiritual condition marked by struggle and one marked by 
inertia. The cardinal sin in Dostoevsky’s novelistic universe is inertia. 
“The teachings of true philosophy,” he writes in his notebook, “[call for] 
the annihilation of inertness.”31 He censures man not for the presence of 
vileness, evil, but for the absence of ideals andof the striving for them. 
What is important to him is that the Russian peasant has “preserved . . . 
the beauty of his image” in the midst of barbarism. “I repeat,” he writes 
in “About Love for the People” in the February 1876 issue of his Diary 
of a Writer, “judge the Russian people not by those vilenesses which 
it so often commits, but by those great and sacred things for which, 
even in its very vileness, it constantly longs. . . . Judge it not by what 
it is, but by what it wants to become. And its ideals are strong and 
sacred.”32 Dostoevsky does not justify abominations, he insists rather 
that man can be judged finally only in reference to his total evolving 
being. 
“Beauty is normality, health,” Dostoevsky writes at the end of his 
critique of Dobroliubov’s utilitarian esthetic. “Beauty is useful because 
it is beauty, because in mankind there is a permanent need for beauty 
and its highest ideal. If a people preserve the ideal of beauty and its need, 
that means there is also a need for health, for the norm, and thus in this 
way the highest development of a people is guaranteed.”33 Stavrogin is 
doomed because he has no ideals, because there is no creative tension 
or struggle in his existence. He is far from the “Prince”—that earlier 
version of Stavrogin whom we encounter in the notebooks to The 
Devils—who declares: “If I am imperfect, foul, and wicked, yet I know 
that there is something other, my ideal, which is beautiful, sacred, 
and blessed . . . From the image of the one to whom I bow, I draw 
forth also his spirit and hence all my moral being. And therefore it is 
31 The passage from which this line is taken reads as follows: “The teachings 
of the materialists—universal inertness (kostnost’) and the mechanism of 
matter—mean death. The teachings of true philosophy—the annihilation 
of inertness, i.e., the center and synthesis of the universe and of its external 
form—of matter, i.e., God, i.e. eternal life.” PSS, 20:175.
32 PSS, 22:43. 
33 PSS, 18:102.
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absolutely necessary to bow down.”34 Stavrogin has lost both the sense 
of higher beauty and his God. He bows to no one. In essence, nothing 
is important to him. His face is the symbol of his stagnant inner being, 
a congealed mask of a triumphant sensualism—moral “bezobrazie”. 
Stavrogin in all essential respects has been “killed” by ugliness.
In contrast, the possibility of Dmitry’s moral-spiritual salvation, 
concretely, a perceptive shift in the direction of control, order, form, 
is rooted in his active moral consciousness, and a recognition of, and 
striving for, the ideal even in the midst of his ignominy. In his keenly 
felt sense of ignominy (nonexistent in Stavrogin), in his moral despair 
at what he discovers in himself and in man, just here lies the measure 
of possibility for change. Consciousness of evil in self is the first step in 
the direction of purgation of evil. “That which seems to you to be foul 
within,” Zosima observes, “is, by the fact alone that you observed it, 
cleansed.” Dmitry, also, has his higher ideal. “I am a lover of Schiller, 
I am an idealist,” he declares in the notebook to The Brothers Karamazov.35 
It is Schiller and his poetry that Dmitry recalls in the depths of his 
degradation. “I have always read that poem about Ceres and about 
man. Has it reformed me? Never! Because I am a Karamazov.” 
Dmitry nonetheless bows down. “Granted that I be cursed, 
granted that I be low and vile, but let me also kiss the edge of that veil 
in which my God is shrouded.” In the very depths of his ignominy—
“and I consider this beauty for myself”—he begins his hymn to that 
luminous divine ideal “without which the world cannot stand or exist.” 
“I am not Silenus, but I am strong” (Ne Silen, a silen), Dmitry remarks, 
setting himself by way of a pun apart from the esthetically disfigured 
image of the father of the satyrs. 
The quest of Dmitry, the quest of man, is an esthetic one; it is 
for form, and therefore, for moral-spiritual structure. It is not without 
significance that Dmitry’s consciousness of a “new man” within himself 
is accompanied by an esthetic awareness of himself as an “image and 
likeness of God.” Dmitry will never be “re-formed,” but in his denial 
of his disfiguration (even as he “follows after the devil”) and in his 
recognition of his symbolic likeness to God (even as he senses his 
disfiguration) he maintains a creative tension toward the ideal.
34 PSS, 11:189.
35 PSS, 15:366.
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There can be no mistaking the central Christian structure, with its 
classical foundation, of Dostoevsky’s higher esthetic, his unwavering 
commitment to the notion of ideal beauty. At the same time, we cannot 
fail to note in his writing and thinking a de facto recognition of another 
kind of beauty, one indifferent to moral context and experienced by man 
as pleasurable disharmony. Dostoevsky succeeded in harmonizing his 
commitment to ideal beauty with his recognition of “another ideal” 
in the framework of his dualistic view of man, his division between 
the material and spiritual nature of man. Man finds pleasure in the 
destructive drives of his corporeal nature yet simultaneously, strives 
for a spiritual ideal, a tranquility, harmony, and esthetic integrity which 
is contrary to his nature. Dostoevsky recognizes only the beauty which 
is the object of man’s higher strivings. In the contradiction between his 
classical and Christian higher esthetic, and his practical poetics, we 
find the creative dynamic of his novel, his psychological and fantastic 
realism.
The sentencing of Fyodor karamazov1
In Anna Karenina is expressed a view of human guilt and 
criminality. People are portrayed in abnormal circumstances. 
Evil existed before them. Caught in a whirl of deceit, people 
commit crimes and inexorably perish: clearly the idea 
pertains to one of the most beloved and ancient of European 
themes. 
—Dostoevsky, Diary of a Writer
He got what was due him.
—The prosecutor in The Brothers Karamazov 
Two short scenes, “Over the Brandy” and “The Sensualists,” one 
following the other, occupy a pivotal place in the destiny of Fyodor 
Karamazov. In the first scene, the theme of desecration (crime), as 
it relates to Fyodor, attains its sharpest and most comprehensive 
expression. In the second scene, the theme of retribution (punishment) 
surfaces as the inexorable response to his desecration. Both the crime 
and punishment of Fyodor, in the poetics of Dostoevsky, belong to the 
realm of “bezobrazie (the morally and esthetically “monstrous” or 
“shapeless”) and involve the disfiguration of man made in the image 
and likeness of God.
The centrality of the concepts of “obraz” (image, form, icon) 
and “bezobrazie” as antithetical moral and esthetic categories in 
Dostoevsky’s thought cannot be overstressed. “Obraz”, for Dostoevsky, 
is the axis of beauty in the Russian language. It is esthetic form, and it 
is also the iconographic image, or icon, the visible symbol of the beauty 
of God.2 Esthetically, “bezobrazie” is the deformation of ideal form. The 
1 From Robert Louis Jackson, The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and Nocturnes 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 304-318.
2 Dostoevsky speaks of his great respect for the popular cult of the icon in 
a letter to Apollon Maikov in 1868 (PSS, 28[2]:333). See also his remarks 
on this subject to E. P. Opochinin, “Iz Besed s Dostoveskim” (Moscow: 
Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1990), 2:387. 
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humanization of man is the creation of form, the restoration of the image. 
All violence against man is a dehumanization, which is a deformation, 
in Dostoevsky’s view, of the divine image. Zosima in The Brothers 
Karamazov recalls how once, as a young man in a “savage and monstrous” 
(bezobraznyi) state of mind, he struck his servant in the face; and he 
remembers how he then reproached himself for his act of violence against 
another being created, like himself, in the image and likeness of God. 
On the symbolic plane, the desecration of the icon (obraz, ikona) involves 
a crime of the most grave nature, an assault upon the very ideal and 
principle of divine, and therefore human, beauty. Fyodor is guilty of 
precisely this crime of desecration.
Both the crime and punishment of Fyodor, in Dostoevsky’s 
Christian view, are deeply reprehensible and should have yielded 
to an ethos of love and self-sacrifice. Yet as dramatist, Dostoevsky 
grasps the character’s fate in the somber logic of classical Greek 
tragedy. “The theme is not the tragic workings of a mind,” H. D. F. Kit- 
to wrote in connection with Aeschylus’s Oresteia, “it is that men of 
violence do things which outrage Justice, bring retribution, and 
provoke further deeds of violence.”3 Fyodor is not a victim; he brings 
his fate down upon himself by his own words and deeds—his criminal 
neglect of his sons, his persecution of his wife, his debauchery, and his 
desecration of all things sacred. Fyodor, although the embodiment of 
a “universal senselessness,” is by no means presented to the reader 
as an unconscionable villain, however. “You are not an evil man, but 
corrupted,” Alyosha once remarks to him. This observation, perhaps 
more than any other, echoes Dostoevsky’s view that the evil that men 
do rarely serves to define their whole inner nature.
In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky discloses Fyodor’s 
complex and many-sided character. As dramatist, however, he is deeply 
concerned with the ineluctable movement in the novel from crime to 
punishment and with the tragic rhythm that carries Fyodor to disaster. 
He captures the elusive moment in the destiny of a man when quantity 
turns into quality, when he exceeds all limits, when, like Agamemnon, 
he steps upon the “purple carpet”—and falls. Such a moment occurs 
in “Over the Brandy, a scene of Shakespearean power and conception, 
when Fyodor loses all moral controls. The full implications of this 
moment are spelled out in the following scene, “The Sensualists,” in 
3 H. D. F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study (New York, 1954), 75.
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which Dostoevsky discloses the real and false denouement of the tragic 
action in the novel.
The theme of Fyodor is the theme of desecration, or profanation; 
it is the theme of moral and esthetic shapelessness and of the loss of 
all sense of measure and form. The theme is expressed by the very 
physical appearance of Fyodor as he is sketched in the opening chapter 
of the novel, and this is noted by Fyodor’s son Dmitry: “I did not like 
his appearance, there was something about it that was dishonorable, 
boastful, and trampling on everything sacred, mockery, unbelief—vile, 
vile!” Dmitry’s response to his father is direct: “Why is such a man 
alive! . . . No, tell me, can one go on permitting him to dishonor the 
earth?” Fyodor is nicknamed “Aesop,” an allusion, no doubt, to the 
legendary ugliness of the ancient Aesop.
The theme of desecration is also embodied in the chronic and 
“boundless drunkenness” of Fyodor. “The word ‘obrazit’ (reform),” 
Dostoevsky wrote in the January 1876 issue of Diary of a Writer, “is 
a folk word meaning to give an image to, to restore in man a human 
image. One has always said to the drunkard, with reproach: ‘Now you 
ought to go and re-form yourself.’ I heard the convicts say this.”4 Zosima, 
in essence, calls upon Fyodor to “re-form” himself, that is, to restore 
his “image” (obraz). The moral disfiguration of Fyodor, however, has 
passed beyond all limits.
The theme of desecration in its moral-psychological and spiritual 
content is developed in the monastery scenes where Fyodor confronts 
Dmitry, Zosima, and the monks, and in rising crescendo in the scene 
entitled “The Scandal,” where, in his drunken buffoonery, Fyodor 
loses all restraint: “he could no longer control himself and plunged 
as though down from a mountain.” Fyodor flies out of control. 
Objectively, physically, he is dissolving, sagging, losing his features, 
image; subjectively, he is carried away by evil promptings. “Alyosha, 
don’t be angry that I offended your Superior a little while ago,” he 
remarks in “Over the Brandy.” “I can’t help feeling vexed. Now if 
there’s a God, if He exists, then, of course, I’m to blame and I shall 
have to answer for it.” In juxtaposing the phrases menia, brat, zlo beret 
(“I can’t help feeling vexed,” or literally, “I am taken up by evil”) and 
“now if God exists,” Dostoevsky awakens a sleeping metaphor and 
gives the whole sentence symbolic meaning: at this moment, Fyodor is 
4 PSS, 11:167.
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in the power of evil (the devil) and not good (God). What Dostoevsky 
suggests obliquely through Fyodor here, he characterizes directly in 
another context. “But the foolish devil,” writes the narrator apropos of 
Fyodor’s behavior in the monastery, “had caught up Karamazov and 
was carrying him along on his nerves into lower and lower depths of 
ignominy.” “I dare say that there may be an evil spirit in me, too,” 
Fyodor himself remarks at another point in the novel, adding that 
it must, however, be a “small one.” Whatever, Fyodor’s little devil 
triumphs in “Over the Brandy.”
The peculiarly repulsive impression created by Fyodor is 
significant in view of Ivan’s theory of love of one’s neighbor: “One may 
love one’s neighbor in the abstract and even sometimes from a distance, 
but close-up almost never.” Fyodor provides Ivan and Alyosha with 
a close-up view of himself in the opening scenes of the novel and again 
in the scene appropriately entitled “Over the Brandy.” Fyodor is alone 
with his two sons here, and he is drunk. This scene is a fatal one as 
far as Fyodor is concerned; it is the “last act of the performance.” He 
begins to talk, and he cannot stop. He babbles and almost literally 
bespatters everything. Both on the dramatic and ideological planes, the 
scene escalates in tension toward a stupendous finale, a confrontation 
between the sacred and the profane. 
Fyodor begins by expressing his contempt for the Russian 
peasant: “The Russian peasant, generally speaking, needs thrashing.” 
He moves swiftly on to defile Russia: “Russia’s all swinishness. My dear, 
if you only knew how I hate Russia.” He hates Russian vice, but Russia 
itself, he implies, is vice. The motif of beating leads him to his favorite 
subject: the thrashing of women. The shift from Russia to women, from 
“mother Russia” to the mother of men represents ideologically a new 
and dangerous escalation of profanation.
This theme of profanation is closely and fatally interwoven with 
the novel’s moral-philosophical dialectic. The ominous significance of 
Fyodor’s desecration is signaled by a casual remark: “Now if there’s 
a God, if He exists, then, of course, I’m to blame and I shall have to an-
swer for it.” As though gambling with his fate, Fyodor puts this ques- 
tion to Ivan: “Is there a God or not?” His fate is linked with Ivan’s 
resolution of this crucial question, a question that in its basic moral 
content can be rephrased as follows: Is there any moral order or meaning 
in the universe, or is everything permissible? It is Ivan’s tendency 
to resolve this question negatively that ultimately proves fatal to 
Fyodor.
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The significance of the entire moral-philosophical dialectic 
in “Over the Brandy” is that Fyodor himself definitively emerges to 
Ivan, in his personality and outlook, as a hateful embodiment of the 
human condition, as disgusting proof of the moral disorder of man 
and the universe. Ivan answers his father’s question bluntly, “No, 
there is no God . . . there is no immortality, either.” Whether or not 
this answer truthfully reflects Ivan’s views on this question (later he 
insists to Alyosha that he had been “teasing on purpose”), it is clear 
that it expresses his deep skepticism, and on the psychological plane 
of action, at least, pens the way to a negative resolution of the moral 
question that he has linked with immortality.
Fyodor now returns to his favorite topic: women and sensuality. 
His unbridled sensualism, as it is disclosed here, is the very essence 
of “bezobrazie”. In behavior and discourse, he pollutes the very idea of 
woman. As Fyodor shifts his attention to a particular woman, the mother 
of Ivan and Alyosha, and to his dishonorable behavior with her, the 
confrontation between the sacred and profane intensifies. In Alyosha’s 
memory, his mother emerges as a pure, innocent, almost sacrosanct 
figure. She is linked in his mind with the iconographic Madonna (he 
remembers her “praying for him to the Mother of God, holding him 
out in both arms to the icon as though to put him under the Mother’s 
protection”). It is the subject of Alyosha’s and Ivan’s mother that 
provides Fyodor with a bridge to a final assault on the sacred. The attack 
takes the form of a recollection of an act of vileness: the desecration of 
his late wife’s “wonder-working” icon, an object embodying the loftiest 
spiritual beauty. Fyodor recalls that he had insulted his wife only once, 
and that was in the first year of their marriage:
She used to pray a great deal at that time, kept the feasts of Our 
Lady particularly and would turn me out of her room at those 
times. Well now, I thought, I’ll up and knock all that mysticism 
out of her! “You see,” I say, “you see, here is your icon, here 
it is, and here I take it down. Now just look, you regard it as 
a wonder-working icon, but here now, I’ll spit on it in front of 
you and nothing will happen to me for it!” 
As the narrator observes at this point, the old man “was slobbering all 
over.” 
The act of desecration and insult that Fyodor recalls took place 
in the past. But on the dramatic and ideological plane of his drunken 
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discourse, this recollection constitutes the high point of a sweeping 
assault on fundamental national, social, and spiritual values: on 
Russia, the Russian peasant, Russian women, women in general, the 
mother of Alyosha and Ivan, and finally, the image of the Madonna, the 
incarnation of the highest spiritual beauty. The fatal hubris of Fyodor 
is embodied in his astounding, audacious, and cruel words, “Now just 
look, you regard it as a wonder-working image, but here now, I’ll spit 
on it in front of you and nothing will happen to me for it!”
This is one of the most dramatic and psychologically profound 
moments in the novel. It is a moment when past and present merge to 
determine the future, a moment verifying the indissoluble fatal unity 
of a man’s character and fate. Both Fyodor’s vile act and the utterance 
that accompanies it, of course, attest to his deeply superstitious nature. 
Years later, rising again in his consciousness, the memory of this 
moment, guilt, secret dread, tracks him down. The shameless boast 
that he would not be punished for his act, now recalled in the presence 
of his sons, becomes the instrument of his future punishment. Fyodor 
is undone by his own hubris. In the words of Oedipus, the “blinding 
hand” is his own. This moment in “Over the Brandy” rivals in depth 
and depiction the art of Greek tragedy where, in the words of Kitto, “the 
Past is always a menace to the Present, ‘the art of Calchas is unerring’; 
even the Future throws its shadow behind it.”5
As Dostoevsky indicates in the novel, and as Fyodor’s behavior 
suggests, the wonder-working icon of Alyosha’s and Ivan’s mother has 
a certain mystique attached to it. Dostoevsky’s use of the icon at this 
point adds a touch of the mysterious or fantastic to the fate of Fyodor. 
Yet on the deepest level of Fyodor’s characterization, Dostoevsky, like 
the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus, affirms that “a man’s cha- 
racter is his fate.” Dostoevsky is not attempting to introduce 
supernatural motivation into Fyodor’s drama (in the last analysis, 
“God,” the “Mother of God,” or the “devil” are metaphorical embodi-
ments of objective moral and psychological realities). Rather, he is 
concerned with the manner in which the arrogant act and boast of 
his hero is fatefully woven into his drama. This boast is uttered in the 
presence of Ivan, the ideological murderer in the novel. It is Ivan, or 
his alter ego, the devil, who more than anyone, perhaps, is Fyodor’s 
nemesis.
5 Kitto, Greek Tragedy, 76. 
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It is man’s worship of esthetic and spiritual beauty (revealed 
negatively in the peculiar character of Fyodor’s free act), not God, that 
plays the decisive role here, though an element of mystery undoubtedly 
inheres in this scene. Fyodor’s assault on everything sacred in Russian 
life, passing all limits in his spitting on the image of spiritual beauty 
itself, the Madonna, enters into Ivan’s pro and contra and gives a fatal 
turn to his moral-philosophical drama. His profane and drunken 
blabberings not only raise but also provide a tragic answer to the 
fundamental questions tormenting Ivan, and indeed, Dostoevsky as 
well: Is man any good? Is there a moral pivot in him?
In the microcosmic universe inhabited by Fyodor in “Over the 
Brandy,” evil is rampant, evil is unpunished, evil prevails. There wells 
up in Ivan a nihilism of outrage, a subconscious readiness to stand aside 
in the conflict between Dmitry and his father. “One reptile will devour 
another reptile,” Ivan will remark in the next scene, “The Sensualists,” 
“to hell with both of them!” 
Alyosha collapses in hysterics as he listens to Fyodor’s story about 
the icon and his mother. “Ivan, Ivan! Give him some water, quickly!” 
Fyodor exclaims. “It’s like her, exactly like her, the way his mother was 
at that time! . . . He’s upset about his mother, his mother,” exclaims 
Fyodor. “But she was also my mother, too, I think, his mother, isn’t that 
so?” Ivan observes acidly. Fyodor’s profoundly offensive and degrading 
attitude to ward women now takes the form of a mortal personal insult: 
He is seemingly oblivious not only of Ivan’s existence as a son, but of 
his very presence at the moment (one recalls his first ambiguous words 
in the novel about Dmitry, “Yes, Dmitry is nonexistent as yet”). His 
forgetfulness could even be taken as a hint of Ivan’s illegitimacy:
“What do you mean, your mother,” he muttered, not 
understanding. “What’s this all about? Just what mother are 
you talking about? . . . Now can it be that she . . . Oh, the devil! 
Why, of course, she was yours, too! Oh, the devil! Well, now, 
my mind has never been so darkened before, excuse me, and 
I thought, Ivan . . . He, he, he!” He stopped. A broad, drunken, 
half-senseless grin spread out across his face.
Fyodor’s words about a darkening of his mind, more exactly 
translated, “an unprecedented eclipse” (zatmenie kаk nikogda), do more 
than characterize the drunken muddle of his mind; they portend the 
disaster that will befall him and the Kara mazov family as a whole. In 
three words, he pronounces his own death sentence, and he does so in 
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the presence of his ideological executioner, Ivan. Not without reason 
does the word “devil” twice come to his lips as he stumbles over his 
shameless thoughts and tries to come to his senses.
At the beginning of his drunken ramblings, Fyodor remarks to 
Alyosha, “I’d put an end to your monastery. I’d like to take all that 
mysticism and suppress it once and for all, all over the Russian land, 
so as finally to bring all those fools to reason. And what a lot of gold 
and silver would flow into the mint!” “But why suppress it?” Ivan 
goads him on. “So that the truth would shine forth as soon as possible, 
that’s why,” he answers, to which Ivan replies, “But you know, if this 
truth were to shine forth you would be the first to be robbed and then 
. . . suppressed.” In the context of Ivan’s profound skepticism (to say 
nothing of the worldview of Smerdyakov, the man who will physically 
rob and “suppress” Fyodor), the truth that will shine forth is the truth 
of eclipse, the truth of a world without the sun, without the shining 
image of Jesus, and therefore, without morality. In “Over the Brandy,” 
the drunken Fyodor momentarily emerges as the very incarnation 
of man with out God or morality. It is in this scene and the one that 
directly follows that Dostoevsky advances Ivan as one of those people 
who might be capable in a darkened world of suppressing Fyodor.
“Now if there’s a God, if He exists, then, of course, I’m to blame 
and I shall have to answer for it,” Fyodor allows. His subsequent 
punishment, his murder, hardly resolves in the novel the question of 
the existence of God, however. Dostoevsky’s own vision of God was 
not the punitive God of retribution of the Old Testament. Nonetheless, 
these words of Fyodor’s are noteworthy. Fyodor’s murder follows from 
his violation of fundamental moral and spiritual norms. He perishes in 
part because he represents to Ivan, the ideological murderer, a negation 
of all that he, Ivan, holds, or at least would like to hold, sacred. On 
the plane of the novel’s moral action, Ivan and his brother Dmitry are 
bearers of a tragic pre-Christian truth of which Fyodor is quite aware, 
though he remembers it in a Christian reformulation: “And with what 
measure you mete, it shall be measured—or however it goes . . . ,” 
Fyodor remarks in “Over the Brandy.”
Certainly, Dostoevsky did not interpret Jesus’s words in the 
spirit of the Old Testament. Indeed, in the Sermon on the Mount from 
which these lines come, Jesus specifically says, “Ye have heard that it 
hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say 
unto you, That ye resist not evil” (Mt. 5:38–39). The words that Fyodor 
recalls are prefaced by the important lines “Judge not, that ye be not 
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judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged” (Mt. 7:1). 
Dostoevsky, like Tolstoy in Anna Karenina, essentially affirms that it is 
for God and not man to judge. He in no way condones the punishment 
of Fyodor. Like Aeschylus in The Oresteia, he rejects the notion of crime 
as a solution to crime. Yet as novelist-tragedian, he acknowledges in 
the murder of Fyodor a tragic reenactment of the primitive law of 
retribution. All is not permissible in the affairs of men. In the words of 
The Oresteia, the “gods do not fail to punish those who trample upon 
holy things.” The meaning of these words is not that good inevitably 
triumphs over evil but that evil gives birth to evil, and great evil often 
leads to catastrophe, or in the words of Fyodor, to an unprecedented 
eclipse. Fyodor forgets that Alyosha’s mother is also Ivan’s mother, and 
then, half coming to his senses, speaks of a darkening of his mind. 
At this very moment, the narrator observes:
A fearful thunderous clamor echoed from the hall, frenzied 
shouts could be heard; the door burst open and Dmitry tore into 
the room. The old man rushed to Ivan in terror: “He’ll kill me, 
he’ll kill me! Don’t let him get at me, don’t let him!” he screamed, 
clinging to the skirt of Ivan’s coat. 
These concluding lines of “Over the Brandy” dramatize the 
dangerous situation Fyodor finds himself in. He is threatened by 
Dmitry, and he seeks protection from Ivan, whom he has outraged 
by his behavior: “Don’t let him get at me!” Will Ivan let Fyodor be 
killed? In the immediate moment, he will protect his father. But in the 
subsequent action, the internal pro and contra of Ivan will turn on this 
question. Fyodor’s words, then, point to the main area of Ivan’s evil: 
his inaction, his unwillingness to mediate the struggle between Dmitry 
and Fyodor, his insistence on playing the observer.
In the early scenes of the novel, Ivan is characterized almost 
exclusively through inaction and silence, and silence for Dostoevsky 
epitomizes the moral atrophy of the spirit. Ivan, almost unnoticed by 
the reader, silently watches the buffoonery of his father in the early 
monastery scenes but does nothing to stop him. His angry blow 
directed at Maksimov at the moment he departs from the monastery 
reflects his suppressed hostility toward his father. The scene “Over 
the Brandy” brings to the surface the hidden tensions between Ivan 
and Fyodor. Fyodor rightly suspects that Ivan out of spite will not stop 
him from telling lies: “You have contempt for me.” Ivan deliberately 
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leads him on, baits him. Fyodor, intoxicated, is carried away by his 
internal devil and seems to embody in this scene the notion that “all is 
permissible.”
In the following scene, “The Sensualists,” Ivan emerges as 
the most dangerous threat to Fyodor. What takes place in this scene 
is in essence a rehearsal for the murder: Dmitry rushes in followed 
by Grigory and Smerdyakov; as in the real murder scene, he strikes 
Grigory; then he boots his father in the face, announcing that he 
deserves to be killed. But in this action, Ivan, along with Alyosha, 
defends his father, whereas in the murder scene that occurs a short 
while later, after reaching a devious understanding with Smerdyakov, 
he lets his father be killed. Even while he defends his father in “The 
Sensualists,” however, the idea of not defending him enters his mind 
and becomes part of his internal moral and psychological drama. Ivan 
remarks to Alyosha:
“The devil take it, if I hadn’t pulled Dmitry away, I dare say he 
would have gone ahead and killed him. It wouldn’t take much 
to do in Aesop, would it?” Ivan whispered to Alyosha. “God 
forbid!” cried Alyosha. “And why forbid?” Ivan continued in 
the same whisper malignantly contorting his face. “One reptile 
will devour another reptile; to hell with both of them!” Alyosha 
shuddered. “Of course, I won’t let him be murdered as I did not 
let him now. Stay here, Alyosha, I’ll go for a walk in the yard, my 
head has begun to ache.” 
Noteworthy in this exchange is the way the psychological 
and mythopoetic planes of action come together. God and the devil 
emerge in the subtext as central antagonists. Ivan’s remark, “and why 
forbid?” (a zachem sokhranit’, or literally, “why preserve or take care 
of”) echoes Dmitry’s question earlier in the novel: “Why is such a man 
alive! . . . No, tell me, can one go on permitting him to dishonor the 
earth?” The body of Dmitry hunches up into a deformed shape when 
he utters these words. Similarly, Ivan’s face is contorted by a grimace 
when he echoes Dmitry’s words. He assures Alyosha that he will not let 
his father be murdered. But the degree to which the idea of letting his 
father be murdered has taken hold in his subconscious, and at the same 
time, the degree to which this subconscius temptation disturbs him is 
suggested by his complaint about a head ache. His headache is the first 
physical symptom of imminent psychological disorder, a disorder that 
will involve a deep inner split, and an encounter with his alter ego, 
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the devil. Ivan’s conscious assurances that he will defend his father, 
then, contradict his deep subconscious disposition to let his father 
perish.
In the conversation between Alyosha and Fyodor that follows 
Alyosha’s exchange with Ivan, Dostoevsky accents the emergence 
of Ivan as the main threat to his father. Fyodor’s first question on 
recovering consciousness relates not to the beating he received from 
Dmitry, as might be expected, but to the conversation with Ivan just 
before Dmitry burst into the room. “Alyosha, where’s Ivan?” Fyodor 
whispers fearfully. “Outside, he has a headache. He will protect us,” 
Alyosha replies. “What does Ivan say? Alyosha, my dear and only son, 
I am afraid of Ivan; I am afraid of Ivan more than the other. You’re the 
only one I do not fear . . .” Fyodor’s terrible fear of Ivan, especially 
at this moment, is an expression in part of his inner awareness of the 
full implications of his behavior in the scene preceding the brawl and 
of the implications of Ivan’s dangerous moral-philosophical dialectic. 
Yet ominously and naïvely, even after his “eclipse,” he continues to 
disown Ivan and refers to Alyosha as “my dear and only son”; he speaks 
of his first son, Dmitry, not by his name, but simply as “the other.” 
Alyosha assures his father that Ivan will protect them, but the refe-
rence to a headache suggests another course of action or inaction on 
Ivan’s part.
Ivan in “The Sensualists” is moving toward moral conflict and 
mental confusion, whereas Fyodor is slowly recovering his senses. 
As though stepping back from a terrible abyss, Fyodor now adopts 
a wholly different attitude toward the icon he had abused and the 
monastery he had reviled: “That little icon of the Mother of God, the 
one I was talking about a moment ago—you take it with you and keep 
if for yourself. And I give you permission to go back to the monastery. . . . 
I was joking a moment ago, don’t be angry. My head aches, Alyosha.” 
Fyodor’s head aches from the beating it has received; but psycholgically 
his headache, like Ivan’s, reflects inner conflict and guilt over his words 
and behavior in “Over the Brandy.”
Ivan, as we have noted earlier, insists that he had been “deliberately 
teasing” in the episode with his father. Fyodor likewise asserts that he 
was only “joking.” Yet the tragedy of words to which “Over the Brandy” 
bears witness is that the words have a power and dynamic of their own. 
The “teasing” and “joking” of both Ivan and Fyodor mask a deep and 
corrosive skepticism. In both father and son, this behavior constitutes 
a cover for their real feelings and for their evasion of responsibility. 
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Both Ivan and his father are constantly playing with ideas. Ivan’s play 
with ideas—he first expounds them before a group of provincial ladies, 
then allows Miusov to develop them in his own presence, and finally sits 
by almost silently as his disciple Smerdyakov (in “The Controversy”) 
parodies his thought—is the corollary of his self-deception. In the cases 
of both Ivan and his father, seemingly innocent or uncontrolled play 
ends in tragedy. Fyodor’s effort to step back from the abyss comes too 
late, while Ivan lacks the inner moral strength and candor to confront 
himself directly.
The final episode in “The Sensualists” brings to the foreground 
the complex moral-psychological game that Ivan is playing with 
himself and others. When Alyosha returns to Ivan in the courtyard, 
he finds Ivan “writing something with a pencil in his notebook.” His 
mood is disturbingly lighthearted in contrast to his ugly state of mind 
of a few moments before. Alyosha, upset over the “horror” of relations 
between Dmitry and his father, puts a crucial question to Ivan:
“Brother, let me ask one thing more: has any man really the right 
to look at other people and decide which of them is worthy of 
living and which of them is less worthy?” “Why introduce here 
a decision about worth? This question most often is decided in the 
hearts of people not at all on the grounds of worth, but for other 
reasons much more natural. And as for right, who does not have 
the right to wish?” “Not for the death of another?” “What even 
if for another person’s death? Why lie to oneself, since all people 
live so and probably cannot live otherwise? Are you referring 
to what I said just now—that the two reptiles will devour each 
other? In that case, let me ask you, do you think me like Dmitry 
capable of shedding Aesop’s blood, say, of murdering him, eh?” 
“What are you saying, Ivan? Such an idea never entered my 
head! And I don’t believe that Dmitry. . . .” “Thanks if only for 
that,” laughed Ivan. “Be sure I shall always defend him. But in 
my wishes I reserve full latitude for myself in this case. Goodbye, 
till tomorrow. Don’t condemn me, and don’t look upon me as 
a villain,” he added with a smile. 
This Russian Hamlet’s last words, “don’t condemn me,” point to 
his inner resolution of the question Alyosha poses, a question that he 
himself puts more bluntly when he asks Alyosha: “Do you think me like 
Dmitry capable of shedding Aesop’s blood?” What is symptomatic of 
Ivan’s evasiveness here is not only his unwillingness to name his father, 
but his initial willingness to let somebody else resolve a question that 
ought to evoke an immediate and decisive answer from him.
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Alyosha poses the problem of the brothers’ relation to their father 
in an ethical context: does a person have the right to decide whether 
another person is worthy or unworthy of living? (Quite clearly, the 
idea of murder crossed Alyosha’s mind as well.) He places the question 
squarely in the realm of conscious decision. Ivan, significantly, removes 
the question from the realm of ethical judgment and responsibility and 
relegates it to the “natural” realm of feeling and instinct. Man’s natural 
feelings, in Ivan’s view, do not bind him to love his neighbor or to do 
good. “There is absolutely nothing on earth that could compel people 
to love each other,” Miusov reports Ivan as believing. “A law of nature 
saying that man must love mankind simply does not exist.” Man’s 
wishes, then, come from the amoral, instinctual, natural side of his 
being. And “who does not have the right to wish?” Ivan will defend his 
father; such is his rational decision. But as for his wishes, he reserves 
for himself full latitude.
Though he has excluded wishes from the realm of ethical 
judgment, Ivan involuntarily condemns himself (“don’t look upon 
me as a villain”). He believes nonetheless that he can keep his 
wishes separate from his actions. The denouement of the Karamazov 
drama demonstrates the naïveté of this belief and the tragedy of 
his unconscious duplicity. Just as his wishes involuntarily signal to 
him his guilt, so those same wishes involuntarily will later signal to 
Smerdyakov, the actual physical murderer, his desires. In the end, 
Ivan adopts his favorite stance of the “observer.” This stance and its 
moral implications are well illustrated in the last chapter of the section 
of the novel entitled “Pro and Contra.” After his fatal encounter with 
Smerdyakov at the garden gate, Ivan goes upstairs and sits up late:
Remembering that night long afterwards Ivan recalled with 
especial revulsion how at one point he suddenly got up from the 
sofa and very quietly, as though he were terribly afraid that he 
might be watched, opened the door, went out onto the staircase 
and listened to Fyodor moving and walking about below; he 
listened, holding his breath and with beating heart; for a long 
time, for perhaps five minutes, with a sort of strange curiosity; 
but just why he did all this, or what was the purpose of listening 
he of course did not know. This “action” all his life afterwards 
he called “abominable”; for his whole life long, deeply within 
himself and in the recesses of his soul, he considered it the most 
vile act of his life. 
The Defiled and Defiling “Physiognomy”  
of Fyodor Pavlovich karamazov1
In a discussion some years ago entitled “The Sentencing of Fyodor 
Karamazov,” I focused on the way in which the theme of defilement 
reached its culmination in “Over the Brandy” (Za kon’iachkom). Fyodor 
Pavlovich, in the presence of Alyosha and Ivan, recalls spitting on 
Sofia Ivanovna’s icon of the Mother of God and saying to her, “Just 
take a look, you think this is [a miracle-making] icon, well right now 
before you I’m spitting on it, and nothing will happen to me!” In “Over 
the Brandy,” as early in the novel, the theme of esthetic-religious 
defilement is linked with the theme of sexual defilement, but now with 
catastrophic consequences for Fyodor Pavlovich.2
Defilement, or crime, inexorably calls forth vengeance, or 
punishment. In “The Sensualists” (Sladostrastniki), the chapter 
immediately following “Over the Brandy,” we have a dress rehearsal 
for the crime. The roles of the various characters, to be sure, will be 
shuffled in the final crime scene. Accident, chance, choice—conscious 
and unconscious—enter into the denouement; nothing is fated, nothing 
preordained; but the sentence is carried out. The murder did not have 
1 From Word, Music, History: A Festschrift for Caryl Emerson, eds. Lazar 
Fleishman, Gabriella Safran, and Michael Wachtel, Stanford Slavic Studies 
29, 30 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005): 450-463.  
2 “To defile”: to “trample,” “make impure,” “befoul, “soil,” “contaminate,” 
“debase,” “dishonor,” “sully” and, in the sexual realm, “to deflower,” 
“ravish,” “deprive of virginity.” The notion of defilement is conveyed 
in Russian by “zagriaznit’,” “oskvernit’,” in French by “souiller,” and in 
German by “besudeln”—among other words.
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to happen, but it happened, and the happening carries with it a sense 
of tragic inevitability. As we are told in Aeschylus’s Oresteia, the “gods 
do not fail to punish those who trample upon holy things.” In the 
words of the prosecutor who responds to a primordial, pre-Christian, 
ordering of things, “[Fyodor Pavlovich] received his due” (on poluchil 
svoiu mzdu). 
Tragedy in the Christian universe of the The Brothers Karamazov, 
however, opens up a very different kind of knowledge and perspective 
than that suggested by the prosecutor’s remark. Yet in spite of Fyodor 
Pavlovich’s basic inner humanity, his personal drama is caught up 
in the evil of defilement and the ineluctable vengeance it provokes. 
Dmitry, Ivan, and Alyosha, and probably Smerdyakov, on the other 
hand, whatever the nature and degree of their complicity in the death 
of their father, in one measure or another, recoil from defilement.
The theme of sexual defilement emerges in the very first pages 
of the novel, particularly in the two chapters dedicated respectively to 
Fyodor Pavlovich’s second marriage and to his third son, Alyosha. This 
theme marks Fyodor Pavlovich’s relationship with Sofia Ivanovna, the 
mother of Ivan and Alyosha; it hovers on the margins of the monastery 
scenes and bursts forth in the encounter between Fyodor Pavlovich 
and Dmitry in “Why Is Such a Man Alive” (Zachem zhivet takoi chelovek). 
The theme of defilement culminates, literally, in Fyodor Pavlovich’s 
rape of Lizaveta Smerdyashchaia, and figuratively, in his profanation 
of women and the icon of Mother of God in “Over the Brandy.”
The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur writes of the age-old 
“indissoluble complicity between defilement and sexuality.”3 What 
is striking is the way Fyodor Pavlovich’s consciousness of defilement 
gives evidence of what Ricoeur calls “primitive dread” or “ethical 
terror.” Characterizing defilement (la souillure) in its archaic system 
of beliefs as “an act that involves an evil, an impurity, a fluid . . . 
a quasi-material something that infects as a sort of filth, that harms 
by invisible properties, and that nevertheless works in the manner of 
a force, in the field of our undividedly psychic and corporeal existence,”4 
3 See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil. Translated from the French by 
Emerson Buchanan (New York: Beacon Press,1967), 28. This work was 
originally published as part of the larger work: Philosophie de la volonté. 
Finitude et culpabilité. 2. La Symbolique du mal (Paris: Aubier, 1960).
4 Ricoeur, op. cit. 25–26.
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Objectively, Ricoeur notes, it “infects by contact. But this infectious 
contact is experienced subjectively in a specific feeling which is of the 
order of Dread.”5 “The origin of that dread is the primordial connection 
of vengeance with defilement.”6
Dostoevsky discloses precisely this “dread” in Fyodor Pavlovich. 
We recall that in areas of “certain things of life” pertaining to his weak 
character, “he knew and feared much.” Indeed, at times, and in the 
depths of depravity, the narrator writes, he “sometimes suddenly felt in 
himself a spiritual fear and moral shock (dukhovnyi strakh i nravstvennoe 
sotriasenie) that almost, so to speak, resounded physically in his soul. 
‘My soul just trembles in my throat at those times,’ he would sometimes 
say.” He needed somebody who “did not reproach him or threaten him 
with anything,” and who in case of need “would defend him if need be—
from whom? From someone unknown, but terrible and dangerous.” 
In Dostoevsky’s perception, Fyodor Pavlovich’s “dangerous” enemies 
arise out of the very depths of his sexual depravity; they are there before 
the arrival of his sons and find objective embodiment in the later threat 
of Ivan, Dmitry, and Smerdyakov.
“Dread,” writes Ricoeur in lines relevant to our discussion of 
Fyodor Pavlovich, is “already ethical dread, and not merely physical 
fear, dread of a danger which is itself ethical and which, at a higher 
level of the consciousness of evil, will be the danger of not being able to 
love any more, the danger of being a dead man in the realm of ends.”7 
It is this danger that is addressed in Fyodor Pavlovich’s unexpectedly 
congenial relationship with Alyosha.
The early appearance of the “chaste and pure” Alyosha in Fyodor 
Pavlovich’s “den of filthy debauchery” might have been expected to 
further intensify the tension between purity and defilment, form and 
disfiguration, “obraz” and “bezobrazie” in the opening pages of the 
novel, and completely undermine the relationship between Alyosha 
and his father. The reverse is the case: any potential for tension quickly 
dissolves into a friendly relationship: one that foregrounds both the 
purity of Alyosha’s ethical character and unexpected sensitivities in 
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Dostoevsky, however, brings this new view of Fyodor Pavlovich 
into focus only moments after his narrator has presented us with 
a portrait that would appear to utterly demolish the most charitable 
view of Fyodor Pavlovich, let alone any hope that he might be 
redeemed. In “The Third Son Alyosha,” the narrator provides a verbal 
sketch of the so-called physiognomy (fizionomiia) of Fyodor Pavlovich:
I have already said that he was very bloated. His physiognomy by 
that time offered something that sharply testified to the character 
and essence of the whole life he had been living. Besides the long 
and fleshy bags under his small eyes; besides the multitude of 
deep wrinkles on his small, but fattish little face, there hung, in 
addition, beneath his pointed chin, a large Adam’s apple, fleshly 
and oblong like a purse, which gave him a kind of repulsively 
sensual look. Add to this a long, lewd mouth, with puffed-up 
lips, under which could be seen small stumps of black, nearly 
rotten teeth. He sprayed saliva whenever he spoke.
[Ia uzhe govoril, chto on ochen’ obriuzg. Fizionomiia ego 
predstavliala k tomu vremeni chto-to rezko svidetel’stvovavshee 
о kharakteristike i sushchnosti vsei prozhitoi im zhizni. Krome 
dlinnykh i miasistykh meshochkov pod malen’kimi ego glazami, 
vechno naglymi, podozritel’nymi i nasmeshlivymi, krome 
mnozhestva glubokikh morshchinok na ego malen’kom, no 
zhirnen’kom lichike, k ostromu podborodku ego podveshivalsia 
eshche bol’shoi kadyk, miasistyi i prodolgovatyi, kаk koshelek, 
chto pridavalo emu kakoi-to otvratitel’no sladostrastnyi vid. 
Pribav’te k tomu plotoiadnyi, dlinnyi rot, s pukhlymi gubami, 
iz-pod kotorykh vidnelis’ malen’kie oblomki chernykh, pochti 
istlevshikh zubov. On bryzgalsia sliunoi kazhdyi raz, kogda 
nachinal govorit’.] 
What Paul Ricoeur refers to as the age-old “complicity of 
defilement and sexuality” is plainly visible in Fyodor Pavlovich’s 
“physiognomy” as it is in his life at large. The narrator speaks of 
Fyodor Pavlovich’s “repulsively sensual appearance.” Indeed, there is 
no mistaking in the narrator’s verbal sketch the sexualized character 
of Fyodor Pavlovich’s defilement. His features seem like sexual organs 
metamorphosed into facial forms. His face insolently and shamelessly 
leers and sneers at the reader. His lewd mouth, black and rotten with 
decay, spits out at his interlocutors. “He sprayed saliva whenever he 
spoke.” It is as if the very seed of man had become corrupt.
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Like the famous painting of the pawnbroker in Gogol’s “The 
Portrait” (1835), Fyodor Pavlovich’s face enters, as it were, the world 
of the Karamazovs as a force for evil.8 Appearing at the very beginning 
of the novel, the narrator’s sketch in itself sharply poses for the 
reader central moral-esthetic questions of the novel, most specifically 
the ethical and philosophical questions that Ivan will formulate in 
“Rebellion” (Bunt): is it possible to love one’s neighbor, particularly 
if he is close-by? And most important, is the impossibility of loving 
one’s neighbor (that is Ivan’s view of the matter) due to “people’s bad 
qualities” or is it due to their “nature” (Vopros ved’ v tom, ot durnykh li 
kachestv liudei eto proiskhodit, ili uzh ottogo, chto takova ikh natura). Ivan, 
as we know, inclines toward the view that the nature of man stands in 
the way of love.
Among the brothers, it is Dmitry who responds most directly 
and vociferously to the uncleanliness, the impurity, the filth of 
Fyodor Pavlovich’s physiognomy. We may leave aside any unconscious 
responses of Smerdyakov to his father. His fastidious, obsessive 
cleanliness might be interpreted as an involuntary reaction to the 
filthy presence of Fyodor Pavlovich. Such a response, accompanied by 
an unconscious self-loathing, would not be surprising. Smerdyakov, 
after all, is the product of what would appear to be Fyodor Pavlovich’s 
most vile act of sexual defilement—his rape of Lizaveta Smer- 
dyashchaia.
It is Dmitry, however, who openly rebels at the face of his father: 
“I hate his Adam’s apple, his nose, his eyes, his shameless snigger. I feel 
a personal sense of loathing! It’s just this that I fear, I just won’t be able 
to restrain myself” (“In the Darkness”). Or again, “I did not like his 
outward appearance,” he says at the first preliminary hearing, “there 
was something dishonorable, boastful, a trampling on everything 
8 In Gogol’s story, a religious painter, desiring to introduce the “Prince of 
Darkness” into one of his religious epics, strives to paint the portrait of a 
moneylender with “scrupulous exactitude.” He succeeds, but in a terrible 
way: “The dark eyes of the old man looked out in an extraordinarily lifelike, 
and yet dead way.” The demonic power of the moneylender, that is, the 
Antichrist, continues to live in the portrait and to bring misfortune to all 
those who come into contact with it. The attempt to reproduce reality with 
“scrupulous” fidelity, in Gogol’s outlook, has resulted in a morally and 
spiritually destructive “super” natural realism, one that has a disturbing 
and corrupting impact on the viewer in both moral and social aspects.
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sacred, mockery, unbelief—vile, vile!” (Mne ne nravilas’ ego naruzhnost’, 
chto-to beschestnoe, pokhval’ba i popiranie vsiakoi sviatyni, nasmeshka i 
bezverie, gadko, gadko!) 
Dmitry fully grasps the sexual foundation of his father’s 
defilement. “Don’t dare defile a most noble girl,” he shouts to his 
father in the chapter “Why Is Such a Man Alive.” “No, tell me, can 
one go on allowing him to dishonor the earth with himself?” Dmitry 
seconds Miusov, who earlier (“The Old Buffoon”) remarks to Fyodor 
Pavlovich, “You literally defile everything you touch.” Trample, defile, 
dishonor (popiranie, marat’, beschestit’). The notion of Fyodor Pavlovich 
dishonoring the earth gives mythic dimensions to the archaic theme 
of sexual defilement, while at the same time it offers a corollary to the 
novel’s epigraph: the corn of wheat dying in the ground yet bringing 
forth new life. 
Ivan’s response to Fyodor Pavlovich’s, like everything else that 
pertains to his relations with his father, is marked by indirection 
and evasion. He does not respond directly to element of ugliness 
and disfiguration (bezobrazie). Yet his graphic picture in the chapter 
“Rebellion” of John the Merciful embracing and breathing into the foul 
and festering mouth of a person suffering from some terrible disease— 
a tableau that is the centerpiece to his moral-philosophical discourse 
on love of one’s neighbor—constitutes an analogue to his father’s 
physiogomy and the moral-esthetic issues it raises. The putrid and 
diseased mouth of Ivan’s passerby and the vile and repellent mouth of 
Fyodor Pavlovich belong to the same order of images. The reader has 
already encountered the face of Fyodor Pavlovich and has looked at it 
with revulsion. The mouth is central to Ivan’s thought: it is the locus of 
the kiss of love. Ivan, full of hatred, compels Alyosha (and the reader), 
as it were, to kiss the mouth of Fyodor Pavlovich and reflect upon the 
theme of love of one’s neighbor!
“In order to love a person,” Ivan famously declares in 
“Rebellion,” “it is necessary that he be hidden, because the moment 
he shows his face—love is gone.” The focus here on “litso,” or face, 
or countenance, is central. Zosima and Alyosha, as we know, are fully 
conscious of how often the esthetic element constitutes an obstacle to 
higher love. “Active love . . . is a cruel and terrifying business” (“A Lady 
of Little Faith”), Zosima declares not many pages after the introduction 
of Fyodor Pavlovich’s infamous physiognomy. “The face of man often 
prevents many people inexperienced in love from loving others,” 
Alyosha replies to Ivan, citing Zosima (“Rebellion”). Though the face of 
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a person, of man, made in the image of God, may be repellent; though 
it may give evidence of a corrupted life, Zosima and Alyosha insist, it 
is never representative of the whole person.
Dostoevsky makes this very point at the beginning of the novel 
when his narrator refers to Fyodor Pavlovich’s “physiognomy”: 
“Physiognomy” is precisely “litso,” “face.” Dostoevsky’s choice of 
the word “physiognomy” (fizionomiia) is significant. The Greek root 
of the word fizionomiia or physiognomy is “physiognomon”—“to 
judge a character by the features.” The word derives from “physis”—
“nature,” “physique,” “appearance” + “gnomon”—“interpreter.” The 
art of physiognomy, then, is typically the art of knowing, discovering, 
judging temperament and character on the basis of a person’s outward 
appearance, face, or features.9
9 The art or so-called science of physionomic interpretation, as developed and 
popularized in the studies the Swiss writer and Protestant pastor, Johann 
Kaspar Lavater (1741–1801), consisted in judging or interpreting character 
on the basis of a person’s face or outward appearance (bodily movements, 
gestures, speech, etc.). The relationship between man’s inner character and 
his features and movements is more or less fixed, according to Lavater. 
The beauty or hatefulness of a face stands in direct relation to the beauty 
and moral state of a human being: the better morally, the more beautiful, 
while the more morally bad—the more hateful. Man cannot escape his basic 
character, Lavater believed. He is as “free as a bird in a cage” (frei wie der 
Vogel im Käfig). For a recent discussion of physiognomy and character in 
nineteenth and early twentieth century literature, see Kirstin Breitenfellner, 
Lavaters Schatten. Physiognomie und Charakter bei Ganghofer, Fontane und 
Döblin (Dresden and Munich: Dresden University Press, 1999). Some of 
Breitenfellner’s discussions on physiognomy bear on Dostoevsky’s Crime 
and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov, in particular 158–162; 187–189, 
and 195–198. These discussions draw upon Horst-Jürgen-Gerigk’s critical 
writings, in particular, “Der Mörder Smerdjakow. Bermerkungen zu 
Dostojewskijs Typologie der kriminellen Persönlichkeit,” in Dostoevsky 
Studies (1986) 7:107–122, and “Dostojewskij: Der Kriminologe als Dichter,” 
in Willi Hirdt, Ed. Europas Weg in die Moderne (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991), 19–39. 
There is no hard evidence that Dostoevsky read any of Lavater’s work, but 
his complete familiarity with, and critical stance on, many of the Swiss 
writer’s ideas on physionomic interpretation cannot be doubted. Thus, in 
his remarks on academic genre painting in “Apropos of the Exhibition” (Po 
povodu vystavki) in his Diary of a Writer in 1873, Dostoevsky writes: “One 
must portray reality as it is,” they say, whereas reality such as this does not 
exist and never has on earth because the essence of things is inaccessible to 
man; he perceives nature as it is reflected in his ideas, after it has passed 
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We cannot, however, fully know, interpret, or judge a human 
being, Dostoevsky insists, through a superficial glance at, or a sur-
face, naturalistic depiction of, a person’s face or features. To know 
esthetically is to know spiritually; to know spiritually is to see into 
a character. The narrator’s physiognomic characterization of Fyodor 
Pavlovich, from the standpoint of Dostoevsky’s poetics, is limited 
and lacking in insight—if taken out of the broader context in which 
it appears. While this “physiognomic” reading of Fyodor Pavlovich 
countenance contains much truth, it fails to encompass the whole truth 
of Fyodor Pavlovich’s character. It does represent the physiogomy of 
Fyodor Pavlovich, however, as Ivan and Dmitry, and others, see it and 
respond to it. 
The narrator’s later “physiognomic” interpretation of Smer-
dyakov, in the chapter “Smerdyakov,” however, suggests that he can 
successfully read a person’s face or physical being. Remarking on 
Smerdyakov’s habit sometimes of coming to a halt in the house, or in the 
yard, or on the street, and then lapsing into thought for as long as even 
ten minutes, the narrator observes: “A physiognomist, looking deeply 
into him (vgliadevshis’ v nego) would have said that here there was 
neither thought nor reflection, but only some kind of contemplation. 
The key word and verb here is “vgliadet’sia”—to look intently, deeply, 
into something. In his Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language 
(Tolkovyi slovar’ riusskogo iazyka, 1935), D. N. Ushakov provided an 
instructive example of the use of this verb: “My vgliadelis’ v ego litso 
i uzhe ne zamechali ego bezobraziia” (We looked into his face and did 
not notice its disfigured character). 
In the case of Smerdyakov, the narrator’s physiognomic 
reading is, without doubt, on firm ground. His wisdom at this point, 
however, is borrowed: he does not provide us with his own analysis 
through his senses. Accordingly, more scope must be given to the idea, and 
the ideal should not be feared. A portraitist, for example seats his subject 
to paint his portrait; he prepares, he studies the subject carefully. Why 
does he do that? Because he knows from experience that a person does not 
always look like himself and therefore he seeks out ‘the principal idea of his 
physiognomy,’ that moment when the subject most resembles his self. The 
portraitist’s gift consists in the ability to seek out and capture that moment. 
And so what is the artist doing here if not trusting first his own idea (the 
ideal) more than the reality before him? The ideal is also reality, after all, 
and just as legitimate as immediate reality. (Dostoevskii, PSS, 21:75) 
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of Smerdyakov’s peculiar habit of contemplation, but presents it to 
the reader by analogy with the “contemplator” in Ivan N. Kramskoy’s 
well-known painting, “The Contemplator” (Sozertsatel’, 1878).10 The 
physiognomist (“A physiognomist . . . would have said”) in essence 
turns out to be a well-known Russian painter. The narrator conveys to 
the reader thoughts evoked by Kramskoi’s portrayal of a contemplative 
type.11 At the conclusion of his discussion he states that Smerdyakov 
“probably was just one of those contemplators” depicted by Kramskoy. 
It is the artist, painter, or writer, finally, who looks into the character of 
such contemplative types as Smerdyakov and finds them complex and 
multidimensional.12
The narrator’s verbal portrait of Fyodor Pavlovich at the opening 
of The Brothers Karamazov might be called the mask of evil. It does not, 
however, turn out to be the true portrait of old Karamazov, that is, the in-
depth verbal portrait that the novel will provide. Dostoevsky, it might 
be said, has heeded a prescription for the painter and poet provided 
by the literary icon of his youth, Friedrich Schiller. In his Reflections on 
the Use of the Vulgar and Low Elements in Works of Art (Gedanken über den 
Gebrauch des Gemeinen und Niedrigen in der Kunst, 1802), the German 
poet, dramatist, and philosopher argued that artists need not fear to 
10 By having his narrator essentially borrow his physiognomic interpretation 
from Kramskoy, Dostoevsky guards his narrator from the charge of being 
inconsistent in these two physiognomic readings.
11 Dostoevsky himself, as James L. Rice points out, may have heard and 
incorporated in his text analyses of Kramskoy’s painting. For a discussion 
of Dostoevsky’s relation to Kramskoy’s painting, “Sozertsatel’,” and to 
interpretations of it that relate to the passages we have discussed, see Rice, 
Dostoevsky and the Healing Art: An Essay in Literary and Medical History (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Ardis Publishers, 1985), 252–259.
12 For views that challenges the generally negative perception of Smerdyakov, 
see Lee D. Johnson’s “Struggle for Theosis: Smerdyakov as Would-Be Saint” 
and Vladimir Golstein’s “Accidental Families and Surrogate Fathers: Richard, 
Grigory, and Smerdyakov” in A New Word on The Brothers Karamazov, ed. 
Robert Louis Jackson, with an introductory essay by Robin Feuer Miller and 
a concluding essay by William Mills Todd III (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2004), 74-89 and 99-106. For other views on Smerdyakov, 
see also Horst-Jürgen Gerigk’s essay on Smerdyakov (noted in footnote 8 of 
this chapter), as well as Gary Saul Morson’s “Verbal Pollution in The Brothers 
Karamazov” (1978) reprinted in Critical Essays on The Brothers Karamazov, ed. 
Robin Feuer Miller (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1986), 234-242. 
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show us their heroes under a contemptible exterior, provided that they 
have already given expression to their inner world:
But what is allowed the poet is not always permitted to the 
painter. The former merely brings objects before the imagination; 
the latter, on the contrary, brings objects before the senses. So it 
is not only that the impression of the painting is more alive than 
that of the poem, but also that the painters with their natural 
symbols cannot make the interior spirit [das Innere] so visible as 
the poets do with their arbitrary ones, and yet—only the interior 
spirit can reconcile us with the exterior.13 
Dostoevsky illustrates Schiller’s point when he allows his 
narrator to present the reader with what amounts to a naturalistic 
portrait of Fyodor Pavlovich. Dostoevsky does not fear, as it were, to 
show us his hero under a “contemptible exterior” because he is fully 
capable of showing the reader the full inner being of Fyodor Pavlovich. 
In the final analysis, we can say that it is only Dostoevsky’s in-depth 
revelation of Fyodor Pavlovich’s “interior spirit” that ultimately, and in 
the light of the novel’s whole moral-spiritual direction and denouement, 
reconciles the reader with Fyodor Pavlovich’s contemptible exterior, 
that is, with his mask.
Dostoevsky’s poetics of insight rests comfortably, of course, in 
the matrix of his religious worldview. “Man is created in the image and 
likeness of God” (I sotvoril Bog cheloveka, po obrazu Svoemu, po obrazu 
Bozhiiu sotvoril ego) (Gen. 1:27), Zosima remarks. “Obraz” (image, form, 
but also icon) is the ”axis of beauty in the Russian language.”14 Strictly 
speaking, a bezobraznyi obraz (ugly form, ugly icon) is a contradiction 
in terms both in the Russian language and in Dostoevsky’s higher 
esthetic-religious outlook. Man’s “obraz,” man’s image, his likeness 
to divinity may be marred, as with an old icon, but the sacred image 
retains its essential link with divinity. Alyosha echoes this view in plain 
language when he says to Fyodor Pavlovich in the chapter “At his 
13 See Friedrich Schiller, Kleiner prosaische Schriften von Schiller. Aus mehreren 
Zeitschriften vom Verfasser selbst versammelt und verbessert. v. 4 (Leipzig: 
Siegfried Lebrecht Crusius, 1802), 324-325. 
14 “L’image, dans la langue russe, est l’axe de la Beauté.” See Lydie Krestovsky, 
La laideur dans L’art a travers les ages (Paris: Seuil, 1947), 36.
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Father’s,” “You’re not a bad person, but distorted” (Ne zloi vy chelovek, 
a iskoverkannyi).
In Romans, St. Paul challenges the notion of absolute 
uncleanliness: “I know and am convinced by the Lord Jesus that there 
is nothing unclean of itself.” Paul goes on to acknowledge the relativity 
of human judgment, however, declaring that “to him who considers 
anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean” (Rom. 14:14).
Ivan, Dmitry, and Alyosha, like most of the readers of The Brothers 
Karamazov, find themselves in the ranks of the majority for whom 
uncleanliness is unclean, impurity—impure, a bad smell—a bad smell. 
People can’t see other people’s suffering, Ivan argues in “Rebellion,” 
because the other person has “a bad smell” or “a foolish face.” Ivan 
inclines to the view, however, that man’s looks and smells may betray 
his nature. For a moment, as we know, even Alyosha’s faith is shaken 
by a bad smell.
Dmitry shares Ivan’s sensitivity to looks and faces. Yet for all 
of his violent reaction to his father’s face, there is nothing about his 
view of his father or of people in general to suggest that the superficial 
impression of a face gives evidence of a person’s whole nature. He fears 
the impact of Fyodor Pavlovich’s “exterior” or “outward appearance” 
(naruzhnost’). “I’m afraid that [Fyodor Pavlovich’s] face at that very 
moment will suddenly become hateful to me” (Boius’, chto nenavisten 
on vdrug mne stanet svoim litsom v tu samuiu minutu), he declares in the 
chapter “In the Darkness.” Dostoevsky italicizes the words “svoim 
litsom v tu samuiu minutu.” His emphasis on these words—Dmitry’s 
emphasis, let us remember—is crucial to an understanding of why he, 
Dmitry, might kill his father. Yet those same italicized words are equally 
crucial to an understanding of why he might not kill his father. As his 
stress on the word “litso” and “naruzhnost’” and the momentary effect 
of the appearance of his face suggests, Dmitry does not at root take 
mere surface features to be the whole person.
Dmitry’s situation at the window may be compared with 
Father Zosima’s after he had struck his servant. After his “crime”—
that is Zosima’s word—he recalls thinking that his servant is “a man, 
just like I, made in the image and likeness of God”. Dmitry, to be 
sure, does not utter these words as he stands at the window and 
observes his father; nor is he remotely thinking about Genesis 1:27 or 
theology in general. He is a man, however, who in the days leading 
up to the murder of Fyodor Pavlovich obsessively preoccupies 
himself with moral and esthetic questions; he is a person who, one 
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might say, suffers them through; and these tormented questions, 
openly confronted and contemplated, lay the groundwork for the 
answer he will give as he stands by the window and observes his 
father.
Fyodor Pavlovich’s outer appearance revolts Dmitry. That 
exterior, he says at the first preliminary hearing, “trampled on 
everything sacred,” it embodied “mockery” and “unbelief.” “But 
now that he’s dead,” he continues, “I think differently . . . I regret that 
I hated him . . . It’s not so much repentance . . . [but] I myself am not 
good . . . I myself am not so very beautiful (sam-to ia ne ochen’ krasiv), 
and therefore did not have the right to consider him repulsive, that’s 
the thing!” (vot chto!) (“The Torments of a Soul”)
At the highest level of ethico-religious perception, Zosima sees in 
his servant a person made in the image and likeness of God. Dmitry sees 
himself mirrored in Fyodor Pavlovich’s moral turpitude and ugliness: 
a first step on the part of Dmitry in the direction of a deeper awareness 
of himself and the other. His use of the word “krasiv” (beautiful) is 
important: it marks, once again, his heightened awareness (in the 
spirit of the poet Schiller whose poetry he fondly recites) of moral and 
esthetic questions. This awareness enters into Dmitry’s unconscious 
decision not to kill his father.
Dmitry’s deep spiritual-religious consciousness surfaces in the 
third preliminary investigation: “‘In my opinion, gentlemen, in my 
opinion, this is how it was,’ he quietly said. ‘Whether it was someone’s 
tears, whether my mother prayed to God, whether a bright spirit 
kissed me at that moment—I don’t know, but the devil was conquered 
[The Third Torment].” Dmitry, then, views his action or inaction at the 
window as the culmination of what he earlier described as an inner 
struggle in himself between God and the devil.
“God . . . watched over [or “guarded”] me at the time (Bog . . . 
storozhil menia togda [“In the Darkness”]), Dmitry later says in 
explanation of why he did not kill his father. “Storozhit’” is to “guard, 
or watch over the safety of someone,” but also to “be on the watch 
for somebody.” Dmitry was on the watch for Grushenka, while God, 
as he sees it, was watching over his safety. In Dostoevsky’s Christian 
universe, however, it is not God who watches over us and determines 
our actions, but God who gives us the freedom to watch over ourselves 
and to save ourselves. That is exactly what Dmitry is doing in the time-
span of the novel. He had spent the two days before the murder of 
his father—so the narrator tells us—“literally casting himself in all 
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directions, ‘struggling with his fate and saving himself,’ as he put it 
later.” (On zhe v eti dva dnia bukval’no metalsia vo vse storony, ‘borias’ 
so svoeiu sud’boi i spasaia sebia’, kаk on sam potom vyrazilsia [“Kuzma 
Samsonov”]). In his encounter with his father at the window, he saves 
himself. Not God, one might say, but a residual striving in Dmitry for 
a moral-spiritual ideal saves him.
Very much to the point here are the programmatic verses he 
utters (the first to be recited by Dmitry in the three “confessional” 
chapters, and ones that he himself has composed) in “Confession of 
a Passionate Heart,” in verse, and then again in the chapter “A Sudden 
Decision” that immediately follows his encounter with his father at 
the window, “Glory to the Highest in Heaven, Glory to the Highest in 
me!..” (Slava Vysshemu na svete, Slava Vysshemu vo mne!.. [my italics—
RLJ]).15 Dostoevsky’s trailing ellipses point to the special importance 
of the words “in me.” Dmitry, finally, is deeply conscious of the whole 
picture.16 The Dmitry who declares that “God sees [the] whole picture 
in me” (“The Confession of a Passionate Heart. In Anecdote”)—that 
is, God sees the whole human being in him, is capable of intuiting the 
whole human being in others.
What happens to Dmitry at the window was, indeed, a happening, 
or to borrow a notion and phrase of the German writer Adelbert 
von Chamisso (1781–1838) in his novella, The Strange Story of Peter 
Schlemihl (Peter Schlemihls wundersame Geschichte, [1814])—“an event in 
place of a deed” (ein Ereignis an die Stelle einer Tat).17 Chamisso’s Peter 
Schlemihl differs from Dostoevsky’s Dmitry in almost every aspect. Yet 
a comparison of the way each man relates to his respective “event” 
15 Dmitry’s lines, as the editors of the thirty volume Russian edition of 
Dostoevsky’s work note, echo words from Luke 2:13–14: “I vnezapno 
iavilos’ s Angelom mnogochislennoe voinstvo nebesnoe, slaviashchee Воgа 
i vzyvaiushchee:/slava v vyshnikh Bogu, i na zemle mir v chelovekakh 
blagovolenie!” (And suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the 
heavenly host praising God and saying:/ “Glory to God in the highest and 
on earth peace, good will toward men!”) See PSS, 15:541.
16 See my discussion of the significance of the concept of “whole picture” in 
my essay, “Alyosha’s Speech at the Stone: ‘The Whole Picture’,” in A New 
Word on The Brothers Karamazov, op. cit., 234–253.
17 Cf. Adelbert von Chamisso, Peter Schlemihls wundersame Geschichte, Vorwort 
von Horst-Jürgen Gerigk (Heidelberg: 1998), 55.
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serves to bring out the specific character of Dmitry’s happening, what 
happened, and the way he related to it.
In Chamisso’s story, Peter Schlemihl has given up his “shadow” 
to a “gray stranger,” the devil in disguise, in exchange for an unlimited 
source of gold. The stranger nonetheless seeks the ultimate prize: the 
soul of Schlemihl. At a critical moment in Schlemihl’s life, when he is 
about to lose his beloved to a scoundrel who would ruin her; when he 
himself is about to be exposed as an adventurer and imposter without 
a shadow—at this moment the “gray stranger” offers to get him out of 
all his difficulties in exchange for a signature in blood. Torn between his 
affection for, and moral commitment to, the girl, and his loathing for the 
demonic “gray stranger,” he reaches for the parchment to sign, but at 
that moment falls into a deep faint (eine tiefe Ohnmacht). “I lay there for 
a long time as though in the arms of the dead.” An “event”—a positive 
one in the view of Schlemihl—has taken the place of a decision.18 Yet 
the event also discloses his fundamental passivity.
For all his romantic characteristics, Schlemihl’s own views of the 
happening reveal him as a child of the Enlightenment. The event, he 
explains, had taught him to “respect necessity, and what is greater than 
a deed that has been done, an event that has occurred, its [necessity’s] 
property!” (Ich habe erstlich die Notwendigkeit verehren lernen, und was 
ist mehr als die getane Tat, das geschehne Ereignis, ihr Eigentum!) Even 
more, he has learned to “revere that necessity as a wise providence 
that pervades the whole great mechanism in which we are enmeshed 
as mere driving and driven wheels; what must be, must happen; what 
was to happen, happened; and not without that providence which 
I finally learned to revere in my own destiny and in the destinies of 
those that interlocked with mine.”19
Schlemihil’s “providence” (Fügung) is a kind of divine fate; his 
is a fate-ruled universe. His ethics are markedly deterministic. The 
ideological dynamics of Dmitry’s own “event” and of his view of it are 
basically the reverse of Schlemihl’s, though Dmitry only gropes toward 
an understanding of what took place at the window. What is clear is that 
Dmitry’s universe is not a machine and his Providence is one that leaves 
man free to make his own decisions. Dmitry has inclinations toward 
fatalism. He remarks after the murder of his father, “I understand that 
18 Ibid., 56.
19 Ibid., 55–56.
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for such people like me, a blow is need, a blow of fate, to catch them as 
with a noose, and bind them by an external force” (Ponimaiu teper’, chto 
na takikh, kаk ia, nuzhen udar, udar sud’by, chtob zakhvatit’ ego kаk v arkan i 
skrutit’ vneshneiu siloi [“They Carry Mitya Away”]). What is important, 
however, is that at a crucial moment in his struggle with his “fate”—
with his own sense of fatality, with “unknown ideas,” and with crude 
materialistic-philosophical conceptions of man—the balance tips in the 
direction of his not killing his father. In the final analysis, Dmtri knows 
something that Schlemihl does not know.
There is no miracle in the fact that Dmitry does not kill his father, 
though Dostoevsky’s asterisks throw a temporary veil of mystery over 
the event. How we act at any given moment depends not only on the 
circumstances of the moment, but on what we bring to that moment. 
Dmitry’s unconscious decision not to kill his father finds support in the 
dialectic of his moral, spiritual, and nascent religious consciousness; it 
finds sustenance in a consciousness or conscience that is continually 
alive to the complexities and interaction in human behavior and 
consciousness of the sacred and the profane, obraz and “bezobrazie”, 
the man and the mask. This unconscious choice not to kill his father is 
a blow to fate. As Ralph Waldo Emerson put it in an essay, “Fate,” “If 
Fate is so prevailing, man also is part of it, and can confront fate with 
fate [. . .] If there be omnipotence in the stroke, there is omnipotence of 
recoil.”20
“Man is a mystery,” wrote the seventeen-year-old Dostoevsky. “It 
is necessary to divine it” (Chelovek est’ taina. Ее nado razgadat’ [28:1:63]). 
“Razgadat’”—“to divine,” “to guess at the meaning of something,” “to 
get to the bottom of something”; that is what the novelist has done 
in The Brothers Karamazov; that is what Dmitry does intuitively at the 
window; that is what the reader does when revisits and reviews the 
fateful “physiognomy” of Fyodor Pavlovich at the opening of the novel 
and recognizes both its power and its limitations as a true portrait. 
“There’s no art to find the mind’s construction in the face,” complains 
Duncan, King of Scotland, in Macbeth (I: 4). There’s no art, except the 
artist’s art of seeing, which points to the second meaning embedded in 
Shakespeare’s line and to Dostoevsky’s own “physiognomic” vision.
20 See Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen E. Whicher (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 340–341.
Dostoevsky’s “anecdote from a Child’s Life”: 
a Case of Bifurcation1
Call it a moment’s work (and such it seems)
This tale’s a fragment from the life of dreams; 
But say, that years matured the silent strife, 
And ’tis a record from the dream of life.
—Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “Phantom or Fact”
The sketch entitled “An Anecdote from a Child’s Life” (“Anekdot 
iz detskoi zhizni”) constitutes the first section of chapter 2 of the 
December 1876 issue of Diary of a Writer (Dnevnik pisatelia).2 In length 
it is about 2,000 words. The story centers on a twelve-year-old girl 
who decides not to come home after school and to spend the night 
in St. Petersburg. Its focus is the psychology of a preadolescent girl at 
the moment of passage from innocence to a “knowledge of good and 
evil” and the predatory world this girl faces in the dark Petersburg 
night. The theme of child seduction lies close to the surface of this story. 
Typical of threshold art, or of the boundary genre that characterizes 
a multitude of entries in Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer, “An Anecdote 
from a Child’s Life” combines fact and fiction, actual material from 
everyday life with the author’s imaginative development of those 
same materials.3 Throughout, Dostoevsky, as narrator, comments on 
the elements of the story, their psychological, pedagogical, and social 
interest and significance.4 The reader is drawn directly into a story 
1 From Russian Literature 25 (1989): 127-140. 
2 Dostoevskii, PSS, 24:55–59. 
3 For two discussions of Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer, see Gary Saul Morson, 
The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer and the Traditions of 
Literary Utopia (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), in particular 
3–68. See also his “Introductory Study: Dostoevsky’s Great Experiment,” 
to A Writer’s Diary [by] Fyodor Dostoevsky. 2 v. Translated and Annotated 
by Kenneth Lantz. With an Introductory Study by Gary Saul Morson 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 1:1-117. 
4 Dostoevsky’s “Anecdote” highlights such questions as the .different 
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in process, one that theoretically could be turned into a story told by 
a wholly fictitious narrator.
The sketch can be divided into two parts: the first part is devoted 
to a story told by a mother whose twelve-year-old daughter, Sasha, 
had failed to come home from school until late in the evening. On 
her return, the girl recites her adventures to her mother, who in turn 
tells them to the narrator of the Diary, who then recounts them to the 
reader.5 The girl’s tale, the first part of the story, has a happy ending. The 
second—and shorter—part of the story consists of Dostoevsky’s sketch 
of what might have happened to the girl; it involves the seduction 
or “fall” of a girl and has an unhappy ending. Both narratives are 
discussed in the context of an earnest pedagogical discussion on the 
psychology of preadolescents, that is, “young souls who have already 
left early childhood, but have in no sense arrived even at the threshold 
of maturity.” 
“An Anecdote from the Life of a Child” affords Dostoevsky an 
opportunity to comment briefly on his poetics of fantastic realism. “This 
anecdote is a true one” (anekdot etot pravda), Dostoevsky remarks after 
relating the mother’s account of Sasha’s experiences. To the objection 
that the girl’s experience is “an isolated incident,” Dostoevsky calls 
attention to the complex boundary-mentality of twelve- or thirteen-
year-olds and to “the amazingly fantastic notions, dreams and 
decisions that are generated at times in these young souls.” What may 
appear exceptional or fantastic to us is really the normal fantasy world 
of preadolescents. He recommends that educators and parents study 
“this extraordinarily interesting age group.”
Sasha lives on the outskirts of St. Petersburg with her mother. 
She travels back and forth every day from school by streetcar. 
character of youthful dreams and fantasies in different generations; the 
weakened sense of family ties and obligations in the current generation: 
prostitution, adolescent vagrancy in general, and the vagrancy of girls 
in particular. Dostoevsky regards national vagrancy as a Russian trait. 
“Vagrancy is an unhealthy habit, in part our national habit, one that 
later turns into an unhealthy passion.” For Dostoevsky’s comments on 
“vagrancy” (brodiazhnichestvo), see PSS, 4:250. 
5 Anna Grigorievna Dostoevsky, the author’ wife, comments with regard 
to this story: “This was a real incident which involved the daughter of 
Mrs. Khokhriakova. The mother of the girl related it to [Dostoevsky].” See 
Leonid Grossman, Seminarii Dostoevskogo (Petersburg: Gosizdat, 1922), 66.
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One day, she fails to return home on the usual 6:00 p.m. streetcar. 
Instead, the conductor hands a note to the mother in which Sasha has 
written: 
Dearest Mama, all during this past week I have been a very bad 
girl. I received three zeroes and was deceiving you all along. I am 
ashamed to return to you and I will no longer return to you. 
Farewell, dearest Mama, forgive me, your Sasha. 
When Sasha returns to her distraught mother four hours later, 
she explains that she had wanted to run away because she had been 
lying to her mother about working on her lessons. Moreover, she adds, 
she had been influenced by another girl who had been playing truant 
already for two weeks. The story Sasha tells her mother is as follows: 
in deciding to run away, she had not thought much on how she was 
going to live; but she took along with her a few rolls. As evening drew 
near, she sought a place to sleep. She went first to the railway station, 
noticed some unusual looking railway carriages off to the side, and 
started to get into one of them. But at this point a watchman shouts 
to her, “Where do you think you’re slinking? These cars are carrying 
the dead!” (Kudu lezesh’? V etikh vagonakh mertvykh voziat!) And again, 
approaching her, “What is it you want here?” Whereupon Sasha runs 
away to the sound of the watchman’s voice calling out to her. There is 
a Gogolian touch to this scene: corpses, too, travel in Russia, even they 
partake in the unhealthy passion for vagrancy. 
Sasha’s second effort to find a place to sleep is no less frightening 
and funereal in character. She tries to make her way into another 
symbolic coffin or mortuary: a large house in construction, but boarded 
up; no sooner, however, does she crawl into the house “as into a pit” to 
seek out a plank to sleep on than she hears talk, and senses eyes gazing 
at her. Frightened, she again runs away to the sound of voices calling 
her back.
Sasha’s third effort to find a place to sleep does not get beyond the 
idea stage, but her innocence and naïveté promise a sinister conclusion. 
She “suddenly became tired,” she recalls, and decides at this point to 
find “a good man” (dobryi chelovek) on Nevsky Prospect who would say 
to her, “Come and spend the night with us” (Poidemte k nam nochevat’). 
Later, the narrator remarks with irony that St. Petersburg’s streets and 
most “affluent homes” teem with “nice little people” (dobrye chelovechki) 
of bad intent. Sasha, however, has no such encounter with a nice man. 
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“Suddenly she looks up, sees a coach, the last one for the night, and 
decides to return home to her mother.” 
Meanwhile, her worried mother, preferring to wait at home 
should her daughter turn up, accepts the assistance of another “good 
man” (dobryi chelovek), this one a “close acquaintance” who manifests 
a “fervent concern” (goriachee uchastie) over Sasha’s plight. He sets forth 
into the Petersburg night, prepared “if necessary to spend all all-night 
long seeking out the girl at acquaintances,” in order to bring her home. 
But Sasha, however, returns home on her own. “Sasha,” her mother 
asks, “is it possible that you dreamed all this up yourself so as not to go 
to school and to live on the street?” 
At this point in the girl’s narrative, the reader has a clear idea of 
what might have happened to Sasha that night had the bad “good man” 
turned up instead of the good “good man” sent out by Sasha’s mother. 
The presence in the story, however, of two “good men,” but of differing 
intentions, wandering about in the Petersburg night and looking for 
young girls, is a calculated ambiguity on the part of Dostoevsky. It 
signals the story’s complex moral-psychological subtext. 
After comparing the adolescent imagination of an earlier 
romantic generation with that of the current young generation (a more 
down-to-earth youth that dreams but also carries out its dreams), 
the narrator insists that the case of Sasha relates to a definite stage 
in preadolescent development. Then, developing his line of thought, 
he continues: “And how easily all this could have happened, that is, 
the most awful thing of all, and what is more, to whom? To our own 
children!” The accumulation of ominous images and innuendoes in 
Sasha’s narrative leads logically to “the most awful thing of all.”—that 
is, a tragic, ending to Sasha’s story—an alternate ending upon which 
the narrator-writer now calls upon the reader to meditate:
Only think about that place in the mother’s story where the girl 
“suddenly tires,” walks about, weeps and dreams about meeting 
a good man who would take pity on the poor girl who has 
nowhere to sleep, and will invite her to his house. Just think now, 
this wish (zhelanie) of hers, testifying to her extremely youthful 
innocence and immaturity, might easily have been realized; 
everywhere among us, on the streets and in the wealthiest houses, 
there are countless just such “good little people.” Well, and after 
that, the next morning? It’s either a hole in the ice or the shame of 
confessing, and beyond the shame of confessing, a growing ability 
to accommodate this recollection; then later on to reflect upon the 
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matter, but now from a different point of view, and to go on just 
thinking and thinking, but now with an extraordinary variety 
of notions, and all this slowly and by herself; well and at last, 
I dare say, a desire will arise to repeat the incident, and then all 
the rest. And all this taking place in a twelve-year-old! And all 
this undercover. Really undercover in the full sense of the word! 
(I vse shito-kryto. Ved’ shito-kryto v polnom smysle slova). 
It is useful to juxtapose Sasha’s account of her adventure, as told 
by her mother with the narrator’s variant of the story: what might 
have happened. In Sasha’s story, the motif of innocence and naïveté 
predominates, though she is conscious of danger around her. She is 
perfectly open and frank in her disclosure of her motivations and 
actions. She freely unburdens herself to her mother and feels ashamed. 
Though in the note, she calls herself a “bad girl” (durnaia devochka), her 
sense of badness is mitigated by her innocence. 
In the narrator’s continuation of the tale, however, the girl falls, 
and in falling she loses both her innocence and openness. In this 
alternate ending, she experiences a deep sense of shame that inhibits 
confession; she accommodates herself to her fall. Sex is no longer an 
external threatening force; it is an increasingly active internal one. 
The awakened sexual instinct of the girl not only brings with it an 
immobilizing sense of shame, but a feeling of pleasure, a desire to 
repeat the experience. Seduced by some roving “good man,” the fallen 
girl in Dostoevsky’s new tale succumbs to the power of the erotic 
instinct in herself.
What is of particular interest, however, in the narrator’s whole 
conception of the drama of preadolescent consciousness is its divided 
character. After noting that “vagrant girls” really do exist, he concludes: 
Granted that for the time being there is complete innocence 
here; but even if she be as innocent as the first primeval creature 
in paradise, all the same she will not escape a “knowledge 
of good and evil,” well, at least a touch of it, be it only in the 
imagination, in dreams. After all, the street is a very lively 
school. But mainly, I want to repeat over and over again: here we 
have a most interesting age, an age still maintaining, on the one 
hand, in its entirety, the most childlike, touching innocence and 
immaturity, and, on the other, a rapidly acquired almost greedy 
taking things in, and a knack for quickly familiarizing oneself 
with ideas and notions which, in the opinion of a great many 
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parents and teachers, this age group is seemingly incapable even 
of imagining. Now just this duality (razdvoenie), just these two 
so dissimilar halves of a young creature constitute in their unity 
an extraordinarily dangerous and critical element in the lives of 
these young creatures.
The sketch that begins with Sasha’s innocent foray into the 
Petersburg jungle ends with the narrator’s warning about the dangerous 
phenomenon of duality (razdvoenie). With this word or concept we 
are at the heart of Dostoevsky’s sketch. The phenomenon of duality 
or interplay of opposites characterizes not only the consciousness of 
preadolescent girls, but the consciousness, so to speak, of the entire 
sketch; it constitutes the principle governing its message, structure, 
psychology, and most of its linguistic play. 
“Anecdote,” to begin with, consists of two narratives, Sasha’s and 
Dostoevsky’s. In their unity, they dramatize “two dissimilar halves of a 
young creature,” an innocent half and a half that has begun to acquire 
a “knowledge of good and evil”; a pre-fall and a post-fall Sasha. There 
is the good girl Sasha and the “bad girl” she innocently takes herself 
to be, but then there is her bad girl friend (“just like me”). There is the 
androgynous name “Sasha” which may denote a man or a woman. And 
finally, there is the good “good man” who at the behest of the mother 
goes out looking for Sasha in order to aid her, and the bad “good man” 
whom she encounters at every turn from whom she innocently seeks 
aid on the street.
The two anecdotes are bridged by a section in which the 
narrator discusses the way two different generations of youth dream 
and fantasize. The earlier generation, clearly that of the people of the 
1840s, emerges as frankly romantic, that is, divorced from life; the later 
generation, to which Sasha belongs, acts out its fantasies: three young 
boys, we are told, recently tried to make off for America with pistols. This 
generation is representative of an environment marked by weakening 
values, a faltering sense of duty, and a loosening of family ties. In this 
connection, it is noteworthy that there is no mention in the sketch of 
Sasha’s father; she belongs, perhaps, to a broken family. Perhaps, too, 
the father’s place has been taken by the “close acquaintance” who turns 
up in Sasha’s house the night she fails to come home, that is, the good 
“good man” who sets out in the night to find Sasha at the very moment 
Sasha herself is looking for a fatherly “good man” who will invite her 
to spend the night at his home. 
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Duality dominates the geography of the story. Sasha and her 
mother live on the outskirts, “na kraiu,” literally “on the edge,” “at the 
borderline” of St. Petersburg. Sasha crosses that line when she goes to 
school in Petersburg; there on the streets (a “lively school”) an innocent 
vagrant girl “will not escape ‘a knowledge of good and evil,’ well, at 
least a touch of it (nu khot’ s kraiushku).” Sasha lives between a pastoral 
and an urban world, between innocence and knowledge.
“It is just this self-division (razdvoenie),” Dostoevsky writes 
in the concluding line of his sketch, “the union of just these two 
quite dissimilar halves of a young being, that constitutes a most 
extraordinarily dangerous and critical element in the lives of these 
young creatures.”
A binary pattern emerges in Dostoevsky’s deployment of 
individual words and phrases. This is strikingly evident in Sasha’s 
emotionally excited, but naïve account of her visit to the railroad 
station. Sasha has just told her mother that she had expected her fifteen 
kopecks would last her for five days. “And what then?” (A tam?) asks 
her mother:
And what then?
I don’t know what then, I hadn’t thought that far.
And what about the night, where were you planning to spend 
the night?
About the night, I'd thought about that. When it got dark and 
when it got late, my thought was to the railway, only further 
away beyond the station, where there isn’t anybody and where 
a frightful lot of railway cars are standing. I’d crawl into one of 
those cars which didn’t look as if they were going anywhere, and 
spend the night. And I went there. And I went far beyond the 
station, and nobody was there, and I see cars standing just nearby 
and not at all like the ones one rides in. Well, I think, I’ll crawl 
into one of these cars, and nobody will see. But I had just started 
to climb in when suddenly a watchman cried out: “Where do 
you think you are slinking?” These cars are for hauling the dead.
A tam ne znaiu, dal’she ia ne podumala.
A nochevat’-to, nochevat’—gde?
A nochevat’, ja eto obdumala. Kak uzh temno i kak uzh pozdno, ia 
dumala vsiakii den’ khodit’ na zheleznuiu dorogu, tuda dal’she, 
za vokzal, gde nikogo uzh net i gde uzhasno mnogo vagonov 
stoit. Vlezt’ v kakoi-nibud’ etot wagon, kotoryi uzh vidno, eto 
ne poidet, i nochevat’ do utra. Ia i poshla. I daleko zashla, tuda 
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za vokzal, i nikogo tam net, i vizhu sovsem v storone vagony 
stoiat i sovsem ne takie v kotorych vse ezdiat. Vot, dumaiu, vlezu 
v kakoi-nibud’ etot vagon, i nikto ne uvidit. Tol’ko ia nachala 
vlezat’, a vdrug storozh mne i zakrichal: “Kuda lezesh’? V etikh 
vagonakh mertvykh voziat.”
The multitude here of paired words and phrases, or syntactic 
parallelisms, is overwhelming: tam/tam; dal’she/dal’she; podumala/
obdumala; nochevat’-to/nochevat’-to; kak uzh/kak uzh; tuda za vokzal/tuda za 
vokzal; gde nikogo uzh net/i nikogo tam net; vlezt’ ̀v kakoi-nibud’ ̀etot vagon/
vlezu v kakoi-nibud’ ̀ etot vagon; khodit’/ezdit’, etc. The almost formulaic 
pairing of words and phrases serves to convey Sasha’s innocent and 
highly agitated stream of consciousness, the dangerous rhythm of 
anxious impulse and action. 
The words tam/tam, two staccato beats, inaugurate a feverish, 
nightmarish movement towards darkness and death. A sinister sub-
narrative runs parallel to Sasha’s account: “there” (tam), “beyond” 
(dal’she), lies “night” (nochevat’), “darkness” (temno), “horror” (uzhasno, 
uzhas), where “there is nobody” (gde nikogo net), that is, where there are 
only the dead (mertvykh). 
Other uses of paired words and phrases carry us directly into 
the dark world of moral and psychological duality. The mother’s close 
acquaintance, we are told, expressed “a fervent concern” (goriachee 
uchastie) over the girl’s plight. This “good man” is willing to spend 
the night looking for Sasha. In the next sentence, the narrator reminds 
us again that the mother put her “trust in the fervent concern of the 
good man” (doverit’sia goriachemu uchastiiu dobrogo cheloveka). The 
word “goriachee,” which we have translated as “fervent,” also has 
the alternate meanings “passionate,” “feverish.” And these words, 
of course, define those “dobrye chelovechki”—those nice little men 
who inhabit the empty boarded-up houses and warehouses and the 
dwellings of the well-to-do men.
Dostoevsky’s thought in his sketch is clear: we are not dealing 
here with two different moral types of human beings, a good “good 
man” and a bad “good man,” that is, a bad man masking himself in 
goodness; we are dealing with a basic duality of human consciousness. 
The girl whose bad example of truancy Sasha follows is “just like 
me” The same fervently good man who goes out in the night to safely 
bring home a twelve-year-old girl to her mother may also lust for an 
adolescent girl in order to bring her home to seduce her. “Anecdote 
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from a Child’s Life” suggests, in short, that two kinds of men live in 
the same person, a not novel notion that Goethe’s Faust famously 
formulates: “Two souls, alas! are living in my breast.”6
One may cite other examples of significant uses of words 
and phrases in pairs and sometimes even in triads. The “unhealthy 
passion” (boleznennaia strast’) for vagrancy recurs as a “national 
passion” (natsional’naia strast’). There are not only “vagrant girls,” but 
vagrant “dreams and fantasies” that “wander about” in the heads of 
very young people. The same word, as we have seen in the example of 
“goriachee,” takes on a different meaning in a different context. Sasha’s 
innocent “wish” (zhelanie) to turn to a fatherly good man for a night’s 
lodging in the worst instance in a seduced girl may turn into desire 
(zhelanie) to continue a bad pattern of life. 
Dostoevsky’s play with the verb “dumat’,” “to think,” provides 
an illustration of the way words may be used to draw the reader into 
the vortex of Sasha’s drama. The narrator calls upon the reader to give 
some thought (podumat’) to the possible consequences of the innocent 
girl’s appeal to a so-called good man. In the very next line, he again 
appeals to us to think (podumat’) of how her wish (zhelanie) might 
be fulfilled. A few lines later, this pair of words (podumat’/podumat’), 
associated with the reader’s thoughts, is replaced by a related pair of 
words linked with the consciousness of the fallen girl: following her 
seduction, she is “continuously thinking” (vse dumat’ i dumat’) about 
her experience with the bad good man, but now from the standpoint of 
the pleasure obtained in her first sexual encounter with him. 
Dostoevsky establishes a sense of complicity between the reader’s 
thoughts about the consequences of the girl’s appeal to a good man 
and the girl’s thoughts on the pleasures of sex. Dostoevsky scrambles 
low-minded thoughts with high-minded thoughts. We are witness to 
a kind of linguistic seduction. The reader himself is subtly implicated 
6 “Zwei Seelen wohnen! ach, in meiner Brust” (Goethe’s Faust [I: 1112]). 
Faust goes on to say, however, that “one soul wants to separate from the 
other. The one holds on to “gross amorous desire,” the other “lifts itself 
powerfully from the dust to ancestral fields of higher presentiment.” (Die 
eine will sich von der andern trennen; / Die eine hält in derber Liebeslust, 
/ Sich an die Welt mit klammerden Organen; / Die andre hebt gewaltsam 
sich vom Dust / Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.) (I: 1113–1117). Like Goethe, 
Dostoevsky views man’s ambivalent nature as one ultimately galvanized by 
a striving for higher things, for an ideal that is contrary to his nature. 
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in what the Dostoevsky calls the “dangerous” drama of duality: it is 
dangerous, in the final analysis, not only because it might get us into 
serious trouble, but because it is a phenomenon the complexity of 
which exhausts moral judgment. 
Finally, one feels at moments that the high-minded narrator, 
Dostoevsky, himself stands in some sort of double relationship to 
his subject. He repeatedly emphasizes his “interest” in girls of the 
twelve- to thirteen-year-old age bracket. “This age (twelve or thirteen) 
is extremely interesting (neobychaino interesen) in girls even more than 
in boys,” he writes. “I repeat,” he writes later on, “this extraordinarily 
interesting age (chrezvychaino interesnyi vozrast) absolutely requires the 
special attention of . . . our pedagogues.” Then again, at the end of the 
sketch, he returns to this theme: “I repeat again and again: here we 
have a most interesting age (interesneishii vozrast).” The repetition of 
these phrases and the emphasis upon their repetition, “I repeat again 
and again” (povtoriaiu eshche i eshche), suggest to the reader that the 
narrator himself may not be free of double thoughts, that is, that he, too, 
is ruled by the same law of bifurcation that governs his text, and that he 
connects with his story on some deeper level, enjoys, perhaps, a covert 
interest in his theme. Indeed, the very word “interesnyi” (interesting) is 
marked by a certain duality in “Anekdot”; a theme may be “interesting,” 
but the word can be used to suggest an erotic interest in a person; 
“u nego k nei interesnoe otnoshenie,” literally, he has an interesting 
relation to her, that is, he is erotically attracted to her. The frequency of 
the theme of seduction of children, adolescents, and young women in 
Dostoevsky’s works suggest that he has indeed a special “interest” in 
this theme. 7 Or is “Anecdote from a Child’s Life” just another example 
of threshold art in Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer—an art in which the 
author Dostoevsky seems to be dissolving into a fictional narrator or 
character? The theme of seduction is broadly linked in his writing with 
7 Dostoevsky’s “A Christmas Party and a Wedding” (“Elka i svad’ba,” 1848) 
is an early example of Dostoevsky’s subtle psychological development 
of the theme of seduction of children. At the center of this story is 
Julian Mastakovich, a predecessor of the dobrye chelovechki who appear 
in “Anecdote from a Child’s Life.” The narrator in this story calls Julian 
Mastakovich a “dobrozhelatel’,” that is, a “Well-wisher” or a “Wisher of 
Good.” See my discussion of this story in Dialogues with Dostoevsky: The 
Overwhelming Questions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
94–103. 
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the problem of memory, guilt, and confession. In this sense, the casual 
opening phrase or sentence of his sketch is noteworthy: “I’ve a story 
to tell that I don’t want to forget” (Rasskazhu, chtob ne zabyt’). Should 
the reader simply take this opening line as typical of Dostoevsky’s 
sometimes informal mode of addressing the reader in his Diary of 
a Writer? Or, again, should we associate that motif of forgetting yet 
wanting not to forget with a semi-fictive narrator in the making, 
a bifurcated “good man” who, obsessed with a recollection, has a need 
to tell a story? And what better way is there to cope with a troubling 
recollection than to talk about it in the form of somebody else’s story. 
“When I was told this anecdote,” Dostoevsky remarks, “I realized 
that it was very important to publish it in the Diary. I was given 
permission to do so, of course, without revealing anybody’s identity 
(s polnym inkognito).” This motif of concealment crops up again when 
Dostoevsky speaks of the psychological processes of adolescents: “All 
this is undercover, indeed, undercover in the full sense of the word!” 
(Vse eto shito-kryto. Ved’ shito-kryto v polnom smysle slova!). The same may 
be said of “Anecdote from a Child’s Life” as a whole. 
The Triple Vision: 
Dostoevsky’s “The Peasant Marey”1
Life is a whole art and to live is to make an artistic 
work out of oneself.
—Dostoevsky
Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit.
—Goethe
In “The Peasant Marey” (Diary of a Writer, February 1876, chapter 1, 
section 3), Dostoevsky recalls how as a convict in a Siberian prison, 
early in Easter week, 1850, he recoiled in horror before the depravity 
and violence of his fellow convicts. The words of a Polish political 
prisoner addressed to him on this occasion, “Je hais ces brigands,” seem 
to express his own sense of disgust, hatred, and despair. Dostoevsky 
writes that he lay down on his bunk in the barracks a few moments later 
and recalled, in a daydream, a childhood encounter with the kindly 
peasant Marey.2 As a result of that recollection, he recalls, something 
unusual happened to Dostoevsky, the convict. Just what happened, he 
describes at the end of “The Peasant Marey”: 
1 From Robert Louis Jackson, The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and Nocturnes 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 20-32.
2 Dostoevsky’s brother Andrey observes in his memoirs that the peasant 
Marey, “probably called Mark,” was “not an invented character but one who 
really existed.” He describes him as a handsome, black-bearded peasant 
around middle age who was known for his expertise with cattle. See Andrei 
Dostoevskii, Vospominaniia A. M. Dostoevskogo (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo 
pisatelei, 1930), 58–59. There are a number of references to “Marey” in 
Dostoevsky’s notebook at the time he was conceiving his sketch in 1876. 
In one of them he sums up his artistic idea: “Marey. A little scene from 
childhood, I had not been thinking about it, that is, had not forgotten, but 
once, later, long afterwards—oh, how I dreamed, and often—and suddenly 
I recalled Marey; really some childhood scenes make it possible to look at 
things quite differently.” (PSS, 24:121)
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And so when I got off the bunk and looked round, I remember, 
I suddenly felt that I could look at these unhappy creatures with 
quite a different glance, and that suddenly, as though by some 
miracle, all hatred and anger vanished from my heart. I went 
about looking into the faces of people I encountered. This rascal 
of a peasant with shaven head and branded face, intoxicated, 
bawling out his drunken hoarse song,—why, he too may be the 
very same Marey: after all, I really can’t look into his heart.3 
The daydream-recollection of Dostoevsky the convict certainly 
brought about an important transfiguration in his heart. This change 
is intimately connected with his daydream image of Marey, a peasant 
that Dostoevsky had known as a child. At that moment, he felt that he 
could look at the convicts with new eyes, that is, look beyond their raw, 
frightening exterior. Yet when Dostoevsky, looking into the faces of the 
convicts, speculates that this or that peasant “may be the very same 
Marey,” he adds, oddly, “after all, I really can’t look into his heart.” 
We can count five words in the passage quoted above that have 
to do with vision. Dostoevsky must have been fully aware of the 
curious non sequitur presented by that last phrase. So we come to the 
question: How is it possible to have a new view of the convicts, that is, 
a view of their basic humanity, without the capacity to look into their 
hearts? How can there be belief without insight? We will leave aside the 
testimony of Jesus, his gentle admonition to the once doubting Thomas, 
“Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed” (Jn. 20:29). 
The answer to this question involves not only an understanding of the 
precise nature and limits of the action of the daydream-recollection in 
a psychological and esthetic sense, but a recognition that the vision of 
Dostoevsky the convict is only an intermediate level in a three-stage 
vision and transfiguration of reality. This triple vision involves the 
encounter of the nine-year-old Dostoevsky with the peasant Marey, 
the convict Dostoevsky’s daydream-recollection of the encounter, and 
the recollection of the recollection in “The Peasant Marey”—all that 
constitutes section 3, chapter 1 of the February 1876 issue of Diary of 
a Writer. 
In analyzing this sketch or testimony, we must continually bear 
in mind some important remarks Dostoevsky makes toward the middle 
3 PSS, 22:49.
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of the story. The daydream, he indicates, was for him both an escape 
and a creative occupation in prison. All through those four years, he 
would “incessantly” recall his past, “relive [his] whole past life.” These 
recollections, he notes, would arise spontaneously: 
I rarely evoked them of my own will. It used to begin with some 
spark, traits, sometimes almost imperceptible, and then little 
by little grew into a whole picture, some kind of strong and 
integral impression. I would analyze these impressions, add 
new features to things that had happened long ago, and, mainly, 
I would correct, endlessly correct the picture, and herein lay my 
whole pleasure.4 
There is no doubt at all that Dostoevsky the convict did indeed 
dream and think, in this manner, that he would correct, that is, shape 
or give form and moral meaning to the impressions and experiences of 
his past. These remarks, however, also provide us with a clue to “The 
Peasant Marey” as a whole, and to the serious play of Dostoevsky, the 
artist, here, a sacred play involving his fundamental esthetic, spiritual, 
and populist outlook. 
Perhaps more than any other work of Dostoevsky, “The Peasant 
Marey” constitutes a profession de foi, a declaration of faith and 
convictions. Everything else, including the recollection of the peasant 
Marey, is subordinated to this idea. The opening lines of “The Peasant 
Marey,” commenting on the short discussion of the Russian people 
in the section of Diary of a Writer just preceding the sketch, read as 
follows: 
But these professions de foi, I think, are very boring to read, and 
therefore I will relate an anecdote, or rather not even an anecdote; 
just one distant recollection which for some reason I very much 
want to relate precisely here and now, at the conclusion of our 
little treatise on the people. I was then only nine years old . . . but 
no, better that I start when I was twenty-nine years old.5
Dostoevsky’s profession de foi, of course, points forward to his 
anecdote as well as backward to his treatise on the people. They are 
most relevant to “The Peasant Marey.” 
4 PSS, 22:47.
5 PSS, 22:46.
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The short piece that precedes “The Peasant Marey” is entitled 
“About Love for the People. A Necessary Contract with the People.”6 In 
the so-called anecdote or distant recollection that follows, Dostoevsky 
presents the reader with precisely the moment when he made his 
“contract” with the people, that is, when he attained to the most 
important vision of his life. In this vision, esthetics, religion, and 
populism form a grand trinity. We say “moment,” yet an analysis of 
“The Peasant Marey” suggests that the moment existed at a number of 
points in historical time, and therefore, exists out of time, or only in the 
ideality of time created by the artist himself. 
One cannot overestimate the critical, indeed agonizing, 
importance that the people, the problem of understanding them, and 
being reconciled with them, played in Dostoevsky’s life, outlook, and art. 
It is agonizing because Dostoevsky came to understand through direct 
experience that any authentic understanding or reconciliation would 
have to endure a terrifying journey before it reached the interior, the 
spiritual yearnings, of this wounded people. In the so-called treatise on 
the people that precedes “The Peasant Marey,” Dostoevsky formulates 
the problem of love for the people in characteristically esthetic 
terms: 
In Russian man from the common people, one must be able 
to abstract his beauty from alluvial barbarism. Owing to 
circumstances of almost all Russian history our people have 
been subjected to such depravity and debauched, tempted, 
and constantly tortured to such an extent that it is still amazing 
how it survived, preserving its human image, to say nothing 
of preserving its beauty. But it also preserved the beauty of its 
image. A true friend of humanity . . . will understand and excuse 
all the impassable alluvial filth in which our people are sunk and 
be able to seek out diamonds in this filth.7
Dostoevsky distinguishes between repulsive, yet alluvial, filth in 
Russian life, that is, a surface disfiguration and an inner organic form, 
obraz, or image. Diamonds in filth. In this extended metaphor, the 
diamond or image represents the luminous, refulgent ideals preserved 
6 “About Love for the People. A Necessary Contract with the People,” in the 
February 1876 issue of the Diary of a Writer. PSS, 22:42–45.
7 PSS, 22:43. 
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in the heart of the people—“all those great and sacred things it longs 
for,” everything that we find in its “saints,” saints who “themselves 
glow and illuminate the path for us all.” The ideals of the people, 
Dostoevsky insists, are “strong and sacred”; they “saved it in centuries 
of suffering”; “they became one with its spirit . . . And if moreover 
there is so much filth, then Russian man more than anybody else 
anguishes over it and believes that all this is only alluvial and temporal, 
a diabolical delusion, and that the darkness will disappear and eternal 
light without fail will shine forth some day.”8
What conceals or disfigures the image, or icon, of the Russian 
people, then, is not merely ugly, but evil, a diabolical delusion 
something alien, accidental, slanderous, as the Russian word nanosnyi 
(alluvial) implies. In turn, the revelation of the beauty of the image, 
the removal, as it were, of layers of filth from the icon, will also be 
a triumph over evil. It will be a revelation of light in the broad esthetic 
and religious sense. The esthetic act, the revelation of light and beauty, 
is in this sense apocalyptic: it presages rebirth and transfiguration. In 
the deepest sense, though, Dostoevsky would say of the artist and his 
action what the Gospel says of John the Baptist, “He was not that Light, 
but was sent to bear witness of that Light” (Jn. 1:8). 
Who, according to Dostoevsky, bears witness to the luminous 
image of the Russian people? Who gives birth to images? Or, as he puts 
it, who “seeks out diamonds in filth”? Russian literature, the Russian 
artist, the poet, of course. The poem, Dostoevsky wrote to Apollon 
Maikov May 15, 1869, “is like a natural precious stone, a diamond in 
the soul of the poet”; of course, “life,” the “mighty essence of life,” 
“God, living and real” are the real creators manifesting power “most 
often in a great soul and powerful poet, so that if it is not [the poet] 
himself who is the creator then at least his soul is the very mine that 
gives produces the diamonds.”9 It is “only in accord with common 
interests, in sympathy with the mass of society,” Dostoevsky had 
written in a feuilleton in a newspaper column entitled “Petersburg 
Chronicle” (Peterburgskaia letopis’, 1847), “with its direct, immediate 
requirements, and not in drowsiness, not in indifference, which leads 
to the disintegration of the mass, not in solitude, that man’s treasure, 
8 PSS, 22:43.
9 PSS, 29(1):39. 
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his capital, his good heart can be refined into a precious, inimitable, 
brilliant diamond.”10
It is no surprise, then, that Dostoevsky once again insists, in his 
treatise on the people in Diary of a Writer in February 1876, that it is 
precisely the Russian artist who has been drawing forth “diamonds” 
from the tragic history of the Russian people, discovering and displaying 
the “beauty of image” that the Russian people have preserved in spite 
of the alluvial barbarism of its life and history. “All that is truly beautiful 
in Russian literature has been taken from the people,” he writes. The 
great writers “borrowed from the people its simple-heartedness, 
purity, gentleness, breadth of mind, and kindliness, in contrast to 
all that is twisted, false, alluvial, and slavishly borrowed.” Russian 
literature, Turgenev, Goncharov, and others, has the merit of having 
“recognized the people’s ideals as genuinely beautiful.” “In all this,” 
Dostoevsky remarks, “it has been guided by artistic sense rather than 
good will.”11 Where good will is easily frustrated, artistic sense, acting 
independently, discerns the beauty and the deepest layers of moral 
reality in man. Esthetic vision, revelation, the simultaneous discovery 
of light and truth in the midst of darkness, penetrating the alluvial 
filth, in a word, artistic sense, is what “The Peasant Marey” is about. 
When, however, did the miracle take place? In the summer of 
1830, when the nine-year-old Dostoevsky met Marey in the woods? 
In prison, during Easter week 1850, when at the age of twenty-nine 
Dostoevsky, the convict, recollected Marey? Or in February 1876 in St. 
Petersburg, when Dostoevsky, a fifty-five-year-old writer, recollected 
his recollection of Marey and embodied it in “The Peasant Marey”? 
Easter Monday, though a traditional moment of joyous expectation 
for the believer, was a terrifying time for the convict Dostoevsky in 
Omsk, Siberia, in 1850. Dostoevsky accents the degradation, violence, 
and brutality of the convicts around him: 
Monstrous, vile songs, groups of convicts playing cards under 
the bunks; several of convicts already half-beaten to death by 
verdict of their own comrades and covered with sheepskins in 
their bunks till they recovered and came to their senses; knives 
had already been drawn several times—all this, for the two days 
10 PSS, 18:13–14. 
11 PSS, 22:44.
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of the holiday, had been tormenting me to the point of illness. 
And indeed I could never endure without repulsion the drunken 
revelry, and here, in this place, especially.12 
Dostoevsky had just rushed out of the barracks “half mad” 
when six convicts beat the drunken, monstrous Tatar Gazin nearly to 
death (Dostoevsky describes Gazin in Notes from the House of the Dead 
as “having the appearance of a huge spider the size of a man”). He 
returned to the barracks fifteen minutes later with the words of the 
Polish political prisoner ringing in his ears: “Je hais ces brigands.” 
In the midst of this nightmare of violence and debauch, 
Dostoevsky relates, he lay down on his bunk on his back and closed 
his eyes. “I liked to lie that way: people don’t bother a person who 
is sleeping, and meanwhile one can dream and think.” Little by little, 
he forgot his surroundings and “imperceptibly sank into memories.” 
What follows is the recollection of Dostoevsky, the convict, in the 
rendition of Dostoevsky, the writer, of his experience as a child on 
a walk through a wooded area called Losk (that is, “shine” or “luster”) 
one late summer’s day. We shall not dwell on the extraordinary 
description Dostoevsky gives of himself in the woods hunting beetles, 
lizards, and mushrooms—fearing only snakes. “These impressions 
remain with you for your whole life,” he remarks. Suffice it to say that 
there is something distinctly idyllic, indeed mythic about this scene; 
it is a kind of Garden of Eden, such as is rarely found in Dostoevsky’s 
works. 
Suddenly, in this garden, the child hears a cry, “A wolf is coming!” 
“I shrieked, and beside myself with fright, and screaming at the top of 
my lungs, I rushed out to the clearing and straight to the ploughing 
peasant,” to the kindly and benevolent Marey. It turns out that the 
boy had been the victim of a hallucination. The peasant Marey gently 
calmed him, Dostoevsky, the convict, recalls; he “extended his hand 
and suddenly stroked” his cheek and made the sign of the cross. With 
a “broad motherly smile,” “he quietly stretched out his thick earth-
bespattered finger with its blackened nail and gently touched my 
trembling lips.”13 The episode is almost iconographic in its detail. As 
12 PSS 22:46.
13 PSS, 22:47–48. In his notebook, Dostoevsky does not mention being touched 
on the lips: “And how this peasant Marey patted me on the cheek and head. 
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though to emphasize its importance, Dostoevsky in his Diary of a Writer 
repeats his description of it a few moments later. 
Suddenly now, twenty years later, in Siberia I remembered 
this entire meeting with great clarity, to the last detail. That is, 
it had lain in my soul unnoticed, on its own, and without my 
will and then suddenly was remembered when it was needed; 
remembered was this tender, motherly smile of that poor serf, his 
sign of the cross, the nodding of his head . . . and especially that 
thick finger bespattered with earth with which quietly and with 
such shy tenderness he touched my trembling lips. Of course, 
anybody would have comforted a child, but here in this lonely 
encounter it seems that something quite different happened, 
and if I had been his own son, he could not have looked at me 
and beamed a more luminous glance of love; yet who compelled 
him? . . . The meeting was a solitary one, in an empty field, and 
only God, perhaps, saw from above with what profound and 
enlightened human feeling, and with what delicate, almost 
feminine tenderness, the heart of a coarse, savagely ignorant 
Russian serf was filled, a serf who at the time neither expected 
nor dreamed, of his emancipation.14 
I had forgotten this, that is, not forgotten, but had only recalled it in prison. 
These recollections made it possible for me to survive in prison.” PSS, 
24:107.
14 PSS, 22:49. The incident Dostoevsky recalls is archtypal in its essence. In his 
Confessions of an English Opium Eater (1821), Thomas de Quincy recalls the 
following incident in his life: A gentleman’s butler or person of some lower 
rank sitting next to him on a mail coach produces an initial impression of 
a “brutal fellow.” But on learning that the wandering child, De Quincey, was 
ill, this man, while the child was sleeping, put his arm around him to protect 
him from falling off. De Quincey goes on to write: “And for the rest of my 
journey he behaved to me with the gentleness of a woman, so that at length, 
I almost lay in his arms.” This incident, along with many others in his life, 
convinced De Quincey “how easily a man who has never been in any great 
distress may pass through life without knowing, in his own person at least, 
anything of the possible goodness of the human heart, or as I must add, with 
a sigh, of its possible vileness. So thick a curtain of manners is drawn over 
the features and expression of men’s natures that, to the ordinary observer, 
the two extremities and the infinite field of varieties which lie between 
them are all confounded, the vast and multitudinous compass of their 
several harmonies reduced to the meager outline of differences expressed 
in the gamut or alphabet of elementary sounds.” See Thomas De Quincey, 
Confessions of an English Opium Eater (New York and Toronto, 1966), 50–51. 
219The Triple Vision: Dostoevsky’s “The Peasant Marey”
The change of heart of Dostoevsky, the convict, is, of course, the 
miracle of the memory-purified image of Marey, an image expressed in 
his “gentle motherly smile” (mentioned three times), his “shy, feminine 
tenderness,” his “luminous glance of love.” At the moment of contact 
with the boy Dostoevsky, Marey is the very embodiment of love and 
motherly compassion. 
Dostoevsky has selected this name “Marey” for the peasant 
of his childhood memory,15 for he remarks, significantly, on his first 
mention of the peasant, “I do not know if there is such a name.” The 
name, if indeed it exists, is certainly a rare one. It is, in any case, not 
accidental that the name or word “Marey” could very easily have 
been associated in the popular mind with the dialect pronunciation 
of “Mariia” (Mary), which is “Mareia.” The peasant Marey, in all his 
essential characteristics, his tenderness, and motherly compassion, is an 
imitation of the Holy Mary. In this sense, the nine-year-old Dostoevsky, 
like the child Alyosha Karamazov whose mother held him up before 
the icon-image of Mary, may be said to have come under the protection 
of the Madonna. 
The symbolic meaning of Dostoevsky’s encounter with Marey 
dawned upon him only as a convict in prison. This encounter, as 
Dostoevsky, the writer, conceives it, suggests the depth of feeling and 
concept that underlay his assertion in the last section of Diary of a Writer 
in 1873 that at the basis of his change of “convictions and heart” lay 
“direct contact with the people, brotherly unity with it in the common 
The Russian sculptor Naum Gabo (1890-1977), in the tradition of De Quincy 
and Dostoevsky, relates an incident from his childhood almost identical in 
detail and moral import with Dostoevsky’s story in “The Peasant Marey.” 
Wandering off into an “enchanted” woods near his home, the child Gabo 
encounters a “huge, overwhelming image of a peasant with an ax.” He 
faints, but is carried in the arms of the same peasant home to safety. Later in 
life, Gabo writes, he learned that the fear he had had in general of “Man—of 
the Stranger” was rather a fear of his unknown image. “And when I found 
him as my neighbor among the multitude of my contemporaries, I saw 
that he might be much more afraid of me than I of him, and that it was 
perhaps up to me to take him into my arms and bring him safely to his 
home whence he had wandered so frightfully far away.” See Of Divers Arts, 
Bollingen Series XXXV 8 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 
12–13, 15.
15 See Andrei Dostoevskii, Vospominaniia, op. cit., 58–59.
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misfortune.”16 Contact with the people for Dostoevsky, as for Alyosha 
Karamazov in the chapter “Cana of Galilee,” was not only a contact with 
the rejuvenating powers of the earth, but a hidden revelation. Thus, 
the special words of Dostoevsky—“something different” happened—
point to a mystical experience, a religious moment of consecration— 
a solitary one, as Dostoevsky puts it, in an empty field with only God 
looking on.
Let us briefly review the experience remembered in “The 
Peasant Marey.” In prison, surrounded by coarse and frightening 
peasant convicts, Dostoevsky closes his eyes and recalls a moment in 
his childhood when, alone in the woods, he had a terrible fright about 
a wolf (in Russian, the word for “wolf” is “volk”). We have an obvious 
parallel in experience here. On the one hand, we have the moment of 
panic in the woods in which the boy fears a terrible wolf; this all turns 
out to have been a hallucination. On the other hand, we have a moment 
of panic in the barracks in which Dostoevsky, the convict, is terrorized 
by monster convicts; this also turns out to have been something of 
a hallucination, a nightmare, a demonic suggestion, for it involved 
a deep misunderstanding of the true nature of the convicts, or Russian 
people. (The German word for “the people,” “das Volk,” comes to 
mind here.) Dostoevsky had been deceived in his judgment by alluvial 
filth, the diabolical mask of ugliness. In the first instance, the terrified 
child is touched on the lips and cured of his hallucination by the 
compassionate Marey with his “gentle motherly smile.” In the second 
instance, Dostoevsky the convict is cured of his hatred and anger, his 
moral blindness, by what he calls the “gentle smile of memory”: 
All this I recalled at once, I do not know why, but with amazing 
accuracy of detail. I suddenly came to and sat up in my bunk 
and, I remember, I could still feel the gentle smile of memory on 
my face. For another minute I went on recalling that incident of 
my childhood.17 
The gentle smile of memory, of course, spreads across the 
hardened, embittered face of Dostoevsky, the convict, comforts him in 
his suffering, and above all—momentarily, to be sure—banishes from 
16 PSS, 21:133–134. 
17 PSS, 22:49.
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his heart all hatred and anger. The esthetic impact of the daydream-
recollection with its glowing image of Marey is such as to make him 
feel, precisely feel, that he could look at the convicts with quite different 
eyes. 
And yet for Dostoevsky the convict, in the very first months of 
his imprisonment, there was as yet no real seeing into the inner human 
core of the convicts. Under the impact of his daydream-recollection, he 
only sensed or supposed the existence of other peasant Mareys under 
the harsh exterior of the convicts. “But after all I cannot really look 
into his heart,” he says. If we read correctly the concluding passage 
from “The Peasant Marey,” we realize that the daydream-recollection 
constituted a form of intuition by analogy; the purified dream-image 
of Marey momentarily came between Dostoevsky and the convicts. 
What the daydream-recollection did for Dostoevsky, the convict, was 
to open up for Dostoevsky, the artist, the possibility of a new “quite 
different glance”; it opened the way for those months and years of 
purifying his recollection of his years in prison, years of slow spiritual 
recovery, years of preparation of Notes from the House of the Dead, the 
pivotal work in Dostoevsky’s post-exile artistic development. In the 
latter work, in which philosophical idealism blends with a Christian 
faith and mythology, Dostoevsky simultaneously formulates his 
Christian poetics18 and signals his own personal and artistic triumph 
over the raw, naturalistic, lethal reality of Russian life. The daydream-
recollection, then, is analogous to the artistic process. As Dostoevsky 
himself notes in “The Peasant Marey,” it is an active creative process 
working toward a final, integral, complete “picture.” Further, the 
daydream-recollection, as a completed memory image, in all its 
artistic detail, acts upon the dreamer like a work of art: it momentarily 
transforms him, inwardly and outwardly. Yet the convict Dostoevsky’s 
daydream-recollection was not art in itself. It became art in the final 
recollection of the recollection, that is, when the anecdote or distant 
recollection, after much analysis and correction, after prolonged search 
for form and meaning, was finally embodied in artistic imagery. 
18 In a letter to A. E. Wrangel, April 13, 1856, Dostoevsky refers to a then 
unpublished essay he had written, “Letters about Art”—one that has not 
been preserved. The essay, he wrote, is the “fruit of decades of thought. 
I worked it out to the last word in Omsk . . . It is directly about role of 
Christianity in art.” PSS, 28(1):229.
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In sum, we can distinguish three intersecting levels of vision or 
esthetic-spiritual experience. The first vision pertains to the appearance 
of Marey before the nine-year-old Dostoevsky. Something happened 
to the child in the field: he was not merely comforted; his lips were 
touched, consecrated by earth; he was blessed by the archetypal man 
of the people, the peasant Marey. The poet discovers in this the inner 
mystical moment of his spiritual formation and calling. This whole 
“adventure,” as Dostoevsky calls it, along with the memory of Marey, 
was, of course, quickly forgotten by the child. But nothing is ever lost. 
It only waits to be recovered. 
The second vision was experienced by the convict Dostoevsky in 
prison on the second day of Easter week. Just as the Russian peasant 
was saved in centuries of suffering by the luminous, embodied ideals 
of the people, so the image of Marey, as Dostoevsky puts it, “came back 
when it was needed,” came back in the purifying form of a daydream-
revelation. 
The third and final vision involved the crucial artistic embodiment 
of all that the child experienced, the convict unearthed, and artistic 
memory refined. The miracle of the encounter that became the miracle 
of the daydream now becomes the miracle of the resurrection. Here, 
memory and imagination, always prompting one another, merge into 
the image. The poet is no longer witness, but creator. “The time is 
fulfilled” (Mk. 1:15). Here, the lips of the poet open, the dream becomes 
prophecy, and prophecy, the word. 
At the beginning of “The Peasant Marey,” Dostoevsky recalls 
the words of the Polish convict, “Je hais ces brigands.” He concludes 
his story with a final reference to these words. On the very evening 
of his daydream, Dostoevsky writes he met the Polish convict again. 
“Unfortunate one!” he exclaims, “Now he could not have had any 
recollections about any Mareys or any other view of these people 
except, ‘Je hais ces brigands!’ No, these Poles endured more than 
we did at that time!” In this final line, Dostoevsky brings the reader 
back to the reality of the prison, the reality of suffering, the reality 
of reality as he himself had experienced it during his four years 
in Omsk. 
The words of hatred he attributes to the suffering Polish convict 
he must have uttered countless times himself. The recollection of the 
recollection of Marey, after all, was not Dostoevsky’s only recollection 
of his prison years. “Even now at nights,” he writes in “The Peasant 
Marey,” “I sometimes dream of that time, and I have no dreams more 
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agonizing than these.”19 “Those four years,” Dostoevsky had written 
his brother, Andrey, on November 6, 1854, a few months after his 
release from prison, “I consider a time in which I was buried alive 
and closed up in a coffin. I haven’t the strength to tell you, my friend, 
what a frightful time this was. It was inexpressible, endless suffering, 
because every hour, every minute weighed on my soul like a stone.”20 
“Man does not live his whole life, but composes himself, self-composes 
himself,” Dostoevsky wrote apropos of Katerina Ivanovna in The 
Brothers Karamazov in his last notebook in 1881.21 Anecdote and distant 
recollection merge in “The Peasant Marey.” Without doubt, there is 
material of biographical interest here, though it is clear that this material 
has been reshaped and that the image of Marey is an idealized one.22 Yet 
the real importance of the sketch as a work of art lies not in its measure 
of literal truthfulness to incidents in Dostoevsky’s life, but in the way 
it signals the manner in which he approached his prison experiences 
in the critical period of his Siberian exile. His emphasis upon the role 
of “artistic sense” as opposed to “good will” in the Russian writer’s 
perception of the Russian people may also be taken as something of 
an artist’s confession. Dostoevsky, the man and convict, struggling to 
survive, certainly felt little “good will” toward the convicts with whom 
19 PSS, 22:47.
20 PSS, 28(1)181.
21 “Chelovek vsiu zhizn’ ne zhivet, a sochiniaet sebia, samosochiniaetsia.” 
PSS, 27:59. 
22 It is difficult to say to what extent Dostoevsky “corrected,” or idealized, 
the original peasant Marey. In his notebook in January 1876, at the time 
of the publication of “The Peasant Marey,” in his Diary of a Writer he 
recalls Marey in a distinctly unidyllic context. “Marey. He loves his mare 
and calls her his wet-nurse And if he has moments of impatience and the 
Tatar breaks out in him and he begins to lash the one who feeds him with 
a whip across the eyes when she gets stuck in the mud with the wagon, 
then remember the courier here, upbringing, habits, recollections, vodka, 
Vorobiev.” (“Vorobiev” stands in for Dostoevsky as a “mythic” despotic 
figure) (PSS, 24:128). Dostoevsky associates the “Marey” of his notebook 
entry (he has in mind here Marey as a peasant type) with the peasant 
Mikolka from Raskolnikov’s dream who lashes his mare across her “gentle 
eyes.” In “The Peasant Marey,” Marey is in the field “with his mare,” but 
there is no indication of any brutal behavior on his part toward the mare 
or of any hostile feelings on the part of the child toward the peasant, as in 
Raskolnikov’s dream. 
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he lived those four terrible years. But with his “artistic sense,” he 
discerned an inner moral truth, the truth of their essential humanity.23 
This is the real message of “The Peasant Marey.” 
It does not seem likely that Dostoevsky experienced any sudden 
revelation about the Russian peasant, though we cannot exclude the 
possibility of a mystical experience in prison. The author of Poor Folk had 
many revelations of the humanity that lay beneath the coarse exterior 
of the Russian peasant-convict. What Dostoevsky does in “The Peasant 
Marey,” however, is to dramatize the miracle of artistic revelation, 
the miracle of the artistic process itself, involving esthetic distancing, the 
interplay of memory and imagination, and the perception of the inner 
“idea” of reality. 
“The Peasant Marey,” then, points directly to Dostoevsky’s 
artistic and spiritual resolution of his crisis in prison and his Siberian 
exile, a crisis involving not only his personal sufferings and feelings of 
hatred and resentment, but his recognition of the profound tragedy of 
the Russian people and its history. Dostoevsky did not merely discover 
a people buried, like himself, in prison, but a people buried in the 
alluvial barbarism of Russian life and history. The esthetic and spiritual 
processes whereby Dostoevsky overcame his disillusionments, as well 
as his own misery with its accumulation of bitterness and hatred, the 
processes whereby he reassembled broken dreams and ideals on the 
basis of a renewed Christian faith—this is the real subject of “The 
Peasant Marey.” Though written almost a decade and a half after House 
23 Dostoevsky’s long letter of February 22, 1854, shortly after his release from 
prison to his brother, Mikhail, provides evidence of the tension between 
ill-will born of hardship and artistic and humane insight and intuition. 
Dostoevsky begins by detailing his terrible situation in prison—over four 
long years “150 enemies never tired in their persecution of us” and our 
only defense was to meet it “with indifference, moral superiority”—but 
ends it with the exhilaration and affirmation of the artist: “A propos: how 
many types of common people, of characters, did I bring away with me 
from the prison camp! I lived together with them, and so I think I know 
them quite well. How many stories [did I hear] of vagabonds and robbers 
and in general of that whole dark and miserable world! Enough for whole 
volumes. What a marvelous people! On the whole the time was not lost for 
me. I may not have gotten to know Russia, but I got to know the Russian 
people, as well, perhaps, as only a few people know them.” (PSS, 28(1):169–
170, 172).
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of the Dead, “The Peasant Marey,” in fact, forms a fitting prologue to 
that work, to its poetics and the problems involved in its creation. 
“Perhaps is will be noted that until this day I have hardly ever 
spoken in print about my life in prison,” remarks Dostoevsky in “The 
Peasant Marey.” “Now I wrote Notes from the House of the Dead fifteen 
years ago in the person of a fictitious character, a criminal who was 
supposed to have killed his wife. I may add, incidentally, as a minor 
detail that from that time many people have believed and even now 
maintain that I was exiled for the murder of my wife.” An analysis of 
the problem of the fictitious narrator of House of the Dead leads to the 
heart of some of the central esthetic and ideological problems of that 
work.
The Making of a Russian Icon: 
solzhenitsyn’s “Matryona’s Home”1
“O, Rus! My wife! Our long road lies painfully clear ahead!” 
—Blok, “On the Field of Kulikovo” 
“It chewed ’em all up. Can’t even pick up the pieces.” “That’s 
a detail. The nine o’clock express nearly jumped the track, 
that would’ve been something.” 
—Solzhenitsyn, “Matryona’s Home”
The years pass, and what is not recalled grows ever dimmer 
in our memory. 
—Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago
Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s tale “Matryona’s Home” (“Matrenin dvor,” 
1963),2 consisting of three little chapters, begins with a prologue that is 
brief, factual, yet tense with significant drama.
One hundred and eighty-four kilometers from Moscow, and 
a good half year after it happened, all trains slowed down their 
course almost to a crawl. The passengers pressed to the windows, 
went out into the vestibule: were they repairing the tracks, or 
what? Was there a change in schedule? 
No. Past the crossing, the train again picked up speed and the 
passengers settled back. 
Only the engineers knew and remembered what it was all about. 
And I. 
1 From Solzhenitsyn. A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Kathryn Feuer 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 60-70. 
2 The word “dvor,” translated here as “home,” has the more inclusive 
meaning of “homestead,” or “farmstead,” that is, it suggests the house, 
yard, and the whole domain.
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These lines have a dramatic impact upon the reader: his curiosity 
instantly aroused, he peers ahead in order to learn what has happened, 
what will happen, what in fact will turn out to be the dramatic and 
ideological core of the story. The mystery is deepened by the narrator’s 
cryptic and somewhat unconventional way of alluding to the cause 
of the slow-down: “eshche s dobrykh polgoda posle togo vse poezda 
zamediali svoi khod,” literally, “a good half after that all trains slowed 
down their course” (my italics—RLJ). 
What is “that”? As the reader learns in chapter 2 of the tale, 
“that” is the accident which occurs when “two locomotives coupled 
together, without lights and moving backwards—why without lights 
nobody knows,” crash into a tractor, two sledges loaded with lumber 
and sundry people at a railroad crossing, creating a havoc of organic 
and inorganic matter. Matryona, too, the central figure in the tale, is 
crushed. 
A terrible accident. On the story’s deeper symbolic plane of 
meaning, however, the accident is no accident; it is more than a chance 
error in the moving of railroad stock, more than a “mistake.” The 
accident is the fated expression—in the story, the central metaphor—
of vast social and national catastrophe. The accident emerges out 
of Russian life and history, most immediately out of the years of 
revolutionary upheaval and change; for Solzhenitsyn, profoundly 
tragic years involving the disfiguration and dislocation of Russian 
life. The narrator himself, though a marginal actor in this tale, in his 
own destiny, is a bearer of this theme of disfiguration and dislocation; 
one of the “distant ones” who has spent a good ten years in prison, 
he “came back at random from the dusty, hot desert lands—simply 
to Russia.”3 
This random movement of the narrator is philosophically of the 
same order as the strange movement of the “two locomotives coupled 
together without lights, and moving backwards”; both movements, 
seemingly unmotivated and senseless, are in fact symbolic expressions 
of one violent historical explosion. But the random movement of 
the locomotives embodies the terrifying amoral force of history; the 
haphazard movement of the narrator—the reaction of one of those 
3 The time of the narrator’s return to Russia is given as 1953, the year of the 
dictator Stalin’s death. After his death, masses of amnestied convicts were 
released from Soviet concentration camps. 
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unfortunates to whom such history happens. The accident is history. 
Matryona is the focal point of the historical action. 
“I wanted to work my way into, and lose myself in, the very 
core of Russia, if ever there was such a place,” remarks the narrator 
in the opening lines of chapter 1. These words signal the pilot effort of 
Solzhenitsyn’s “Matryona’s Home”: an effort to make a fundamental 
statement about Russian man and his reality. Solzhenitsyn’s story is 
socialist realism turned on its head: it seeks to depict man not in the 
perspective of the future, but of the past, its myth and reality; it is 
a look at the old Adam, and at the same time, an attempt to restore in 
men’s minds the lost outlines of the iconographic image, the concept of 
a viable ideal, one that is accessible and humane. Matryona’s “home” is 
at the mythic core of Solzhenitsyn’s Russia. 
Matryona herself, the heroine of this fabled but ailing land, is ill; 
doomed to perish, she is nonetheless its restorative force, the bearer of 
the theme of its moral reformation. But the “core” of Russia is above 
all problematic, ominously complex in the contemporary and historical 
perspective of Solzhenitsyn; its ideal incarnation, its mythopoetic 
figura, Matryona is not only challenged symbolically by a “second” 
and “substitute” Matryona (the wife of Faddei), but by the old peasant 
Faddei himself, an incarnation of darker forces in the core of Russian 
life; it is challenged, finally, by the metallic era of socialist primary 
accumulation. The theme of disfiguration in “Matryona’s Home” runs 
from past to present, from the ancient Russian peasant with an axe to 
the modern “excavators snarling about in the bogs.”
The narrator’s predilection for the pastoral ideal is prefigured in 
a scene curiously reminiscent of Ivan Turgenev in A Hunter’s Notebook 
(Zapiski okhotnika, 1852; 1874): the narrator is sitting on a stump in 
the gentle rolling hills and woods of Vysokoe Pole (High Meadow), 
surrounded by “an unbroken ring of forest”; he wishes that he could live 
and die in such a place, do nothing but commune with nature “with the 
whole world silent.” Solzhenitsyn’s Russia, however, provides no such 
total immunity for man from man. “Torfoprodukt (peat product)?” 
ponders the narrator a little later as he scans his official orders directing 
him to a community of that name where he could find work. “Ah, 
Turgenev never knew that one could put together such a thing in 
Russian.”4 The modern place name “Torfoprodukt” and all it connotes 
4 “Torfoprodukt”—a compound of two words brought into the Russian 
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signals the end of the Russian idyll. It abruptly announces the theme of 
disfiguration (in Russian, “bezobrazie”) in the heart of Russian culture: 
its language. “Torfoprodukt.” A terrible accident. Language here 
anticipates the author’s picture of social catastrophe. This “thematic” 
use of language is characteristic of “Matryona’s Home,” as it is in other 
works of Solzhenitsyn, where the typically rich, colloquial speech of 
Russian life enters into a veritable war with the mutilating jargon of 
bureaucracy and propaganda. 
A growing rumble of imagery announces a curse of disfiguration 
on this land: the very “stump” upon which the narrator first sits in 
Vysokoe Pole; the jarring name “Torfoprodukt”; the strange signs at 
its railroad station, “scratched with a nail,” and “carved with a knife”; 
the once dense and impenetrable pre-Revolutionary forests “cut down 
by the peat exploiters and the neighboring collective farm”; the acres 
of timber razed and sold at a profit in Odessa. And in the midst of 
these peaty lowlands, a scene of urban-industrial blight: “a settlement 
sprawled out in disorder” (barracks of the 1930s and the little houses 
with glass verandas of the 1950s), yet oddly skewed by a narrow gauge 
railroad which “here and there” ranged through it. Factory chimneys. 
Thick smoke. Piercing whistles. In this typical industrial settlement, 
the narrator could assume “without fear of error” that in the evening 
the “loud speaker” over the doors of the club would “screech forth in 
lacerating tones,” that on the streets the drunkards would brawl, “not 
without thrusting at each other with knives.” This imagery of social 
disfiguration, deformation, and disorder foreshadows the impending 
tragedy. 
Torfoprodukt: this was where the narrator’s dream of a “quiet 
little corner in Russia” had brought him. Torfoprodukt with its 
mutilated landscape is a last stop. “It was easy to arrive at Torfoprodukt, 
but not to leave.” But Torfoprodukt is not all of Russia, at least not yet. 
language, “Torf” (German-Austrian dialect for “peat”) and “produkt” 
(product). Turgenev, perhaps, is one the greatest prose stylists in Russian 
literature. However, the reference to Turgenev (the only Russian writer 
mentioned in “Matryona’s Home”) has deeper significance. “Matryona’s 
Home,” in certain features—its open form, its use of a narrator-observer, 
and (out of regard for censorship) its oblique critique of the social order—
recalls Turgenev’s sketches in A Hunter’s Notebook. The power of “Matryona’s 
Home,” from a purely artistic point of view, rests on Solzhenitsyn’s ability 
to speak in images. 
230 Two kinds of Beauty
The landscape of disfiguration is immediately offset by an atmosphere 
or setting such as that encountered in Washington Irving’s “Legend 
of Sleepy Hollow” or “Rip Van Winkle.” At daybreak, after his night 
at the railroad station, the narrator wanders to the market place and 
encounters a peasant woman selling milk. He takes a bottle and starts 
drinking it right away . . . A new world unfolds. “I was struck by her 
speech. She did not speak, but sang in a sing-song way and her words 
were the very ones I was longing to hear when I left Asia.” 
From this peasant woman the narrator learned that not 
everything was peat production, that beyond the railroad “was a hill, 
and behind the hill, a village, and this village was Talnovo, which had 
been here from time immemorial, even when the ‘gypsy woman’ lived 
there and the enchanted forest stood all round.” And beyond Talnovo, 
“deeper into the hinterland, and farther from the railroad toward the 
lakes,” follow a whole region of villages with “soothing” names that 
“promised me age-old Russia.” 
Thus, do the magically mellifluous words and drink of a Russian 
peasant woman in a “tiny market place” open the broad way, as in 
a fairy tale, to Matryona’s little homestead with its “two or three 
willows, a lopsided house” and a pond with ducks and geese— 
a place that is close to the narrator’s heart. And out of age-old Russia, 
out of the enchanted forest, out of Talnovo, out of her house emerges 
Matryona, a figure whom the narrator himself compares with one of 
the “grandmothers in fairy tales”; she emerges to survive and die in 
a world “turned upside down.” 
Matryona’s strange little lopsided world with its quaint, almost 
grotesque interior might seem disfigured in the way of Torfoprodukt; 
yet it is in every respect its antithesis. Outwardly battered by use and 
nature, it has the warmth and humanity of its mistress, the simple 
rhythms and shapes of a workaday life. The dirty white goat with the 
twisted horn, the lame cat, the mice that run rampant behind the five 
loose layers of wallpaper, the tubs full of odd rubber plants, the food 
with its occasional litter of peat and cockroach legs—everything is 
touched by the benign and tangible presence of Matryona. Everything 
is manifestly what it is. Of the noisome cockroaches and mice, the 
narrator observes, significantly, that “there is nothing evil in them, 
no lie in them.” It is here that the narrator “hermit” finds his cot, his 
refuge; it is here that he begins to discover his ideal. 
The “lusterless mirror,” like a Gogolian artifact, reflects the 
“bleary” eye of Matryona; it was plain, notes the narrator, that illness 
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had exhausted her (her illness is almost a motif in the tale). Yet her 
much-emphasized “roundish face” with its quixotic expression points 
to an almost legendary spiritual health and goodness. 
There is more than a touch of the writings of Nikolay Gogol 
(1809–1852) in Matryona’s immediate surroundings, in her life and 
in her person.5 Yet this is no “vegetable life,” no tedious world of 
physical satiety and slumber, no world in which the vitality of things 
parodies the slumber of man. Food is conspicuous by its absence or 
meagerness. And the narrator reconciles himself with his diet because 
“life had taught me not to find the meaning of everyday life in food” 
(an outlook, of course, quite distinct from that of Solzhenitsyn’s convict 
hero in his gulag in One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, 1962). In 
this, of course, the narrator mirrors the life view of Matryona. In an 
existence that is marginal to the engulfing life of the new social and 
economic forms of the collective farm and state enterprise (she had 
worked for the collective farm for twenty-five years, but was dismissed 
when she fell ill), Matryona scours about for food and fuel, potatoes, 
peat, and stumps; yet her essence is not in the Gogolian accumulation 
of things, in drawing everything toward herself, but in what might be 
called a proliferation of selfless activity. With wondrous energy, she 
aids others—individuals and enterprises—who invariably call on 
her in their moments of need. This goodness that is neither humble 
nor dumb, this simple nature that also feels pain and injustice, seems 
powered by an organic earthly force. In Matryona (her name is 
etymologically connected with the Russian word “mat’,” or “mother”), 
in this peasant possessed of incredible physical strength, one recognizes 
those indefatigable laborers of Russian life: Russian women. Plain 
and simple in her half-pagan, half-Christian religiosity and ethic, 
Matryona is also a type that finds persistent embodiment in Russian 
literature, one of that class of simple and unpretentious people who do 
not preach but live their values. Such are the Mironovs in Alexander 
Pushkin’s The Captain’s Daughter (1836) or Samson Vyrin in “The 
Station Master” (1831); such, too, are Maksim Maksimych in Mikhail 
Lermontov’s Hero of Our Time (1841), Devushkin in Dostoevsky’s Poor 
5 We may note, as another example, the fleeting but touching mention of 
how Matryona, on receiving her pension money at last, orders from the 
“hunchbacked tailor” a “wonderful coat.” The allusion here is to Gogol's 
classic story, “The Overcoat” (“Shinel’,” 1842).
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Folk (1846), Captain Tushin in Tolstoy’s War and Peace (1863–1869), or 
even Chekhov’s Samoylenko in “The Duel” (1891)—all people whom 
everybody takes for granted, but upon whom everybody depends; 
people whose reliability rests on their complete freedom from any kind 
of self-interest or opportunism. 
The theme of disfiguration which rings out so emphatically at 
the opening of chapter 1 reaches its apogee in chapter 2 with the dis-
memberment, first, of Matryona’s house, and then of Matryona herself 
in the accident. These two events, forming the structural and ideologi-
cal center of the story, are part of the tangled skein of past and present. 
From Matryona herself, the narrator learns her tragic personal history: 
the disappearance of her betrothed, Faddei, in the World War I; her 
subsequent marriage to Faddei’s brother, Yefim; and then the sudden 
reappearance of Faddei, axe in hand: “If it weren’t my very own brother 
I’d cut you both down with this axe.” And then the sequel: her luckless 
family life with Yefim (six children born and buried, the unfaithfulness, 
and finally, the disappearance of Yefim in the World War II). 
Under pressure from Faddei and his daughter and son-in-law 
(the young couple needs a building in order to buy and keep a plot of 
land), Matryona agrees to yield in her lifetime what she had willed to 
her niece: the top room of her house. The house must be torn apart. “It 
was an agony for her to start about smashing that roof under which she 
had spent forty years,” the narrator observes. “Even I as a tenant felt 
sick at the thought that they would tear out the boards and yank out 
the beams of the house. But this was the end of her whole life. Yet those 
who were insisting on it knew that her house could be broken up even 
while she was alive.” 
The mutilation of Matryona’s house and the events leading up to 
the accident are described in detail. The mood is apocalyptic. Faddei 
with his sons and son-in-law turned up one February morning and 
began hacking away with their “five axes,” setting up a screeching and 
creaking as they ripped off the boards. They worked feverishly, left 
chinks in the walls, and “everything indicated they were wreckers—
not builders.” Old Faddei comes to life in this work of destruction, 
his eyes “gleamed.” Two weeks later, the dismembered room is piled 
onto two sledges. “All were working like madmen.” But before leaving 
the mutilated house, they celebrate with drink and leave behind them 
a scene of “desolate carnage.” 
The railroad accident itself, the final episode in this terrible 
drama of destruction, is a mauling of men and material. “It chewed 
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’em all up. Can’t even pick up the pieces,” remarks one observer. The 
locomotives “came flying up and crushed to a pulp the three people 
who were between the tractor and sledges.” Tractor, sledge, tracks, 
and locomotives are churned into a chaos. The remains of Matryona, 
covered with a dirty sack on a sled, are “jumbled together. The feet, half 
of the trunk and the left hand were missing.” “The Lord has left her 
right hand,” observes one peasant woman. “She will say her prayers 
there.” This motif of the reformation of the spiritual image of Matryona 
at the opening of chapter 3 follows directly upon the last lines of the 
preceding chapter which speak of the fatality of the tragedy: “For forty 
years [Faddei’s] threat had idled in a corner like an idle broadsword—
and then struck at last. . . .” 
Solzhenitsyn’s use of the railroad and of the railroad accident 
in the ideological design of “Matryona’s Home” follows in the rich 
tradition of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. For these two great novelists, 
the railroad symbolizes the commercial and capitalist disfiguration 
of Russian life and family. The railroad is part of the apocalyptic 
imagery in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot (1868). The apocalyptic note is struck 
in the very first lines of the novel—in the ominous image of the train 
rushing through the fog, bearing Myshkin and Rogozhin into the chaos 
of Russian life. The theme of the railroad is used with consummate 
artistry in Anna Karenina. The railroad accident at the opening of the 
novel—a guard is crushed by one of the trains—is not an “accident” 
on the deepest level of the novel’s meaning: both the death of the 
guard and the subsequent suicide of Anna on the tracks emerge 
as ultimate expressions of profound dislocations in Russian life in 
which “everything is topsy turvy” (Levin’s words), in which new and 
destructive social and economic forces, spearheaded by the railroad, 
are overtaking traditional Russian life, tearing up what for Tolstoy is 
its rich communal and patriarchal fabric. Anna’s suicide, in the last 
analysis, is inseparable from the general social tragedy in Russian life. 
The same may be said of Solzhenitsyn’s conception of the death of 
Matryona. Her fear of railroads points not simply to her superstitious 
nature, but to an elemental sense of alienation from all that this railroad 
and its creation, Torfoprodukt, represent.6 
6 The narrator is very close to Matryona in his basic outlook on contemporary 
industrial society. His purely social perspectives seem to turn backward, 
rather than forward, into Russian history. Noteworthy in this respect, is his 
interest in photographing “somebody at an old-fashioned handloom.” 
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The railroad crossing in “Matryona’s Home,” then, is the tragic 
junction between all forces in Russian life: those fated to destroy, 
those fated to perish, and those fated to bear witness to the disaster 
and record it. The accident is the focal point of a tragic action which 
involves the entire society. The remorseless realism of Solzhenitsyn in 
developing the theme of disfiguration and destruction in “Matryona’s 
Home” prefigures his Gulag Archipelago (1973). What dominates the 
consciousness in a reading of “Matryona’s Home,” however, is not 
only the mutilated house and body of Matryona, obvious symbols of 
a much larger edifice, but the brutal and elementary character of the 
mutilating forces, senselessness and moral anarchy reaching deeply 
into man and history. The tragic destiny of Matryona is not alone the 
product of a “new” upheaval in Russian life. Woven into that destiny 
is the record of men driven by crude impulses of need and greed, men 
who have accepted the rituals of Christianity but who have remained 
alien to its essence, its ethic of love and self-sacrifice. 
The tragedy of botched life in “Matryona’s Home” is more 
overwhelming because of the disparity between the real and the ideal 
that it exposes not only in society at large, but in man himself. In this 
connection, the figure of Faddei occupies a central place in Solzhenitsyn’s 
tableau. The dark counterpart of Matryona on the mythic as well as 
the real plane of the story, Faddei is the legendary Russian peasant 
with an axe. How does he use that axe, as a “builder or destroyer”? 
Faddei, too, emerges out of the core of Russia; he threatens Matryona 
with his axe, seeks out another woman with the name of Matryona 
to marry, as though, in malice, to scratch out the very existence of the 
“first” Matryona; finally, eyes gleaming, he lays an axe to Matryona’s 
house, and in effect, to Matryona herself. This strange person carries 
the motif of demonism in the story: not without reason is the epithet 
“dark” (chernyi) applied seven times in the opening two lines of the 
description of Faddei. 
The narrator outlines the sad state of affairs in Faddei’s life after 
the accident: his daughter’s sanity has been shaken, his son-in-law 
faces a criminal charge in connection with the accident, and his son, 
as well as his first betrothed, Matryona, are dead. Faddei stands by 
the coffins only briefly, then leaves. “His lofty brow was clouded by 
painful thoughts, but what he was thinking about was how to save 
the timbers of the top room from the flames and from Matryona’s 
scheming sisters.” Faddei’s “lofty brow,” struggling with thought, 
seems to promise something more worthy of the destiny of man than 
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acquisitiveness. But the promise is a lie. “Going over the people of 
Talnovo in my mind,” the narrator continues, “I realized that Faddei 
was not the only one like that.” 
Faddei’s choice of evil arouses in the narrator the following 
speculation: “The [Russian] language strangely calls property our good, 
whether it be the people’s property or personal. And yet losing any of 
it is considered disgraceful and stupid by the people.” (The Russian 
word “dobro” may signify either ethical “good” or “property,” that 
is, “goods.”) The line of thought here is a tragic one: the only “good” 
that man understands is property, material goods, in short, whatever 
is good for him, whatever serves his self-interest; his feeling of “shame” 
in giving up property, therefore, parodies that feeling of shame man is 
supposed to feel when he deviates from ethical good, from his supposed 
inner sense of what is right or just. In like manner, Faddei’s “painful 
thoughts,” in their inner essence and genealogy, sharply parody and 
contradict the lofty spiritual attribute arbitrarily assigned to the “lofty 
brow” by the indulgent observer.7 
The demonism of Faddei, then, consists in the fact that he, like 
so many others around him, stands at the fringe of moral evolution, 
a troubled and uncertain realm where, as Dostoevsky repeatedly 
demonstrates, acquisitiveness, violence, and sensuality constitute an 
entangling syndrome.8 
7  In his portrait of Faddei, Solzhenitsyn may be polemicizing with Turgenev’s 
portrait of the “peasant Khor” in the latter’s story, “Khor and Kalinych” in 
his Hunter’s Notebook. Khor’s face reminds Turgenev’s narrator of the face 
of Socrates: “the same high bumpy brow,” etc. More important, Turgenev 
admires Khor for his “positive, practical, efficient head, a rationalist.” 
Khor’s general disposition convinces Turgenev’s narrator that “Peter the 
Great was preeminently a Russian man, precisely in his transformations.” 
For Solzhenitsyn and many others, however, Peter the Great’s reforms were 
regarded as manifestly destructive of Russian peasant and national life. In 
this context, Solzhenitsyn’s axe-bearing peasant Faddei turns Turgenev’s 
“Khor” upside down: the “westernized” peasant has degenerated in 
Solzhenitsyn’s story. Peter the Great’s so-called “transformations” of Russia, 
for Solzhenisyn, are deformations.
8 The ambiguity of the word “dobro” is brought out by Dostoevsky in 
Raskolnikov’s dream about the beating of the mare. “My property!” (Moe 
dobro!) screams the peasant Mikolka repeatedly as he beats his horse. 
Mikolka’s crude “ethic” may be put into words: what I covet and own 
releases me from all obligations because it is my good (property). 
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Even the religious conventions and rituals would seem only to 
mask man’s moral and spiritual immaturity. “I observed in the weeping 
a coldly thought-out time-worn pattern,” the narrator observes of the 
lamentations over the body of Matryona. The striving for goods set the 
tone of these “political” lamentations. “At her burial all sang, ‘Worthy 
Is She.’ Then again thrice over: eternal memory! eternal memory! 
eternal memory! But the voices were hoarse, discordant, their faces 
drunk and nobody put any feelings into the eternal memory.” After the 
special guests left, the remaining relatives “took out their cigarettes, 
smoked, exchanged jokes and laughter.” In such a world, Matryona, 
who “never tried to acquire things for herself,” who “never struggled 
to buy things and then treasure them more than life,” who “never tried 
to dress smartly,” was inevitably considered a “ridiculous creature”; in 
such a world, Matryona, who would work for others without pay, who 
even accompanied her dismembered house to the railroad crossing 
(as though to her crucifixion), was inevitably pitied and scorned; in 
such a world, as the narrator concludes, Matryona was the only true 
“righteous” one. “All of us lived alongside her and did not understand 
that she was that very righteous one without whom, according to the 
proverb, no village can stand. Nor city. Nor our whole earth.” 
Matryona, clearly, is the only true Christian, in the language of 
her time—the only true communist. 
The Russian word for image or form is “obraz,” and it carries 
the implication of the highest beauty; it also stands for “icon”; its 
antithesis in the Russian language is “bezobrazie”—disfiguration, the 
monstrous, literally, that which is “without form or image.” These two 
moral-esthetic opposites structure Solzhenitsyn’s story (as they do 
Dostoevsky’s worldview) and invest much of its imagery with their 
deeper symbolic meaning. Matryona is Mother Russia. Her death, in 
the symbolism of Solzhenitsyn, signifies Russia’s martyrdom. 
Matryona is no more. Somebody precious had been killed (ubit 
rodnoi chelovek). And I had reproached her the day before for 
wearing my jerkin. The ornately drawn red and yellow peasant 
woman in the bookstore advertising poster smiled joyfully.9 
9 The word “rodnoi” has several related meanings: one’s own (a close, blood 
relationship); somebody or something close in spirit or way of life; native; 
dear; precious. The phrase, then “ubit rodnoi chelovek” (literally, “a dear, 
or precious, or closely related person has been killed”) suggests an intimate 
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Matryona, real and tangible, nonetheless has a mythic aura (she 
invisibly flutters about the hut bidding all farewell at the end of the 
story); but she is infinitely more real in all her moral and spiritual health, 
than the “joyfully smiling” woman who looks down at the narrator 
from the poster on the wall of the hut, that fabricated Soviet madonna 
who knows no home in the real world as she knows no suffering. 
Matryona, horribly disfigured in the accident, still emerges a symbol 
of transcendent spiritual beauty. Solzhenitsyn’s final description of 
Matryona in death suggests precisely the triumph of image (obraz) 
over disfiguration (bezobrazie). “Matryona lay in her coffin. Her lifeless, 
mangled body was neatly and simply covered with a clean sheet. Her 
head was enveloped in a white kerchief, but her face, undamaged and 
peaceful, seemed more alive than dead.” Matryona’s death completes 
the making of a Russian icon. 
A premonition of catastrophe pervades the prologue to this story. 
“Only the engineers knew and remembered what it was all about. 
And I.” The author Solzhenitsyn merges with the narrator, memory 
with conscience, history with art. Of course, precisely on this level 
of art, in the creation of moral-esthetic form, the aching disparity of 
the real and ideal is bridged, the catastrophe of history is overcome, 
suffering is redeemed, and the possibility of moral progress in society 
restored. Such is the action of all significant art. 
family relationship between the narrator and Matryona, as between 
a mother and son. 
cr itic a l perspecti v es
Dostoevsky’s Concept of Reality  
and Its Representation in art1
“By the word reality we understand everything that is,” observed 
Belinsky in 1840, “the visible world and the spiritual world, the world 
of facts and the world of ideas.”2 Belinsky’s definition—which belongs 
to his middle or so-called Hegelian period of rationalization of reality—
comes close to characterizing Dostoevsky’s omnibus view of reality. We 
shall not encounter a single binding concept of reality in Dostoevsky’s 
thought; rather, his notion of reality is a syncretism.3 Reality for him 
1 From Robert Louis Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form: A Study of his 
Philosophy of Art (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 
71-91.
2 V. G. Belinskii, “Gore ot uma,” in Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh, 3 vols., 
ed. F.M. Golovchenko (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1948), 1: 469.
3 The syncretic character of Dostoevsky’s realism has been noted by 
L. P. Grossman and others. Grossman writes, “Close in many respects to 
the current of critical representation of reality, and frequently offering 
fine examples of it, the style of the novelist is unique and qualitatively 
different. A profound truthfulness of experience gives to his painting 
the sharp features of a realistic reflection of life. But this is . . . realism of 
a special type—psychological or grotesque, or in the words of Dostoevsky 
himself, ‘prophetic,’ i.e. striving to determine on the basis of the deep 
currents of contemporary history, the lines of its future development.” 
L. P. Grossman, “Dostoevskii-khudozhnik,” in Tvorchestvo F.M. Dostoevskogo, 
ed. L. D. Opul’skaia (Moscow: Akademiia nauk, 1959), 368. J. van der Eng 
in Dostoevskij Romancier (Gravenhage: Mouton & Co.,1957), 44–45, notes the 
range of definitions of Dostoevsky’s realism in critical literature: “mystical 
realism,” “symbolic realism,” “symbolic or transcendental realism,” the 
“realism of an epileptic,” “demoniac realism,” “fantastic realism,” “réalisme 
du dernier degré,” “allegorical realism,” “psychological realism.”
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embraces concrete, historical reality with its classes, its immediate 
problems and conflicts, and its social and national types which give 
expression to the life and development of society. But Dostoevsky’s 
reality also encompasses the ideals and dreams that are part of social 
reality, and their embodiment in ideal types. These ideals and dreams, 
though they arise in a specific historical moment or context, relate 
ultimately to a universal spiritual reality; it is in this deeper, archetypal 
reality that Dostoevsky seeks the ultimate meaning of man’s existence. 
Reality, he writes in “Two Suicides,” in the October 1876 issue of Diary 
of a Writer, is “all available human meaning,” but “we can never exhaust 
the whole of a phenomenon, never reach its ends and beginnings. We 
are familiar only with the immediate, visible, current, and this only in 
its appearance, while the ends and beginnings—all this is still a realm 
of the fantastic for man.”4 But it is precisely this realm of reality without 
end—at its point of intersection with man’s “immediate” present—
that is the exploratory realm of art for Dostoevsky. Reality for him, 
finally, is man: the journey of his life. This journey, like that of Dante 
in the Commedia, is eminently real, concrete, and historical; yet at the 
same time, like Dante’s, it is symbolic and imbued with a meaning and 
perspective that is transcendental and timeless.
In “Mr. [Dobrolyu]bov and the Question of Art” (1861) 
Dostoevsky writes that “one may know a fact, see it oneself a hundred 
times, and still not get the impression one would if somebody else, 
a particular person, stands beside you and points out to you that 
very fact, but of course, in his own way, explains it to you in his own 
words, compels you to look at that fact with his own glance. A real 
talent is recognized by just this influence.”5 This is a very simple way of 
describing the role of the artist in the artistic representation of reality. 
The “particular person,” the artist, distinguishes an ordinary fact; he 
gives it special shape or form (his own glance, his own words, his own 
way). The artist does not mirror reality (the ordinary observer performs 
this essentially unperceptive act a hundred times); rather, he acts upon 
reality, “explains” it through the shaping he gives to it, through form; 
he gives us a unique “impression” of it. The artistic power with which 
the artist compels us to view reality resides in the form that he gives 
to reality. We may note, finally, the basis here for a distinction between 
4 PSS, 23:145.
5 PSS, 18:89–90.
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two kinds of reality: an apparent, everyday reality; and a real or 
underlying reality that is visible to the artist but hidden to the formless 
and unforming glance. The artist is the one who sees into life, perceives 
all its richness and complexity in depth. The image of the eyes—of sight 
and vision—is recurrent throughout all of Dostoevsky’s discussion of 
the artistic representation of reality. “Really, examine some fact of real 
life, even one which at first glance is not very striking,” Dostoevsky 
writes later in his Diary of a Writer, “and if only you are able and have 
the eyes you will discover in it a depth such as is not to be found in 
Shakespeare. But really here is just the whole point: whose eyes and who 
is able? Indeed, not only to create and write artistic works, but even just 
to note a fact, something in the way of an artist is also needed.”6
The problem of the representation of reality in art and literature 
is at the center of “The Exhibition in the Academy of Arts: 1860–
1861.” Dostoevsky singles out for particular criticism a work of the 
painter Valery I. Jakoby (1834–1902), entitled “Convicts at a Halting 
Point.”7 The picture is striking for its remarkable exactitude, he writes. 
“Everything is like that even in nature . . . if one looks at nature, so to 
speak, only from without.” The spectator looks at the picture as though 
he saw it in a mirror or in an expertly touched-up photograph. But the 
photographic snapshot or mirror reflection is by no means an artistic 
work, Dostoevsky insists again in “The Exhibition at the Academy 
of Arts.” “Not photographic faithfulness, not mechanical accuracy, 
but something else, larger, broader, deeper is demanded from art.” 
Accuracy and faithfulness are needed only in a basic sense, as material 
“out of which the artistic work is then created; it is a tool of creation. In 
a mirror reflection one does not see how the mirror looks at the subject, 
or put another way, it is evident that it does not look at all, but reflects 
passively, mechanically.” Dostoevsky insists that this is not the case 
with the true artist; whether in a picture, story, or musical work “he 
himself will be visible invariably; he will be reflected involuntarily; even 
against his will, he will speak out with all his views, with his character, 
in accordance with his development.” When we overhear two people 
discussing an ordinary street incident, Dostoevsky observes by way of 
6 PSS, 23:145. 
7 Jacoby received a gold medal for his painting, “Convicts at a Halting Point” 
(Prival arestantov) at the Academy of Arts Exhibition in St. Petersburg, 
1861.
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example, we often guess their age, the nature and field of their work, 
their level of development, and even their rank in the civil service.8 The 
artist, then, cannot evade identification.
Dostoevsky does not elaborate upon the notion that a writer 
will be reflected in his art even against his will. Belinsky much earlier 
had advanced the view that the thought of an artist in his poetic 
creation may contradict his personal convictions.9 The radical critic 
Dobrolyubov later elaborated on this view with his theory that social 
type in an artistic work may reveal an author’s view independently of, 
and even contrary to, his conscious intentions.10 Dostoevsky appears 
to be echoing Dobrolyubov’s theory in the distinction he makes in 
“Stories of N. V. Uspensky” between the “preconceived view” of the 
artist and his “real view” expressed in social type.11
“There is not, and cannot be, any epic, indifferent tranquility in 
our time,” Dostoevsky writes in “The Exhibition in the Academy of Arts: 
1860-1861.” Only completely undeveloped, capricious, or mad people 
could manifest such tranquility. And since these “sad possibilities” are 
unlikely in the artist, Dostoevsky concludes that the artist’s audience 
is right in demanding that he “view nature not as a photographic 
8 PSS, 19:153. 
9 Belinsky argues in his article “Menzel as a Critic of Goethe” in 1840 that 
one must distinguish between the man and the artist. Art has its own laws, 
he insists, on the basis of which one must examine its works. “The thought, 
expressed by a poet in a creation, may contradict the personal conviction of 
the critic, without ceasing to be true and universal, provided the creation 
is really an artistic one, because man, as a limited individual, may err and 
nourish false convictions, but the poet, as the organ of the general and 
universal, as the direct manifestation of the spirit, cannot err and speak a lie 
. . . Therefore, to find out whether a thought expressed by a poet in his work 
is correct, one must first find out whether his creation is really artistic.” 
Belinskii, “Mentsel’, kak kritik Gete,” op. cit., 1, 429–430.
10 See, in particular, the opening section of N. A. Dobrolyubov’s essay, “Realm 
of Darkness.” Dobrolyubov distinguishes between the artist as artist and 
the artist as thinker. “Frequently even in abstract discussions [the artist] 
expresses concepts strikingly in contradiction with what is expressed in his 
artistic work.” Truth, according to Dobrolyubov, lies in the images created 
by the artist, in the types created by him. See N. A. Dobroliubov “Temnoe 
tsarstvo,” lzbrannye sochineniia (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1948), 
104.
11 PSS, 19:179.
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apparatus sees it, but as a man.” The representation of reality in art is 
a humanistic process.
Dostoevsky’s concept of the artistic representation of reality is 
brought out in his criticism of Jacoby’s painting. The subject of the 
painting, the representation of convicts, was one which could not but 
intensely interest the author of Notes from the House of the Dead. Jacoby’s 
painting (we summarize Dostoevsky’s description of it) represents 
a group of convicts surrounding a wagon; upon it lies a dead man 
and on his outstretched hand is a precious ring. The figure of the dead 
convict suggests a person of gentry origin. Another convict, “with 
a repulsive face,” reaches out from beneath the wagon and is in the act 
of removing the ring from the dead man’s hand. He produces upon 
the observer the impression of a “reptile that is foul and at the same 
time dangerous, like a scorpion.” An officer stands by the corpse, very 
indifferently smoking a pipe; he is holding open one of the eyes of 
the dead convict and calmly looking at it. His face expresses neither 
sympathy, nor compassion, nor surprise—absolutely nothing. Another 
convict dully examines a wound made by his chains.
In ancient times, Dostoevsky remarks, people would have said 
that the artist “must see with physical eyes, and, above all, with the 
eyes of the soul, or with a spiritual glance.” Jacoby, in his opinion, lacks 
this second pair of eyes. There is not a trace of artistry in the painting. 
The figures of the convicts, he complains, all appear as scoundrels, 
monstrous. The dead man alone is an exception to this impression of 
monstrousness. A splendid youth in life, academic demands made it 
impossible to give him “more ordinary or less classical features: thus 
one sees a man of birth among a vile people, vile in the sense that he 
has understood it all his life.” Dostoevsky acknowledges the hopeless 
condition of the convicts, but “at the same time it is impossible not to 
allow that they are people. At least present them to us as people, if you 
are an artist, and leave the photographing of them to the phrenologists 
and the judicial investigators.”12 But it is precisely man that Jacoby 
does not reveal.
Dostoevsky resents this caricature depiction of the convicts with 
its underlying class snobbism. But the basis of his criticism is esthetic: 
the artist must go beyond surface reality. “We think it insufficient to set 
forth faithfully all the given qualities of a person; one must resolutely 
12 PSS, 19:152–154.
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illumine him with one’s own artistic vision,” Dostoevsky writes in 
“Apropos of a New Drama” his Diary of a Writer in 1873. “A genuine 
artist should under no circumstances remain on one level with the 
person portrayed by him, contenting himself with the mere realistic 
truth of that person: the impression will carry no truth.”13 “Above all,” 
Dostoevsky writes earlier in his critique of Jacoby’s painting at the 
“Exhibition of the Academy of Arts in 1860–1861,” “one must master 
the difficulties of transmitting actual truth in order to rise to the heights 
of artistic truth.”14 Jacoby in his striving for photographic truth, in his 
play for effect, has depicted a lie. “This is melodrama and not reality,” 
Dostoevsky insists.15 The painting, in other words, appeals for its effect 
to the upper class view of the convict and of the people; it confronts the 
observer with his own luridly exaggerated and cliché notion of a “vile” 
people. Here there can be no true reality, no representation of deeper 
human reality, but only a crude caricature in which the surface, the face 
of reality as it were, is divorced from its meanings, from the deeper 
moral substratum of reality.
The faces of the convicts are disfigured; this is “actual” or 
surface truth. But surface reality, Dostoevsky points out in “Apropos 
of the Exhibition” in his Diary of a Writer for 1873, is deceptive. Why—
he asks—does a portrait painter long scrutinize the subject of his 
painting before setting to work? “Because he knows in practice that 
man does not always resemble himself, and therefore he seeks out 
‘the main idea of his physiognomy,’ that moment when the subject 
most resembles himself.”16 Versilov in Dostoevsky’s novel The Raw 
Youth (1875), echoing Dostoevsky’s views, observes that only on rare 
occasions does a man’s face express his “main idea, his most defining 
idea.” The painter “studies and divines this idea,” whereas on the other 
hand “photography catches man as [he] is, and it is quite possible that 
Napoleon at one moment would have turned out looking stupid, and 
Bismarck—tender.”
The “main idea” is the organizing principle in a work of art. On 




16 PSS, 21:75. 
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for the idea, the result is not realism but caricature. Thus, the quixotic 
hero of Dostoevsky fantastic story, “Bobok” (Diary of a Writer, 1873) 
discussing a portrait of which he is the subject, remarks that he believes 
the artist did his portrait “not for the sake of literature, but for the sake 
of my two symmetrical warts on my forehead: it’s a phenomenon, so to 
speak. They have no idea, so now they go to town on phenomena. Well, 
but how well he succeeded with my two warts in the portrait—they’re 
alive! They call this realism.”17 
The unselected and unilluminated truth of detail, “mere realistic 
truth”—is caricature or, simply, ugliness. This idea is suggested 
indirectly in Dostoevsky’s formulation of a remark by the young Arkady 
Dolgoruky in The Raw Youth; recalling a past incident: “I remember 
(for I remember that whole morning to the detail) that there followed 
between us a scene most disgusting in its realistic truth.” The realistic 
truth here, like the realism of the portrait in “Bobok,” has nothing to do 
with artistic realism; it is chaotic, detail-crammed reality of everyday life; 
it is untransfigured actuality. The writer Uspensky, Dostoevsky writes 
in “Stories of N. V. Uspensky,” sets up his photographic machine on 
a plaza, without even selecting a point of view, and takes in everything 
“faithfully, as is. Naturally, everything that is absolutely unnecessary to 
this picture, or rather, unnecessary to the idea of this picture, will enter 
into the picture.” Some laud this kind of approach for its accuracy. But 
is this accuracy, Dostoevsky asks, and does accuracy consist in this? 
“This is confusion, not accuracy.”18 “You needed chaos, disorder at all 
costs,” Dostoevsky remarks apropos of Jacoby’s arbitrary use of detail.19 
“Reality strives toward fragmentation,” the narrator remarks in Notes 
from the House of the Dead. On the other hand, art imposes order upon 
reality—not mechanical order, but the order of organic form; and 
artistic form for Dostoevsky is inseparable from idea. There is little, 
he insists, that can be transmitted through the mere description of 
material. The playwright A. N. Ostrovsky, he observes in “Stories of 
N. B. Uspensky,” would have had to be stretched out to two hundred 
volumes, and then these volumes would not convey what Ostrovsky 
17 PSS, 21:42.
18 PSS, 19:180.
19 PSS, 19:155. 
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gave us in two volumes. “Moreover, one cannot faithfully transmit 
even the material with only a daguerreotype.”20
Dostoevsky’s sharp criticism of Emile Zola’s naturalism in the 
1870s, in light of the above discussion, is not unexpected. In “Children’s 
Secrets,” in the July–August 1876 issue of Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky 
refers scornfully to our “so-called realist” Zola.21 “In realism alone there 
is no truth,” Dostoevsky writes in his notebook in 1875 in connection 
with a reading of Zola’s Le Ventre de Paris. And again these notes: 
“Photography and the artist. Zola overlooked in G[eorge]. Sand (in 
the first tales) poetry and beauty, something far more real than leaving 
mankind with only filth.”22 In connection with Zola’s naturalistic 
method, Dostoevsky writes, “He will describe every nail in the heel of 
a boot, and in a quarter of an hour, when the sun rises, he will again 
describe this nail in another illumination. This is not art. Speak to me 
one word [Pushkin], but let it be the most essential word.”23 “I can 
scarcely read him—what muck!” he writes to his wife, July 15, 1876. 
“And we scream about Zola as a celebrity, a luminary of realism!”24
 “I am terribly fond of realism in art,” Dostoevsky wrote in “An 
Isolated Case” in his March issue of Diary of a Writer in 1877, “but there 
is no moral center in the pictures of some of our contemporary, realists.”25 
Jacoby’s painting of Russian convicts lacked precisely a moral center. The 
criticism of his painting appears in sharp relief against the background 
of Dostoevsky’s own canvas on convict life, Notes from the House of the 
Dead. The moral center in this work, the restoration of the image of 
the “lost people,” was reached through the esthetic accomplishment: 
the penetration of surface, or naturalistic, truth. A “repulsive crust,” 
the narrator observes, covered even the most decent convicts. Yet 
“one need only remove the outer superficial crust and examine more 
attentively the kernel itself, more closely, and without prejudice, and 
some of us will see things in the people that we never expected.” Here, 
20 PSS, 19:181.
21 PSS, 23:94–95. 
22 PSS, 24:248.
23 PSS, 24:239. 
24 PSS, 29:2:100.
25 PSS, 25:90. 
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of course, is a very simple and clear statement of Dostoevsky’s notion 
of realism. To be sure, he in no way ignores the repulsive crust—the 
frightful details, the ugly actuality of convict life. The multitude of 
raw details, however, is never presented for themselves alone. Reality, 
however chaotic and disfigured at first glance, yields to an inner, 
organizing idea, a moral idea. The ugly, the repulsive, the disfigured 
presents itself to the reader invariably as a deformation of a norm: 
that norm is the moral-esthetic shape of man-created in the image of 
God, a preeminently humanistic norm for Dostoevsky. He sought the 
truth about the convicts not only in the cross section of the moment; 
Notes from the House of the Dead is not a series of snapshots. “After 
all, the whole truth must be told: these were an exceptional people,” 
the narrator remarks at the conclusion of his memoirs. “Indeed, they 
are, perhaps, the most gifted, the strongest of all our people. But 
mighty forces perished in vain, perished abnormally, wrongfully, 
irrevocably. And who is to blame? And this is just the point: who is 
to blame?”
The young Arkady Dolgoruky remembers an episode to the 
detail, remembers it, he says, in all its disgusting realistic truth. The 
narrator in Notes from the House of the Dead also recalls his past, but 
differently. “This was really long ago,” he observes at the beginning of 
his memoirs, “it all seems like a dream to me.” The narrator’s passing 
reference to the dreamlike character of his recollections is not without 
significance. The so-called dream here is artistic transfiguration; it 
marks esthetic distance between the writer and his material. Much 
later, in his semiautobiographical sketch, “The Peasant of Marey,” 
published in the February 1876 number of Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky 
offered a clue to his artistic approach in Notes from the House of the Dead. 
He relates how, as a convict, he once had dreamed of a kindly peasant 
who had befriended him as a child. The dream came to an end. He got 
off his bunk and looked around. “I suddenly felt that I could look at 
these unhappy creatures with quite different eyes and that suddenly, 
by some miracle, all hatred and malice had disappeared completely 
from my heart.”26 The dream here has both a psychological and esthetic 
character; it is both catharsis and revelation; it opens what Dostoevsky 
calls the eyes of the soul. The miracle affected by the dream is the 
miracle of artistic transfiguration.
26 PSS, 22:49.
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In his entry “Apropos of the Exhibition” in his Diary of a Writer 
in 1873, Dostoevsky leaves no doubt as to the philosophically idealist 
character of his conception of reality. “‘One must depict reality as 
it is,’ they say, whereas there is simply no such reality, and indeed 
such a reality never existed on earth, because the essence of things is 
inaccessible to man, and he apprehends nature as it is reflected in his 
idea, passing through his feelings; thereore one must give far more 
expression to the idea and not fear the ideal.”27 In a letter to Apollon 
Maikov, December 11, 1868, Dostoevsky defines the “idealist” character 
of his realism. He confides to his friend the plan of a “huge novel” to be 
entitled “Atheism.” At its center is a Russian man who suddenly loses 
faith in God, gets involved with atheistic groups, falls into the power of 
a Jesuit, but finally, in the end, rediscovers Christ and the Russian land. 
At this point in the letter, Dostoevsky pauses to exclaim:
Ah, my friend! I have completely different notions about 
reality and about realism from our realists and critics. My 
idealism is more real than theirs. Lord! To relate intelligibly 
all that we Russians have experienced in the past ten years in 
our spiritual development—now wouldn’t the realists shout 
that this is fantasy! Yet this is the old genuine realism! Precisely 
this is realism, only deeper, and they are swimming in shallow 
waters. Now isn’t Lyubim Tortsov [the central character in 
A. N. Ostrovsky’s play Poverty Is No Crime, 1854] really insigni-
ficant in essence—and yet this is all the ideal that their realism 
allows. Deep realism—hardly! With their realism you won’t 
explain one-hundredth of the real, actual facts that have occurred. 
And with our idealism we have prophesied even facts. It has 
happened.28
Dostoevsky’s point of departure for his defense of his idealism is 
his formulation of the drama of Russian man in terms of an immense 
moral and spiritual quest. But this is “realism, only deeper”; it is more 
real for Dostoevsky because it focuses the historical reality of the 
27 PPS 21:75.
28 PSS, 28(2):329. Dostoevsky has in mind here a murder committed by the 
student A. M. Danilov in 1865. The circumstances of Danilov’s crime and his 
motives were somewhat similar to those of Raskolnikov. (For commentary 
on Danilov’s crime, see PSS, 9:391-392). 
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moment against a background of the permanent spiritual strivings and 
aspirations of man. Dostoevsky speaks of “explaining” real facts; he 
is proud that he even has prophesied facts, that he has grasped the 
inner dynamic of reality and anticipated its “facts.” “They understand 
only what takes place before their eyes,” he is reported to have said 
of his critics, “but because of nearsightedness they themselves are 
not only unable to look ahead, but cannot understand even how for 
another person the future consequences of present events can be clear 
as the palm one’s hand.”29 It is the cognitive function of realism that 
Dostoevsky values: in its most immediate action true realism captures 
social reality in movement; in its deeper action artistic cognition 
approaches religious revelation.
Dostoevsky’s defense of his realism in his letter to Maikov had 
a definite purpose: it was to defend himself against the charge that his 
art (specifically, The Idiot) lacked verisimilitude as a depiction of reality, 
that his realism was fantastic. Maikov had written Dostoevsky apropos 
of the second half of part 1 of The Idiot:
Here’s my impression: an awful lot of strength, genius-inspired 
strokes (for example, when the Idiot is slapped, and what he 
says, and various other places), but in the whole action there is 
more possibility and plausibility than truth. The most real person, 
if you will, is the Idiot (does this seem strange to you?) but the 
others—all, as it were, live in a fantastic world; all of them have 
a strong yet fantastic, somewhat exceptional luster. One reads 
avidly, and at the same time—one doesn’t believe in it.30
And in another letter, Maikov comments:
Various reviews, the chief reproach being the fantastic quality 
of the characters; one gentleman even says that such country 
houses are not to be found in Pavlovsk.31
29 L. Kh. Simonova-Khokhriakova, “Iz vospominanii о F. M. Dostoevskom,” 
in F.M. Dostoevskii v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov v dvukh tomakh (Moscow: 
Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1990), 2:348.
30 Letter of A. Maikov to Dostoevsky, March 14, 1868. Quoted by A. S. Dolinin 
in F.M. Dostoevskii, Pis’ma, edited and annotated by A. S. Dolinin, 4 vols. 
(Moscow: 1928-1959), 2: 419.
31 Letter of A. Maikov to Dostoevsky, September 30, 1868, ibid., 2: 426.
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The charge that his artistic vision, or embodiment, of reality 
was “fantastic” certainly was not a new one to Dostoevsky. “As far 
back as the 1840s I was dubbed mockingly a fantasist,” he observed 
in “Petersburg Visions in Verse and Prose” (1861).32 “I am a frightful 
hunter after mysteries. I am a fantasist, I am a mystic, and, I confess to 
you, Petersburg, I don’t know why, has always seemed to me something 
of a mystery.”33 Pushkin perceived and projected the historical-
philosophical contradictions of Russian history, its social drama and 
pathos, in the complex image of a fantastic Petersburg; Gogol further 
contributed to this image through his Petersburg tales. The notion of the 
city as a vast, abstract, and impersonal entity, expropriating from man 
his humanity, threatening to transform him into a nonentity, making 
his whole existence strange, fantastic, unreal, finds embodiment in 
Dostoevsky’s early stories, as well as in his later novels. The “fantastic 
titulary councillors” in the early tales—Mr. Proharchin, Vasya Shumkov, 
Golyadkin Sr., and others—are victims of their own convoluted natures 
and at the same time are sacrifices of the Petersburg bureaucratic anthill 
state. Netochka Nezvanova, in Dostoevsky’s work of the same name, 
writes: “I am not surprised that among such strange people as my 
father and mother I myself became such a strange, fantastic child.” She 
is spoiled by her “fantastic, exceptional” love for her father. Her life and 
the world about her she compares to a “fairy tale,” a “novel,” a strange 
“dream.” G. M. Fridlender has observed that these comparisons serve 
to emphasize precisely the strangeness, the fantastic and exceptional 
character of the reality around Netochka, a reality which appears to the 
reader of her notes and to Netochka herself not as stable and normal, 
but as extraordinarily unstable and abnormal.34 Yet it is recognizably 
and vividly the real world in a picture that shows, in its distortion, how 
that world deviates from the ideal.
The criticism of his art as fantastic spurred Dostoevsky to 
a sharper definition and defense of his realistic method. He writes to 
his friend Nikolai N. Strakhov, February 26, 1869:
32 PSS, 19:73.
33 PSS, 19:68. 
34 G.M. Fridlender, Realizm Dostoevskogo (Moscow and Leningrad: Gosizdat, 
1964), 76. 
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I have my special view of reality [in art], and what the majority 
calls almost fantastic and exceptional, for me is sometimes the 
very essence of the real. The everyday aspect of phenomena and 
the cliché view of them, in my opinion, is still not realism, and 
even the opposite. In every issue of the newspapers you encounter 
a report about the most real facts and about most strange ones. 
For our writers they are fantastic; and indeed, they don’t busy 
themselves with them; and yet they are reality, because they are 
facts. Now who will note them, explain them, write them down. 
They are daily and of the moment, and not exceptional . . . We let 
all reality . . . pass by our noses. Now who will take note of the 
facts and go deeply into them? . . . Is it possible that my fantastic 
Idiot is not reality, indeed even the most common sort! Why, it’s 
just these days that such characters are inevitably found in those 
social strata divorced from the soil—strata that are in reality 
becoming fantastic.35
Dostoevsky, it will be noted, does not deny that certain 
phenomena, facts of reality, do indeed appear fantastic, improbable, 
exceptional. Indeed, as he affirms several years later in “Mummer” 
in Diary of a Writer in 1873, “true events, depicted in all their 
exclusiveness of their chance occurrence (sluchainosti), almost always 
assume a fantastic, almost improbable character.”36 Lebedev in The 
Idiot observes that “almost every reality, though it has its immutable 
laws, is always incredible and improbable.” But the central question 
here is: fantastic, incredible, improbable from what point of view and 
to whom? Dostoevsky answers that the facts of reality often appear 
incredible from the cliché viewpoint of the majority, appear fantastic to 
those who look at reality with merely surface, as it were, photographic 
eyes. A fact of reality from this viewpoint often appears fantastic 
(and indeed, statically perceived, is fantastic) because it turns up in 
all its exclusiveness in a clutter of unrelated and haphazard detail; it 
35 PSS, 29(1):19.
36 PSS, 21:82. The chronicler in The Devils echoes Dostoevsky’s idea of fantastic 
realism. He observes at one point in his narrative (part 1, chapter 2, section 
vi) that it was difficult to know what was in Varvara Petrovna’s heart and 
that he was not going to try to unravel the contradictions in her plan. “As 
the chronicler I limit myself only to presenting events in a precise form, 
exactly as they occurred, and it is not my fault if they appear improbable.” 
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appears fantastic, essentially, because it is unexplained (esthetically—
unformed), because it is unrelated to the underlying “immutable laws” 
which govern its appearance. “The aim of art,” Dostoevsky writes 
again in “Mummer,” “is not the accidentalities of day-to-day life, but 
their general idea, keenly perceived and correctly removed from the 
whole multiplicity of identical phenomena of life.”37
Dostoevsky insists, as we have seen, that his “fantastic Idiot” 
is perhaps a part of even common reality, that there must be such 
characters in those strata of society divorced from the people. But it 
is not primarily upon faithfulness to common reality that Dostoevsky 
ultimately justifies his special realism (though he is proud that he has 
anticipated real facts in his art). He recognizes, for example, that a fact 
of reality may indeed be uncommon, exceptional, a rarity. A cruel monk, 
for example, beats to death a ten-year-old boy in a famous monastery. 
“Well, now isn’t this a fantastic story at first glance?” Dostoevsky 
remarks. “And yet it is, it seems, wholly true.” But if one were to 
write about it, he adds, people would shout that it was improbable, 
exceptional. “And they would be right, if the matter was judged only 
from the standpoint of faithfulness in depicting the ordinary run of 
life in our monasteries.” Life in the monasteries, Dostoevsky freely 
acknowledges, is quite different, and the incident involving the evil 
monk will always stand out as an exception to the rule. “But for the 
narrator, for the poet, there may also be other tasks besides the ordinary 
run-of-life aspect; these are the general, universal, and, I think, eternally 
inexhaustible depths of spirit and human character.”38
The ultimate test of verisimilitude of a fact, the test of “realism,” 
then, is not in the identity of fact A to fact В to fact С and so forth; 
it is in the degree to which fact A, however isolated and exceptional, 
conducts us to the larger realities of society and the human spirit. 
An exceptional, seemingly strange or fantastic incident may open 
up a startling perspective of human evil or goodness. Realism in 
Dostoevsky’s novelistic universe, as in Dante’s Commedia, is vertical; 
the facts of our lives are starkly represented, sometimes even with 
naturalistic precision, but they are selected in such a way as to illuminate 
the hierarchical reality of the human spirit.
37 PSS, 21:82. 
38  PSS, 21:83.
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The facts of crime for Dostoevsky clearly were prime conductors 
to reality of human nature. Evidence of his preoccupation with these 
“facts” and with their deeper significance may be found in his editor’s 
note in his journal Vremia in 1861; here, he informs the readers that his 
publication will carry accounts of criminal trials:
We are thinking of entertaining the readers when from time 
to time we give accounts of famous criminal trials. Apart 
from the fact that they are more entertaining than all sorts of 
novels, because they illuminate these dark sides of the human 
soul which art does not like to touch (and if it does then only 
in passing, in the form of an episode)—apart from this, reading 
about such trials, it seems to us, will not be without use to the 
Russian reader . . . In the trial we now present we are concerned 
with the personality of an extraordinary, enigmatic, terrible, 
and interesting man. Low instincts and weakness in the face of 
need made him a criminal, but he dares to present himself as 
the victim of his century. And all this with a boundless vanity. 
This is a type of vanity carried to extreme limits. The trial was 
conducted with magnificent impartiality, conveyed with the 
exactitude of a daguerreotype, of a physiological sketch.39
Dostoevsky does not appear to conceive of the journalistic account 
of criminal trials as an art form. The account of the trial is offered to the 
reader as a fact of reality that has the exactitude of a daguerreotype. 
But in a few casual strokes, Dostoevsky suggests that these facts have 
broad social and human significance. The daguerreotype is but the raw 
material of reality. He leaves it to the reader to perform, in effect, the act 
of artistic cognition which gives meaningful shape to the “exceptional” 
fact of reality.
The novel Crime and Punishment, of course, is that act of artistic 
cognition focused on an “exceptional” crime. Dostoevsky boldly 
“touches upon” the dark sides of man and society. The problem of the 
exceptional and fantastic character of Raskolnikov’s crime (inseparable 
from his idea of the crime) is noted by the police investigator Porfiry. 
“Your article is fantastic and absurd,” he comments to Raskolnikov. 
Raskolnikov’s ideas on the relation of the superior man to the human 
herd, and the rights of crime which derive from this superiority, are 
39 PSS, 19:89–90. 
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indeed fantastic when seen from an everyday point of view. But Porfiry 
is aware of the deeper social import of Raskolnikov’s ideas. “We are 
dealing with quite a fantastic affair, a somber affair, a modern one . . . 
We are dealing with bookish dreams.” Raskolnikov’s crime has social 
reality (or typicality) for Dostoevsky not because students in the 1860s 
killed helpless pawnbrokers every day with axes, but because the 
syndrome of Raskolnikov’s moral, psychological, and ideological being 
reveals in its roots deep imbalances within Russian society, profound 
spiritual disorder.
It was his critics, Dostoevsky wrote in his notebook around 
1875, who were “ignoring facts. They do not observe. There are no 
citizens, and nobody wants to make an effort and compel himself to 
think and observe. I cannot tear myself away, and all the cries of the 
critics that I am depicting unreal life have not dissuaded me. There 
are no foundations to our society, no norms that have been worked out 
[vyzhity—literally “lived out”] because there have been none in life 
even. A colossal eruption and all is crumbling, falling, being negated, 
as though it had not even existed. And not only externally, as in the 
West, but internally, morally.”40
“Does the fantastic have a right to exist in art?” Dostoevsky 
asks in a letter of December 23, 1863, to Turgenev in which he defends 
Turgenev’s story-fantasia, “Ghosts.” “Now just who answers such 
questions! If there is anything that one might criticize in ‘Ghosts’ it is 
that it is not quite fully fantastic.”41 Dostoevsky has in mind here the use 
of the literally fantastic or unreal in art. Only art can provide an answer 
to the question Dostoevsky raises. Know-nothing people demand 
“limited utilitarianism.” “Write for them a most poetic work—they will 
put it aside and take something in which a thrashing of somebody is 
described. Poetic truth is considered nonsense. Only that alone which 
is copied from real fact is needed.” It is the inner reality revealed in 
Turgenev’s fantasy that interests Dostoevsky. The form of “Ghosts” 
will astonish people, he writes. But the main thing is to understand its 
real content. What is real here is the anguish of an intelligent and aware 
person living in our time. Dostoevsky sympathizes with a nostalgic, 
melancholic element in Turgenev’s story, an anguish which Dostoevsky, 
40 PSS, 16:329.
41 PSS, 28(2):61.
255Dostoevsky’s Concept of Reality and Its Representation in art
as we have noted earlier, considered a distinguishing mark of the 
human condition. Dostoevsky significantly singles out in Turgenev’s 
stories images which hint at the “elemental still unresolved idea (that 
very idea which is in all nature) which we do not know whether human 
intelligence will ever resolve—but now the heart only anguishes over 
it and is frightened even more, although it does not want to wrench 
itself away from it.” And Dostoevsky concludes that “such a thought 
is precisely timely and such fantastic things are extremely positive.”42
Dostoevsky has the highest regard for E. T. A. Hoffmann’s fantasy: 
it is imbued with poetic truth. Hoffmann, he writes in a “Preface to 
Publication of ‘Three Stories by Edgar Poe,’” “embodies the powers 
of nature in images . . . and sometimes even “seeks his ideal beyond 
the earth, in some kind of extraordinary world, positing this world 
as most lofty, as though he himself believed in the certain existence 
of a mysterious, magical world.” Dostoevsky, however, highly 
values Poe, his unrivaled “power of imagination,” and linked with 
it his “mastery of details” (sila podrobnostei). Yet in the end, he places 
Hoffmann “immeasureably higher than Poe as a poet. Hoffmann 
has an ideal, perhaps not very precisely formulated, but in this ideal 
there is a purity, a real, genuine beauty indigenous to man . . . What 
a thirst for beauty, what a luminous ideal!” Dostoevsky exclaims with 
regard to Hoffmann’s story.43 Just this striving for beauty is central to 
Dostoevsky’s higher esthetics in his post-exile period.
Dostoevsky’s observations on Edgar Allan Poe’s stories provide 
a further insight into his general conception of the uses of the unreal-
fantastic in art. Poe’s writing, he argues, cannot be regarded as wholly 
fantasy, or if his art is fantastic, it must be considered so only in an 
external sense, and then only initially fantastic. Рое allows for an 
improbable event, but then “in everything else he is completely faithful 
to reality.” He might be called “not a fantastic but a capricious writer.” 
“He almost always takes the most exceptional reality, places his hero in 
a most exceptional external or psychological situation, and, with what 
power of insight, with what striking faithfulness does he not relate 





Poe’s realism that Dostoevsky so admires here is an integral aspect 
of his own realistic method. The same may be said of his admiration 
for Hoffmann’s “ideal”: for Dostoevsky presence of an ideal is the 
characteristic of a great “poet.”
Dostoevsky outlines his concept of fantastic realism in his 
authorial foreword to “A Gentle One: A Fantastic Story” in the 
November 1876 number of his Diary of a Writer. The form of the story 
(in it the hero or antihero speaks to himself, and as it were, to “some 
kind of judge”), according to Dostoevsky, constitutes the story’s 
fantastic element. “This supposition about a stenographer writing 
everything down (after which I polish up the notes) is just what I call 
the fantastic in this story.” Yet the story is “real in the highest degree.” 
Victor Hugo, Dostoevsky adds, employed a similar method in “The 
Last Day of a Man Condemned to Death.” He assumed an even greater 
improbability, namely, that the condemned man could put down his 
notes right up to the last minute. “But had he not allowed for this 
fantasy, there never would have come into existence the work itself—
the most real and most truthful of all the works written by him.”45 
Dostoevsky’s interest in the fantastic in art reaches back to the 
earliest beginnings of his creative work. In his story “The Double” 
(“Dvoinik,” 1846), he strives to combine the wholly real phenomenon 
of a real clerk’s (Golyadkin Sr.) moral and psychological ambivalence 
with the improbable (in a literal sense) existence of a “real” double, 
Golyadkin Jr. We have no record at that time of Dostoevsky’s views on 
the fantastic in art. But in the final year of his life, he did set forth a view 
regulating the use of the fantastic in art, as pertains especially to what 
might today be called scientific fantasy. 
In a letter of June 15, 1880, to Iu. F. Abaza, an amateur writer who 
had sent him the manuscript of a story he had written, Dostoevsky 
praised the author’s idea as a good one, “but God how impossibly you 
carried it through! The thought that a breed of people, having received 
an initial idea from their forebears and having subordinated themselves 
to it exclusively in the course of several generations, subsequently 
must necessarily degenerate into something peculiar to humanity . . . 
even . . . something hostile to humanity . . . this thought is correct and 
profound.” But the “descendant” is “impossibly depicted.” He should 
have been given only moral suffering. But the writer has invented 
45 PSS, 24:5–6.
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“something crudely physical, some kind of block of ice instead of 
a heart. The doctors after curing him for so many years did not notice 
that he had no heart. Now how can a man live without a physical 
organ?” 46 
Dostoevsky’s objection to the absence of a physical heart, 
however, seems less an objection to an unreal or scientifically impossible 
occurrence than an esthetic objection: the failure of the storyteller to 
make the reader suspend his disbelief in the face of the unbelievable, 
that is, to do what Alexander Pushkin succeeded in doing in his story, 
“The Queen of Spades” (1834). At the end of his letter, Dostoevsky 
writes: 
Granted that this is a fantastic tale, but after all the fantastic 
in art has limits and rules. The fantastic must be contiguous 
with the real to such a degree that you must almost believe it. 
Pushkin, who gave us practically all forms of art, wrote “The 
Queen of Spades”—the pinnacle of fantastic art. And you believe 
that Hermann really had a vision, and precisely in accordance 
with his world view, and yet at the end of the story, that is, after 
having read it through, you do not know what to think. Did this 
vision emerge from the nature of Hermann, or is it really one 
of those [visions] which have touched on another world, full of 
spirits evil and hostile to mankind? (N.B. Spiritualism and its 
teachings.) Now this is art! Now in the place where the chemist 
creates a heart out of wine and communion bread—this you 
do so crudely that it even makes one laugh. (As a writer I must 
confess, however, that this scene is daring and not lacking in the 
picturesque.)47
The failure of Abaza, then, is not scientific, but artistic. The notion 
that the “fantastic must be contiguous with the real to such a degree 
that you must almost believe it,” undoubedly constituted the ideal 
which Dostoevsky sought to achieve, but without complete success, in 
one of his earliest stories, “The Double” (1846). 
One may distinguish in Dostoevsky’s thought, so far, two for- 




realism: the seemingly fantastic facts or phenomena which are 
represented in art and which find a real (even if sometimes rare) 
correlative in life, and the actually or literally unreal phenomena that 
we encounter in one degree or another, for instance, in Hoffmann and 
Рое. In the first instance, real phenomena (e.g., facts of crime, violence, 
eccentric behavior) serve to illuminate the larger reality of man and 
society; in the second instance, art, returning to its mythic root and 
function, either strives directly to illuminate the mystery of a deeper 
reality with purely imaginative elements or posits a palpably unreal, 
fantastic fact or detail as a point of departure for an otherwise “real” 
representation of reality.
We say “actually or literally unreal phenomena” in defining 
the notion of the fantastic as it is exhibited, for instance, in Рое or in 
Turgenev’s “Ghosts.” But the very distinction assumed here between 
real and unreal phenomena or facts is obliterated, or at least seriously 
blurred, in Dostoevsky’s Christian religious illumination of reality. 
We noted earlier Dostoevsky’s view that man is familiar only 
with the immediate and visible, “and this only in its appearance, 
while the ends and beginnings—all this is still a realm of the fantastic 
for man.” The fantastic here, of course, is precisely ultimate reality 
in the philosophical or religious sense. The philosophically idealist 
understructure of Dostoevsky’s thought on reality is evident at all 
stages of his career; it is strikingly visible, however, in the last decade 
of his life, a time when the Christian religious emphasis of his thought 
is most pronounced. Ultimate reality for the author of The Brothers 
Karamazov is the transcendent reality of the universal Christian ideal. 
Much on earth is concealed from us, Zosima observes in the chapter 
“Talks and Homilies of the Elder Zosima” in The Brothers Karamazov, 
“but instead there is granted us a mysterious, precious perception of 
a living connection with another world, with a lofty and sublime world, 
indeed the roots of our thoughts and feelings are not here, but in other 
worlds. That is why also the philosophers say that it is impossible 
to perceive the essence of things on earth.” The assumption of 
a connection or bond between an earthly reality and “another world,” 
the affirmation of the reality of that other world, leads Dostoevsky to 
affirm the reality of “facts” which are not of earthly origin but which 
are manifest in man’s earthly existence. Thus, we find these notations or 
comments in the notebooks of The Brothers Karamazov: “NB. If there is 
a connection with that world, then it is perfectly clear that it can and 
must be manifested sometimes by unusual facts (a flying coffin) which do 
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not always take place on this earth.” “In the world much is inexplicable, 
if there are no miracles.”48 We read again in the notebooks, “But the 
lack of faith of people did not disturb him at all; these people do not 
believe in immortality or another life, hence too they cannot believe in 
miracles because for them everything is entirely on earth.”49
We are confronted here not merely with a “fantastic” spiritual 
reality (revealed, for example, in Myshkin’s epileptic fits), but with 
fantastic facts (miracles) on earth. We cannot, therefore, maintain 
a distinction between “real” and “unreal” facts; we can only distinguish 
between the origins (earthly or transcendental) of observable facts 
and phenomena. As Dostoevsky put it—after reading “The Queen of 
Spades,” “You do not know what to think. Did this vision emerge from 
the nature of Hermann, or is it really one of those [visions] which have 
touched on another world?” Dostoevsky, to be sure, was concerned with 
the art of the fantastic in this letter, but the question he raises demands 
attention, too, in regard to his spiritual, indeed, fantastic realism.
The inaccessibility to man of ultimate reality, the lofty and 
sublime world which is revealed to Zosima, is the tragic fact of man’s 
earthly existence. “The individual cannot divine completely the eternal 
universal ideal even though he be Shakespeare himself,” Dostoevsky 
writes in his article on Dobrolyubov in 1861.50 Yet in the final analysis, 
he believes it is the artist (and above all Shakespeare) who comes closest 
to divining this universal ideal, to disclosing the idea (the ideal) of 
reality. “This is not simply a reproduction of the everyday [world] with 
which, many teachers assure us, all reality is exhausted,” Dostoevsky 
writes in his notebook to The Devils apropos of Shakespeare. “All 
reality is far from exhausted by everyday existence, because a huge 
part of it exists in it in the form of a still hidden, unexpressed, future 
Word. From time to time prophets appear who divine and express this 
integral Word. Shakespeare is prophet sent by God to announce to us 
the mystery of man, of the human soul.”51 The mystery of man lies not 
only in the present. “The realists are wrong,” Dostoevsky wrote in his 




51 PSS, 11:237. 
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future and is by no means entirely exhausted by the present.”52 The 
role of the artist, then, is ultimately that of seer; in him, imaginative 
(poetic) consciousness and religious prophetic consciousness are one; 
phenomena to him are not divided into real and unreal, actual and 
fictitious; he reveals man to himself in the completeness of his destiny, 
his timeless being.
It is not surprising, considering the syncretic nature of 
Dostoevsky’s thought, that we should find in it a conscious striving 
to reconcile, indeed, to merge the notions of realism and idealism. 
Dostoevsky, unlike Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and other radicals of 
his generation, stood permanently at the crossroads of realism and 
philosophical idealism. “The idealist and the realist, if only they are 
honest and high-minded, have one and the same essence—love for 
mankind, and one and the same object—man; only the forms of the 
representation of the object differ,” Dostoevsky wrote in “Is It Shameful 
To Be an Idealist?” in the July–August issue of his Diary of a Writer 
in 1876. “There is no reason to be ashamed of one’s idealism: it is the 
same path [as that of realism] and to the same goal. So that idealism, 
in essence, is just as real as realism and can never disappear from the 
world.”53
The real and the ideal, then, merge in man. It is man in the 
fullness of his material and spiritual being who is both the center 
and circumference of Dostoevsky’s “reality.” The highest form of 
representation of reality, the most supreme realism for Dostoevsky, 
is inextricably linked with the revelation of man’s quest for the ideal, 
with the revelation, finally, of that ideal itself.
The final dimension of realism belongs to art itself. What is 
artistic reality? “They say that the artistic work must reflect life, and so 
forth,” Dostoevsky wrote to his young friend E. N. Opochinin. “All that 
is rubbish: the writer (the poet) creates life, a life in such full amplitude 
as did not exist before him.”54
52 PSS, 24:247.
53 PSS, 23:70. 
54 Opochinin, “Besedy s Dostoevskim,” Zven’ia, ed. L. P. Grossman, 472.
In the Interests of social Pedagogy: 
Maxim Gorky’s Polemic with Dostoevsky1 
I remember an expressive gesture of Aleksey Maksimovich 
during a conversation about Dostoevsky. The talk was about 
the integral and monumental character of the novelist-
tragedian’s work, about the verbal magic of his genius. Gorky 
sat silently, listening, and suddenly, threatening somebody 
with his fist, said: “Thus do various gracious sovereigns in 
Moscow convince themselves and others that Gorky doesn’t 
give a brass farthing for Dostoevsky”—and Gorky cast his 
head upwards, frozen in prayerful ecstasy—“that’s how he 
looks upon Dostoevsky.”
—A. A. Zolatarev, Gorky, Denizen of Capri
Three things may be said about the lifelong polemic of Maxim Gorky 
(1868–1936) with Dostoevsky. First, it had deep psychological roots in 
a confrontation with aspects of his own nature; overcoming 
Dostoevsky, for Gorky, was a process of self-overcoming. Second, 
this process of self-overcoming became linked with a central effort of 
Gorky’s literary and cultural writings—the task of overcoming Russian 
history, the painful legacy of violence and disorder in Russian man and 
life, all that he once called “our most implacable enemy—our past.”2 
And third, this overcoming ultimately took on the dimensions of 
a struggle between worldviews, a struggle, as Gorky conceived it, over 
whether man is good or evil. 
“It is clear and comprehensible to the point of obviousness,” 
Dostoevsky wrote in a review of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, “that 
1 From Robert Louis Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky: The Overwhelming 
Questions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 121-133.
2 M. Gor’kii, Novaia zhizn’ 5, April 23, 1917, in M. Gor’kii, Nesvoevremennye 
mysli. Stat’i 1917–1918, ed. G. Ermolaev (Paris, 1917), 29. Hereafter this work 
will be referred to as Nesvoevremennye mysli.
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evil is more deeply rooted in mankind than the socialist quacks 
believe.”3 Gorky’s greatest fear, we suggest, was that Dostoevsky 
was right; a good deal of his life was spent trying to prove him 
wrong.
One of Gorky’s lively concerns in the period between the 
upheavals of 1905 and 1917 was that Russian intellectual and cultural 
consciousness would get bogged down in what he regarded as the 
moral-psychological turmoil of Dostoevsky’s novels, and in particular 
in the ideology of that “preacher of passivism and social indifference,” 
Dostoevsky.4 Gorky, like many of his contemporaries, did not clearly 
distinguish between Dostoevsky and his heroes and heroines, between 
the artist-thinker and his complex statement, and the world he 
sought to decipher in his art. Thus, in a letter to the editor of Russkoe 
slovo in 1913, one accompanying his first article of protest “About 
Karamazovism,” against the staging of Dostoevsky’s The Devils (Besy, 
1870), Gorky wrote, “I am deeply convinced that preaching from the 
stage Dostoevsky’s sick ideas can only further unsettle the already 
unhealthy nerves of society.”5 In his article, Gorky speaks out against 
the Moscow Art Theater’s announced plan to stage what he calls the 
“sadistic and sick” novel The Devils.6 The Moscow Art Theater earlier 
in 1910 had staged The Brothers Karamazov; it was now preparing a new 
Dostoevsky production under the title “Nikolai Stavrogin.” Gorky’s 
concern is frankly social and utilitarian in character. “Does Russian 
society,” he asks, “think that the depiction on stage of events and 
people described in the novel The Devils is necessary and useful and in 
the interests of social pedagogy?”7
“About Karamazovism” aroused a storm of indignation, inclu-
ding charges of censorship. In a reply, “Once Again About ‘Karamazo-
3 Dostoevskii, PSS, 25:201. 
4 Gor’kii, Istoriia russkoi literatury, ed. I.D. Ladyzhnikov et al (Moscow: 
Khodozhestvennaia literatura, 1939), 276. 
5 Cited by the editors in their commentary on Gorky’s “O ‘karamazovshchine,’” 
in Gor’kii, O literature. Literaturno-kriticheskie stat’i, ed. N. P. Zhdanovskii 
and A. I. Ovcharenko (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1953), 836. Hereafter 
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vism,’” Gorky defended his position, arguing vigorously for society’s 
right to protest against the “tendencies of Dostoevsky and in general 
against any artist whatever his preachment.”8 At the same time, he 
insisted that “Gorky is not against Dostoevsky but against his novels 
being put on stage.”9 Gorky’s effort to join issues of social pedago-
gy with questions of esthetics throws light on his own ambivalent 
attitude toward Dostoevsky.
“As gestures, on the stage of a theater,” Gorky argues, “an 
author’s thoughts are not so clear.” Impoverished by cuts, Dostoevsky’s 
novels will emerge on stage as “nothing but nervous convulsions.”10 
Gorky is especially preoccupied with the pictorial representation of 
Dostoevsky’s world. In the opening paragraph of his first article, he 
questions the significance of showing “pictures” from The Devils. The 
Moscow Art Theater, he writes, proposes to present Dostoevsky’s ideas 
“in images.” “Do we need this mutilating ‘performance’?”11 “This 
‘performance’ is doubtful esthetically and unconditionally harmful 
in a social sense.”12 Thus, in staging Dostoevsky’s The Idiot (1868)— 
a work produced by another Russian theater at the time—one witnesses 
in the foreground the “agony of the tubercular Ippolit, the epilepsy of 
Prince Myshkin, the cruelty of Rogozhin, the histrionics of Nastasya 
Filippovna, and other instructive pictures of all kinds of illness of body 
and spirit.”13 
“Pictures,” “images,” “performance”—for Gorky, all this visual 
representation constitutes a disfiguration of the written work, “nervous 
convulsions.” In his second article, Gorky expands on his esthetic 
argument. He distinguishes between “reading the books of Dostoevsky” 
and “seeing images of him on the stage.”14 Reading, for Gorky, is not 
a passive performance. In reading the books of Dostoevsky, the attentive 
reader perceives the “reactionary tendency of Dostoevsky and all his 
8 Ibid., 155.
9 Ibid., 156. 
10 Ibid., 154. 
11 Ibid., 153.
12 Ibid., 154. 
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 156. 
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contradictions.”15 He can “correct the thoughts of his heroes as a result 
of which they significantly gain in beauty, depth and humanity. But 
when a person is shown an image of Dostoevsky on the stage, even in 
an exceptionally talented performance, the skill of the artist, enhancing 
the talent of Dostoevsky, imparts to his images a particular significance 
and a decisive finality.”16
Gorky’s article has its subtleties. He acknowledges that the 
Dostoevsky novel as text, even one as tendentious as The Devils 
essentially does not offer a one-sided view of reality, come up with 
absolute conclusions. The novel of Dostoevsky read as text, he suggests, 
is open, or in the language used later on by Bakhtin, “dialogical.” The 
stage representation of a Dostoevsky novel, on the other hand, “carries 
the viewer away from the sphere of thought, one freely admitting 
argument, to the sphere of suggestions, hypnosis, to the dark region of 
the peculiar Karamazov-like emotions and feelings, emphasized and 
concentrated with malicious pleasure.” “On the stage the audience sees 
man created by Dostoevsky in the image of ‘a wild and evil animal.’”17 
The Moscow Art Theater, “this gloomy institution,” Gorky wrote in the 
same vein to I. P. Ladyzhnikov August 29, 1913, “exhibits the naked 
Dostoevsky.”18
The sense of Gorky’s argument is ambiguous: On the one hand, 
he suggests that a stage performance distorts or narrows Dostoevsky’s 
novelistic universe through naturalistic or visual stage representation; 
on the other hand, he suggests that a stage representation brings 
out precisely Dostoevsky’s naked truth, that is, the notion that man 
is “a wild and evil animal.” The distinction between the novelist 
Dostoevsky’s truth and the naked Dostoevsky’s truth is one that is 
central to Gorky’s approach to his antagonist. It takes different forms 
in his writing. Thus, Lyutov, in The Life of Klim Samgin (1925–1936) 
at one point outlines the theory that the Russian people only want 
the kind of freedom that is given by priests: the freedom to commit 
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 158. 
17 Ibid.
18 Quoted by B. A. Bialik in “Dostoevskii i dostoevshchina v otsenkakh 
Gor’kogo,” in Tvorchestvo Dostoevskogo, ed. M. L. Stepanov, et al. (Moscow: 
Akademiia nauk, 1959), 68. 
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terrible sins in order to become frightened, and then find peace within 
themselves. “A strange theory . . . ,” remarks Turoboev, adding after 
a moment of apparent inner uncertainty and debate, “All the same, this 
is Dostoevsky. If not according to his thoughts, then according to his 
spirit . . .”19
Lyutov’s theory, in short, is not in accord with Dostoevsky’s 
thoughts, that is, all that we may ascertain from a reading of his novels. 
This theory, according to Gorky, does find support in the world of 
Dostoevsky’s characters’ experiences and thoughts; a realm in which 
Dostoevsky, Gorky believed, invested his deepest fears and anguish; 
a domain, in Gorky’s view, where we encounter precisely the “spirit” 
of Dostoevsky, the “naked Dostoevsky,” the “permanent terror” of 
Dostoevsky, all that that writer sought to come to grips with through 
religion, but in reality, only “justified.” “Dostoevsky has been called 
‘a seeker of truth,’” Gorky observed in a speech before the First All-
Union Congress of Soviet Writers August 17, 1934. “If he searched for 
truth he found it in the bestial, animal element in man, and he found it 
not in order to refute it, but in order to justify it.”20
We are here at the core of Gorky’s polemic with Dostoevsky, 
one linked with Gorky’s despair over Russian history and brutalized 
Russian man, and his desire to redeem Russian man from the chaos 
of his past. At the center of his solicitude for the moral and spiritual 
health of Russian man and his polemic with Dostoevsky is a notion of 
the disorder of the Russian national character. “Bear in mind,” Gorky 
wrote in a letter to I. D. Surguchev in December 1911, “that our evil 
genius Fyodor Dostoevsky, ‘the knight of the woeful countenance,’ by 
no means popped up on the nose of literature like some unexpected 
odd pimple: his is a face fully justified by Russian life, by our history 
and, I may say, not a very original face.”21 
The very same year, Gorky wrote the literary and cultural 
historian D. N. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky (1853–1920) the following 
apropos of some recent writings of the historian:
19 M. Gor’kii, Sobranie sochinenii v vosemnadsati tomakh, 18 vols. (Moscow: 
Gosizdatkhudlit, 1962), 12:256. 
20 M. Gor’kii, “Sovetskaia literatura. Doklad na pervom vsesoiuznom s’ezde 
sovetskikh pisatelei, 17 avgusta 1934 goda,” in O literature, 705.
21 Quoted by Bialik, in “Dostoevskii i dostoevshchina v otsenkakh Gor’kogo,” 
op. cit., 90. 
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This is the first time, I say, that I have encountered in such sharp 
and precise form this sad but long-needed and surprisingly 
contemporary indication of the organic tendency of the Great 
Russian to eastern passivity which, combined with the famed 
“breadth of the Russian soul,” or rather with the formless, 
chaotic nature of this soul, brings forth that quality so typical 
of us—“swaggering nihilism,” always ruinous, especially 
ruinous, in our austere times. Precisely here, my dear Dmitry 
Nikolaevich, lies, I am certain, the foundation of such sick and 
disfigured phenomena as Karamazovism and Karataevism. “My 
idea is a corner,” repeatedly said F[ydor] Dostoevsky, the evil 
genius of cultured Russia, a man who with the greatest power 
and clarity depicted the spiritual illnesses instilled in us by the 
Mongol, by the mutilation inflicted on our soul by tormenting 
Moscow history.22
In his 1913 article “About Karamazovism,” Gorky spells out the 
spiritual illnesses of Russia as “the sadistic savagery of the completely 
disillusioned nihilist and its opposite, the masochism of the beaten, 
frightened creature who is capable of enjoying his suffering, not without 
malicious pleasure, however, parading it before himself; he has been 
mercilessly beaten, and he brags about it.”23 Fyodor Karamazov and 
the Underground Man emerge in Gorky’s writings as typical carriers 
of these two illnesses.
The word “sadism” appears three times in the opening three 
sentences of “About Karamazovism.” Gorky is in step with the critic 
Nikolai K. Mikhailovsky (1842–1904), who in his study, A Cruel Talent 
(Zhestokii talant,1882) dubs Dostoevsky an intrinsically cruel or sadistic 
talent.24 “Dostoevsky himself was a great torturer and a man of sick 
conscience,” Gorky writes.25 But it is the social-historical dimension of 
sadomasochism that interests Gorky. He writes in his article “About 
Karamazovism”:
22 M. Gor’kii, Materialy i issledovaniia, ed. S. D. Balukhatyi and V. A. Desnitskii 
(Moscow-Leningrad, 1941) 3:135–136. 
23 O literature, 152. 
24 See Nikolai K. Mikhailovsky, A Cruel Talent. An Essay on Dostoevsky, trans. 
Spencer V. Cadmus, Jr. (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis Publishers, 1978). 
25 O literature, 152. 
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The main person, and the one most subtly understood by 
Dostoevsky, repeated countless times in all the novels of this 
“cruel talent,” sometimes as fully and sometimes partially, was 
Fyodor Karamazov. Here is unquestionably the Russian soul, 
formless and diverse, simultaneously cowardly and insolent, but 
chiefly morbidly sick: the soul of Ivan the Terrible, Saltychikhi, 
the landlord who baited dogs with children; the peasant who 
beats his pregnant wife to death; the soul of the Philistine who 
raped his bride and there and then handed her over to be raped 
by a gang of hooligans.26
“Here is unquestionably the Russian soul.” Gorky insists, 
however, that Fyodor Karamazov, the Underground Man, Foma 
Opiskin, Svidrigailov, and Peter Verkhovensky “are still not our sum 
and substance; after all, it is not just the beastly and crooked that holds 
sway in us. Yet Dostoevsky saw only those features, and desiring to 
depict something else showed us the ‘Idiot’ or Alyosha, transforming 
sadism into masochism, Karamazovism and Karataevism.”27
On the stage, the audience “sees man created . . . in the image 
and likeness of ‘a wild and evil animal.’ But man is not like that,” 
Gorky maintains. “I know . . . He is far simpler, nicer than he has been 
conjured up by the Russian wise men.”28 But what does Gorky know? Is 
he so sure about the niceness of Russian man? In the very same article, 
he warns the reader about the Russian national character. “I know the 
fragility of Russian national character. I know the pitiful instability of 
the Russian soul and its inclination, tormented, tired and despairing, 
toward every kind of plague.”29 Gorky himself, one might say, exhibits 
an extreme instability in his judgment of the Russian people. Thus, 
we are confronted by a paradox. On the one hand, he affirms that “all 
of Dostoevsky’s work is a generalization of the negative attributes 
and qualities of Russian national character.”30 On the other hand, he 
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. The term “Karataevism” as used by Gorky refers to the outlook, often 
viewed as fatalistic, of the peasant Platon Karataev in Tolstoy’s War and 
Peace.
28 Ibid., 158. 
29 Ibid., 159. 
30 Ibid., 158. 
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implies that precisely in Fyodor Karamazov Dostoevsky has most 
subtly embodied the Russian national character. 
In Gorky’s unfinished cycle of novels, The Life of Klim Samgin 
(1925–1936), Lyutov argues that Dostoevsky was “seduced by prison. 
What is his prison? A parade. He was an inspector at a [prison] parade. 
And for the rest of his life he was unable to write about anybody but 
convicts, while the righteous man for him was the Idiot. He did not 
know the people.”31 In turning to Gorky’s own works, however, one 
finds a parade of characters and personalities that offers a far from 
flattering portrait of the Russian people. In his brutally frank essay “On 
the Russian Peasantry” (1922), Gorky asks:
Now once and for all—just where is that good-natured, 
meditative Russian peasant, the inexhaustible seeker of truth 
and justice, about whom nineteenth century Russian literature 
so convincingly and eloquently spoke to the world? In my youth 
I earnestly sought out this person in the villages of Russia and— 
I didn’t find him. I found instead a grim and cunning realist 
who, when it served his purposes, was marvelously capable of 
playing the role of a simpleton. By nature he was not stupid, and 
he himself knew that very well. He created a multitude of sad 
songs, rough and cruel tales, created thousands of proverbs in 
which he embodied the experience of his hard life . . . He says: 
“Don’t fear devils, fear people.” “Beat those near you, others will 
be afraid.” He doesn’t have a high opinion about truth: “You 
won’t get full on truth.” “A truthful person, like a fool, is also 
harmful.”32 
In Gorky’s somber and skeptical Notes from my Diary (1923), 
a work with a title suspiciously resembling that of Dostoevsky’s Diary of 
a Writer, he reviews a parade of troubled and troubling Russian types. 
“They are a gifted people, but only for anecdotes,” he observes in one 
of the sketches. This was a bitter judgment. Was Gorky not responding 
here to Dostoevsky’s well-known reference at the end of Notes from 
the House of the Dead to the Russian convict as “really the most highly 
gifted and strongest of all our people.” Gorky’s conclusion to Notes from 
31 M. Gor’kii, Sobranie sochinenii, v vosemnadsati tomakh, 18 vols. (Moscow: 
Gosizdatkhudlit, 1962), 12: 256.
32 M. Gor’kii, O russkom krest’ianstve (Berlin: I. P. Ladyzhikov, 1922), 23.
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my Diary is a startling one: “I have lived among such people for half 
a century. I hope that this book provides ample evidence that I am not 
shy about writing the truth when I want to write about it” (my italics—
RLJ). 
Gorky was not trying to avoid the truth of Russian man in his 
articles about Karamazovism. He saw too much of this truth in Russian 
life and did not wish to see it displayed on stage. As he wrote in “Once 
Again About Karamazovism”:
Things are not well is Rus’, gentemen! Not Stavrogins should be 
shown to it now, but something different. What is necessary is 
a preachment of vitality, what is needed is spiritual health, 
deeds, and not narcissism; what is needed is a return to the 
source of energy—to democracy, to the people, to a sense of civic 
duty and science. We’ve had enough of that self-denigration 
which among us replaces self-criticism; we’ve had enough of 
squabbling among ourselves, senseless anarchism and all kinds 
of convulsions.33
Gorky sees no reason in 1913 to dwell on these “two sick 
phenomena [sadism and masochism] of our national psyche and 
its disfigurations.”34 Rather, one must struggle to create a healthy 
atmosphere in which these diseases will not flourish. Russia is in 
crisis. “Our tormented country is experiencing a deeply tragic time.”35 
Prophetically, Gorky writes, “Once again clouds are moving upon 
Rus’, auguring great storms and disasters . . . Russian society, having 
experienced too many dramas shattering to the heart, is exhausted, 
disillusioned, apathetic.” He rejects both “social pessimism” and 
the “rhetoric” of the “so-called higher demands of the spirit, which 
among us, in Rus’, contribute nothing to ethics, do not improve our 
relations with each other.” Would not a production of The Devils, he 
asks rhetorically, “intensify savage drunkenness, the dark cruelty of 
our life, the sadism of deeds and words, our feebleness, our sad lack 
of attention to the life of the world, to the fate of the country and to 
each other?” In all this, Gorky turns to Pushkin, “a man who knew his 
33 O literature, op. cit., 159. 
34 Ibid., 152. 
35 Ibid., 159. 
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country but was not poisoned by it.”36 Dostoevsky, on the other hand, 
was for Gorky a man who knew his country but was poisoned by it.
Did Gorky in 1913 sense the relevance of The Devils and its 
demons to the unfolding revolutionary movement? He appended to 
his article “Once Again About Karamazovism” an excerpt from an 
article signed by a certain “Independent,” entitled “Contemporary 
Reality and F. M. Dostoevsky.” The author of this article regards The 
Devils as a very contemporary work. One cannot, this author writes, 
make out “where revolutionary party work ends and where the filthy 
provocation of these filthy operators begins. How contemporary all 
this is! And how instructive! . . . Here he is, Azef [a notorious police 
agent working simultaneously for the revolutionaries and the police], 
a [version of] Peter Verkhovensky . . . Do we not see all this in our 
times? . . . What a pity that Dostoevsky’s The Devils is not a reference 
book for our sensitive youth?”
For Gorky, this article is proof of the “complete satisfaction 
that the Moscow Art Theater’s performance of The Devils evoked in 
the ‘reactionary press.’”37 But Gorky himself could not have failed to 
recognize the parallel between Azef and other corrupt revolutionaries 
of the period and Dostoevsky’s “devils.” Was this one of those cases in 
which Gorky avoided an unpleasant truth because he wished to avoid 
it? Or by publishing “Independent’s” observations, was he, obliquely, 
introducing some of his own arguments? Whatever the answer to these 
questions, Gorky in 1917, barely a few years later, publicly, and very 
much in the style of “independent,” began to criticize the contemporary 
“devils” of the revolution. 
Gorky welcomed the February revolution, but simultaneously 
expressed fears that the Russian people were not prepared for freedom 
and democracy. Russia had been corrupted by its past. “The most 
terrible enemy of freedom and justice is within us,” he wrote in the 
Petrograd newspaper Novaia Zhizn’ in April 1917. “This is our stupidity, 
our cruelty and the whole chaos of dark, anarchic feelings nurtured in 
our soul by the shameless yoke of monarchy.”38 “The conditions of the 
people’s life,” he wrote again in May, “have not been able to develop 
36 Ibid., 135. 
37 Ibid., 159, 160. 
38 Nesvoevremennye mysli, op. cit., 29–30. 
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in it either respect for the human being or the consciousness of the 
right of the citizen or the feeling of justice.”39 The fact remains that “the 
Russian people is organically inclined to anarchism, that the renowned 
goodness of its soul is a Karamazov-like sentimentalism, that it is 
terribly unreceptive to suggestions of humanism and culture.”40 
Gorky does not mention Dostoevsky by name in his articles 
in Novaia Zhizn’ in 1917–1918. Dostoevsky, however, is clearly on his 
mind. Gorky’s thoughts about the arbitrariness, cruelty, and anarchy in 
Russian man and life echo the themes of his polemic with Dostoevsky 
in his articles on “Karamazovism” in 1913 and in his other critical 
writings and fiction in the pre-Revolutionary period. In these writings, 
the “underground” type (Karamazov, the Underground Man, etc.) is 
an individual in whom sadism and masochism form a syndrome of 
destruction and self-destruction. Notes from the Underground for Gorky 
is always a historical-psychological document that gives expression 
to the historically-shaped tragedy of the individual in Russian history 
and society, a tragedy of suffering, one in which the tortured becomes 
the torturer, the slave—a despot. 
The revolution as Gorky perceives it in 1917–1918 is a reenactment 
on an epic scale of this tragedy. Defending himself in Novaia Zhizn’ in 
December 1917, two months after the Bolshevik October revolution, 
against the charge that he spoke the “language of the enemies of the 
working class,”41 Gorky insists on his right to regard the working class 
critically, no matter who is in power. “And,” he went on, “I regard 
Russian man in power with particular suspicion, with particular 
distrust; a recent slave himself, he becomes the most unbridled despot 
as soon as he gets a chance to be his neighbor’s master.”42 “The animal, 
exasperated by its long imprisonment, tormented by centuries-old 
sufferings, has opened wide its vengeful jaws,” Gorky writes again 
in December. “Yesterday’s slave sees its master prostrate in the dust, 
impotent, frightened—a spectacle of the greatest joy for the slave who 
has not yet known a joy more worthy of man.”43 The revolution is 
39 Ibid., 56. 
40 Ibid., 55. 
41 Ibid., 118.
42 Ibid., 120.
43 Ibid., 141. 
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a period of “monstrous contradictions,” Gorky writes. “At the present-
time Russian man is not well, even less well than ever.”44
As the October revolution unfolds, Gorky becomes increasingly 
pessimistic and harsh in his comments in Novaia Zhizn’. Referring to 
the “poisonous inheritance of the Tatar yoke and of serfdom,” he sees 
Russia as undergoing “a severe revenge for the sins of the past: for our 
Asiatic inertia, for the passivity with which we suffered the violence 
done to us.”45
In his prophetic story “Karamora,” published in 1924, Gorky 
continues his polemic with Dostoevsky; yet while criticizing him, he 
stands closer to him; he calls attention to the links connecting corrupted 
revolutionaries with the moral-psychological “underground” of 
Dostoevsky—an underground, we must add, that Dostoevsky himself 
criticizes.46
In “Karamora,” Gorky’s strange and frightening underground 
antihero, the intellectually agile but morally and spiritually vacuous 
double agent Peter Karazin who is writing his own “notes” in prison, 
echoes in a rare moment of moral clarity Underground Man’s final 
warning of moral and social bankrupcy in Notes from the Underground 
with a diagnosis of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia and a dark 
prognosis for the future. The words may surely be considered those of 
Maxim Gorky:
In the years between 1907 and 1914, observing how easily people 
abandoned their beliefs, I became convinced that something was 
missing in them, something which had never been there. What was 
it? Feelings of physical squeamishness over something rejected 
by their thoughts? Or was there no habit of living honestly? Now 
here I think I’m on to something: the habit of living honestly—
that’s the very thing which people lack. My comrades, too, lacked 
the habit. Their way of life contradicted their “convictions,” 
“principles”—the dogmas of faith. This contradiction was most 
strikingly manifest in the strife among party factions, in the 
44 Ibid., 144. 
45 Ibid., 198. 
46 For a discussion of “Karamora” in the context of Gorky’s polemic with 
Dostoevsky, see the chapter “Maksim Gorky and Notes from the Underground” 
in my Dostoevsky’s Underground Man in Russian Literature (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1958; repr. Westport, CT: 1981), 127–146. 
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enmity between people of the same conviction, but of different 
tactics. Here there took place the most shameful type of Jesuitry, 
cunning traps and even the vile tricks of feverish gamblers 
carried away by the game the point of oblivion, playing only for 
the sake of the processes of the game. Yes, yes—people lack the 
habit of living honestly. I know, of course, that the majority of 
them did not have and do not have the chance to acquire this 
habit. But those who set before themselves the task of rebuilding 
life, re-educating people—they are mistaken in supposing that 
“all means are allowed in the struggle.” No, guided by such 
a dogma one will not teach people the habit of living honestly.
“Karamora” sums up a feeling of disillusionment that Gorky had 
begun to experience in the earliest days of the February revolution. 
The publication of lists of people who had worked for the tsarist secret 
police, people whose hands he had shook, had come as a shock to 
Gorky. “This is one of the most ignominious mockeries of my faith 
in man,” he wrote in a sketch entitled “Nightmare” in May 1917. He 
describes his revulsion at a woman spy who entreated him to protect 
her from the revolutionary authorities. The experience is a depressing 
one for Gorky and casts “a dark shadow” over his spirit. “Am I not 
responsible for all this vileness of life seething about me; is it not I who 
am responsible for this life that at dawn is so foully smeared with the 
filth of treachery?” Somber thoughts weigh upon him. Outside in the 
streets, he hears the elemental hum of the “liberated populace.” He 
hears the “sharp odor of new words”; he rejoices. “But I feel myself 
nailed to some kind of rotten wall,” he confesses, “crucified on it by 
bitter thoughts about disfigured man whom I cannot, I cannot help in 
any way—ever.”47
These lines poignantly sum up Gorky’s affinity with a central 
feature of Dostoevsky as man and artist: anguish over human nature. 
Gorky’s image of himself as a suffering Christ, nailed not to a cross but 
to some “rotten wall” of human existence, brings to mind Dostoevsky’s 
Ridiculous Man (“The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” 1877) at the 
moment in his dream when he becomes aware that he has corrupted the 
paradise about him. Full of anguish and guilt, weeping and accusing 
himself, he asks to be crucified. On awakening, however, the ridiculous 
man, transfigured by his dream, sets forth preaching his vision and his 
47 Nesovremennye mysli, 46. 
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ethics of love. He is moved no longer by the “monstrous earthly truth” 
of his nightmare, however, but by the “eternal truth” of his vision of 
paradise. So too, but in a fatal way, Gorky in the late 1920s, returning 
to Russia, awoke to his old desire to redeem Russian man and history; 
awoke with a vengeance to “pedagogy,” to his fatal urge to romanticize 
reality, awoke to his tendency to blame Dostoevsky for his gloomy 
outlook on human nature! 
Remarking in his speech at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet 
Writers, August 17, 1934, that Dostoevsky had found truth in the “bestial, 
animal element in man,” Gorky went on to compare Dostoevsky’s 
artistic genius to that of Shakespeare; but “as a personality,” he added, 
“as a ‘judge of the world and of people,’ he is easy to imagine in the role 
of a medieval inquisitor.”48 Gorky explains why he has given so much 
space to Dostoevsky in his speech: “Without the influence of his ideas 
it would be almost impossible to understand the radical turnabout of 
Russian literature and a large part of the intelligentsia after the years 
1905–1906 from radicalism and democracy in favor of the preservation 
and defense of the bourgeois ‘order.’”49 However simplistic and crude 
these words, they attest once again to the central linkage in Gorky’s 
mind beween Dostoevsky and Russian history and culture. These 
words, finally, signalled his own turnabout in favor of the preservation 
and defense of the “order” of the party led by Stalin. 
In 1906, after reading Leonid Andreyev’s short story “Lazarus,” 
Gorky wrote the author that he considered the work “the best . . . that 
has been written about death in all the world’s literature.” He praised 
“Lazarus” for its style and insight, “In general, as literature, as a work 
of art, this work gives me immense enjoyment.” However, Gorky adds, 
“philosophically I cannot accept it. I am infected by life and by its drives 
for six hundred years, and the longer I live the more optimistically 
I look on life, although my stomach and teeth hurt unbearably.”50
The image Gorky projects here of himself is singularly 
Dostoevskian, even “underground” in its suggestion of pleasure in the 
face of severe toothache. Yet a split is always present in Gorky between 
48 M. Gor’kii, “Sovetskaia literatura,” op. cit., 705. 
49 Ibid., 705. 
50 See Letters of Gorky and Andreev 1899–1912, ed. Peter Yershov, trans. Lydia 
Weston (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 88. 
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his “philosophy,” that is, what he wanted to believe about “proud” 
man, and his bitter experience about man and life, all that his stomach 
and teeth told him. Gorky’s affinity here, too, with Dostoevsky’s heroes 
could only have added tension to his strained relations with Andreyev. 
He wrote ironically to him in 1902 about a certain public figure who 
“preaches love, the scoundrel, so that his life might not be disturbed 
by the tragedy of his contradictions.”51 The same might be said 
of Gorky.
The Russian poet Valery Bryusov (1873–1924) put down in his 
notebook for October 1900 these remarks of Gorky:
“Here’s what is dear to me in Dostoevsky. You remember in Notes 
from the Underground, in Part One that man who, in the midst of 
the reign of universal common sense, will suddenly say: ‘Well, 
now oughtn’t we to send all this common sense to the devil?’” 
And Gorky with a movement of his leg showed how this man 
would kick that common sense into the abyss. Indeed, he himself 
is capable of doing this.52
Citing this same passage from Notes from the Underground in 
which common sense is sent to the devil, Gorky wrote in his projected 
History of Russian Literature:
Here, I say are concentrated all the fundamental motifs of 
Dostoevsky’s creative work—work most agonizing and, I would 
say, fruitless, for it does not clarify anything, it does not enhance 
the positive in life; rather, by emphasizing merely the negative 
aspects it strengthens them in man’s memory, it always depicts 
him as helpless in the chaos of dark forces and can lead him to 
pessimism, mysticism, etc.53
Taking his distance from the “dark forces” within himself, 
perceiving in part the historical meaning of the Underground Man as 
a social type, Gorky nonetheless was unable, or more likely unwilling, 
to discern the inner pro and contra of Notes from the Underground, 
that is, to distinguish between Dostoevsky’s use of the Underground 
51 Ibid., 37.
52 V. Ia. Briusov, Dnevniki: 1890–1910 (Moscow: Sobashnikov, 1927), 94. 
53 Gorky, Istoriia russkoi literatury, op.cit., 63. 
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Man’s defense of freedom and his critique of the Underground Man’s 
capricious individualism. Equally important in his later polemics with 
Dostoevsky, he was unwilling publicly to acknowledge his deep, if 
paradoxical, affinity with Dostoevsky. In all of Russian literature, there 
is perhaps no other writer who more closely approximated Dostoevsky 
in his deeply ambivalent nature and his torment over human suffering 
than Gorky. Unlike Dostoevsky, however, Gorky as critic and ideologist 
increasingly embraced the “elevating deception” of a bankrupt 
rational humanism. Grasping desperately for utopian solutions to the 
dilemmas of Russian man, life, and history, turning a blind eye in his 
last years to tragic Soviet Russian reality, he failed to comprehend the 
profoundly affirmative and active character of Dostoevsky’s religious 
humanism, one that posited a transcendental moral and spiritual 
imperative in human existence. In ceaselessly and wrongly pointing 
to Dostoevsky as a preacher of passivity, Gorky concealed a larger 
truth about Dostoevsky and that writer’s impact on him as a young 
man, a truth that the Russian writer Leonid Andreyev underscored in 
a scathing letter to Gorky, March 28, 1912:
The West has distorted your view by the instruments of its 
own struggle, and you have ceased to understand that our 
instruments for struggle are entirely different, and that our evil 
genius Dostoevsky is actually a rebel, a teacher of action, and 
that he taught you rebellion. The glossy bourgeoisie of the West, 
like every bourgeoisie, falls to ashes in Dostoevsky’s presence, 
and this is the most genuine and the most permanent revolution.54
Andreyev might have added that the final lesson Dostoevsky 
taught his pupil Gorky was rebellion against his teacher. That act of 
rebellion, however, obscured on every level the complex, intimate, 
and dramatic relationship between teacher and pupil. It grievously 
distorted the image of Dostoevsky as man and writer, but it released 
Gorky from thralldom to one of the most powerful writers in world 
history. On the psychological plane, it made possible the independent 
growth of one of Russia’s great modern writers.
54 Letters of Gorky and Andreev, op. cit., 130. In a letter to Andreyev, Gorky 
referred to Dostoevsky as “our evil genius” (Ibid., 120). 
Bakhtin’s poetics oF dostoevsKy
and  
“Dostoevsky’s Christian Declaration of Faith”1
“God can get along without man,” Mikhail M. Bakhtin wrote in 
“Towards a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book” in 1961, “but man 
cannot get along without Him.”2 How does Dostoevsky get along 
with God? Vyacheslav Ivanov answers this question in his Dostoevsky 
book (1932): “Dostoevsky has long since made his choice: his surety 
and pledge for it is the figure of Christ shining upon his path.”3 The 
1 From Robert Louis Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky: The Overwhelming 
Questions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 269-292. 
2 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics: Theory and History of 
Lierature, Vol. 8, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson, introduction by Wayne C. 
Booth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 285. All citations 
in this essay refer to this Emerson translation; it is based upon M. Bakhtin, 
Problemy poėtiki Dostoevskogo (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1963), itself 
an expanded edition of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art, see idem., Problemy 
tvorchestva Dostoevskogo (Leningrad, 1929). 
3 Vyacheslav Ivanov, Freedom and the Tragic Life: A Study in Dostoevsky, 
translated from the German by Norman Cameron, ed. S. Konovalov, 
foreword by Sir Maurice Bowra, with a new introduction by Robert Louis 
Jackson (Wolfeboro, NH: Longwood Academic, 1989), 111-112. The English 
translation of Ivanov’s book on Dostoevsky was originally published under 
the same title by Noonday Press in New York, 1952. The German translation 
from the Russian was first published under the name and title, Wjatscheslaw 
Iwanow, Dostojewskij, Tragögie—Mythos—Mystik, trans. Alexander Kresling 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932). The original Russian manuscript of the book 
has been lost. Parts of Ivanov’s earlier published writings on Dostoevsky, 
however, went into the German translation of the book. Ivanov supervised 
the translation of the Russian text into German. 
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“infallible criterion” for this claim, Ivanov insists, is “the accord 
between what Dostoevsky had to teach and the living artistic imagery 
in which he clothed it.”4 For Ivanov, “the investigation of Dostoevsky’s 
religious philosophy remains a serious task for the future.”5 Bakhtin 
began writing his book in the immediate post-revolutionary period 
in Russia several years after Ivanov’s early Dostoevsky studies (1914, 
1916, 1917); he published it in 1929 a few years before the appearance 
of Ivanov’s Dostoevsky book in 1932, one in which Ivanov consolidated 
his ideas and writings on Dostoevsky. On the surface, Bakhtin has very 
little to say about Dostoevsky’s religious philosophy. For the most part, 
he does not cite relevant testimony on Dostoevsky’s views that are to 
be found in the novelist’s own letters, notebooks, literary criticism, 
and in his Diary of a Writer. Yet a close reading of his study suggests 
that Dostoevsky’s poetics, as Bakhtin understands it, does address the 
religious question in fundamental ways, and is organic to Dostoevsky’s 
declared religious outlook.6
Bakhtin’s groundbreaking study, a work proclaiming Dostoevsky 
as “creator of the polyphonic novel,”7 architect of a “polyphonic 
world,” and destroyer of the “established forms of the fundamentally 
monologic (homophonic) European novel,”8 relegates the religious 
question, among other broadly ideological matters pertaining to 
Dostoevsky, to the back shelf of his concerns. “The present book is 
devoted to problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics and surveys his work from 
that viewpoint only” (Bakhtin’s italics), Bakhtin wrote in the opening 
line of his preface to his revised Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics in 1963.9 
“The fundamental innovation that this poetics represents, its organic 
unity within the whole of Dostoevsky’s work,” he adds, “has received 
4 Ibid., 119. 
5 Ibid., 118. 
6 For discussions of Bakhtin and Dostoevsky, among other questions, see 
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of Prosaics 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990) and Katerina Clark and 
Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1984).
7 Bakhtin, Poetics, 7. 
8 Ibid., 8.
9 Ibid., 3.
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far too little elucidation in scholarship. Literature on Dostoevsky has 
focused primarily on the ideological problems raised by his work.” In 
the foreword to the original edition of his Dostoevsky book in 1929, 
Bakhtin put the matter in slightly different words:
The present book is limited solely to theoretical problems 
of Dostoevsky’s art. We have had to exclude all historical 
problems . . . Dostoevsky’s work has been, up to now, the object 
of a narrowly ideological approach and treatment. Of greatest 
interest has been the ideology that found its direct expression 
in the pronouncements of Dostoevsky (or more precisely of 
his characters). The ideology that determined his artistic form, 
his extraordinarily complex and completely new novelistic 
construction, has reåmained to this day almost completely 
unexamined.10
The “ideology that determined [Dostoevsky’s] artistic form” 
is distinguished from Dostoevsky’s “pronouncements,” many of 
which, of course, explicitly addressed his religious point of view. The 
qualification, “more precisely [those] of his characters,” is a note- 
worthy one. Though Dostoevsky in general shares the religious 
convictions of some of his characters, these characters for the most 
part do not give direct expression to the complexity and ambience 
of his religious outlook. Bakhtin’s qualification suggests that he 
did not wish to place Dostoevsky’s pronouncements on religion at 
a distance from “the ideology that determined his artistic form.” At 
the very outset of his 1929 book, then, Bakhtin leaves the door open for 
a relationship between Dostoevsky’s religious outlook and his poetics, 
although he chooses to narrow his focus to a discussion of Dostoevsky’s 
poetics.
Bakhtin’s book, begun in the early years of the Russian 
Revolution and published at a time of increasingly heated rhetoric of 
revolution, was essentially an attempt to lift the question of ideology or 
worldview above conventional attempts in Western as well as Russian 
criticism to identify Dostoevsky with this or that character or ideology. 
It was an effort to locate Dostoevsky and his ultimate statement in the 
“higher unity” of the so-called polyphonic novel.11 For Bakhtin, the real 
10 Ibid., 275, 276.
11 Ibid., 17. 
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message of the Dostoevsky novel is the author’s means of representing 
the multileveled, multivoiced, nonfinalized, dialogical nature of all 
character, idea, human experience, life itself. It is in Dostoevsky’s way 
of looking at the world, in the artist’s “completely new type of artistic 
thinking,”12 his “new form of artistic visualization” of the world,13 and 
the “objectivism” of that visualization,14 rather than in any formal or 
conventional authorial affirmation of his Christian faith through one or 
another character, that Bakhtin finds Dostoevsky’s ultimate statement 
on man’s relation to God and to the universe.
When Bakhtin says that “one should learn not from Raskolnikov 
or Sonya, Ivan or Zosima (thereby ripping their voices out of the 
polyphonic whole and by that act alone distorting the novels),” that 
one should rather “learn from Dostoevsky himself as a creator of the 
polyphonic novel,”15 he in no way denies the importance of what he 
calls “Dostoevskian ideas,”16 Dostoevsky’s “pronouncements,” or 
the presence of a personal authorial ideology or point of view in his 
creative works. “A novel without an authorial position . . . is in general 
impossible,” Bakhtin readily concedes.17 He does not deny, further, 
that some of Dostoevsky’s novels have “conventionally literary, 
conventionally monologic” endings,18 that is, definitive or “finalizing” 
resolutions that give expression to a monological viewpoint. What 
Bakhtin denies is that these conclusions retain their absolute hegemony 
in the body of the artistic work or form a basis upon which to judge 
the authors deepest artistic statement. “The ideas of Dostoevsky, the 
thinker, upon entering his polyphonic novel change the very form of 
their existence, they are transformed into artistic images of ideas.”19 
What is involved in the Dostoevsky polyphonic novel is “not an absence 
but a radical change in the author’s position.” Dostoevsky’s “radically 
12 Ibid., 3.
13 Ibid., 38.
14 Ibid., 278. 
15 Ibid., 36. 
16 Ibid., 92.
17 Ibid., 67.
18 Ibid., 39. 
19 Ibid., 92. 
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new authorial position” led to the discovery of a “new integral view 
on the person,” one that offers “a new form for visualizing a human 
being in art.”20
The new authorial position in the polyphonic novel, Bakhtin 
maintains, is “located above the monological position.”21 The entire 
realm of the artist’s “creative subjectivity” has been objectified in his 
characters’ voices. It follows from this new position that the unity of 
a Dostoevsky novel as a whole is “above personal style and above 
personal tone.”22 We are involved, then, not with two Dostoevskys, 
author-ideologist and artist-philosopher, but with a new positioning 
of the author-ideologist in the multivoiced world created by the artist, 
one in which the ideologist participates on equal terms with other 
voices. It is on this plane of relationships between voices that Bakhtin 
will find the value orientation of the Dostoevsky novel. The nature 
of authorial participation in the Dostoevsky novel and the form in 
which Dostoevsky’s point of view manifests itself is crucial to Bakhtin’s 
thinking on Dostoevsky’s poetics.
Dostoevsky emerges in his creative work, in Bakhtin’s conception, 
as the creator of “free people, capable of standing alongside their 
creator, capable of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling 
against him.” “A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and 
consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact 
the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky s novels.”23 The author’s “word” 
or “voice” is but one of a number of voices, none of which are reduced 
to a single ideological common denominator.24 Here, too, there is no 
thought of an ultimate synthesis, of contradictions and bifurcations 
becoming dialectical and “moving along a temporal path or in an 
evolving sequence; they were rather spread out in one plane . . . 
as constant but not merging or as hopelessly contradictory . . . as an 
eternal harmony of unmerged voices.” Not evolution toward some 
grand synthesis, but “coexistence and interaction . . . space, not time” 
20 Ibid., 57, 58. 
21 Ibid., 18.
22 Ibid., 15. 
23 Ibid., 6.
24 Ibid., 17. 
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constitute the fundamental category in Dostoevsky’s mode of artistic 
visualization.25
In chapter 1 of his revised Dostoevsky book, Dostoevsky’s 
Polyphonic Novel and Its Treatment in Critical Literature, Bakhtin to one 
degree or another faults almost the entire body of critical literature 
on Dostoevsky before and after his 1929 book for attempting to 
“monologize” Dostoevsky’s “multivoiced world.” He directs his 
attention, first, to Vyacheslav I. Ivanov, a writer, he acknowledges, 
who nonetheless pointed to the active “fundamental principle at 
work in Dostoevsky’s art.”26 Ivanov, he writes approvingly, defined 
Dostoevsky’s realism “as a realism based not on cognition (objectified 
cognition) but on ‘penetration.’” As Bakhtin formulates Ivanov’s 
position, “The affirmation of someone else’s consciousness [“Thou 
art”]—as an autonomous subject and not as an object—is the ethico-
religious postulate determining the content of the novel.”27 When 
Bakhtin later sums up his own theory of the way the “larger sense of 
[Dostoevsky’s] artistic form . . . liberates and de-reifies the human being,” 
he will return to Ivanov’s basic “Thou art” formulation: “Thus the new 
artistic position of the author with regard to the hero in Dostoevsky’s 
polyphonic novel is a fully realized and thoroughly consistent dialogic 
position, one that affirms the independence, internal unfinalizability, 
and indeterminacy of the hero. For the author the hero is not ‘he’ and 
not ‘I’ but a fully valid ‘Thou,’ that is, another and other autonomous 
I (“Thou art”).”28
Bakhtin, however, argues that Ivanov, “having arrived at a pro- 
found and correct definition of Dostoevsky’s fundamental principle . . . 
25 Ibid., 30, 28.
26 Ibid., 11. For a general discussion of Bakhtin and Ivanov, see Nikolai Kotrelev, 
“K probleme dialogicheskogo personazha (M. M. Bakhtin i Viacheslav 
Ivanov)” in Cultura e memoria: Atti del terzo Simposio Internazionale dedicato 
a Viaceslav Ivanov.[2 vols] Testi in russo, ed. Fausto Malcovati 2 (Florence: “La 
Nuova Italia,” 1988), 93–103. 
27 Bakhtin, Poetics, 10. 
28 Ibid., 63. Or as Bakhtin articulates Dostoevsky’s artistic position in his notes 
“Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book,” “I cannot manage without 
another. I cannot become myself without another; I must find myself in 
another by finding another in myself [in mutual reflection and mutual 
acceptance]” (Ibid., 287).
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proceeded to monologize this principle, that is, he incorporated it into 
a monologically formulated authorial worldview and perceived it 
as merely one of the interesting themes in a world represented from 
the point of view of a monologic authorial consciousness.”29 Bakhtin 
understates the importance Ivanov attributes to the “Thou art” principle 
in Dostoevsky’s novel; it is considerably more than a “theme.” The core 
of Bakhtin’s criticism, however, is that Ivanov committed “a typical 
methodological error: he moves directly from the author’s worldview 
to the content of the author’s works, passing over the form. In other 
instances Ivanov more correctly understands the interrelationship 
between worldview and form” (my italics—RLJ).30 Bakhtin writes:
Vyacheslav Ivanov did not show how this principle of 
Dostoevsky’s worldview becomes the principle behind 
Dostoevsky’s artistic visualization of the world, the principle 
behind his artistic structuring of a verbal whole, the novel. But 
it is only in this form, as a principle governing concrete literary 
construction and not as the ethico-religious principle behind an 
abstract worldview, that it is essential for the literary scholar.31 
Bakhtin, then, does not differ with Ivanov on the centrality of 
the “Thou art” principle in Dostoevsky’s art—for Ivanov, the core of 
Dostoevsky’s ethico-religious point of view. His main criticism is that 
Ivanov did not disclose the pervasive, informing, and structuring 
role of the “Thou art” principle in Dostoevsky’s artistic-philosophical 
rendering of his novelistic universe, that he did not follow through on 
his initial insight. On this point, Bakhtin is certainly correct. Yet the 
Russian philosopher, like Bakhtin, clearly affirms “the great organic 
unity of Dostoevsky’s work as a whole.” Ivanov continues:
Indeed, all parts of his “doctrine” have such an inwardly 
fundamental and living relationship—his ethics, psychology, 
metaphysic, anthropology, sociology and eschatology so utterly 
determine and complement each other—that the deeper we 
penetrate into the nature of the connection between them, the 
more certain we come to realize that for Dostoevsky the creation 
29 Ibid., 11.
30 Ibid., 44.
31 Ibid., 11. 
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of literary form was only a medium for the polymorphous 
development of a synthetic idea of the universe, which from the 
outset he had carried within him as a comprehensive vision and 
a morphological principle of his spiritual growth.32
Dostoevsky’s “literary form” for Ivanov is an integral part and 
expression of the novelists “doctrine,” his concept of the “polymorphous 
development of a synthetic idea of the universe.” Ivanov puts the word 
doctrine in quotation marks: he fully recognizes that Dostoevsky’s art 
does not emerge literally from a doctrine. He might have used the word 
poetics, a word which in Bakhtin’s usage embraces problems of “literary 
form” and addresses the whole question of Dostoevsky’s fundamental 
innovation: his artistic construction of “a new artistic model of the 
world,” “a polyphonic world.”33
In his remarks on Ivanov, Bakhtin uses the notion of worldview 
somewhat ambiguously. He uses this term in the first instance to 
designate Dostoevsky’s ethico-religious outlook, that position (“the 
author’s worldview” [mirovozzren’e]) from which Ivanov, erroneously 
in Bakhtin’s view, moves directly . . . to the content of the author’s 
work, passing over the form. In Bakhtin’s view, however, the 
underlying ethico-religious principle of this worldview, “Dostoevsky’s 
fundamental principle,” lies at the heart of his “artistic visualization of 
the world,” his artistic worldview. At root, then, Dostoevsky’s “abstract 
worldview” and his “artistic visualization of the world” bear a close 
resemblance to each other.
Bakhtin’s distinction between an “abstract worldview” and 
a higher worldview, or “artistic visualization” (khudozhestvennoe 
videnie) of the world, however, remains crucial to his understanding 
of Dostoevsky’s poetics. Noteworthy is Bakhtin’s consistent use of the 
noun “videnie” (vision, visualization, or seeing), with its root in the 
Russian word “videt’” (to see) when speaking of Dostoevsky’s artistic 
32 Ivanov, Dostoevsky, op. cit., 116. There is no evidence that Ivanov had read 
Bakhtin’s study of Dostoevsky when he was preparing his 1932 Dostoevsky 
book. Bakhtin, in turn, could have had no knowledge in 1929 of these 
particular observations of Ivanov, since they do not appear in his earlier 
essays on Dostoevsky.
33 Bakhtin, Poetics, 3, 8. 
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worldview.34 Active or artistic seeing, the creation of images in words, 
on the one hand, and making abstract ideological pronouncements 
(such as might constitute a worldview in the conventional use of the 
term), on the other, are two different things. Thus, Bakhtin cautions 
apropos of Dostoevsky’s capacity to “see and represent the world” only 
in the “category of coexistence”: “The characteristic of Dostoevsky we 
offer here is not, of course, a trait of his worldview (mirovozzrenie) in 
the ordinary sense of the word. It is a trait of his artistic perception of 
the world” (my italics—RLJ).35 Bakhtin’s qualification, “in the ordinary 
sense of the word,” leaves open precisely the possibility of using the 
term worldview in the higher sense of the word, as he uses it to a large 
extent in his discussion of Dostoevsky’s poetics. Yet Bakhtin implicitly 
contrasts worldview in the ordinary sense of the word with visualization 
when he juxtaposes Dostoevsky’s religious views—in particular as 
they take shape in the mouths of his characters—with Dostoevsky’s 
“artistic cognition of the human world.”36
To provide another example: when discussing Dostoevsky’s no-
tion of the being of man (in Bakhtin’s words, “to be means to commu-
nicate”), Bakhtin cautions that “all this is no philosophical theory of 
Dostoevsky’s—it is the way he artistically visualized the life of human 
consciousness, a visualization embodied in the form of a content.”37 
Bakhtin, it should be noted, is careful in his formulation to avoid the 
“methodological error” he attributes to Ivanov; that is, he does not di-
rectly “pass over form” to content but speaks of “a visualization em-
bodied in the form of a content” (my italics—RLJ). Bakhtin’s notion of 
visualization in the form of a content is important in another respect: 
it implies that visualization is never passive but always forming, shap-
ing, image producing. Thus, for example, he refers to “Dostoevsky’s 
visualizing power (videnie Dostoevskogo) . . . organizing and shaping 
this diversity [of unmerged voices] in the cross-section of a given mo- 
34 “Videt’,” “videnie”—words etymologically linked with “knowing” 
(as in the German “wissen”). The Russian word “videnie” is rich in 
meanings and connotations: it means literally “the capacity or possibility 
of seeing”; it may be “sight” or “eyes”; “vision” (prophetic); or “face” or 
“image.”
35 Bakhtin, Poetics, 29. 
36 Ibid., 285. 
37 Ibid., 287. 
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ment.”38 Dostoevsky’s “new form of visualization,” Bakhtin suggests, 
is also a kind of unveiling. The polyphonic novel, he writes, contrib-
uted to the “seeing and discovery of something new in life.”39 “Artistic 
form or vision, correctly understood, does not shape already prepared 
and found content, but rather permits content to be found and seen 
for the first time.”40 Dostoevsky himself repeatedly stressed the spe-
cial unveiling character of artistic vision. “Really, examine some fact 
of real life, even one which at first glance is not very striking,” Dos-
toevsky wrote in his Diary of a Writer in October 1876, “and if only you 
are able and have the eyes, you will discover in it a depth such as is 
not to be found in Shakespeare. But really here is just the whole point: 
whose eyes and who is able. Indeed, not only to create and write artis-
tic works, but even just to note a fact, something in the way of an artist 
is also needed.”41 The artistic visualization of reality here, as Bakhtin 
recognized, is of a different order than a realism based on cognition.
The words of the critic (or of the author, outside the work of art) 
may violate the organic form-content unity that emerges from genuine 
artistic visualization. Expository language or discourse, however subtle, 
is not the same as the language of artistic visualization. At one point, 
Bakhtin himself apologetically speaks of translating “into the language 
of an abstract worldview that which was the object [for Dostoevsky] 
of concrete and living artistic visualization and which then became 
a principle of form.”42 Bakhtin’s comment serves to remind the reader 
that he is not concerned with Dostoevsky’s worldview “in the ordinary 
sense of the word,” that is, with abstract pronouncements, but with 
a mode of expression in which words are used not to preach or teach 
directly but to create or form images. Thus, Bakhtin emphasizes: 
“As an artist, Dostoevsky did not create his ideas in the same way 
philosophers or scholars create theirs—he created images of ideas 
found, heard, sometimes divined by him in reality itself that is, ideas 
already living or entering life as idea-forces.”43 “For Dostoevsky, there 
38 Ibid., 30. 
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 43. 
41 Dostoevskii, PSS, 23:144.
42 Bakhtin, Poetics, 288. 
43 Ibid., 90. 
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are no ideas, no thoughts, no positions which belong to no one, which 
exist ‘in themselves.’ Even ‘truth in itself’ he presents in the spirit of 
Christian ideology, as incarnated in Christ; that is, he presents it as 
a personality entering into relationships with other personalities.”44 Yet 
for all the limitations of the “language of an abstract worldview,” it 
may convey accurately, albeit in a cumbersome way (as is often the case 
in Bakhtin’s study), the truths of the language of imagery, the language 
of artistic visualization. The point is an important one: the essence 
and dynamic of Dostoevsky’s artistic visualization of reality do find 
subtle expression in his religious “pronouncements,” in his abstract 
“ideology,” and the other way around.
At the beginning of his third chapter, “The Idea in Dostoevsky,” 
a section concerned with the “positioning of the idea in Dostoevsky’s 
artistic world,” Bakhtin stresses that in his analysis, he will “avoid 
matters of content in the ideas introduced by Dostoevsky. What is 
important for us here is their artistic function in the work.”45 At the 
end of this same chapter, after citing a passage from Dostoevsky’s 
notebook, in which the novelist affirms his personal faith in Christ, 
Bakhtin writes, “In these thoughts the important thing for us is not 
Dostoevsky’s Christian declaration of faith in itself, but those living 
forms of his artistic and ideological thinking that are here so lucidly 
realized and expressed.”46 Bakhtin, however, all but directly affirms an 
organic relationship between Dostoevsky’s declaration of faith and the 
“living forms” of his thinking. He simply insists that “Dostoevskian 
ideas” “enter the great dialogue of the [Dostoevsky] novel on completely 
equal terms with other idea-images.”47 The question, however, is 
whether these ideas prevail in this dialogue, that is, shape the narrative 
and its ultimate point of view.
How do “Dostoevsky ideas” ultimately fare in the great 
dialogue? Bakhtin speaks not of a definitive or finalizing triumph of 
44 Ibid., 31–32. See also Bakhtin’s comment: “It is characteristic that in 
Dostoevsky’s works there are absolutely no separate thoughts, propositions, 
or formulations such as maxims, sayings, aphorisms which, when removed 
from their context and detached from their voice, would retain their 
semantic meaning in an impersonal form” (Ibid., 95). 
45 Ibid., 78. 
46 Ibid., 98. 
47 Ibid., 92. 
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Dostoevsky ideas or worldview. With respect to his understanding 
of “worldview” in general, Bakhtin follows Dostoevsky closely: 
“Dostoevsky understands worldview not as an abstract unity and 
sequence in a system of thoughts and positions, but as an ultimate 
position in the world in relation to higher values,” Bakhtin writes in 
“Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book” (1961). “Worldviews 
embodied in voices. A dialogue among such embodied worldviews, in 
which he himself participated.”48 In some important lines in the same 
notes, Bakhtin provides an important clue to the form Dostoevsky’s 
“ultimate position” takes in his novels, to the way it is manifested. “Not 
faith (in the sense of a specific faith in orthodoxy, in progress, in man, 
in revolution, etc.) but a sense of faith, that is, an integral attitude (by 
means of the whole person) toward a higher and ultimate value.”49 In 
this definition of faith, there is no final victory; there is only a tension, 
or movement, of the whole being toward higher value. Man cannot 
wholly know or appropriate “higher values,” ultimate value, truth, or 
God, but he can with his whole being sense it, lean toward it, stand in 
a positive relationship to it. Such is the essence of Luke 12:30: “And 
thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy 
soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength.” Here there 
is a tension toward God, not a merging with, or appropriation of, 
God. When the scribe repeats with some elaboration on this notion 
(Lk. 12:33), Jesus replies, “Thou art not far from the kingdom of God” 
(Lk. 12:34). 
This sense of “an integral attitude . . . toward a higher and ultimate 
value,” manifested in the tension of unfinalized dialogue within the 
self, objectified in the clash of voices on the novelistic plane or plane of 
life, is well illustrated by one of Dostoevsky’s central observations in 
his notebook, “Man strives on earth for an ideal that is contrary to his 
nature.”50 The idea of permanent striving for value, for the ideal, for 
God, is central to Bakhtin’s understanding of the authorial position in 
a Dostoevsky novel.
Bakhtin recognizes the centrality of the question of Dostoevsky’s 
authorial position in his novel. In a letter to the Russian critic Vadim 
48 Ibid., 296. 
49 Ibid., 294. 
50 Dostoevskii, PSS, 20:175. 
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V. Kozhinov in 1961, Bakhtin notes that his discussion on the position 
of the author in the polyphonic novel “has more than anything else 
given rise to objections and misunderstanding.”51 In his notes “Toward 
a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book,” Bakhtin seeks to address this 
misunderstanding:
Our point of view in no way assumes a passivity on the part 
of the author, who would then merely assemble others’ point 
of view, others’ truths, completely denying his own point of 
view, his own truth. This is not the case at all; the case is rather 
a completely new and special interrelationship between the 
authors and the other’s truth. The author is profoundly active 
but his activity is of a special dialogic sort. It is one thing to be 
active in relation to a dead thing, to voiceless material that can be 
molded and formed as one wishes, and another thing to be active 
in relation to someone else’s living, autonomous consciousness. 
This is a questioning, provoking, answering, agreeing, objecting 
activity; that is, it is dialogic activity no less active than the 
activity that finalizes materializes, explains, and kills causally, 
that drowns out the other’s voice with nonsemantic arguments. 
Dostoevsky frequently interrupts, but he never drowns out the 
others voice, never finishes it off “from himself,” that is, out of 
his own and alien consciousness. This is, so to speak, the activity 
of God in His relation to man, a relation allowing man to reveal 
himself utterly [in his immanent development], to judge himself, 
to refute himself. This is activity of a higher quality. It surmounts 
not the resistance of dead material but the resistance of another’s 
consciousness, another’s truth.52
Bakhtin does not provide any concrete illustrations here of how 
dialogic “activity” “surmounts” or overcomes the “resistance . . . of 
another’s consciousness,” while at the same time, remaining open-
ended. What does it mean to surmount the resistance of another’s 
consciousness, another’s truth? Dostoevsky’s “sense of faith,” his 
“ultimate position in relation to higher values,” what we might be 
called his tension toward the ideal, finds expression in the continuous 
and continuing process of surmounting another truth, or surmounting 
51 Bakhtin, Poetics, 283. 
52 Ibid., 285. 
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the resistance of another truth. Bakhtin, for this reason, rejects as 
inauthentic and “monological” the conclusions of some of Dostoevsky’s 
novels (as, for example, the epilogue in Crime and Punishment); typical 
of Dostoevsky’s abstract ideology, they contradict, in Bakhtin’s view, 
the novelist’s polyphonic artistic stance. As opposed to the idea of 
a finalizing monologicai conclusion, the concept of surmounting may 
suggest, however, a permanent tendency toward such a conclusion. 
The “conclusion” is never reached, and it may certainly be challenged, 
even mocked by other voices, but in the overall configuration of 
voices, there is always a felt tendency toward it; or in Bakhtin’s words, 
“a sense of faith,” an “integral attitude . . . toward a higher and ultimate 
value.” 
In Dostoevsky’s notebooks, a close connection may be perceived 
between the idea of a permanent process of open-ended surmounting 
or overcoming another’s truth in his novelistic universe and his ethico-
religious thinking. A consideration of Bakhtin’s analogy between 
Dostoevsky’s artistic activity and the “activity of God in His relation to 
man” serves to open up this question. 
Frequent are the comparisons in critical literature between Leo 
Tolstoy and God (Gorky, Thomas Mann, and others have drawn this 
analogy). Dostoevsky himself once referred to Tolstoy as “a god of 
art.” Among major critical thinkers, only Bakhtin, it would seem, has 
drawn an analogy between Dostoevsky, the artist, and God. In this 
comparison, one simultaneously esthetic and theological, Dostoevsky 
emerges in his novelistic activity as God-Creator, but above all as God. 
“In His relation to man, a relation allowing man to reveal himself 
utterly (in his immanent development).”53 What is at issue is God’s 
grand design with respect to the salvation of man. The artist-god is 
not the monologically oriented personal god of the Old Testament, 
a deity who is always interfering with the destinies of his people, now 
threatening them, now punishing them, now rewarding them, and 
always laying out their destiny, but the god of the New Testament who 
leaves man free to decide for himself, free “to judge himself, to refute 
himself” in self-regulating dialogical processes. 
53 There is an analogy here with Bakhtin’s whole understanding of form: 
“Artistic form, correctly understood, does not shape already prepared and 
found content, but rather permits content to be found and seen for the first 
time” (Poetics, 43). 
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If Dostoevsky’s relation to his multivoiced world may be 
compared to the activity of God in his relation to man, then the “divine” 
principle behind Dostoevsky’s activity is freedom: open-ended 
dialogue, interchange, struggle, continual movement, or nonfinalized 
striving. In this sense, the “new artistic model of the world” that 
Dostoevsky created is the world as it is, the world that God created: 
a world of endless struggle between good and evil, of many competing 
truths, autonomous tendencies; a world in which men are in turmoil 
and “argument” has not ceased; a world, above all, in which “the end 
is not by and by” (Lk. 21: 8–9). 
“As major heroes,” Bakhtin writes, “Dostoevsky portrays 
only those people in his work with whom argument has not yet 
ended (for indeed it is not yet ended in the world).”54 An element of 
unfinalizability defines the strivings of Dostoevsky’s heroes. Bakhtin, 
in this connection, cites Alyosha on his brother Ivan in The Brothers 
Karamazov: “Oh, his soul is a stormy one. His mind is a prisoner of it. 
There is a great and unresolved thought in him. He is one of those who 
don’t need millions, they just need to get a thought straight [nadobno 
mysl’ razreshit’, literally “they need to resolve a thought”].” “It is given 
to all of Dostoevsky’s characters to ‘think and seek higher things,’” 
comments Bakhtin. “In each of them there is a ‘great and unresolved 
thought’; all of them must, before all else, ‘resolve a thought.’ And in 
this resolution of a thought (an idea) lies their entire real life and their 
own personal unfinalizability.”55
Indeed, Dostoevsky’s heroes are endlessly trying to resolve the 
unresolvable, to solve the insoluble, to cross uncrossable boundaries. 
Ivan’s supreme effort to “resolve a thought,” the problem of freedom 
itself, is his “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor,” a “poem” that sets forth 
“the unsolved historical contradictions of human nature.” Ivan’s quest 
for resolution of this question remains, like the so-called historical 
contradictions of human nature, unresolved in the legend. It is in the 
novel as a whole, however, in the developing drama of Ivan and other 
characters, that one observes a tendency toward a resolution; a point 
of view emerges out of the configuration of these struggles that gives 
embodiment to “Dostoevsky ideas.” 
54 Ibid., 284.
55 Ibid., 87. 
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The artistic position of Dostoevsky as “God” is eminently 
an ethical position but one that does not involve direct action in the 
form of “an externalizing and finalizing approach” to his characters.56 
Dostoevsky does not overwhelm his characters, in Bakhtin’s view, 
with his supreme power and knowledge. He respects “that internally 
unrealizable something in man,” their intrinsic freedom and 
independence as human beings, their essential unfinalizable character. 
“In Dostoevsky’s subsequent works [after Poor Folk and other early 
works], the characters . . . all do furious battle with such [finalizing 
secondhand] definitions in the mouths of other people.”57 
Dostoevsky’s open-ended godlike approach to his characters 
may be compared to that of the Lord in the Book of Job or Goethe’s 
Faust. The supreme finalizing approach to, and definitive definition 
of, man, however, surely belongs to Satan and the Grand Inquisitor, 
demonic entities who stress the idea of the limited and defective nature 
of human beings, man’s inability to bear the burden of freedom, his 
negative dive toward self-limitation and self-destruction. The devil in 
Faust asks only that God allow him to go to work on the “little earth 
god” Faust to demonstrate the truth of his, the devil’s, tragic definition. 
God grants the devil’s request; he is confident of his creation and leaves 
it to Faust to discover the truth: “A good man in his dark striving is 
conscious of the right way.” 
It is in The Brothers Karamazov that the Joban and Faustian design 
finds most dramatic embodiment. The Grand Inquisitor’s definition of 
man—“I swear, man is weaker and baser by nature than Thou hast 
believed him”—is tested in the dramas of the Karamazov brothers, 
in particular in the drama of Dmitry Karamazov.58 Dmitry spends 
the two days before the murder of his father “literally casting himself 
in all directions, ‘struggling with his fate and saving himself,’ as he 
himself put it later.” Characteristically, the quoted words are spoken by 
Dmitry, not by the omniscient narrator. Dmitry recognizes his struggle 
to be a universal one. “God and the devil are fighting there and the 
56 Ibid., 58. 
57 Ibid., 59. 
58 For a more extensive discussion of some of the ideas set forth here on 
Dmitry Karamazov, see my chapter “Dmitry Karamazov and the Legend,” 
in The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and Nocturnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1981), 335–346. 
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battlefield is the heart of man.” “Struggling with his fate and saving 
himself” speaks of Dmitry’s salvation as something in process. Dmitry 
does “save himself” from killing his father with his own hand (though 
he contributes to the murder of his father), but his struggle is still going 
on at the end of the novel. What is important is that he has become 
conscious of his inner struggle, of the task, one endless for him as for 
humanity, of continuously striving, of continuously striving to “save 
himself.” Dmitry rejects, and then not so much in thought as in action, 
in the drama of his life, the Grand Inquisitor’s humiliating definition of 
man. In seeking to define himself, in his furious and ever-continuing 
internal dialogue (“unknown ideas are storming within me,” “various 
philosophies are tormenting me”), Dmitry in spite of all backslidings 
and opposite movements, tends toward a lofty ideal. His ecstasy over 
the poetry of Schiller serves both to signal these higher ideals and his 
own inner striving toward them. 
It is significant that Dmitry speaks of the birth of a “new man” 
within himself. Yet even such a happening appears utopian. “You 
wanted through suffering to be reborn into another man,” Alyosha says 
to his brother. “In my opinion, remember only and always through your 
life . . . this other man—and that will be enough for you.” Memory here 
serves to foreground the purity of intention, the point of light toward 
which Dmitry can strive. Ethical behavior in Dostoevsky’s artistic 
universe, in the language of Russian grammar, is in the imperfective 
or durative aspect, not perfective or punctual. One cannot speak in any 
sense of a resolution of Dmitry’s conflicts; one cannot speak of a new 
formed outlook or faith in any specific sense. Yet one may speak of 
a “sense of faith . . . an integral attitude (by means of the whole person) 
toward a higher and ultimate value.” Dostoevsky’s representation of 
the dynamic, ongoing drama of Dmitry validates Bakhtin’s view of 
the Russian novelist’s work as “the activity of God in His relation to 
man, a relation allowing man to reveal himself utterly (in his immanent 
development), to judge himself, to refute himself.”
Bakhtin, however, provides no illustrations of how Dostoevsky’s 
“point of view” manifests itself in his work or in the lives of his heroes; 
he excludes from his circle of concerns precisely concrete and rounded 
discussions of the ideological dramas of Dostoevsky’s characters. He 
does indicate that in the realm of competing consciousnesses, truths, 
voices, some voices, some truths that sound out are more “authoritative.” 
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After characterizing Dostoevsky’s “method of integral juxtaposi-
tions,”59 his “form-shaping ideology,” Bakhtin observes:
As a result of such an ideological approach, what unfolds before 
Dostoevsky is not a world of objects, illuminated and ordered by 
his monologic thought, but a world of consciousnesses mutually 
illuminating one another, a world of yoked-together semantic 
human orientations. Among them Dostoevsky seeks the highest 
and most authoritative orientation, and he perceives it not as 
his own true thought, but as another authentic human being 
and his discourse. The image of the ideal human being or the 
image of Christ represents for him the resolution of ideological 
quests. This image or this highest voice must crown the world 
of voices, must organize and subdue it. Precisely the image of 
a human being and his voice, a voice not the author’s own, was 
the ultimate artistic criterion for Dostoevsky: not fidelity to his 
own convictions and not fidelity to convictions themselves taken 
abstractly, but precisely a fidelity to the authoritative image of 
a human being.60
These lines are among the most important in Bakhtin’s study; 
they deserve the most careful attention. Bakhtin projects, as it were, 
a horizontal plane to the Dostoevsky novel on which coexist multiple 
“consciousnesses,” separate, albeit “yoked together” “semantic human 
orientations,” “voices,” each jostling one another, each bearing its own 
truths. At the same time, he suggests what we may term a vertical 
dimension in Dostoevsky’s novelistic universe, a hierarchy of voices, 
orientations, or truths arising out of this sea of autonomous jostling 
truths. This hierarchy of orientations results from the special activity of 
the author. “Among [these orientations] Dostoevsky seeks the highest 
and most authoritative orientation.” The highest orientation is the 
voice of Christ and his “discourse.” The highest word, in short, is the 
word of Christ, and “his voice must crown the world of voices, must 
organize and subdue it.”
One point deserves emphasis here: Dostoevsky, in Bakhtin’s 
view, characteristically “seeks the highest and most authoritative 
59 Bakhtin, Poetics, 97. 
60 Ibid. 
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orientation; he perceives it not as his own thought”; the image of Christ 
represents for him “the resolution of ideological quests,” a resolution, 
however, that is clearly not at hand. There is a paradox here. Christ’s 
voice or word is one among many voices or “words” on the horizontal, 
egalitarian plane of the novel’s life and work, as on the stage of life. Yet 
because of Dostoevsky’s seeking—the correlative of the seeking of all 
characters in his novels (“It is given to all of Dostoevsky’s characters 
to ‘think and seek higher things’”)—Christ’s “word” (in the figurative 
sense, above all) acquires a privileged, though not uncontested, status 
as an “authoritative orientation” or ideal.
The concept of Dostoevsky seeking the highest truth within 
a world of competing truths is a crucial one in Bakhtin’s understanding 
of Dostoevsky’s relation to his novelistic universe. Dostoevsky, the 
seeker, plays no didactic role on the stage of his novel’s activity 
(such a role, for example, is played by Father Zosima in The Brothers 
Karamazov); he does not impose his point of view through authorial 
pronouncement. It is Christ’s voice, Christ’s image, not Dostoevsky’s 
opinions, that must “crown the world of voices, must organize 
and subdue it” at the end of time—though not at the end of the 
novel. 
The final goal toward which Dostoevsky and his characters strive 
in light or darkness, consciously or unconsciously, may be previsioned, 
anticipated, even symbolized in memory, dream, or art, but it cannot 
be achieved in the novel, as it cannot be achieved in life. All that can 
be done is to seek; all that can be achieved in the social, ethical, and 
spiritual realm is “an integral attitude toward a higher and ultimate 
value.” “Do not lose touch with life, preserve your soul, believe in the 
truth,” Dostoevsky wrote Nadezhda Suslova on April 19, 1865. “But 
seek it intently all life long, or else it is terribly easy to go astray.” 
Dostoevsky’s words here and elsewhere in his letters and notebooks 
give perfect expression to his so-called abstract worldview and his 
“artistic visualization” of reality. His monological “word,” one might 
say—though Bakhtin would not say it—is expressed in a dynamic 
polyphonic context.
Dostoevsky’s relation to his novelistic world, then, is a double 
one: as ideologist, as a man with a point of view, it is that of any 
character in his novel seeking truth, striving not to go astray in 
a world where the end is not yet in sight; as artist, it is that of the 
grand architect who “allows man freely to reveal himself utterly (in his 
immanent development), to judge himself, to refute himself.” In both 
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roles, Dostoevsky acknowledges the unfinished or unfinalized nature 
of human experience and striving, the permanent reality of freedom 
and uncertainty, dialogue and dilemma, in this world. For both writer 
and seeker, the voice of Christ has a privileged place as “the highest 
voice” or truth, but it is a truth that one can only stand in relation to, 
a truth to which one can only relate imperfectly, and at best, with 
a sense of faith or fidelity.
The distinction between “fidelity” to an authoritative image 
as opposed to fidelity to one’s own convictions or convictions taken 
abstractly is important to Bakhtin’s understanding of the relation of 
Dostoevsky or his characters to an ideal or ultimate value. In his effort 
to clarify the distinction between these two types of fidelity, and so 
establish more clearly Dostoevsky’s special position in relation to 
his universe of voices, Bakhtin cites the Russian novelist’s response 
in his notebook (1881) to some remarks by the Russian historian 
K. D. Kavelin:
It is not enough to define morality as fidelity to one’s own 
convictions. Even more one must endlessly stimulate within 
oneself the question: are my convictions true? Only one 
verification of them exists—Christ. But this is no longer 
philosophy it is faith, and this faith is a red color . . . I cannot 
recognize one who burns heretics as a moral man, because I do 
not accept your thesis that morality is an agreement with internal 
convictions. That is merely honesty (the Russian language is rich), 
but not morality. I have one moral model and an ideal, Christ. 
I ask: would he have burned heretics?—no. Well, that means the 
burning of heretics is an immoral act . . . Christ was mistaken—
it’s been proved! A scorching feeling tells me: better that I remain 
with a mistake, with Christ, than with you . . . Living life has 
led you, only the formulas and categories remain, and that, it 
seems, makes you happy. You say there’s more peace and quiet 
(laziness) that way . . . You say that to be moral one need only 
act according to conviction. But just where do you get your 
convictions? I simply do not believe you and say that on the 
contrary it is immoral to act according to one’s convictions. And 
you, of course, cannot find a way to prove me wrong.61
61 Bakhtin, Poetics, 97–98. See Dostoevsky’s observations in PSS, 27: 56, 57, 58, 
85. 
297Bakhtin’s Poetics of Dostoevsky and “Dostoevsky’s Christian Declaration of Faith”
At the heart of Dostoevsky’s comments is his idea: “better that 
I remain with a mistake, with Christ,” that is, even if Christ were wrong, 
he would rather remain with him. Bakhtin prefaces his observations on 
this passage with the remark that “in these thoughts the important thing 
for us is not Dostoevsky’s Christian declaration of faith in itself but those 
living forms of his artistic and ideological thinking.”62 “Declaration of 
faith” and “living forms” of artistic thought (like Bakhtin’s opposition 
of “worldview,” “in the ordinary sense of the word,” to “artistic 
visualization”) seem to emerge here as antithetical categories. Yet it 
is clear that Dostoevsky’s “Christian declaration of faith” not only 
sums up his religious worldview, but gives precise expression, albeit 
“in the language of an abstract worldview,” to the “living forms” of 
his “artistic and ideological thinking.” Bakhtin, indeed, seems fully 
conscious of this fact. In his discussion of Dostoevsky’s response to 
Kavelin, Bakhtin centers on the dynamic character of Dostoevsky’s 
religious outlook. “Formulas and categories” are alien to Dostoevsky’s 
thinking, he writes:
[Dostoevsky] prefers to remain with the mistake but with 
Christ that is, without truth in the theoretical sense of the word, 
without truth-as-formula, truth-as-proposition . . . A distrust 
of convictions and their usual monologic function, a quest for 
truth not as the deduction of one’s own consciousness, in fact 
not in the monologic context of an individual consciousness at 
all, but rather in the ideal authoritative image of another human 
being, an orientation toward the others voice, the other’s word: 
all this is characteristic of Dostoevsky’s form-shaping ideology. 
An authorial idea or thought must not perform in the work the 
function of totally illuminating the represented world, but must 
rather enter into that world as an image of a human being, as one 
orientation among other orientations, as one word among many 
words. This ideal orientation (the true word) and its potential 
must never be lost sight of [literally, must be before the eyes], but 
it must not color the work with the personal ideological tone of 
the author.63 
Dostoevsky’s stress, according to Bakhtin, upon the “quest 
for truth” as something disclosed not in “the deduction of one’s 
62 Bakhtin, Poetics, 98. 
63 Ibid.
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own consciousness” (that is, merely in words, ratiocination, abstract 
philosophy), but “rather in the ideal authoritative image of another 
human being” and in an “orientation” toward that voice; his notion 
that in Dostoevsky’s work, the “ideal orientation (the true word) and 
its possibility” must remain before the eyes—all of this concords 
with Dostoevsky’s conception of the appearance of Christ and man’s 
relation to him in the design of divine salvation. “Christ,” he wrote 
in his notebook, “is the ideal of man in the flesh.”64 Renan and others 
consider Christ an ordinary man and criticize the teachings of Christ as 
inappropriate for our times, Dostoevsky observes in his notebook for 
The Devils, “But here there are not even any teachings, only occasional 
words, while the main thing is the image of Christ from which comes 
all teaching.”65 “Not Christ’s morality, not the teaching of Christ 
will save the world, but precisely faith that the Word became flesh. 
This faith is not just intellectual recognition of the superiority of His 
teachings, but direct attraction.”66 Jesus, the Grand Inquisitor notes, 
declared that “man must hereafter with free heart decide for himself 
what is good and what is evil, having only Thy image before him as his 
guide.” 
The hero of the “Dream of a Ridiculous Man” experiences in his 
dream “real images and forms” of higher beauty. “I saw, I saw,” he 
declares, “and the living image filled my soul forever . . . the living 
image of what I saw will always be with me and always correct and 
guide me.” The ridiculous man relates directly to the image of beauty; 
characteristically he has difficulty formulating his vision in words. 
“After my dream I lost the knack of putting things into words. At least, 
into the most necessary and most important words.” What is important 
now is his organic relationship to his vision: “I have indeed beheld it 
[heaven on earth] with my own eyes, though I cannot describe what 
I saw.” Verbal descriptions or affirmations of faith (“the most necessary 
and most important words”) cannot substitute for or convey the image 
of beauty itself. One can only see the “living image,” be drawn toward 
it, follow it: “The living image . . . will always be with me and always 
correct and guide me.” 
64 Dostoevskii, PSS, 20:172.
65 Ibid., 11:192. 
66 Ibid., 11:187–188.
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Dostoevsky relates to the image of Christ much as the Ridiculous 
Man relates to his “living image” of beauty and truth. In his Diary of 
a Writer, he sets out at times directly to preach his religious idea. In the 
artistic universe of his novels, however, Dostoevsky, as it were, preaches 
his idea in imagery. Bakhtin speaks of Dostoevsky’s images of ideas. 
“The idea, as it was seen by Dostoevsky the artist, is not a subjective 
individual-psychological formation with ‘permanent resident rights’ 
in a person’s head . . . The idea is a live event . . . the idea is similar to 
the word . . . like the word, the idea wants to be heard, understood, 
and ‘answered’ by other voices from other positions.”67 Similarly, the 
embodied “idea” of Christ, this “ideal authoritative image,” also wants 
to be heard, understood, and “answered.” And indeed, the power 
and presence of Jesus is felt most strongly in The Brothers Karamazov 
precisely in a moment of dialogue when he is “answered” by the Grand 
Inquisitor.
What is important in man’s orientation toward the “ideal 
authoritative image,” whether he be the Ridiculous Man, Dmitry 
Karamazov, or the crowd of people in front of the cathedral in Seville 
who “strive toward” Jesus,68 is the fact that he continue to strive 
toward it. The ideal orientation (the true word) and its possibility must 
always be before the eyes. Man must freely discover Christ, “the ideal 
authoritative image,” “as one orientation among other orientations, 
as one word among many words.” Christ, the idea-image of Christ, 
emerges as the supreme embodiment of man’s never-ending “quest for 
truth,” or in the esthetic and spiritual terms of “artistic visualization,” 
as the supreme ideal of man in his quest for form.69
The idea of a permanent quest for form, for absolute spirtual 
beauty, and truth, is embodied in Dostoevsky’s readiness to “remain 
with a mistake,” that is, with Christ. The thought that Dostoevsky 
67 Ibid., 88.
68 In the opening scene of Ivan’s “poem” the people in front of the cathedral 
in Seville recognize the silent Christ and freely “strive toward” him. “That 
might be one of the best passages in the poem,” Ivan remarks, “I mean, 
why they recognize Him. The people are irresistibly drawn to Him, they 
surround Him, they flock about Him. Follow Him.”
69 For a discussion of Dostoevsky’s higher esthetic, see Jackson, Dostoevsky’s 
Quest for Form: A Study of His Philosophy of Art (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966; 2nd ed., Physsardt, 1978). 
300 Critical Perspectives
sets forth here found expression in a letter (one that Bakhtin was 
perfectly familiar with) wrote to N. D. Fonvizina immediately after his 
release from prison in 1854. In that letter, he speaks of his religious 
beliefs:
I am a child of the age, a child of lack of faith and doubt till 
now, and [this I know] this will be true till the coffin closes over. 
What frightful torments this thirst to believe has cost and costs 
me now, one which is all the stronger in my soul the more there 
are opposite proofs in me. And yet God sometimes sends me 
moments in which I am perfectly tranquil; in these moments 
I love and find that I am loved by others, and in such moments 
I have formed in myself a symbol of faith in which everything 
is clear and sacred for me. This symbol is very simple; here it 
is: to believe that there is nothing more beautiful, profound, 
sympathetic, intelligent, manly, and perfect than Christ, and not 
only is not but, with jealous love I say to myself, cannot be. Even 
more, if somebody proved to me that Christ was outside the 
truth, and it really were so that the truth were outside of Christ, 
then I would rather remain with Christ than with the truth.70
Dostoevsky, in short, is prepared to “remain with a mistake,” 
with Christ. He allows for the existence of a negative truth—“opposite 
proofs”—a truth that logically denies the divinity of Christ. Yet in the 
face of that truth, he makes a leap of faith that places Christ back into 
the circle of revealed truth. The paradoxical formulation of faith here 
is central both to Dostoevsky’s “artistic visualization of the world, the 
principle behind his artistic structuring of a verbal whole, the novel”71 
and to his Christian ethico-religious outlook. Dostoevsky’s “even if,” 
his choice to remain with Christ even if he were outside the truth, 
is that of a man who will remain “a child of the century, a child of 
disbelief and doubt” until his grave closes over. This spiritual condition 
Dostoevsky describes in these lines is that of a person in a permanent 
state of spiritual tension in which the “thirst to believe” is continually 
overcoming the “opposite proofs,” doubt, the negative truth. What 
defines this condition in him is not a definitive triumph of Christ’s 
70 Dostoevskii, PSS, 28(1):176. 
71 Bakhtin, Poetics, 11.
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truth but a continual “quest for truth,” a continual and agonizing quest 
for form, a continual positing of an ideal authoritative image.
Dostoevsky’s letter to N. D. Fonvizina in 1854 contains the earliest 
extant formulation of what Bakhtin in his Poetics calls Dostoevsky’s 
“Christian declaration of faith.” Bakhtin makes no reference to this 
letter nor does he refer to the most definitive reformulation of this 
declaration of faith, one that may be found in Dostoevsky’s notebook, 
April 17, 1864. On the occasion of the death of his first wife and at the 
time of writing Notes from the Underground, Dostoevsky put down some 
thoughts that constitute the core of his worldview. He posits Christ 
as the “everlasting ideal since the beginning of time, towards whom 
man aspires . . . The entire history of mankind, and partly that of each 
individual, is only the development, the struggle, the striving, and the 
achievement of this goal.” 
Central to Dostoevsky’s entire view of man and history is the 
idea of permanent movement, development, transition. “Man on this 
earth is only a developing creature.” His life is a permanent process of 
“achieving, struggling, and, through all defeats, refocusing on the ideal 
[Christ] and struggling for it.” Dostoevsky posits this process as a “law 
of nature,” the “law of striving for the ideal,” the law that gives spiritual 
life through setting into creative movement or tension the opposing 
truths or realities of human existence. “Man strives on earth for an ideal 
that is contrary to his nature.” Spiritual health for Dostoevsky is not in 
stasis, not in utopia, and certainly not in dystopia, not in any definitive 
perfection of personality or society, but in movement, movement 
toward an ideal, ultimately, the religious ideal. “The teaching of the 
materialists is universal stagnation and the mechanism of substance, 
that is, death. The teaching of true philosophy is the destruction of 
inertia, that is, thought . . . i.e., God, i.e., endless life.”72
Bakhtin deduces from Dostoevsky’s decision to “remain with 
a mistake, with Christ” Dostoevsky’s fundamental understanding 
of the protean, indeed “unfinalizable” character of truth—truth as 
movement, truth as something alien to formula, categories, inertia. It is 
precisely man’s endless quest for higher truth, for an authoritative voice, 
for the ideal—one never to be attained on earth—that distinguishes 
Dostoevsky’s concept of the “teachings of true philosophy,” indeed 
his philosophical outlook, from the tragic perpetual mobile of the 
72 Dostoevskii, PSS, 20: 172, 173, 174, 175. 
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Underground Man. This denizen of the underworld also prefers to 
remain with the mistake, with the irrational leap, with his formula 
2 + 2 = 5, but his is a course of action that excludes Christ. In chapter 
11, the Underground Man confesses that he is lying when he celebrates 
the “underground”: “I am lying, because I know, as twice two is four, 
that it is not at all the underground which is better, but something 
else, quite different, for which I thirst but which I can in no way find!” 
In the uncensored but no longer extant manuscript of Notes from the 
Underground, Dostoevsky indicated that this “something else,” the 
“different ideal” that the Underground Man sought, the ideal that 
would indeed give meaning to his own and mankind’s seemingly 
meaningless endless motion, is Christ. Thus, in a letter to his brother 
Mikhail on March 26, 1864, a letter written but a few weeks before his 
jottings in his notebook of April 16, Dostoevsky complains of “horrible 
excisions” of his manuscript by the censor:
It really would have been better not to have printed the 
penultimate chapter [the main one where the very idea is 
expressed] (chapter 10 in part 1) than to have printed it as it is, 
that is, with sentences thrown together and contradicting each 
other. But what is to be done! The swinish censors let pass those 
places where I ridiculed everything and blasphemed for show—
that is allowed, but where I deduce from all this the need for 
faith and Christ—that is forbidden. Really, are these censors in 
a conspiracy against the government or something?73
Dostoevsky uses the pronoun “I”—“where I deduce from all 
this”—yet it was of course not through his own pronouncements or 
intervention but through the discourse, the internal dialogue of the 
Underground Man, that Dostoevsky in the original text had disclosed 
the Underground Man’s religious ideal. In some direct, oblique, or 
paradoxical way, the Underground Man, in the uncensored edition 
of Notes, must have given expression to thoughts that Dostoevsky 
set down in his April 1864 notations in his notebook: the law of 
“striving for the ideal,” the ideal of Christ. The Underground Man is 
not a believer.74 Yet it is only a step from the capricious and rebellious 
73 PSS, 28(2):73. 
74 The Underground Man’s lack of religious faith is touched upon obliquely 
in the censored chapter ten of the novel. He wonders there why he is “so 
303Bakhtin’s Poetics of Dostoevsky and “Dostoevsky’s Christian Declaration of Faith”
2 + 2 = 5 of the Underground Man to the spiritually productive 2 + 2 = 5 
of the Ridiculous Man, to the 2 + 2 = 5 of Dostoevsky—the novelist’s 
“readiness to remain with a mistake, with Christ,” in spite of all 
“opposite proofs.” 
The Underground Man could have had only a glimpse of “the 
need for faith and Christ.” That glimpse would not have transformed 
him or altered the dark ambiguities of the text, but it would have signaled 
more clearly to the reader what we might today call Dostoevsky’s 
Christian existential design. It might have clearly disclosed, in short, the 
religious-philosophical foundations the religious credo that underlies 
his notion of the “unfinalizable” character of truth, the notion of truth 
as movement, truth as something alien to formula, categories, inertia. 
What is certain is that Dostoevsky’s declaration of Christian faith in 
his letter to Fonvizina in 1854, his private thoughts in his notebook 
in 1864, and his remarks about Kavelin in his notebook in 1881, that 
is, his abstract philosophical-religious worldview, is integral to his 
poetics and in full harmony with what Bakhtin calls the “living forms 
of [Dostoevsky’s] artistic and ideological thinking,” his “completely 
new kind of artistic thinking.”
Bakhtin clearly recognized this direct relationship between 
Dostoevsky’s religious thought, his “pronouncements,” on the one 
hand and his artistic worldview on the other. Indeed, his book may be 
viewed precisely as an effort to do what he believed Vyacheslav Ivanov 
did not do: “show how this [ethico-religious] principle of Dostoevsky’s 
worldview becomes the principle behind Dostoevsky’s artistic 
visualization of the world” and is not merely “the ethico-religious 
principle behind an abstract worldview.”75 His desire to demonstrate 
that “Dostoevsky is first and foremost an artist”76 goes a long way 
to explain his almost principled avoidance of direct discussion of 
Dostoevsky’s religious beliefs. Yet it is obvious that the times in which 
constituted” to have desires for a high ideal. “Can I have been so constituted 
to reach the conclusion that my whole constitution is nothing but a swindle? 
Can that really be the whole purpose? I don’t believe so (ne veriu). Yet 
the alternate meaning of the words “ne veriu” that lurk in the subtext— 
“I do not believe”; “I have no faith”—point to his tragic amibivalence and 
uncertainty in the very realm of his highest yearnings.
75 Bakhtin, Poetics, 11.
76 Ibid., 3, 4. 
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Bakhtin worked on his book and published it (the 1920s and early 
1960s) were not propitious to the appearance of a book in which the 
author would not only more fully acknowledge his indebtedness to the 
religious philosopher, poet, and thinker Vyacheslav I. Ivanov, but would 
bring to the foreground the Christian foundations of Dostoevsky’s 
poetics. In his introduction to Caryl Emerson’s fine scholarly edition 
and translation of Bakhtin’s study of Dostoevsky, Wayne C. Booth, 
after justly praising Bakhtin’s high achievements, goes on to complain 
about Bakhtin’s “failure to settle into sustained study of any one of 
Dostoevsky’s works . . . Whenever an author dwells at great length on 
general theories about huge lumps of literature called ‘the novel’ or 
even about smaller piles called ‘Dostoevsky’s works,’ without settling 
into detailed efforts at exemplification, I grow restless.”77 More than one 
reader has experienced this kind of restlessness with Bakhtin’s book. 
Yet those same readers will also forgive Bakhtin for his omissions: he 
was obliged to work in conditions of “restlessness” that Russians will 
long remember. 
Bakhtin did not leave behind the kind of sustained study of 
Dostoevsky’s works that many in the more comfortable quarters of the 
world might have wished for. Such a study might have done much to 
clarify Bakhtin’s view on the authorial position in the Dostoevsky text, 
among other matters, and perhaps modify his theory of polyphony 
with respect to Dostoevsky’s novels. What Bakhtin did leave, however, 
is a major work, one which indeed is “devoted to the problems of 
Dostoevsky’s poetics and [which] surveys his work from that viewpoint 
only” but one which in its in-depth treatment of its theme goes a long 
way toward meeting Vyacheslav I. Ivanov’s appeal for “an investigation 
of Dostoevsky’s religious philosophy” and toward validating what 
Ivanov considered “the accord between what Dostoevsky had to teach 
and the living images in which he clothed it.”
77 Ibid., xxvi. 
Vyacheslav I. Ivanov’s Poem “nudus salta!”  
and 
The Purpose of art 1
How painful to walk among people
And pretend to those who have not perished,
And talk about the game of tragic passions
To those who have not lived as yet.
And, peering into one’s own dark nightmare,
To find order in the disordered whirlwind of feelings,
So that by art’s pale glow 
They would learn of life’s fatal fire! 
[Kak tiazhelo khodit’ sredi liudei
I pritvoriat’sia nepogibshim,
I ob igre tragicheskoi strastei
Povestvovat’ eshche ne zhivshim.
I, vgliadyvaias’ v svoi nochnoi koshmar,
Stroi nakhodit’ v nestroinom vikhre chuvstva,
Chtoby po blednym zarevam iskusstva
Uznali zhizni gibel’noi pozhar!]
—Alexandr Blok, May 10, 1910 
I heard a call from heaven:
“Abandon, priest, the temple decorated by devils.” 
And I fled . . .
[Ia slyshal s neba zov: 
“Pokin’, sluzhitel’, khram ukrashennyi besov.” 
I ia bezhal . . .]
—Vyacheslav I. Ivanov, “Palinodiia,” 1937
1 From Russian Literature 44 (October, 1998): 289-302.
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“Nudus salta! The purpose of art—
Uncovered, unfettered 
To show what you are, 
To relate the dark sensations 
Of hidden sanctuaries— 
All that swarms in potholes 
Under the glittering, smooth ice—
To unseal the dead house,
Where hides from light of day
Unconscious Sodom.”
Sacred to me is the enclosure of the Muses.
To the fires of pure altars 
My gift—the best lamb of the herd
And fruits, the first of the garden,
Not a nest of bats.
Dear to the Muses are the mountain rock spring 
And in the deserts of nature 
Caraway and thyme and wild grass. 
Pour purifying waters, 
After turning away, into the underground darkness. 
[“Nudus salta! Tsel’ iskusstva—
Bez pokrovov, bez okov
Pokazat’, kto ty takov,
Temnye povedat’ chuvstva
Zapovednykh tainikov—
Vse, chto v omutakh roitsia
Pod blestiashchim, gladkim l’dom—
Raspechatat’ mertvyi dom,
Gde ot bela dnia taitsia
Podsoznatel’nyi Sodom.”
—Mne sviashchenna Muz ograda.
Zharu chistykh altarei
Dar moi—agnets luchshii stada
I plody, perviny sada,
Ne gnezdo netopyrei.
Muzam gornyi kliuch porody
Mil i v pustyniakh prirody
Chobr i tmin, i dikii zlak.
Lei chistitel’nye vody,
Otvratias’, v podzemnyi mrak.]
—Vyacheslav I. Ivanov
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Ivanov’s untitled poem “Nudus salta! Tsel’ iskusstva” (“Dance 
naked! The Purpose of Art”) appears in his Roman Notebook (Rimskii 
dnevnik, 1944) and is dated February 18, 1944.2 Three earlier versions of 
the poem date from February 15 through February 17, 1944.3 In those 
few days, the poem underwent some small, but significant, changes.
“Nudus salta!” consists of four stanzas of five lines each. On 
the semantic plane, the poem may be divided into two parts, each 
consisting of two stanzas (referred to in this discussion as parts one 
and two). The first two stanzas of the poem appear in quotation marks. 
At the opening of poem, an unnamed speaker, the poet’s antagonist, 
issues a command, “Nudus salta!” (Dance naked!), declaring in sum 
that the “purpose of art” is to disclose without inhibition the carnal 
underground of human nature.4 Art in this perspective engages in 
a kind of erotic danse macabre. 
In part two of “Nudus salta!” that is, the third and fourth stanzas 
of the poem, the poet himself steps forth, and without engaging in 
any direct polemic with his unnamed antagonist on the question of 
2 See Ivanov’s collection of poems entitled Rimskii dnevnik (1944) in Vyacheslav 
Ivanov, Sobranie sochinenii, 4 vols. (Bruxelles: Foyer Oriental Chrétien, 1979), 
3:594–595. 
3 The original variants may be found in the archives of Vyacheslav I. Ivanov 
in Rome. 
4 Ivanov’s allusions in the first two stanzas of “Nudus salta!” are 
unmistakably to the ancient Greek “Mysteries of Dionysus,” a religious cult 
of suffering and sacrificial death; this cult was characterized by orgiastic 
passion rites in which music and dance and drink liberated worshippers 
from inhibitions and restraints, social and sexual, and plunged them into 
a state of Dionysian “rapture” and “madness.” Ivanov discussed, and in 
a certain sense, celebrated the Dionysian cult in his series of lectures The 
Hellenic Religion of the Suffering God: An Essay in a Religious and Historical 
Description (Ellinskaia religiia stradaiushchego boga: Opyt religiozno-istoricheskoi 
kharakteristiki”) published in Novyi put’ in 1904, and later in his unpublished 
manuscript of the same title and work in 1917. Ivanov embraced the Roman 
Catholic faith in Rome in 1926, and in the 1920s and 1930s underwent a 
religious-spiritual renewal. In his poem “Nudus salta!” composed during 
World War II, Ivanov casts a critical eye at the darker side of the Dionysian 
cult, even as he remains captivated by transcendental elements of the 
Dionysian cult. Citations in this essay to Ivanov’s important study Hellenic 
Religion of the Suffering God refer to a translation (in process) of this work by 
Dr. Carol Anschuetz. The Russian original manuscript is in the archives of 
Vyacheslav Ivanov in Rome. 
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the purpose of art, announces his devout commitment to the Muses 
and to both a classical and pastoral world where art and the artist are 
characterized by their sacrificial and devotional functions. In the final 
line of the poem, the poet returns to the theme of the underground 
and suggests that the artist can play a role by tempering underground 
passions. 
Part one of the poem posits a Dionysian netherworld of “dark . . . 
sensations” (temnye . . . chuvstva), a chthonic realm of passions out of 
sight and off limits. The unknown speaker calls for a kind of artistic 
bacchanalia in which one would dance “uncovered” (bez pokrovov) 
and “unfettered” (bez okov) and would “show what you are” (pokazat’, 
kto ty takov). He alludes darkly to a “hidden sanctuary” (zapovednyi 
tainik),5 roiling “potholes” (omuty)6 under the ice (pod l’dom),7 and 
finally, to a “dead house” (mertvyi dom), where lies hidden from light 
of day “unconscious Sodom” (podsoznatel’nyi Sodom)—a reference that 
would seem to encompass both the notion of a repressed subconscious 
world of unbridled sexual impulse and desire and the idea of almost 
anthropomorphic Sodom. Ivanov’s end rhymes in the second stanza 
(l’dom, mertvyi dom, Sodom), foregrounding the sound and word “dom” 
(house) lead the reader to the nethermost house of debauchery: Sodom. 
In an early draft of “Nudus salta!” the “dead house” is in fact 
a place where “where an unconscious Sodom is hiding from 
punishment” (gde ot Bozh’ikh kar taitsia / podsoznatel’nyi Sodom). In 
a second version of the poem, “a spellbound Sodom” (zakoldovannyi 
Sodom) is hiding from God’s punishment. In the final version of the 
5 For a discussion of Ivanov’s concept of “Zapovednyi tainik,” see footnote 12 
of this essay. 
6 “Omut”—pothole, whirlpool, deep hollows at the bottom of a river where 
currents swirl. A well-known Russian proverb runs “V tikhom omute cherti 
vodiatsia,” literally, “in a quiet hollow under the water devils are at play”; 
figuratively, “a quiet, reserved person is capable of doing things that one 
would never expect of them.”
7 “Pod l’dom” (under the ice): the phrase “l’dom” may be an indirect reference 
to the once popular historical novel, The Ice Palace (Ledianoi dom, 1835) by 
Ivan I. Lazhechnikov (1792–1869). The “ice house” or “ice palace” actually 
existed. In Lazhechnikov’s novel, it is is a symbol of the despotic reign of 
Empress Anna Ioannovna; it casts a shadow on all aspects of the novel’s 
intrigue and passions. The veiled allusion to the “ice palace,” then, is 
a fitting image for Ivanov’s dark and ominous underworld.
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poem, Ivanov replaces the words “from God’s punishment” (ot Bozh’ikh 
kar) with “from the light of day” (ot bela dnia), thus veiling the notion 
that “Sodom” is perhaps the devil, the great antagonist of God, and 
that our violent sexual unconscious or subconscious has been confined 
here in some kind of spellbound state. These suppositions are echoed 
in somewhat different imagery in Ivanov’s early study, The Hellenic 
Religion of the Suffering God (Ellinskaia religiia stradaiushchego boga, 
1904; 1917), where he writes that “the principle of cosmos and order 
in everything, having effected a profound transformation of our 
inner primeval chaos yet not transformed it altogether, has outwardly 
subdued it and confined it to the sphere of the subconscious, whence it 
breaks out volcanically in destructive eruptions.”8 
Our violent carnal instincts, Ivanov suggests in “Nudus salta!” 
have been committed to a deep dungeon or “dead house.” Art’s 
purpose, according to the unnamed speaker, is explore and celebrate 
its interior. On the esthetic plane, his command to “unseal the dead 
house” (raspechatat’ mertvyi dom) is a call to depict the human nature 
in a wholly naturalistic way, that is, to show people what they are. The 
corollary of this naturalism on the plane of human behavior is that 
everything is permissible. Naturalism for Ivanov, as for Dostoevsky, 
posits a thoroughly despiritualized view of the world; it is evidence of 
moral-esthetic bankrupcy. 
The image and concept of a “dead house” in Ivanov’s poem, 
of course, signals Dostoevsky’s strong moral and literary presence. 
The call to unseal the “dead house” and to awaken the unconscious 
Sodom brings to mind Dostoevsky’s Notes from the House of the Dead 
(Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, 1861–1862), where a world of violence and 
moral degradation is disclosed in a variety of ways. Yet in a more 
direct way, the poem echoes the lubricious and lugubrious world of 
“contemporary corpses” in Dostoevsky’s fantasy-grotesque, “Bobok. 
The Notes of a Certain Person”—a sketch first published in his Diary of 
a Writer in 1873. It is a tale that satirizes the materialism and so-called 
realism or naturalism of contemporary art and society.9 
The still-living, but decaying and dying “contemporary corpses” 
that the narrator of “Bobok” overhears in his visit to the cemetery 
8 See “Hellenic Religion,” 226.
9 See my discussion of “Bobok” in The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and 
Nocturnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 288–303.
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and tomb stones find their most typical representative in the Sadean 
figure of the engineer Baron Klinevich. He invites his expiring fellow 
corpses in the time remaining to them unashamedly to engage in 
a kind of literary and everyday debauch of sensuality. Like the Marquis 
de Sade, Klinevich has a keen sense of the role of narrative art in the 
breakdown of moral-spiritual culture. He proposes first of all that 
“nobody be ashamed of anything” (“Oh, yes, yes, let’s not be ashamed 
of anything!” respond the voices of many corpses). He follows with 
a proposal for a symposium, a kind of Decameron of the dead, in 
which nobody will lie:
We’ll all tell our stories out loud to the others and not be ashamed 
of anything. I’ll tell you about myself first of all. I am, you see, 
an animal sensualist. Up above everything was bound by rotten 
ropes. Down with ropes, and let’s live out these last two months 
in the most shameless truth! Let’s become naked and bare 
outselves! “Let’s bare ourselves,” cried all the voices. “I terribly, 
terribly want to be naked,” squealed Avdotya Ignatievna . . . 
“The main thing is that nobody can stop us.”
Shamelessly telling all is the literary corollary of nakedness, 
a symptom for Dostoevsky of social and cultural disintegration. (If 
everybody spoke their mind, he once remarked, the world would 
drown in a sea of muck). The narrator of “Bobok” himself, Ivan Ivanych 
early in his narrative complains that he has lost control of his language, 
his “style” is changing, it has become “hackneyed.” Of the painter who 
meticulously depicts the warts on his, Ivan Ivanych’s face, he remarks, 
“They have no ideas, so they go to town on phenomena. But what 
a job he did on my warts in the portrait—they’re alive! They call this 
realism!” “Bobok” ends in a whirling danse macabre of “contemporary 
corpses.” 
It is noteworthy that Ivanov foregrounded the motif of 
shamelessness in an early draft of the poem:
“Nudus salta! The purpose of art,
Freeing oneself from all chains, 
Not being ashamed of what you are . . .”
[Nudus salta! Tsel’ iskusstva, 
Svobodias’ ot vsekh okov,
Ne stydias’, chto ty takov.] 
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Ivanov dropped the words “not being ashamed” in the final 
version of his poem, yet shamelessness remains implicit in the 
celebration of being uncovered, or without cover (bez pokrovov). 
The word “pokrov” means “cover,” but it also suggests “Pokrov’,” 
“protection,” “veil,” as in the Orthodox Feast of the Intercession, 
known as “Pokrov’” or “Protective Veil of the Holy Virgin.” Thus, an 
esthetic or art that takes away all “cover” is also intrinsically without 
spiritual or religious patronage.
In the second part of Ivanov’s poem, the action shifts from 
the profane world of Sodom to the sacred world of the Muses, from 
a world of darkness to the light of day. This division between night 
and day echoes formally and semantically the Russian poet Fyodor 
Tyutchev’s poem, “Day and Night” (“Den’ i noch’,” 1839), a poem of 
great importance to Ivanov. The “glittering, smooth ice” that covers the 
abyss in “Nudus salta!” recalls Tyutchev’s “Day—that brilliant cover” 
(“Den’—sei blistatel’nyi pokrov”) which hides the “nameless abyss” 
(bezymiannaia bezdna). Tyutchev’s “day” animates the “earth-born” and 
heals the “suffering soul.” Night, however, tears away the “beneficent 
fabric of cover” (tkan’ blagodatnuiu pokrova) and bares the abyss with its 
“terrors and fogs.” 
The theme of “baring” (obnazhenie) is common to both Tyutchev’s 
and Ivanov’s poems. What night does in Tyutchev’s poem is what the 
unnamed speaker calls upon art to do: tear away the “pokrov” (cover), 
the sacred veil, and bare the abyss. What is ominous and terrible about 
the abyss of night in the poem “Day and Night,” as Tyutchev puts it, 
is that “there are no barriers between us and it” (net pregrad mezh nei i 
nami). 
Ivanov in “Nudus salta!” distances himself from his abyss. His 
quotation marks serve to fence in or quarantine the unnamed speaker’s 
literary manifesto. Part one ends with the concept of an unconscious 
Sodom. In the last analysis, Sodom is not an external, visible, enemy, 
a monster of the day, but an internal, intangible, nocturnal one who 
inhabits the dungeon of human spirit and who attacks by stealth. 
The explicit motif of “turning away” from the abyss is apparent 
not only in the final line of the poem, but in the opening line of part two 
where the poet decisively separates himself from the profane world 
of Sodom and declares his personal allegiance to a different world 
where art and spirituality are united. “Sacred to me is the enclosure 
of the Muses” (Mne sviashchenna Muz ograda); the poet's habitation is 
the “enclosure of the Muses.” The poet chooses the protection and 
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patronage of the classical Muses, those who preside over poetry and 
the arts, divinities of the open spirit as opposed to the demons of 
confinement. 
The “enclosure” (ograda) of the Muses, as Ivanov wrote in Hellenic 
Religion, are the grounds where “great art” was born.10 Ivanov writes 
about a specific part of the ancient Greek Acropolis:
This enclosure (ograda) which housed a theater and two temples 
of different antiquity . . . was the most important arena of 
Dionysiac art. Here the tragic muse first revealed herself to the 
human spirit in beauty’s unfading forms.
[Eta ograda, vmeshchavshaia teatr i dva khrama razlichnoi 
drevnosti, byla vazhneisheiu v Gretsii arenoi dionisiiskogo 
iskusstva. Zdes’ tragicheskaia muza vpervye otkrylas’ 
chelovecheskomu dukhu v neuviadaiushchikh formakh 
krasoty.]11
Dionysiac worship or ritual resulting in the art form of tragedy 
is, in Ivanov’s presentation, a conflation of both Apollonian and 
Dionysiac elements, of both suffering and harmony. “A fine line divided 
the redemptive from the destructive effects of the terrible Dionysiac 
element,” Ivanov wrote in Hellenic Religion. “They found rapture on 
the edge of the abyss, in the whirlwind of orgies, in the breath of 
a frenzied god.”12 A very firm line separates the “redemptive” from the 
“terrible Dionysiac element” in “Nudus salta!” Few hints of this vision 
of paradoxical and paroxysmal Dionysiac religious ethos are to be 
found in Ivanov’s “Nudus salta!”13 Certainly, the implied esthetic of the 
10 “Hellenic Religion,” 47.
11 Ibid., 43.
12 Ibid., 82. 
13 One detects in “Nudus salta!” a hint of the “breath of a frenzied god.” 
Ivanov’s mysterious underground “zapovednyi tainik” (translated here as 
“hidden sanctuary”) seems to allude to Dionysiac “rapture at the edge of the 
abyss.” “Zapovednyi tainik” does not lend itself to easy translation. “Tainik” 
has the meaning of “hiding place,” “cache,” of “recess.” The adjective 
“Zapovednyi” is often used in the sense of reserve, e.g. “zapovednyi 
les”—“forest reserve,” “preserve” or “sanctuary”—a place where one 
may be forbidden to go, or one that is reserved or preserved for other than 
everyday use. “Zapovednyi” carries with it the idea of prohibition, but also 
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poet-persona of “Nudus salta!” leaves no room for creative interaction 
between “day” and “night” in the esthetic process of the contemporary 
writer or artist. 
In an early essay, “Testaments of Symbolism” (“Zavety 
simvolizma,” 1910), however, Ivanov posits a certain “dualism” in the 
artist’s consciousness and creative work, in his spiritual self, precisely 
a kind of “symbolic dualism of day and night.” “Do these worlds exist 
in a state of enmity?” he asks. “In poetry,” he answers, “they are both 
together. We now call them Apollon and Dionysus, we know their 
inseparable and undivided nature.” 
In that same essay, Ivanov writes that the artist “limits his thirst 
to merge with the ‘limitless,’ his striving for ‘oblivion,’ ‘annihilation.’” 
He turns rather to the “clear forms of daytime existence, to the patterns 
of the ‘gold-cloth veil’ (zlatotkannogo pokrova) thrown by the gods onto 
the mysterious world of the spirit, onto the ‘nameless abyss,’ that 
is, the abyss that does not find its name in the language of daytime 
consciousness and eternal experience.” “All the same,” he writes, 
“the most valuable moment in experience and the most prophetic in 
creation is submergence in that contemplative ecstasy where there are 
‘no barriers’ (net pregrady) between us and the ‘naked abyss’ opening 
up—in Silence.”14
It is a sober and somber Ivanov that composes in 1944 the 
very cautionary “Nudus salta!” In his poem, as we have seen, there 
are strong barriers between the poet and this naked abyss; above all, 
there is no “submergence” in contemplative ecstasy: the Apollonian 
and Dionysian form stark antitheses. The silent abyss is manifestly 
a “dead house.” The “dead house” and the “enclosure of the Muses” 
the notion of the “sacral” or the “holy” (see, for example, “zapoved’”—
precept, commandment, as in the Ten Commandments). The notion of 
a “zapovednyi tainik,” then, presents a disturbing ambiguity of meaning. 
In the context of the stanza, the phrase suggests something sinister: a secret 
hiding place or dwelling where reprehensible things take place. In the 
Dionysiac context, however, this same hiding place may be a holy place, 
recess or grounds where primitive rites, rituals or sacrifices, may take 
place. “Zapovednyi tainik,” in this interpretation, takes on the character of 
a secret, yet sacred place of corruption, where the borders between holiness 
and pollution are still undefined. 
14 See “Zavety simvolizma” in Vyacheslav Ivanov, Sobranie sochinenii,  4 vols. 
(Bruxelles: Foyer Oriental Chrétien, 1979), 2:590–591.
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(ograda) stand in stark contrast each another, despite the identification 
of the “ograda” with Ivanov’s beloved sacred grounds of Dionysus. 
“Dionysus is more mighty in the soul of Tyutchev than Apollo,” 
Ivanov had written in “Testaments of Symbolism,”15 In “Nudus salta!” 
one may say that Apollo is more mighty in the soul of Ivanov than 
Dionysus, although the poetic power of “Nudus salta!” nonetheless 
rests on what Ivanov had called the “symbolic dualism of day and 
night” in the artist's creative consciousness. Here poetry, as Ivanov had 
anticipated in “Testaments of Symbolism,” remains at variance with 
ideology in the broad sense of the term.
The magic of the ancient classical world, its language and 
imagery, however, continues to exert its power over the Ivanov. Pushkin 
in his poem “Poet” (1827) speaks of Apollo as one who calls upon the 
poet to participate in “sacred sacrifice” (sviashchennaia zhertva). In “The 
Poet and the Crowd” (Poet i tolpa, 1828), he refers to the poet’s art as 
“service, altar, sacrifice” (sluzhen’e, altar’, zhertvoprinoshenie). The fires 
of Ivanov’s “pure altars” (chistykh altarei) in “Nudus salta!” appear 
ready for ritual cleansing and purification. Yet these sacred fires stand 
ready for another affirmative symbolic offering:
Zharu chistykh altarei
Dar moi—agnets luchshii stada
I plody, perviny sada,
Ne gnezdo netopyrei.
[To the fires of purifying altars
(Go) my gift—the best lamb of the herd,
And the first fruits of the garden,
Not a nest of bats.]
The poet’s “dar,” his “gift,” the lamb, and the fruits of the garden, 
contrast strikingly with the “nest of bats,” creatures of the night who 
dwell beneath the sacred grounds of the Muses.16 The poet’s “gift” 
(dar), of course, is also his talent (dar), the art he dedicates to the Muses.
15 Ibid., 591.
16 The negative connotations of this image are manifested in the thrice-
repeated syllable “ne, ne, ne” (in Russian “not” or “no”) in the phrase: “Ne, 
gnezdo netopyrei.” In literature, myth and folk saying, bats are typically 
associated with darkness and the damned. Dante’s Lucifer is buried in 
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The transcendental habitation of the Muses is symbolized not 
by the roiling waters of the potholes under the ice, but by a spring 
that comes out of the bedrock of a mountain. The mountain spring 
alludes to the Castalian Spring, sacred to the Muses and Apollo, on 
the slopes of Parnassus in Greece. The mountain there has two peaks, 
both frequented by the Muses: one sacred to Dionysus, and the other 
to Apollo, the god of Greek prophecy and healing. 
The final stanza of Ivanov’s poem opens in the mountains of the 
muses. The poem then descends to the “deserts of nature” with their 
spices and wild grass, a point midway between the depths of Sodom 
and the heights of the Muses. The images of garden, fruits, waters, 
spices, and wild grass seem to carry intimations of the Biblical Song 
of Solomon or Song of Songs (Song of Songs 4:14–16) where pastoral 
paradise cradle a lyric eroticism—one far removed from the frenzied 
Dionysian eroticism of part one of “Nudus salta!”
The poem that begins with the abrupt command, “Nudus salta!” 
ends with a gentle imperative: 
Pour purifying waters, 
After turning away, into the underground darkness. 
[Lei chistitel’nye vody,
Otvratias’, v podzemnyi mrak]
Here is the poet’s most direct response to the unknown narrator’s 
esthetic manifesto in part one. It sums up his view of art, an old one, 
as one involving ritual cleansing and purification. The emphasis on 
“turning away” suggests not only moral revulsion and perhaps 
a turning away from temptation, but the poet’s own need for spiritual 
purification. 
In this sense, Ivanov’s miniscule poem presents itself as a testi-
monial, an initiation, and an act of redemption. The poem, a didactic 
one, projects itself—to borrow words from Ivanov’s Hellenic Religion 
ice. His wings, in Dante’s description, were “mighty ones.” “They had no 
feathers, but were like a bat’s” (Non avean penne, ma di vispisrello era lor modo). 
See Charles S. Singleton, Dante, Inferno. Bollngen Series 80 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1970) Canto 35: 49–50. 
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forty years earlier—as a kind of “spiritual re-education which the con-
temporary psyche undoubtedly needs.”17 
In Ivanov’s poem, “Palinodiia” (1927), the poet envisages 
himself as one who had served as an acolyte or assistant (sluzhitel’) 
in the temple of Dionysus. In the final lines of poem he describes 
a moment of temptation when, drawn to the old “rebellious longing/ 
Of indomitable night,” he heard a “call from heaven: ‘Abandon, priest, 
the temple decorated by demons.’ And I fled,”/ the poet recalls, “and 
I eat [now] in the foothills of Thebaid/ the wild honey and coarse 
locusts of silence.” 
In “Nudus salta!” Ivanov completes a movement from Hellenic 
Religion through “The Testaments of Symbolism” and “Palinodia.” Old 
passions, old idols, have been cast out, old syntheses outgrown. Not 
the tormented, divided, Dionysian, Bacchic underworld, but a softened 
Dionysian and Apollonian realm of “service, altar, and sacrifice” is 
celebrated. What emerges in the poem, too, are gestures of solidarity 
with Dostoevsky’s morally and spiritually-infused realism and 
Pushkin’s abandonment of classical idols for “stern,” but transcendent 
“beauty” (“At the Beginning of Life I remember School” [“V nachale 
zhizni shkolu pomniu ia”, 1830]). Finally, there are hints in “Nudus 
saltas!” of a new synthesis of a purified classicism and Christianity. Of 
Christianity, nothing is directly said in the poem, but what is indicated 
is unmistakeable: “My gift is the best lamb of the herd.”
17 “Hellenic Religion,” 224–225.
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Intimations of Mortality: 
Fyodor I. Tyutchev’s  
“In Parting there is a Lofty Meaning”1 
We are such stuff as dreams are made on, and our little life is 
rounded with a sleep.
—Shakespeare, The Tempest, IV. I
V razluke est’ vysokoe znachen’e—
Kak ni liubi, khot’ den’, khot’ vek,
Liubov’ est’ son, a son—odno mgnoven’e,
I rano l’, pozdno l’ budet probuzden’e,
A dolzhen nakonets prosnut’sia chelovek.
[In parting there is a lofty meaning—
However much you love be it one day, be it a century,
Love is a dream, and a dream is one moment,
And sooner or later there will be an awakening,
And man must finally wake up.]
“Here are some bad verses expressing something even worse,” Fyodor 
I. Tyutchev (1803–1873) wrote to his wife with reference to his poem 
of August 6, 1851.2 The poem is in no sense a bad one; on the contrary, 
it is a masterpiece in miniature. Whether it expresses something on 
the somber or pessimistic side is a question. In any case, Tyutchev’s 
subjective reaction to his poem does not alter the poem’s independence 
or its rich poetic and philosophical texture.
“In Parting there is a Lofty Meaning” (“V razluke est’ vysokoe 
znachen’e,” 1851) is a philosophical poem about the pathos of parting 
1 From Text and Context: Essays to Honor Nils Ake Nilsson, ed. Peter Alberg 
Jensen, et al. Stockholm Studies in Russian Literature 23 (Stockholm, 1987): 
38-41.
2 F. I. Tiutchev, Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh, 2 vols. (Moscow: Khudozhestven-
naia literatura, 1984), Pis’ma, 2:169.
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and time. The poet perceives the parting of lovers as a prefiguration 
of man’s ultimate parting from life. The dream of love stands for 
the dream of life. Life, like love, is a dream from which there is an 
inevitable awakening. The awakening is to time and mortality. Yet the 
awakening also carries intimations of immortality. The poem, however, 
seems finally to suggest that immortality lies in the dream of love and 
life, that is, in the timeless realm of poetry, all that man must return to 
eternity. What is certain is that the act of parting is laden with “lofty 
meaning” (vysokoe znachen’e).
The poem consists of five lines and thirty-two words. Six words 
are used twice, thus reducing the poem’s working vocabulary to twenty-
six words. The poem is marked by an extraordinary compression and 
interaction of parts. It is a microuniverse, and as a poem, as a marvel of 
compression, illustrates the paradox of the timeless dream embedded 
in the timebound “moment.”
The core of the poem—lines 2, 3, and 4—asserts that love is 
a dream from which there is an inevitable awakening. The two framing 
lines of the poem—lines 1 and 5—stand in direct relationship to one 
another. The opening line speaks of the “lofty meaning” (vysokoe 
znachen’e) of parting—an allusion to death and resurrection—while the 
final line discloses that meaning in the veiled metaphor of “waking 
up” (prosnut’sia). The dash (-) at the end of the opening line establishes 
the line’s privileged status as signaler of the poem’s, and man’s, solemn 
concern.
Lines 2 and 4 use groups of words that stand in direct relation 
to one another and give expression to the notion of noumenal time: 
“khot’ den’ odin, khot vek / I rano l’, pozdno l’.” Line 3, the middle of 
the poem, speaks of the paradox of the timeless dream (son), that is, of 
phenomenal time, and has as its center of gravity the dream or sleep 
(son / a son).
Lines 2, 3, and 4 break down into two syntactical-semantic units 
separated by a caesura in the third line of the poem: Kak ni liubi, khot’ 
den’ odin, khot’ vek, / Liubov’ est’ son /caesura/, a son—odno mgnoven’e. / 
I rano l’, pozdno l’ budet probuzhden’e. “However / long / one loves, be it 
for a single day or for a lifetime, / Love is a dream”; that is, in loving, 
or in love, one is plunged into a dream world that is timeless. “But the 
dream is a moment. / And sooner or later there will be an awakening”; 
that is, the dream of love is actually but an instant, a single moment in 
man’s temporal existence: on awakening one is returned to noumenal 
time. The abstract noun, “probuzhden’e,” means “awakening” in the 
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literal sense, but it carries the figurative meaning of “coming to one’s 
senses,” waking up to the reality or hard truth.
A dolzhen nakonets prosnut’sia chelovek. In the final line of the 
poem, the poet speaks unambiguously of man’s “waking up”: the 
verb “prosnut’sia,” with its root “son,” means exactly to wake up from 
a dream or sleep. Though seemingly a mere reiteration of the thought 
contained in line 4, the closing line establishes its own independent 
semantic field. The poet’s thought on the dreamlike character of love 
has led him into an even more profound meditation on the inevitable 
ending of the dream of life. Thus, the poem comes full circle back to the 
first line that alludes to the “lofty meaning” of parting.
The notion of “parting” (razluka—with its root in “luchit’”—to 
splinter) in the poem is both structural and thematic. The caesura in 
line 3, falling between “son” and “a son,” evenly divides the poem 
into two groups of sixteen words each. But the matter goes beyond the 
poet’s obvious delight in formal symmetries; the poet has invested this 
pivotal caesura, this nonverbal “space,” with metaphysical meaning, 
indeed, with the poem’s most significant statement: falling between 
two “sleeps” (son / a son) this caesura constitutes a ghostly Pascalian 
embodiment of the transience of human life. Man’s existence is but 
a “moment” between two sleeps of eternity. Thus, the poet has 
converted poetic “space” into time.
One of the most brilliant accomplishments of the poet is the 
manner in which he puts to use the word “son” with its alternate though 
closely related meanings of “sleep” and “dream.” “Son” is certainly 
intended to be understood as “dream” in the syntactic-semantic 
context of line 3. But “son” as “sleep,” as a metaphor for death, is very 
active in the poem’s subtext. The use of the words “probuzhden’e,” and 
in particular, “prosnut’sia,” serve to bring out the meaning of “sleep” 
in “son.” But the poet has laid the groundwork for this association in 
the opening line of his poem where he poses in the reader’s mind the 
question of the “vysokoe znachen’e” of parting. By line 3, the answer—
“son”—is advanced phonologically: the stressed vowel “o” and the 
syllable “so” in “vysokoe” (certainly the most portentous word in 
the line) recurs significantly in “son / a son”—the two sleeps between 
which man lives out his lifetime. The “vysokoe znachen’e” of parting 
is solemn and sonorous “son” (sleep), a fact made explicit only in the 
poem’s final line. The dominant sense of “son” in line 3, however, is 
that of “dream.” Man’s awakening from his dream of love (liubov’ 
est’ son), that is, his consciousness of his dream as “one moment,” is 
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signalled phonologically by the unpleasant cluster of consonants 
“mgn” in the word “mgnoven’e”; after the sonorous “son / a son” this 
is indeed an unpleasant “awakening” (probuzhden’e). Thus, by line 3, 
the poet has prepared the way phonologically for the harsh message of 
lines 4 and 5.
The ultimate fact in man’s existence is his mortality. Does the poet 
view man’s parting from earth, that is, death, in a completely gloomy 
spirit? His conception of death as a “waking up” (prosnut’sia) argues 
against all notions of final closure in human destiny. Too, it is only in 
a religious sense that one can speak of death, mortality or parting from 
earth as a “waking up.” The opening line of the poem would seem to 
contain an allusion to resurrection. The “lofty” and “high” (vysokoe) 
meaning that the poet attaches to parting may not only refer to man’s 
final sleep (son) but also to his highest dream (son): the paradise of love, 
the paradise where the dream of love achieves its highest and eternal 
embodiment. In this interpretation the pathos of parting anticipates the 
pathos of the heavenly reunion.
In this connection, the final rhyming words of lines 1, 3, 
and 4—“znachen’e,” “mgnoven’e,” and “probuzhden’e”—deserve 
consideration. On the surface, these words seem to sum up concisely 
a view of the poem’s content as tragic. Yet the same sequence of words 
seems to reveal a subtext that argues against a tragic interpretation. In 
our sequence seen as subtext, the word “mgnoven’e” (rooted in the verb 
“migat’,” “mignut’”—to wink, to blink) is pivotal in place and meaning 
(as it is in the tragic interpretation of this same sequence). The awareness 
of the dream as a moment (a son—odno mgnoven’e) here points not to 
the unhappy “awakening” in consciousness, but to awakening in the 
highest religious sense. “Mgnoven’e” in this interpretation is not only 
“moment,” but movement, transition, as in the revelation of the loftiest 
religious dream. Thus, we read in 1 Corinthians 15:51–52 in the Russian 
version: “Govoriu vam tainu: ne vse my umrem, no vse izmenimsia / 
Vdrug, vo mgnoven’e oka, pri poslednei trube; ibo vostrubit, i mertvye 
voskresnut netlennymi, a my izmenimsia.”3 (my italics—RLJ). The 
poem’s “lofty” Christian-religious subtext is unmistakable. But in the 
3 “Behold, I shew you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be 
changed./ In a moment, in a twinkling of the eye, at the last trump: for the 
trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we 
shall be changed.” (King James Version).
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poem, as a whole, is the poet really consoling himself with allusions to 
an afterlife, or is he speaking of the illusion not only of the dream of 
love and life, but also of the dream of immortality?
A dolzhen nakonets prosnut’sia chelovek. However, one interprets 
the sequence “znachen’e,” “mgnoven’e,” “probuzhden’e,” this final 
line strikes the reader with jarring force; it is terminal in position and 
in meaning. An unpleasant sense of the inexorable, of compulsion, of 
the idea of paying back a debt is carried by the word “dolzhen.” The 
moment of parting no longer lies in some unspecified time in the future 
(rano l’, pozdno l’): the poet speaks of man waking up “at last” (nakonets). 
The end (konets) is at hand. In line 2, the poet alludes indirectly to man’s 
lifespan: the maximum time one might love is for a lifetime, that is, 
a century (vek). Line 5 makes it clear that the worm of time is at work in 
man (chelovek), that is, mortality is the very definition of man.
Thus, to the ambiguous sequence “znachen’e,” “mgnoven’e.” 
“probuzhden’e,” with its hints at the overcoming of time and space, the 
poet opposes the unambiguous sequence “vek”—“chelovek,” with its 
view of timebound man living out his earthly “moment” between two 
sleeps. In this perspective, man’s inevitable awakening from the dream 
of love and life preludes not resurrection and the kingdom of love, but 
a reentrance into the dreamless world of eternity: “son” without “son.” 
Here, it would seem, is Tyutchev’s eshche khudshee.
The poem’s allusions to two kinds of revelation, the one religious 
and optimistic in character, the other agnostic and pessimistic, coexist 
in the poem in a kind of creative tension. Yet the Christian “presence,” 
though haunting, is passive; it does not fill the poem with a sense of 
promise; the unmistakable and strange glow it gives to the poem seems 
only to illuminate the darker, more somber colors.
Yet Tyutchev’s “even worse” is nonetheless a one-sided and 
narrow appreciation of the poem. In the deepest sense “V razluke 
est’ vysokoe znachen’e” is not a pessimistic poem. Man’s “moment” 
in the universe is seen as infinitesimal, transient, even tragic. Yet this 
moment as dream, illusion, poetry fills the universe. This paradox of 
man’s presence is exemplified by the poet’s extraordinary achievement 
in his microscopic poem: in a single “moment,” in a flash of poetry, 
the poet reveals the landscape of the macrocosm—the infinity of man’s 
universe and its endless dialectic of dream and reality, illusion and 
disillusionment, of contraction and expansion into and out of time. 
In this act of language and in the vision it contains, man is neither 
earthbound nor timebound: he is the measure of his universe.
The Poetry of Memory and the Memory of Poetry:  
Igor severyanin’s “no More Than a Dream”1
Yesterday I dreamed a remarkable dream:
I was riding with a girl who was reading Blok.
The little horse moved quietly. The wheels rustled.
And tears fell. And a russet curl fluttered . . .
And that was all my dream contained . . .
But shaken by it, moved profoundly,
All day, trembling with agitation, I kept thinking
Of the strange girl who had not forgotten Blok . . .
[Ne bolee chem son
Mne udivitel’nyi vchera prisnilsia son:
Ia ekhal s devushkoi, stikhi chitavshei Bloka.
Loshadka tikho shla. Shurshalo koleso.
I slezy kapali. I vilsia rusyi lokon . . .
I bol’she nichego moi son ne soderzhal . . .
No potriasennyi im, vzvolnovannyi gluboko,
Ves’ den’ ia dumaiu, vstrevozhenno drozha,
O strannoi devushke, ne pozabyvshei Bloka . . .] 
—Igor Severyanin, 1927 2
1 An earlier version of this essay was published in Russian under the title 
“Poeziia pamiati i pamiat’ poezii: Stikhotvorenie Igoria Severianina. ‘Ne 
bolee chem son’” in Sub Specie Tolerantiae. Pamiati V. A. Tunimanova (St. Pe-
tersburg: Nauka, 2008), 466-470. 
2 Igor Severyanin (pseudonym of Igor V. Lotaryov, 1887–1941), an innovative 
poet in the use of language, was one of the important representatives of 
Cubo-Futurism, along with Mayakovsky, in pre-revolutionary Russia. 
He emigrated in 1918 to Estonia where his poetry, though reverting to 
a more traditional forms, resulted in a body of deeply felt verse that often 
centered on the drama of the poet’s loss of his homeland. “No More Than 
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The Poem
Igor Severyanin’s poem consists of a title, “Ne Bolee Chem Son” (“No 
More Than a Dream”), and two quatrains, each one numbering twenty-
four words. In the first quatrain, the narrator-dreamer relates that 
he has dreamed a “remarkable” dream. He lists five discrete dream 
sequences beginning with the scene of his riding in a carriage with 
a girl who is reading Blok.3 In the second quatrain, the narrator dwells 
on the profound impact the dream has had on him and how increasingly 
moved he was by the thought that the “the strange girl had not 
forgotten Blok.” “No More Than a Dream” is a simple poem. Yet as the 
American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) once noted, 
“The highest simplicity of structure is produced, not by few elements, 
but by the highest complexity.”4 The poem’s effect, indeed, rests not 
only on the harmonious and euphonious sound patterns of the verse, 
but on the complex semantic play of its language and images, and 
a rich interaction of text and subtext. 
a Dream” (1927) is one of the best in this category, transcending in depth 
and complexity and quiet beauty Severyanin’s beautiful though strikingly 
self-pitying “Classical Roses” (“Klassicheskie rozy,” 1925). 
3 Alexander A. Blok (1880–1921), described as “a monument to the beginning 
of the century” (Anna Akhmatova), has often been compared, as a poet, 
to Alexander S. Pushkin (1799–1837). In some of his poetry and writing in 
the years before the Russian Revolution, he heralded apocalyptic changes 
in Russia. His poetically remarkable but ideologically controversial poem, 
The Twelve (Dvenadtsat’, 1919) was hailed, criticized, and reviled for its 
attempt to hear the “music of the revolution.” Though at first Blok welcomed 
the Russian Revolution, he soon became disillusioned with it, remarking 
that he no longer heard the music of the world about him. 
Revered as a poet in the literary and cultural community in the first years 
of the revolution, he received dubious praise from the ruling Bolsheviks: 
the cultural minister, Anatole Lunacharsky, dubbed Blok “the last poet 
of the nobility,” while Leon Trotsky saw in the author of “The Twelve” 
a remnant of the old world who had “seized the wheel of the Revolution.” 
Increasingly alienated from the world around him, denied a passport to 
leave Russia until the very end, Blok died in destitution, sick, hungry, and 
spiritually broken. “Vile, rotten Mother Russia has devoured me,” he wrote 
in one of the last notebook entries. 
4 “It is the last lesson of modern science that the highest simplicity is 
produced, not by few elements, but by the highest complexity.” See Ralph 
Waldo Emerson’s “Goethe; or the Writer,” in Representative Men, ed. Pamela 
Schirmeister (New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1995), 195.
325The Poetry of Memory and the Memory of Poetry
The poem’s title, “No More Than a Dream,” appears to 
downplay the significance of the dream. Rather than deflating the 
reader’s interest, however, the title intensifies it. Dreams typically 
come across as impressionistic and fleeting; they seem disengaged 
from everyday reality; yet they are notoriously rich in meaning. The 
word “udivitel’nyi” (remarkable, astonishing, amazing) in the opening 
line of the poem immediately signals that the narrator-dreamer has in 
fact, experienced something more than just a dream. 
The first quatrain consists of five seemingly disconnected dream 
frames or sequences. The image of a girl reading Blok, in the first 
frame, is a cryptic one. Who is the girl? And what is the underlying 
significance of her reading Blok? The second, third, and fourth dream-
images suggest that the dreamer’s dream-memory of Blok is laden 
with nostalgic, indeed, sad and painful feelings. Loshadka tikho shla (The 
little horse moved along quietly)—the word “tikho” (quietly) echoes 
Blok’s stikhi (verse); shurshalo koleso (the wheels rustled)—the “sh” or 
“shushing” sound of the verb “shurshat’” sustains the sense of quiet 
meditation in the first part of the dream; it carries the reader back along 
the sound track to the “shushing” sound in “devushka”—the girl who 
is reading Blok. The positioning of I slezy kapali (And tears were falling) 
as an autonomous image has the effect of drawing everything, animate 
and inanimate—the narrator, the girl, the horse, and the wheel into 
the vortex of an almost elegiac sadness and pain. Yet as we shall note 
again, this mood of elegiac sadness is abruptly contradicted by the final 
image of the first quatrain, “and a russet curl fluttered,” an animated 
and cheerful one that not only links the girl reading Blok with Eros, 
but introduces a literary allusion of striking importance to the poem’s 
interpretation. 
“I bol’she nichego moi son ne soderzhal,” the narrator-dreamer 
says in the first line of the second quatrain as though to emphasize the 
sad content of his dream. The first line, however, does contain a hint of 
something new to come. The word “soderzhal” (contained) bears within 
it in scrambled letters the word “drozha” (trembling). The narrator goes 
on to describe his agitation when the real import of the strange girl’s 
reading of Blok dawned upon him: “shaken,” “moved profoundly,” he 
was “trembling with excitement” (vstrevozhenno drozha) all day as he 
kept thinking “of the strange girl who had not forgotten Blok . . .” The 
momentous fact implicit in the dream, the message of the “strange girl” 
that marks the excitement of the dreamer and counteracts his gloom, is 
that Blok had not been forgotten, Blok, in short, is still with us. 
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The dream has turned out to be more than just a dream: it is 
a revelation of the power of poetry, the power of the word, the power 
of memory in life and culture, the power of Blok. 
Blok, his poetry and its myths permeate the narrator-dreamer’s 
language and imagery. The sounds and letters of Blok’s name insinuate 
themselves into the sound patterns of Severyanin’s poem. Thus, the 
sound and letters “b” “l” “o” “k” can be seen and heard in scrambled 
forms: “loshadka,” “shurshalo koleso,” “I slёzy kapali,” “I bol’she.” The 
phonetic affinity of “lokon” (curl) in the phrase “I vilsia rusyi lokon” 
with “Bloka” at the end of the second line of the poem establishes 
a special affinity between Blok and the “strange girl.” 
The rhyming of “Bloka” and “gluboko” (profoundly) at the end 
of the second and fourth lines of the second quatrain is of particular 
interest. In this equation, “Blok” the poet is not only “glubok” 
(profound; “Blok”—“glubok”), but “profundity” (g L u BOK) itself 
is pregnant with “BLOK,” a Blok who appropriately is seen in 
a recognizable, though not finally shaped form—“L BOK.” Blok 
emerges in the narrator-dreamer’s imagery, then as the child of profundity, 
or wisdom. In turn, the “strange girl” herself emerges in the poem as 
a familiar, though “strange” Blok-like figure: an “Incognita,” that is, 
in Russian, a “Neznakomka” (unknown woman, stranger), as one of 
Blok’s many literary incarnations of his muse, mythopoetic or real. 
Severyanin has carried over into his own poem Blok’s “Sophia” motif, 
one linked in turn with the Russian philosopher and poet Vladimir 
Solovyov’s conception of “Sophia” as the “Wisdom of God,” a concept 
that infuses much of Blok’s early poetry.
It is not Blok, however, who invokes his muse, but the 
“strange girl” who surfaces in the narrator-dreamer’s dream to read 
and remember him, thus poetically engendering him, much as the 
goddess Mnemosyne engenders the muses. It is this strange girl, this 
dream-companion of the narrator-dreamer, who leads him out of his 
melancholia and breaks the spell of mourning. Blok and the “strange 
girl,” however, are not the only literary and philosophical presences in 
“No More Than a Dream.”
The Poem within the Poem
A pivotal role in the poem’s movement from a somber to an 
affirmative outlook is played by the final dream-image at the end 
of the first quatrain: “I vilsia rusyi lokon” (And a russet curl flutte- 
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red).5 Its animated spirit of Eros not only contradicts the self-pitying, 
almost depressed mood of the preceding dream-images, but alludes 
to the presence in the semantic design of “No More Than a Dream” 
of Alexander Pushkin’s poem “City of Magnificence, City of Want” 
(“Gorod pyshnyi, gorod bednyi”, 1827), a work that concludes with 
the line “A golden curl fluttered” (V’etsia lokon zolotoi). 
Gorod pyshnyi, gorod bednyi,
Dukh nevoli, stroinyi vid,
Svod nebes zeleno-blednyi, 
Skuka, kholod i granit—
Vse zhe mne vas zhal’ nemnozhko,
Potomu chto zdes’ poroi
Khodit malen’kaia nozhka,
V’etsia lokon zolotoi.
[City of magnificence6, city of want,
Spirit of unfreedom, harmonious forms,
Green pale vault of the heavens,
Boredom, cold and granite—
All the same I’m a little sorry for you,
Because here at times 
Walks a small foot,
A golden curl flutters.]
The importance of Pushkin’s poem in Severyanin’s design of 
“No More Than a Dream” cannot be overstated. He establishes formal 
parallels, symmetries, or correspondences between his own poem 
and Pushkin’s. Both poems consist of eight lines divided into two 
quatrains.7 Each quatrain in Pushkin’s poem consists of sixteen words; 
5 Severyanin’s formulation of words, “I vilsia rusyi lokon” (And a russet curl 
fluttered) is significant. The words “I vilsia” (And fluttered), if heard, as 
opposed to being read, could also be taken for “iavilsia” (appeared), that 
is, the past tense of the Russian verb “iavit’sia” (to appear). Thus the phrase 
“I vilsia rusyi lokon” could be understood as “There appeared a russet 
curl” (Iavilsia rusyi lokon).” Such an understanding of the line reinforces the 
reader’s sense of the pivotal role in the poem of the image of the fluttering 
russet in the poem.
6 The word “pyshnyi” can be variously translated as “magnificent,” 
“splendid,” “opulent,” but also as “arrogant,” “proud,” “haughty.” 
7 Unlike Severyanin’s poem, Pushkin’s is not formally divided into two 
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each of Severyanin’s quatrains consists of twenty-four words. The first 
quatrain in Severyanin’s poem, as in Pushkin’s, consists of syntactically 
discrete images or frames. Pushkin uses only nouns and adjectives in 
his first four lines of his poem; with the exception of the final image, 
Severyanin focuses on verbs and nouns. Pushkin employs a verb of 
motion (used for walking) in the phrase “zdes’ poroi khodit malen’kaia 
nozhka” (here at times walks a small foot); Severyanin echoes Pushkin 
by employing a verb of motion (used for vehicles) in his first quatrain: 
“Ia ekhal s devushkoi, stikhi chitavshei Bloka” (I was riding with a girl 
who was reading Blok). The final image of Severyanin’s first quatrain 
“I vilsia rusyi lokon” (And a russet curl fluttered) closely resembles 
Pushkin’s “V’etsia lokon zolotoi” (A golden curl flutters).
These formal resemblances between the poems support 
Severyanin’s interest in and employment of the semantic motifs of 
Pushkin’s poem. Severyanin is not centrally involved with the subject 
matter of Pushkin’s poem: the city of St. Petersburg as a cultural, 
historical, and mythopoetic presence. He is very much interested in 
Pushkin’s response to the feelings of moral and historical pessimism 
that the colossus Petersburg evokes in the reader. 
St. Petersburg emerges in Pushkin’s mosaic of syntactically 
free-floating images, not so much as a social phenomenon, but as 
a monumental and seemingly immutable historical and mythopoetic 
fact. If there be inhumanity in his Petersburg, Pushkin finds it in 
the city’s epic-indifferent mix of splendor and want, of the spirit of 
unfreedom and classical harmony or regularity, of an overarching and 
overwhelming pale-green firmament faced by a cold and granite earth. 
Pushkin’s reference to “boredom”—that final distillation of unfreedom 
or of unused energies—signals that he is not bullied by St. Petersburg.
In the Petersburg of the first quatrain there would seem to be 
no room for life, for human narrative, for movement (as the absence 
of verbs in the first quatrain suggests). Pushkin, however, is far from 
dismissing St. Petersburg as lifeless. His response in the second 
quatrain to its spirit of unfreedom and seeming immobility, however, is 
revolutionary in a manner that anticipates the capricious and irrational 
ways of the Petersburg dreamers and rebels of Gogol and Dostoevsky. 
“All the same,” the poet observes disarmingly, as though sympathizing 
quatrains, but a clear division between the first four lines and the final four 
lines exists on the semantic plane of the poem.
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with a city stuck with its disagreeable character, “I feel a bit sorry for 
you, because here at times walks a small foot. A golden curl flutters.” 
Pushkin’s critique of Petersburg unfreedom and immobility is 
signalled by his use of the contrary and contrarious “vse zhe” (all the 
same, nevertheless, notwithstanding, in spite of everything). To the 
masculine mandate of history, to Petersburg’s classical and colossal 
indifference, immobility, and unfreedom, Pushkin counterposes the 
romantic, fantastic, and capricious walking little foot and fluttering 
golden curl—symbols and embodiments here of the spirit of freedom, 
images that arouse in the reader’s imagination a feeling for that which 
is alive and sensuous, real and ethereal. To the regulated, regulating, 
and rational and oppressive Petersburg, Pushkin responds with the 
unregulated, irrational, and above all, elusive poetry of life—the 
eternal feminine. 
The fluttering russet curl of Severyanin’s poem, evoking Push-
kin’s “City of Magnificence, City of Want,” links Pushkin’s images 
with the “strange girl,” with Blok and his mythopoetic imagery, with 
Blok’s theme of the eternal feminine, and with his identification of that 
theme with Russia. Above all, Severyanin’s waving curl, echoing the 
golden curl, introduces the irrational affirmation of life, of all the same, 
nonetheless, no matter (vse zhe) into the static and depressed dream 
world of Severyanin’s dreamer. The dreamer’s dream of the girl 
reading Blok and his subconscious recollection of Pushkin and his po-
etry shatters his sense of cultural and historical doom—all that under-
lies his fear that Blok and his poetry, perhaps, had been forgotten. 
Here, the dream is a poetic act of memory, the kind of happening 
that Mircea Eliade called “a true historical anamnesis,” one in which man 
“unconsciously defends himself against the pressure of contemporary 
history” by discovering solidarity with the past, in this way opening 
perspectives to the future.8 This action, of course, is the work of the 
poem of Severyanin—a poet whose work in exile after the Bolshevik 
Revolution in October 1917 focused strongly, and often with bitterness, 
on the drama of the poet’s loss of his homeland.9 His “No More Than 
8 See Mircea Eliade in Myth and Reality, translated from the French by Willard 
R. Trask (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 136–137.
9 See, in particular, Severyanin’s “Classical Roses” (“Klassicheskie rozy,” 1925). 
In “No More Than a Dream,” Severyanin carries over from “Classical 
Roses” the device of literary reminiscence, but puts it to more complex use 
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a Dream” is a powerful, Pushkin-inspired, response to bitterness and 
the sense of hopelessness. The strange girl’s reading of Blok’s verse, 
rather than being an occasion for tears, mourning, and self-pity, becomes 
a moment for a return to life. 
Finally, Severyanin’s “No More Than a Dream” is a poem about 
the power of poetry as memory and memory as poetry in Russian 
culture and history. It is no accident that his poem was written at 
the same historical moment that Rainer Maria Rilke wrote words of 
encouragement to the Russian painter, Leonid Pasternak, then living 
in exile in Berlin: 
Yet though we shall never live to see it in its resurrection, the 
deep, the real, the everlasting Russia has only fallen back into 
its secret root-bed, as happened long ago under tatarshchina [the 
Tatar yoke]. Who could doubt that it is there, and in its darkness, 
invisible to all its children, unhurried in its sacred unhurriedness, 
is gathering strength for what perhaps still lies in the far-distant 
future?!10 
on both formal and semantic levels of the poem. 
10 “Aber wenn wir es auch nicht mehr in seiner Auferstehung erleben 
werden, das Tiefe, das eigentliche, das immer überlebende Russland ist 
nur in die heimliche Wurzel-Schicht zurückgefallen, wie früher einst 
unter der татарщина [Tatarenjoch]; wer dürfte zweifeln, dass es da ist 
und sich in seinem Dunkel, unsichtbar für seine eigenen Kinder, langsam, 
mit seiner heiligen Langsamkeit, zu einer vielleicht noch fernen Zukunft 
zusammennimmt?!” (Letter of March 14, 1926. See Rilke Briefe 1919 bis 1926, 
2 vols. [Frankfurt am Mein und Leipzig: Insel, 1991], 2: 424.)
supremum Vale: The Last stanzas  
of Pushkin’s euGene oneGin. 
Goethe, Zhukovsky, and the Decembrists1
Faust is the supreme creation of the poetic spirit, a repre-
sentative example of contemporary poetry, in the same way 
that The Iliad is a monument of classical antiquity.2 
Say what you will, Zhukovsky has had a decisive influence 
on the spirit of our literature; besides, his style in translating 
will always remain a model.3
—Alexander S. Pushkin
No te, kotorym v druzhnoi vstreche
Ja strofy pervye chital . . .
“Inykh uzh net, a te daleche”,
Kak Sadi nekogda skazal. 
Bez nikh Onegin dorisovan.
A ta, s kotoroi obrazovan
Tat’iany milyi Ideal . . .
O mnogo, mnogo Rok ot’’ial!
Blazhen, kto prazdnik Zhizni rano
Ostavil, ne dopiv do dna
Bokala polnogo vina,
Kto ne dochel ee romana
I vdrug umel rasstat’sia s nim,
Kak ia s Oneginym moim.
1 From Scando-Slavic Tomus 48 (2002): 5-24.
2 “Faust est’ velichaishee sozdanie poeticheskogo dukha, on sluzhit 
predstavitelem noveishei poezii, tochno kak Iliada sluzhit pamiatnikom 
klassicheskoi drevnosti.” See Pushkin o literature, ed. N. V. Bogoslovskii 
(Leningrad: Academia, 1934), 116. Pushkin’s comment dates to 1827, and is 
one of a number made by Pushkin attesting to his extremely high evaluation 
of Goethe.
3 “Chto ni govori, Zhukovskii imel reshitel’noe vliianie na dukh nashei 
slovesnosti; k tomu zhe perevodnyi slog ego ostanetsia vsegda 
obraztsovym.” Letter to K. F. Ryleev, January 25, 1825, Ibid., 61.
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[But those to whom at friendly meetings
the first strophes I read . . .
“Some are no more, others are distant,”
 as erstwhile Saadi said.
Finished without them is Onegin’s portrait.
And she from whom is fashioned
the dear ideal of “Tatyana” . . .
Ah, Fate has much, much snatched away!
Blest who life’s banquet early
left, having not drained to the bottom
the goblet full of wine;
who did not read life’s novel to the end
and all at once could part with it
as I with my Onegin.]4 
—Eugene Onegin (8:LI)
“The last stanza of Eugene Onegin (Evgenii Onegin, 1833) by 
Alexander S. Pushkin begins with an allusion to the Decembrists,” 
wrote Dmitry Chizhevsky in 1953 in his critical edition of Pushkin’s 
masterpiece, “for they were the only group of Pushkin’s friends of 
whom one could say, ‘inykh uzh net, a te daleche’” (Some are no more, 
others are distant).5 That Pushkin was alluding in the opening four 
lines of the last stanza to the Decembrists has long been affirmed by 
scholars.6 In this connection, his reference to the thirteenth century 
Persian poet Muslih-ud Din Saadi as author of the above-cited line 
4 I use Nabokov’s translation of Eugene Onegin in this discussion. See 
Aleksandr Pushkin, Evgenii Onegin: A Novel in Verse, translated from the 
Russian and with a commentary by Vladimir Nabokov, Revised edition, 
2 vols., Bollingen Series 72 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 
I: 95–319. Volume 2 of this edition, devoted to Nabokov’s commentary on 
Eugene Onegin, is divided into two parts, each part with separate pagination. 
Future references to volume 2 will indicate the volume number, part, and 
page number.
5 Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin, Evgenij Onegin: A Novel in Verse. The Russian 
Text, edited with introduction and commentary by Dmitry Cizevsky 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 295. 
6 See, for example, N. O. Lerner’s discussion of the last chapter of Eugene 
Onegin in “Poslednii privet Pushkina Dekabristam” in Pushkinologicheskie 
etiudy in Zven’ia, 5 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1935), 108–112.
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has evoked lively curiosity. Chizhevsky speaks directly of this “saying 
of the Persian poet Saadi,” but hastens to add that “no one has yet 
found this quotation in the works of Saadi.” “The quotation from Saadi 
(“Bustan”) which K. Chaikin cites,”7 Chizhevsky continues, “does not 
correspond with anything in Pushkin’s text.”8 
In his commentary to the last stanza of Eugene Onegin, Vladimir 
Nabokov acknowledges that he has “not been able to discover the exact 
source of Pushkin’s motto, which is at the back of LI:3-4.” He does, 
however, find an echo of the line “in a long poem in ten ‘portals,’ the 
Bustan, or Bostan, or Bashtan . . . by Saadi.” He cites a French version 
that Pushkin might have seen.9
Nabokov devotes roughly five pages to assorted questions: 
the whereabouts in Saadi’s writings of the line “inykh uzh net, a te 
daleche” (some are no more, others are distant); the notion that Pushkin 
read the first chapters of Eugene Onegin “at friendly meetings”;10 and 
a consideration of other possible sources for Pushkin, apart from Saadi, 
of the above-cited line.
Summing up his own research and the work of other Russian 
scholars on the question of the origins of “inykh uzh net, a te daleche,” 
Nabokov cites a number of formulations or wordings in Russian 
literature prior to 1830 of the line in question: 1) A line in a poem of 
1814 by the minor poet Vladimir Filimonov: “Druzei inykh uzh net; 
drugie v otdalen’e” (Some friends are no more, others are far off); 
2) Pushkin’s own prose motto to Bakhchisaraiskii fontan (1824): “Inykh 
uzhe net, drugie stranstvuiut daleche. Sadi” (Some are no more, others 
are wandering far away)—the wording of the sentence, observes 
Nabokov again, seems to have been suggested by Filimonov’s line; 
3) The last two lines of the sixth quatrain of E. A. Baratynsky’s poem, 
“Mara” (Sud’boi nalozhennye tsepi / Upali s ruk moikh [The chains layed on 
by fate / Fell from my hands], 1827, published in full in 1835): “Daleche 
bedstvuiut inye / I v mire net uzhe drugikh” (Some far-off are destitute / 
7 Vremennik Pushkinskoi komissii 2 (Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk, 1936), 468.
8 Op. cit.
9 Nabokov, op. cit. 2:2:249-250.
10 Apart from the Decembrist, Ivan I. Pushchin, to whom Pushkin presumably 
recited three and a half cantos, Nabokov writes, “We must accept as a piece 
of lyrical exaggeration the vision of Pushkin reading Eugene Onegin at 
gatherings of Decembrists.” Ibid., 248.
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And others are no longer in the world)—a line, Nabokov notes, with 
which Pushkin “may or may not have been acquainted in 1830”; 
4) A clear allusion to the Decembrists in an article by the critic N. Pole-
voi in 1826, where P. A. Vyazemsky inserts a reference to the words 
of “Saadi, or of Pushkin, who transmitted to us Saadi’s words: ‘Some 
are no longer, others are wandering distant’” (Saadi ili Pushkina, kotoryi 
nam peredal slova Saadi: ‘Odnikh uzh net, drugie stranstvuiut daleko!’)11; 
5) A stanza (one that Pushkin struck out) containing a similar phrase 
in his own draft of an elegy, “Na kholmakh Gruzii” (“On the Hills of 
Goergia”, 1829): “Inye daleko, inykh uzh v mire net” (Some are distant 
others no longer in the world).12 
Nabokov, citing the Russian critic, Boris V. Tomashevsky, draws 
attention to a line in Thomas Moore’s Lalla Rookh (1816) that Pushkin 
might have read in French translation,13 as well as two lines by Byron 
in “Siege of Corinth” (1816): “But some are dead and some are gone. / 
And some are scatter’d and alone . . . And some are in a far countree” 
(Siege of Corinth, 1816).14 Nabokov does not cite the second line that we 
11 See footnote 24 for a discussion of Vyazemsky’s words.
12 See Nabokov, op. cit. 2:2:245 for his full discussion of these references.
13 “Plusieurs ont vu, comme moi, cette fontaine: mais ils sont loin et leurs 
yeux sont fermé à jamais.” See Tomashevky’s footnote in his study, Pushkin 
(Moscow and Leningrad, 1956), 506n. Moore’s prose passage in the original 
English reads: “It was while they rested during the heat of noon near 
a fountain, on which some hand had rudely traced those well-known words 
from the garden of Saadi—‘Many, like me, have viewed this fountain, but 
they are gone, and their eyes are closed for ever!’—that she took occasion, 
from the melancholy beauty of this passage, to dwell upon the charms 
of beauty in general.” Thomas Moore, Lalla Rookh in The Poetical Works of 
Thomas Moore, ed. A. D. Godley (London: 1929), 393.
14 It should be noted that elements of Byron’s line may be found in the last five 
lines of the English poet and essayist, Charles Lamb’s popular poem, “The 
Old Familiar Faces,” first published in January 1798 and later republished 
in 1817: 
So might we talk of the old familiar faces—
How some they have died, and some they have left me, 
And some are taken from me; all are departed—
All, all are gone, the old familiar faces. 
Nabokov translated Lamb’s poem into Russian under the title of “Znakomye 
litsa” (Familiar Faces) in January 1923. The translation was never published. 
A draft of the translation may be found in the Nabokov archives held in the 
New York Public Library.  
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have inserted in the citation (“And some are scatter’d and alone),” yet 
this line points in the direction of Goethe’s “Zueignung” (Dedication) 
to Faust, 15 an introductory poem written in 1797, but first published 
in 1808 with part I of Faust.16 This poem, predating lines by Filimonov, 
Moore, Byron, Baratynsky, and Pushkin himself, constitutes an 
important subtext to the opening lines of the last stanza of Onegin. 
Sie hören nicht die folgenden Gesänge,
Die Seelen, denen ich die ersten sang;
Zerstoben ist das freundliche Gedränge,
Verklungen ach! der erste Widerklang.
Mein Leid17 ertönt der unbekannten Menge,
15 At the end of his essay on Eugene Onegin and The Little House in Kolomna, 
M. L. Gasparov, discussing Pushkin’s use of the “octava” form, briefly 
calls attention to Pushkin’s response in his last two stanzas of Onegin to 
Goethe’s “Zueignung” and Zhukovsky’s poetic version of that poem (See 
Gasparov, “Evgenii Onegin i Domik v Kolomne. Parodiia i samoparodiia u 
Pushkina” in Izbrannye trudy. 2, O stikhakh (Moscow, 1997), 73–74. In his 
commentary to his German translation of Eugene Onegin, Rolf-Dietrich Keil 
also calls attention to Pushkin’s awareness of Goethe’s “Zueignung” in his 
penultimate stanza: “Man erinnert sich unwillkürlich an die “’Zueignung’ 
zum Faust.,” writes Keil. See Alexander Pushkin. Jewgeni Onegin. Aus dem 
Russichen von Rolf-Dietrich Keil (Frankfurt am Mein and Leipzig, 1999), 
262, Keil first published his translation of Onegin in Giessen in 1980. 
16 According to Goethe’s notebook, his “Zueignung” was composed June 24, 
1797, at the time he had taken up work again on Faust. Faust Part I was first 
published in 1808, along with Goethe’s “Dedication.”
17 The question whether “Leid” or “Lied” should appear in line 21 of 
“Zueignung” has been discussed at length by Goethe scholars. “Leid” 
appears in this line (line 21) of the poem in the first edition of Faust I in 1808. 
This was a misprint. “Leid” was retained, however, throughout Goethe’s 
lifetime in all editions with the exception of a separate printing. Modern 
versions of Goethe’s “Zueignung” generally have retained “Lied” instead 
of “Leid” in this position in the poem. Zhukovsky clearly used an edition 
of Faust in which “Leid” appeared in line 21. In a 1985 Soviet edition of 
Zhukovsky’s translations of foreign poetry, where the editors juxtapose 
Goethe’s “Zueignung” with Zhukovsky’s Russian version of it, “Leid” 
indeed appears in place of “Lied” in line 21. However, in the same Soviet 
reprinting of “Zueignung,” “Leid” is incorrectly substituted for “Lied” in 
line 23 of Goethe’s poem, thus “Und was sich sonst an meinem Leid erfreuet 
. . . The use of “Leid” in line 23 is a distortion of Goethe’s text; we do not find 
that word used in this position in any edition of Faust, old or new. “Leid” in 
line 23 of the Soviet edition is either a typographical misprint or an error on 
the part of the editors. 
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Ihr Beifall selbst macht meinem Herzen bang,
Und was sich sonst an meinem Lied erfreuet,
Wenn es noch lebt, irrt in der Welt zerstreuet.
[Those souls to whom I sang my first 
will not hear the following songs;
that friendly throng is scattered,
the first echo, alas, has died away.
My sorrow sounds for the unknown many
Whose very applause makes my heart afraid,
And all who formerly enjoyed my song,
If living still, are wandering scattered through the world.]18 
Goethe alludes to people to whom he “sang” (sang) his first songs 
who will not hear the “following songs” (die folgenden Gesänge); Pushkin, 
in lines 1–4 of the last stanza of Eugene Onegin, speaks of those to whom 
he had “read” (chital) his “first strophes.” Goethe’s reference to the 
“friendly throng” (das freundliche Gedränge) who first heard his songs 
is echoed in Pushkin’s “friendly meetings” (v druzhnoi vstreche). Where 
Goethe simply observes that that “friendly throng” is “dispersed” 
(zerstoben), or if living still, is “wandering scattered through the world” 
(Wenn es noch lebt, irrt in der Welt zerstreuet), Pushkin, alluding to Saadi, 
observes succinctly, “some are no more while others are distant” (inykh 
uzh net, a te daleche).19 
These lexical parallels, the first of a number, along with a con-
vergence in emotional tonality, suggest that elements from Goethe’s 
“Dedication” had entered Pushkin’s creative imagination. Had 
Pushkin read Goethe’s poem in the original himself? Pushkin, as 
18 See Carlyle F. MacIntyre, translator, Goethe’s Faust, A New American 
Translation with Illustrations by Rockwell Kent together with the German 
text (Norfolk, CT: New Directions, 1941), 398–200. For purposes of close 
analysis, I have amended in places MacIntyre’s prose translation.
19 Goethe himself was familiar with Saadi’s writings through Latin, French and 
German sources. In 1819, for example, he read a work by Adam Olearius 
(1500–1671), entitled Des Welt-berühmten Adami Olearis colligirte und viel 
vermehrte Reise-Beschreibungen (Hamburg: 1696), a work which includes 
Olearius’s translation of PersIanischer Baum-Garten and the PersIanischer 
Rosen-Thal . . . von dem damahls berühmten und tieff-sinnigen Poeten Schich 
Saadi. Goethe’s interest in Saadi and old eastern literature found vivid 
expression in his West-Östlicher Divan (1819; 1827).
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Nabokov noted, had less German than English. Was he not capable, 
however, at least of “listening” to the art of the poem? And did he not 
have sufficient knowledge of German to make out Goethe’s poetic 
text, albeit with a trot in hand or with help of someone who knew 
German intimately? Whatever the answer to these questions, we do 
know that Vasily A. Zhukovsky (1783—1852), the renowned Russian 
poet, translator and interpreter of Goethe, Schiller, and other German 
poets, and a close friend of Pushkin’s, had translated and published in 
1817 his own poetic version of Goethe’s “Zueignung” under the title, 
“Mechta. Podrazhanie Gete” (“A Dream. An Imitation of Goethe”).20 
An examination of Zhukovsky’s so-called “imitation” (a conceit 
on his part calculated to remind his readers that his poem was not 
a slavish imitation) offers additional evidence that elements from 
Goethe’s “Dedication” directly and indirectly found expression in the 
last two stanzas of Eugene Onegin. Zhukovsky renders Goethe’s third 
stanza as follows:
K nim ne doidut poslednei pesni zvuki;
Rasseian krug, gde pervuiu ia pel;
Ne vstretiat ikh prostertye k nim ruki;
Prekrasnyi son ikh zhizni uletel.
Drugikh umchal mogushchii dukh razluki; 
Schastlivyi krai, ikh znavshii, opustel;
Razbrosany po vsem dorogam mira!
Ne im poet zadumchivaia lira.
[The sounds of the final song will not reach them;
The circle where I sang the first [strophe] is dispersed;
No outstretched arms will greet them;
The beautiful dream of their life has taken flight.
The mighty spirit of parting has swept others away;
The happy land that once knew them is deserted;
20 Zhukovsky’s translation first appeared under this title in the journal, Syn 
Otechestva, 39.32 (1817): 226–227. Zhukovsky used this poetic version of 
“Zueignung” as the introductory poem to his own collection, Dvenadtsat’ 
spiashchikh dev. Starinnaia povest’ v dvukh balladakh (1810–1817), a fact that is 
announced in the same issue of Syn Otechestva in which his poem appears. 
In his separate edition of Dvenadtsat’ spiashchikh dev, however, Zhukovsky 
makes no mention of the fact that his poem is a version of Goethe’s poem. He 
viewed his translation as an original creative endeavor. In this connection, 
see his comments on translation in the following footnote.
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Scattered are they on all the world’s roads!
The pensive lyre sings not to them.]
Before discussing the opening lines of the third stanza of 
Zhukovsky’s version of Goethe, we may note that while his poetic 
rendition of “Dedication” is faithful to the form, the ottava rima measure, 
of the German original, he subjects Goethe’s poem to a process of 
Romantic “emotional stylization,” as Viktor Zhirmunsky puts it in his 
discussion of Zhukovsky’s poetics of translation.21 
Further, the subtle changes in words and phrases Zhukovsky 
made in his version of “Dedication” add up to a significant shift from 
the original mood and message of Goethe’s poem; away from its central 
theme of artistic creation—the incantatory power of earlier forms and 
images acting upon Goethe at the moment he returns to work on Faust 
after a break of twenty or more years;22 away from Goethe’s concept of 
21 See Viktor M. Zhirmunskii, Gete v russkoi literature (Leningrad: 1937), 107. 
Zhirmunsky cites Zhukovsky on the latter’s own principles of translation: 
“The translator of prose is a slave, the translator of verse—rival . . . The 
poet-originator is fired by an ideal which he finds in his own imagination; 
the poet-imitator is fired to the same degree by his model, one which then 
becomes a substitute for his ideal: it follows that the translator, while 
yielding the palm of inventiveness to his model, necessarily must have 
almost the same [degree of] imagination as his model, the same literary art, 
the same power of mind and feelings. I will say more: the imitator, while 
not being the inventor in the whole, must without fail be the inventor in the 
parts.” (Perevodchik v proze est’ rab; perevodchik v stikhakh—sopernik . . . Poet 
original’nyi vosplameniaetsia idealom, kotoryi nakhodit u sebia v voobrazhenie; 
poet-podrazhatel’ v takoi zhe stepeni vosplameniaetsia obraztsom svoim, kotoryi 
zastupaet dlia nego togda mesto ideala sobstvennogo: sledstvenno, perevodchik, 
ustupaia obraztsu svoemu pal’mu izobretatel’nosti, dolzhen neobkhodimo imet’ 
pochti odinakoe s nim voobrazhenie, odinakoe iskusstvo sloga, odinakuiu silu 
v ume i chuvstvakh. Skazhu bolee: podrazhatel’, ne buduchi izobretatelem v tselom, 
dolzhen im byt’ nepremenno po chastiam). See V. A. Zhukovskii, “O basne 
i basniakh Krylova,” Sobranie sochinenii v chetyrekh tomakh, 4 vols., ed. E. D. 
Glikman (Moscow and Leningrad: Gosizdatkhudlit, 1959-1960), 4:410. For 
a discussion in English of Zhukovsky’s rendition of Goethe’s “Dedication,” 
see André von Gronicka, The Russian Image of Goethe: Goethe in Russian 
Literature of the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), I: 55–56.
22 Goethe’s “Zueignung” dates back to June 24, 1797, the moment when after 
twenty or so years he took up work again on Faust. As Erich Trunz notes: 
“The poem was placed at the beginning of the entire work, as the first of 
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“dedication” toward that of the more or less melancholy preoccupations 
of the romantic elegy: a dark meditation on, and recollection of, the 
past, a lament for the irretrievable loss of friends, and a desire to return 
to that “mysterious world” (tainstvennyi svet) where “yearning for 
the bliss of former years / warms anew the cold soul” (toska po blagam 
prezhnikh let / dushu khladnuiu razogrevaet).23 
Goethe refers to those who will not hear the “following” songs 
(die folgenden Gesänge). Zhukovsky writes mournfully that those 
who have disappeared will not hear the “sounds of the ‘final song’” 
(poslednei pesni zvuki). Zhukovsky’s poem, in short, with all its romantic 
figures of speech, represented a bold reorientation of Goethe’s poem 
in the direction of the style of the popular elegy. And yet his strongly 
sentimental and elegaic representation of Goethe’s poem, read against 
the background of the later tragedy of the Decembrist revolt of 1825, 
clearly impressed Pushkin by its odd contemporaneity. We shall have 
more to say of the dark mood of Zhukovsky’s version of Goethe’s 
“Dedication” and what it might have contributed conceptually to 
Pushkin’s last two stanzas of Eugene Onegin. 
One may note here, however, some other points of convergence 
between Zhukovsky’s version of Goethe’s lines and Pushkin’s opening 
lines. Pushkin’s phrase “at friendly meetings” (v druzhnoi vstreche) 
recalls Zhukovsky’s “circle” (krug), while his line “the first strophes 
I read” (ia strofy pervye chital) echoes Zhukovsky’s “where I sang the first 
[strophe]” (gde pervuiu ia pel). Pushkin’s “some are no more” (inykh uzh 
net) parallels Zhukovsky’s “swept others away” (drugikh umchal), while 
Pushkin’s “others are distant” (a te daleche) responds to Zhukovsky’s 
three prologues, although it gives expression neither to the context of the 
work’s beginning nor to its end, but rather to the renewal [of work on Faust]; 
precisely this motif expresses the poet’s relation to his work, and explains its 
position here.” Cf. Goethe, Faust. Kommentiert von Erich Trunz (Munich: 
C. H. Beck, 1986), 505.
23 Zhukovsky’s shift from the theme of the rebirth of artistic creation to that 
of a major focus on nostalgia was signalled first of all by his replacement 
of Goethe’s title, “Zueignung” to that of “Mechta (Podrazhanie Gete)”. The 
first part of the title, “Mechta,” emphasizes dream as fantasy, imagination, 
daydreaming, not the “dream” (in Russian, “son”) of sleep, but also the 
idea of something strongly desired, beckoning. The second part of the title, 
“An Imitation of Goethe,” as we have suggested, would appear to have 
been deliberately designed to call attention to the creative character of his 
translation.
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“Scattered are they on all world’s roads!” (Razbrosany po vsem dorogam 
mira!)—itself echoing Goethe’s “wandering scattered through the 
world” (irrt in der Welt zerstreuet). 
Other isolated lexical elements or fragments in Zhukovsky’s 
version of Goethe’s poem seem to have been caught in the web of 
Pushkin’s creative imagination and echoed in the penultimate stanza of 
Eugene Onegin: Pushkin’s “Prosti zh i ty, moj sputnik strannyi” (Farewell 
to you, too, my strange fellow traveler) recalls Zhukovsky’s reference 
to “travelling companions who earlier left the path” (Soputnikov, c puti 
soshedshikh prezhde . . .). Pushkin’s “besed[a] sladkikh druzei” (sweet 
converse of friends) picks up on “Let me taste sweet memories” (Dai 
sladkogo vkusit’ vospominaniia) in Zhukovsky’s last stanza; Pushkin’s 
“promchalos’ mnogo, mnogo dnei” (many, many days have rushed 
by) phonologically recalls the verb in Zhukovsky’s “You summoned 
images of joyful years” (Ty obrazy veselykh let primchala). 
Both Goethe’s “Dedication” in the German original and in 
Zhukovsky’s elegaic version in Russian constitute a lively subtext at 
the end of Eugene Onegin; they broaden and intensify the imaginative 
and emotional content of Pushkin’s allusion to his early Decembrist 
readers and comrades, that is, to the theme of the Decembrist uprising 
and its tragic consequences. 
At first glance, Pushkin’s reference to those who heard the first 
strophes of Eugene Onegin seems merely to overlap with Goethe’s 
benign references to those to whom he “sang” his first songs. Yet if 
we place Goethe’s lines in the context of his, Goethe’s, own poem, and 
then in the more melodramatic context of Zhukovsky’s version of 
“Dedication,” we find that Pushkin’s allusions to Goethe take on an 
even more meaning.
Pushkin’s reference point in Goethe’s “Dedication” is not only 
Goethe’s lines, “Sir hören nicht die folgenden Gesänge, / Die Seelen, 
denen ich die ersten sang,” but the verses that lead up to these lines. 
“Zueignung” opens with a reference to the wavering or hovering shapes 
(schwankende Gestalten) that first appeared before the poet’s gaze. These 
shapes press upon him. His heart, he writes, is stirred: 
Mein Busen fühlt sich jugentlich erschüttert
Vom Zauberhauch, der euren Zug umwittert.
[I am stirred like a boy by the magic breath blowing around your 
procession.] 
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Goethe continues: 
Ihr bringt mit euch die Bilder froher Tage,
Und manche liebe Schatten steigen auf;
Gleich einer alten, halbverklungnen Sage
Kommt erste Lieb’ und Freundschaft mit herauf;
[You bring with you visions of happy days,
and many beloved shadows arise;
like an ancient half-dead legend
comes first love and friendship with it.]
The happy days, first love and friendship, however, are quickly 
replaced with pain. It is these words that deserve our attention:
Der Schmerz wird neu, es wiederholt die Klage
Des Lebens labyrinthisch irren Lauf,
Und nennt die Guten, die, um schöne Stunden
Vom Glück getäuscht, vor mir hinweggeschwunden. 
[The pain is renewed, the lament repeats
the labyrinthine crazy course of life,
and names the dear ones who, cheated of joy
by fortune, have vanished before me.] 
These words, especially, “Die Guten . . . Vom Glück getäuscht”—the 
dear ones cheated or deceived by fortune, chance, or ill-luck—give 
special resonance to the verses that follow:
Sir hören nicht die folgenden Gesänge,
Die Seelen, denen ich die ersten sang;
Zerstoben ist das freundliche Gedränge, 
Verklungen, ach! der erste Widerklang.
[Those souls to whom I sang my first 
will not hear the following songs;
that friendly throng is scattered,
the first echo, alas, has died away.]
Pushkin, as we have noted, echoes these lines in his allusion to 
the Decembrists:
No te, kotorym v druzhnoi vstreche
Ja strofy pervye chital . . .
Inykh uzh net, a te daleche . . .
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Goethe’s lament over the “dead ones cheated by fortune” does 
not, as in Pushkin’s case, pertain to participants in any broad national 
or historical tragedy, though the resonance of Goethe’s line clearly 
extends beyond personal friends or family. Yet as subtext to Pushkin’s 
lines, this lament, along with its reference to life’s “labyrinthisch irren 
Lauf,” serves to intensify and sharpen the sense of pain and disaster 
surrounding Pushkin’s seemingly benign references to people who 
first heard him recite parts of Eugene Onegin—people whom we know 
to be friends among the Decembrists. 
One may speak, additionally, of Pushkin’s poetic response to 
Goethe’s reference to the capricious role of “Glück” (luck, fortune, 
chance) in the affairs of his friends. Pushkin echoes this idea of arbitrary 
forces at work in the lives of people in line 8 of his stanza: “O mnogo, 
mnogo Rok ot’’ial!” (Ah, fate has much, much snatched away). Yet here, 
Pushkin does not play with any of the Russian words that correspond 
to “Glück,” such as “udacha” or “vezenie,” or “schast’e,” (fortune, luck) 
but uses a quite different word and concept: the ancient and dread 
Russian-Norse “Rok” or “Fate” (here, equivalent to English “doom” 
or the German “Verhängnis”): an evil, hostile power linked with idea 
of “term,” “an appointed time,” a power or action that, like the edict of 
Death, carries with it something the irreversible.24 To intensify the idea 
of an ineluctable, overwhelming, fateful force, Pushkin has capitalized 
the word “Rok.” 
24 “Rok,” as a term for “fate,” must be distinguished from the Russian 
“sud’ba,” usually translated into English as “fate.” “Sud’ba” may bring 
good fortune or evil, as is indicated in the Russian phrase: “sud’ba mozhet 
peremenit’sia.” This thought is perfectly illustrated in Tatyana’s words to 
Onegin in Canto VIII: xlvii: “A schast’e bylo tak vozmozhno,/ Tak blizko! 
No sud’ba moia/ uzh reshena...” In a word, Tatyana’s fate or “sud’ba” might 
have been different, but things turned out otherwise, and there is no going 
back. “Rok,” however, is implacable from the outset. “Rok,” or the power, 
or decree, of “rok,” is consistently negative, irreversible, and often linked 
with death. Russian folk sayings make this crystal clear: “Takov nash rok, 
chto vilami v bok,” “Lovit volk rokovuiu ovtsu” or the ominously succinct: 
“Rok golovy ishchet.” The word “Rok” as noun or adjective appears 
a number of times in Pushkin’s works. In his poem, “K Chaadaevu” (1818), 
we find the word “rok” used in its adjectival form; it suggests a powerful, 
negative force: “pod gnetom vlasti rokovooi”—a reference to the tsarist 
government. In “Chem chashche prazdnuet litsei” (1831), Pushkin’s lines—
“My vozmuzhali; rok sudil/ I nam zhiteiski ispytan’ia,/ I smerti dukh sred’ 
nas khodil/ I naznachаl svoi zaklan’ia”—well conveys the deadly power of 
“rok.”
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Pushkin’s choice of “Rok” wholly concords with Zhukovsky’s 
version of Goethe’s text. In his rendition of “Dedication,” Zhukovsky 
substitutes “Rok” for Goethe’s “Glück”; this was done, obviously, 
not out of a desire to find an exact corresponding word in Russian 
for “Glück” (“Rok” is the wrong match for “Glück”), but rather out 
of necessities rooted in his own interpretation of Goethe’s text, out of 
a romantically inspired effort to give Goethe’s poem a dark, indeed 
tragic, formulation. 
Here is Zhukovsky’s rendition of Goethe’s second stanza, the one 
in which he replaces the German “Glück” with the Russian “Rok”:
Ty obrazy veselykh let primchala—
I mnogo milykh tenei vosstaet;
I to, chem zhizn’ stol’ nekogda pleniala,
Chto rok, otniav, nazad ne otdaet,
Ty vse opiat’, dusha moia, uznala;
Prosnulas’ skorb’, i zhaloba zovet
Soputnikov, s puti soshedshikh prezhde
I zdes’ votshche poverivshikh nadezhde.
[You summoned images of joyful years,
So many precious shadows rise;
And that with which life so captivated one,
Which once taken away by fate are never returned, 
All that, my soul, you grasped once more;
Sorrow awoke, and a plaint called out
To travelling companions who earlier left the road 
And vainly put their faith in hope.]
In Zhukovsky’s striking reformulation of Goethe’s verse, we find 
not only Pushkin’s “Rok,” but “Rok, otniav,” a phrase that is identical 
with Pushkin’s more archaic, “Rok ot’ial.” 
“Rok” in contrast to Goethe’s “Glück” conveys a sense of 
irreversible action and loss. Zhukovsky’s version of Goethe’s line, “Und 
nennt die Guten, die, um schöne Stunden / Vom Glück getäuscht, vor 
mir hinweggeschwunden” reinforces a sense of tragedy. Zhukovsky’s 
“Soputnikov, s puti soshedshikh prezhde / I zdes’ votshche poverivshikh 
nadezhde” (travelling companions who earlier left the path / And vainly 
put their faith in hope) seems, prophetically, to define the tragedy of 
the Decembrists. 
It is appropriate at this point, and with the Decembrist theme 
in mind, to turn to the structural and ideological axis of Pushkin’s last 
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stanza of Onegin, the anguished cry “O mnogo, mnogo Rok ot’ial!” 
This line points backward and forward in Pushkin’s stanza; it follows 
three important lines (5–7) that deserve particular attention: 
Bez nikh Onegin dorisovan.
A ta, s kotoroi obrazovan
Tat’iany milyi Ideal . . . 
[Finished without them is Onegin’s portrait
And she from whom is fashioned
the dear ideal of “Tatyana” . . .] 
Appearing immediately after the word “Ideal,” Pushkin’s “O mno- 
go, mnogo Rok ot’ial!” (Ah, Fate has much, much snatched away!) at 
first glance seems a non sequitur, but the impression is deceptive; in 
this line, Pushkin no longer speaks of individuals or of people who had 
heard him recite portions of Eugene Onegin, people who in Goethe’s 
poem had been cheated by “fortune” (Glück) of blissful hours. Pushkin 
speaks of all-powerful “Rok”: a hostile force that has “snatched away” 
(ot’ial) “much, much.” 
“Ot’iat’” or “otniat’” means to take something away from 
somebody by force, or against their will. What has “Rok” snatched 
away by force? Comrades to whom Pushkin had read his first verses, 
yes; but also the model for his Tatyana, “ta, s kotoroi obrazovan Tat’iany 
milyi Ideal . . .” (she from whom is fashioned / the dear ideal of ‘Tat- 
yana’”). 
Pushkin, however, speaks of “much, much.” Significantly, he 
capitalizes “Ideal,” as he does “Rok.” The juxtaposition of “Ideal . . .” 
(Tat’any milyi Ideal . . .) and “ot’ial” (O mnogo, mnogo Rok ot’ial!) is 
a suggestive one: Fate has snatched away the Ideal: “Ideal . . . / Rok 
ot’ial.” And as Zhukovsky puts it in his “imitation” of Goethe, “I to, 
chem zhizn’ stol’ nekogda pleniala, . . . rok, otniav, nazad ne otdaet” 
(And that with which life once so enchanted one . . . once taken away 
by fate is never given back).
It is noteworthy that Pushkin places trailing ellipses after “Ide- 
al . . .”—a device that in Russian frequently calls special attention to the 
preceding word, phrase or thought. Further, the ellipses after “Ideal . . .” 
(end of line 7) parallel the ellipses after “chital . . .” (end of line 2). In this 
juxtaposition of ellipses, and indeed, in the juxtaposition of lines 1 and 
2 with lines 6 and 7, Pushkin accents the link between the Decembrists 
and the “Ideal.” 
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No te kotorym v druzhnoi vstreche
Ia strofy pervye chital . . .
A ta, s kotoroi obrazovan
Tat’iany milyi Ideal . . .
Pushkin identifies “Ideal” in his last stanza directly with his 
beloved Tatyana and “she” from whom the Ideal was fashioned. The 
“Ideal,” however, is something that transcends Tatyana even as she 
embodies it. The capitalized “Ideal” here is an amalgam of the highest 
ethical, social, and esthetic beliefs. “Rok,” in short, has shattered the 
hopes, dreams, ideals, albeit naïve and illusory ones, of the best people 
of Pushkin’s time. So too, “Rok” denied the innocent fantasies, the 
“infantine dreams” (mladencheskie mechty), of Tatyana’s childhood.
Pushkin’s friend, Prince Peter Vyazemsky, wrote in 1827 of the 
preceding two years, “Much of those lively dreams which roused us at 
that time has flown by and disappeared. I look at the circle of our friends, 
once lively, cheerful, and often (thinking of you) sadly repeat the words 
of Saadi, or of Pushkin, who transmitted Saadi’s words to us: ‘Some 
are no longer with us, others are wandering far away.’”25 Vyazemsky, 
of course, was referring to the daydreams of the Decembrists, to their 
naïveté and tragic innocence. 
The “Ideal” Tatyana represents, then, is brought into momentary 
contact in the last stanza of Eugene Onegin with the idealism of the 
Decembrists. Yet whatever elements of daydreaming or reverie 
contributed to the misfortunes of the Decembrists or the youthful 
Tatyana, Pushkin finds the “Ideal” or idealism neither blameworthy nor 
ridiculous. This is no longer Lensky’s “fashionable word ‘ideal’” (mod- 
noe slovo ‘ideal’) (6:23), but a word now uttered by Pushkin without 
25 “V eti dva goda (1825–1826) mnogo proletelo i ischezlo tekh rezvykh 
mechtanii, kotorye veselili nas v byloe vremia . . . Smotriu na krug druzei 
nashikh, prezhde ozhivlennyi, veselyi i chasto (dumaIa o tebe) s grust’iu 
povtoriaiu slova Saadi ili Pushkina, kotoryi nam peredal slova Saadi: 
‘Odnikh uzh net, drugie stranstvuiut daleko!’” Vyazemsky here is citing 
from Pushkin’s prose motto to Bakhchisaraiskii fontan (1824): “inykh uzhe 
net, drugie stranstvuiut daleche. Sadi.” These words by Vyazemsky appear 
in an article by N. Polevoy, “Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu 1825 i 1826 
(Pis’mo v N’iu-Iork k S. D. P.)” in Moskovskii Telegraf, No. 1 (1827). Quoted 
and discussed by Iu. M. Lotman in his commentary to Eugene Onegin in 
A. S. Pushkin, Eugeny Onegin. Kommentarii Iu. M Lotmana (Moscow: 
A.T.R.I.U.M., 1991), 606.
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irony. In the double movement of the final stanza, Pushkin both 
acknowledges a defeat of the Ideal in history and its restoration in 
poetry. “There is no reason to be ashamed of one’s idealism” (Stydit’sia 
svoego idealizma nechego), Dostoevsky wrote in his July–August 1876 
issue of his Diary of a Writer. This is always the point of view of Pushkin 
the artist, even when he, like Dostoevsky, acknowledges the naïveté, 
benign or tragic, of innocent idealism.
Pushkin’s last stanza, for all its covert and overt affirmation of the 
Ideal, remains one of his most poignant utterances about Russia and 
the tragedy of its history. Not accidentally are the final lines of the last 
stanza marked by an elegaic note. Pushkin recalls not only the tragic 
past, but intimates a tragic future: for what has taken place in Russian 
history in the lives of his friends, the Decembrists, must repeat itself in 
the narrative future of Eugene Onegin (the fragments of chapter 10 of 
Eugene Onegin), regardless of how he, Onegin, might personally relate 
to Decembrism. Thus, in Pushkin’s last stanza, to borrow the phrase 
from H. D. F. Kitto, the future throws its shadow behind it.26 
Lines 5 and 6 of the closing stanza of Zhukovsky’s “imitation of 
Goethe” read: “And a yearning for the blessings of past years / warms 
anew the chilled soul” (I dushu khladnuiu razogrevaet / Opiat’ toska po 
blagam prezhnikh let). (Zhukovsky here diverges from Goethe’s original 
text.) In his final stanza 51 of Eugene Onegin, however, Pushkin does 
not yearn for the blessings,27 bliss, or good things (blaga) of past years, 
but rather blesses (blazhen) him who early take leave of banquet of life. 
And what he blesses is not the person alone, but also the philosophical, 
the stoic, view of one who must abruptly take leave of the good things 
of life (blaga). Pushkin concludes Eugene Onegin (chapter 8, stanza 
51) with lines that pick up on the philosophically pivotal lines of the 
concluding stanza 51 of chapter 4: “Blest hundredfold who is to faith 
devoted, / who having curbed cold intellect” etc. (Stokrat blazhen, kto 
predan vere, / Kto khladnyi um ugomoniv . . .) Pushkin’s view of life at the 
end of Eugene Onegin, however, is devoid of any irony. Indeed, the poet 
in his final lines steps forward without a mask: 
26 “The Past is always a menace to the Present, ‘the art of Calchas is unerring,’” 
H. D. F. Kitto wrote in connection with the Oresteia. “Even the future throws 
its shadow behind it.” Cf. Kitto, Greek Tragedy (New York: 1954), 74. 
27 The word “blago” can also be translated as “happiness,” “well-being,” 
“welfare,” “good” or “good things.” “Blago” is etymlogically linked with 
“blazhennyi”—“blest,” “happy in the highest sense.” 
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Blazhen, kto prazdnik zhizni rano
Ostavil, ne dopiv do dna
Bokala polnogo vina,
Kto ne dochel ee romana
I vdrug umel rasstat’sia s nim,
Kak ia s Oneginym moim.
[Blest who Life’s banquet early
Left, having not drained to the bottom
The goblet full of wine;
Who did not read life’s novel to the end
And all at once could part with it
As I with my Onegin.]
From the pagan “Rok,” cruel and vindictive, Pushkin shifts for 
the last time (in the canonic Onegin) to the spiritual “Blazhen” (a word 
often used in Eugene Onegin), with its root meaning in Russian, “to do 
good”; he shifts from the deadly power of “Rok” to “life.” He speaks 
of early leaving “life’s banquet” (prazdnik zhizni), but he does so in the 
tempered spirit of Prospero’s words, “Our revels now are ended” (The 
Tempest (IV: I). 
There is a meditative, almost elegaic air to the last lines of 
Onegin—lines that seem to echo a kind of Horatian withdrawal 
from the world, not so much, however, from mundane passions and 
power struggles, as in Horace, as from life’s highest expectations, 
indeed, from life itself.28 There is something, too, in Pushkin’s lines, of 
Zhukovsky’s “pensive lyre” (zadumchivaia lira). In Pushkin, however, 
there are no romantic longings, no yearning for a mystical world of the 
past; there is only a sober clarity. Here, Pushkin demonstrates, as he 
is prepared to argue in chapter 4, stanza 33 of Eugene Onegin, that not 
everything in the genre of the elegy is “null” or “pitiful” (nichtozhno, 
zhalko).
It would be a mistake, however, to overstress the elegaic character 
of these concluding verses. In them, Pushkin surveys life, history, and 
28 See the usurer Alfius’s monologue announcing his retreat to the pastoral 
world, in Horace’s Epode ii: “Beatus ille qui procul negotiis,/ ut prisca 
gens mortalium,/ paterna rura bobus exercet suis/ solutus omni faenore, 
neque excitatur classico miles truci,/ neque horret iratum mare,” etc. Cf. 
Horace, Odes and Epodes, in the Loeb Classical Library, trans. C. E. Bennett 
(Cambridge, MA and London: 1999), 364–365.
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fiction from the standpoint of the highest vision or wisdom. These last 
six meditative lines (they stand, in their tranquility, in dramatic contrast 
to the emotionally agitated “O mnogo, mnogo Rok ot’’ial!”) are marked 
by a rueful acceptance of the harvest of life and of worldly experience 
in general. In their philosophical content, however, these lines give 
expression to a recognition that limitation constitutes a boundary to 
all human expectations—an outlook that imbues Tatyana’s viewpoint 
in chapter 8.29 
In his last lines, Pushkin counterposes the freedom of the 
individual (a freedom, as Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote, that 
is also fate30) to the fatality of forces beyond his control. Pushkin’s 
freedom, like Emerson’s, is a freedom to limit oneself and to find good in 
limitation.31 It is the freedom of a poet, Pushkin, whom Merezhkovsky 
once alluded to as Russia’s preminent “genius of measure.”32
There is more than “philosophical resignation” in the last lines 
of Eugene Onegin, more than “sad reflections”;33 there is existential 
riposte. “Rok” does not wholly triumph and Pushkin the poet does 
29 In this connection, see Olga Peters Hasty’s discussion of Tatyana in Chapter 
VIII of Eugene Onegin, in Pushkin’s Tatiana (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin, 1999), 179–180, 183, 186.
30 See Emerson’s observations on the theme of fate (limitation) and freedom 
in Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen E. Whicher (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 330–352. Emerson seeks to reconcile Fate 
(limitation) with freedom. “To hazard the contradiction—freedom is 
necessary. If you please to plant yourself on the side of Fate and say, Fate is 
all, then we say, a part of Fate is the freedom of man” (340).
31 The conception of limitation is central to Goethe’s thought. See, for example, 
his remark to Eckermann, April 20, 1825, “Im Übrigen . . . ist es zuletzt 
die grösste Kunst, sich zu beschränken und zu isolieren.” Cf. Johann Peter 
Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe in den Letzten Jahren seines Lebens (Baden-
Baden: 1955), 143. 
32 In a speech on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Ivan Turgenev, 
Merezhkovsky spoke of “Turgenev, after Pushkin, as almost [Russia’s] sole 
genius of measure, and therefore a genius of culture.” D. S. Merezhkovskii, 
“Turgenev,” in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 24 vols. (Moscow: I. D. Sytina, 
1914), 18:58.
33 “There could be no question, it seems, of any struggle with fate [rok] in 
Pushkin,” Danilevsky writes. “There were sad reflections, here there was 
philosophical resignation” See R. Iu. Danilevskii, Pushkin i Gete. Sravnitel’noe 
issledovanie (Sankt-Peterburg: Nauka, 1999), 166–167. 
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not resign. Identifying with those who through choice or character 
choose limitation, who choose to leave life early, who choose not to 
drink to the bottom their goblet of wine, not to read the book of life 
to its end, Pushkin parries the dread power of “Rok.” The “Ideal” has 
been affirmed and vindicated. Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin remains, as he 
himself asserts in the penultimate stanza of the novel, a “free novel” 
(svobodyi roman). Put another way, Pushkin forces a draw in the end 
game. Fate against Fate. In realistic terms, this draw is a triumph for 
man and art.
To move toward the end of this discussion, Goethe, though he 
writes “Dedication” after he began work on Faust, nonetheless places 
it where such writing usually belongs: at the beginning of the work. In 
the course of his dedication, he looks back upon the past, lamenting 
the loss of dear friends, people who had heard him read his first verses. 
His stress is upon the rebirth of his muse and upon the songs to come, 
not upon “the sounds of the final song” (poslednei pesni zvuki) or on 
a longing for the past, as in Zhukovsky’s rendition of Goethe’s poem. 
Memories, old forms, shapes, images, music, and poetry, the stuff 
of imagination, surge up again in the poet. Goethe is overcome by 
his muse, one rising out of the past, out of “Dunst und Nebel” into 
the present and carrying him forward into the future on a wave of 
inspiration. This overwhelming moment of psychic breakthrough is 
experienced by the poet physically, as well as psychically:
Ein Schauer fasst mich, Träne folgt den Tränen,
Das strenge Herz, es fühlt sich mild und weich;
Was ich besitze, seh’ ich wie im Weiten,
Und was verschwand, wird mir zu Wirklichkeiten.
[I tremble, tear follows tear,
the stern heart grows gentle and soft;
what I possess I see as in the distance,
and what vanished becomes my reality.]
Pushkin’s last stanza is also a dedication, but it is one he has 
placed at the end of his epic poem. He, too, recalls the past, the period 
of his first creative endeavors. He recalls, as well, those who had heard 
him read the first lines of Eugene Onegin. Between the reading of the 
first lines and the composing of the last, however, a great and tragic 
event has intervened: not only friends, but an entire historical epoch 
has been swept away. That drama, a historical convulsion for Russia, 
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is punctuated by one line in the middle of his last stanza: “O mnogo, 
mnogo Rok ot’’ial!”—a line that has resonances in both Goethe’s and 
Zhukovsky’s poems; it is a line, however, that is Pushkin’s in its form 
and content. 
Pushkin responds to Goethe’s poem, he responds to its great 
poetry and pathos. Yet Zhukovsky’s poetic rendition of Goethe’s 
poem, his imposition on that poem of dark tonalities, his creative 
misinterpretation of Goethe’s poem, also appear to color Pushkin’s 
own recollection of the Decembrist cataclysm. Reading the third 
stanza of Zhukovsky’s version of Goethe’s “Dedication,” reading it as 
Pushkin must have consciously or unconsciously recollected it at the 
time he composed his last stanzas, the reader feels that almost every 
line addresses the disaster that befell the Decembrists and Russia; he 
feels, finally, that in many respects Zhukovsky’s elegy provided an 
important subtext for Pushkin, a reference point. Zhukovsky’s dark 
romantic elegy, composed eight years before the Decembrist event, yet 
meditated upon in the context of the abortive Decembrist uprising, 
transmutes strangely in the reader’s consciousness into a realistic elegy 
on the catastrophe of Decembrism:34 
K nim ne doidut poslednei pesni zvuki;
Rasseian krug, gde pervuiu ia pel;
Ne vstretiat ikh prostertye k nim ruki;
Prekrasnyi son ikh zhizni uletel.
Drugikh umchal mogushchii dukh razluki; 
Schastlivyi krai, ikh znavshii, opustel;
Razbrosany po vsem dorogam mira!
Ne im poet zadumchivaia lira.
[The sounds of my final song will not reach them;
The circle where I sang the first (song) is dispersed;
No hands will reach out to greet them;
Their beautiful dream of their life has taken flight.
The mighty spirit of parting has swept others away;
The happy land that once knew them is deserted;
Scattered are they on all the world’s roads!
The pensive lyre sings not to them]
34 Lerner makes this point in general with respect to the contemporary reader’s 
response to the last stanza of Eugene Onegin. Lerner, op. cit., 111–112.
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Of course, in his last stanza, Pushkin’s meditative lyre does 
“sing” across the years, to and about his lost friends. Unlike Goethe 
in his “Dedication,” however, but like Zhukovsky in his arbitrary 
interpretation of Goethe’s poem, Pushkin’s sounds (zvuki) are indeed 
those of his “final song,” that is, his last stanza in the canonic version 
of Eugene Onegin.
Let us draw together Pushkin’s ending with Goethe’s beginning 
in one final comparison. Goethe begins his “Dedication” with the 
following lines:
Ihr naht euch wieder, schwankende Gestalten,
Die früh sich einst dem trüben Blick gezeigt.
Versuch’ ich wohl, euch diesmal festzuhalten?
Fühl’ ich mein Herz noch jenem Wahn geneigt?
Ihr drängt euch zu! nun gut, so mögt ihr walten,
Wie ihr aus Dunst und Nebel um mich steigt;
Mein Busen fühlt sich jugendlich erschüttert
Vom Zauberhauch, der euren Zug umwittert. 
[Hovering forms, you come again who once
showed yourself early to my turbid glance.
This time shall I try to hold you fast? 
Is my heart still bent toward that illusion?
You press upon me! Good! Then you may rule
As you rise about me in cloud and mist;
I am stirred like a boy by the magic 
breath blowing around your procession.]
Pushkin’s last stanza, we have noted, is not a transition to new 
poetic creation; it is not a beginning, but an ending. He ends his poem, 
however, as Goethe begins his Faust: with a recollection of early, almost 
inchoate moments of creation when he began work on Eugene Onegin. 
His recollection in the penultimate stanza of that work picks up on 
lexical elements and images from Goethe’s own remembrance of how 
he was re-inspired to work again on Faust: Pushkin’s “smutnyi son” 
(blurry dream) echoes Goethe’s “trüben Blick“; Goethe’s “schwankende 
Gestalten,” hovering forms or apparitions, materialize, as it were, 
in Pushkin’s Tatyana and Onegin. Finally, Pushkin’s “magicheskii 
kristal,” his magic crystal, recalls, in part, Goethe’s “Zauberhauch,” 
or “magic breath.” These images or reminiscences, not to be found in 
Zhukovsky’s poetic rendition of Goethe, left an imprint on Pushkin’s 
imagination: 
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Promchalos’ mnogo, mogno dnei
S tekh por, kak iunaia Tat’iana
I s nei Onegin v smutnom sne
Iavilisia vpervye mne—
I dal’ svobodnogo romana
Ia skvoz’ magicheskii kristal
Eshche ne iasno razlichal.
[Many, many days have rushed by
Since young Tayana,
and with her Onegin, in a blurry dream
appeared to me for the first time—
and the far stretch of a free novel
I through a magic crystal
Still did not make out clearly.]
In the last lines of his “Dedication,” Goethe writes, “Was ich 
besitze, seh’ ich wie im Weiten, / Und was verschwand, wird mir zu 
Wirklichkeiten” (What I possess I see as in the distance, and what 
vanished becomes my reality). What is ahead of Goethe lies behind 
Pushkin, that is, his narrative has already appeared in his “free novel. In 
a special sense, however, what has disappeared for Pushkin, the world 
of his fellow travelers, his companions, the Decembrists, becomes 
a reality for him in Eugene Onegin, but only for a fleeting moment, and 
for the last time.
Pushkin’s pointed allusions in his final stanza to the dead or 
scattered Decembrists and again to Tatyana are, we might say, his last 
farewell, his supremum vale—words Ovid uses (Metamorphoses X) to 
mark the moment when Orpheus loses his beloved Eurydice for the 
second and final time. Thus, Pushkin, in and through his allusion to 
the Decembrists, imbues the end of the eighth and final chapter of 
Eugene Onegin with the spirit of the lines that grace the beginning of 
that chapter, Byron’s “Fare thee well, and if for ever,/ Still for ever, fare 
thee well.”35 
It is in the spirit of this last farewell that Pushkin addresses 
his beloved Tatyana and Onegin in the penultimate stanza of Eugene 
35 Pushkin quotes these lines from Byron’s poem, “Fare Thee Well” (March 17, 
1816) in the original English. With his exact punctuation, Byron’s lines read, 
“Fare thee well! And if for ever,/ Still for ever, fare thee well.” 
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Onegin, one in which the word “sputnik”36 (traveling companion), 
addressed to Onegin, seems to echo Zhukovsky’s “fellow travelers” 
(soputniki) who had earlier left the path. 
So too, in the opening lines of the last stanza of Eugene Onegin, 
Pushkin unmistakably addresses the Decembrists, friends who in their 
own way had remained faithful to the Ideal: 
No te, kotorym v druzhnoi vstreche
Ja strofy pervye chital . . .
“Inykh uzh net, a te daleche”,
Kak Sadi nekogda skazal. 
Bez nikh Onegin dorisovan.
A ta, s kotoroi obrazovan
Tat’iany milyi Ideal . . .
O mnogo, mnogo Rok ot’’ial!
Blazhen, kto prazdnik zhizni rano
Ostavil, ne dopiv do dna
Bokala polnogo vina,
Kto ne dochel Ee romana
I vdrug umel rasstat’sia s nim,
Kak ia s Oneginym moim.
36 “Prosti zh i ty, moi sputnik strannyi” (You, too, farewell, my strange 
traveling companion.)
From the other shore: nabokov’s Translation into 
Russian of Goethe’s “Dedication” to Faust1
1 Published here for the first time.
Iz Gete
Posviashchenie k “Faustu”
Vy snova blizko, reiushchiia teni.
Moi smutnyi vzor uzhe vas videl raz. 
Khochu-l’ teper’ bezumiia videnii?
Zapechatlet’ poprobuiu li vas?
Tesnites’ vy! Sred’ dymnykh isparenii
—da budet tak!—vy iavites’ seichas;
po-iunomu mne serdtse potriasaet
tuman chudes, chto vas soprovozhdaet.
Otrada v vas mne chuditsia bylaia,
i ten’ vstaet rodnaia ne odna;
vstaet liubov’ i druzhba molodaia, 
kak poluzvuk, predan’e, starina;
i snova—bol’, i zhaluias’, bluzhdaia
po labirintu zhiznennago sna,
zovu ia milykh, schastiem zhestoko
Obmerennykh, ischeznuvshikh do sroka.
Te, dlia kogo ia pel pervonachal’no,
ne slyshat pesen nyneshnykh moikh;
ushli druz’ia, i zamer otzvuk dal’nii
ikh pervago priveta. Dlia chuzhikh,
nevedomykh, zvuchit moi stikh pechal’nii,
boius’ ia dazhe odobren’ia ikh,
a vernyia mne dushi, esli zhivy,
skitaiutsia v izgnan’e sirotlivo.
Po istovom i tikhom tsarstve dukha
vo mne toska zabytaia zazhglas’,
trepeshchet pesn’, neiasnaia dlia slukha,
kak po strunam eolovym struias’,
i plachu ia, i uzhasaius’ glukho,
v surovom serdtse nezhhnost’ razlilas’;
vse nastoiashchee vdali propalo,
a proshloe deisvitel’nost’iu stalo.
—V. Sirin [Vladimir Nabokov]
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Zueignung
Ihr naht euch wieder, schwankende Gestalten,
Die früh sich einst dem trüben Blick gezeigt.
Versuch’ ich wohl, euch diesmal festzuhalten?
Fühl’ ich mein Herz noch jenem Wahn geneigt?
Ihr drängt euch zu! nun gut, so mögt ihr walten,
Wie ihr aus Dunst und Nebel um mich steigt;
Mein Busen fühlt sich jugendlich erschüttert
Vom Zauberhauch, der euren Zug umwittert. 
Ihr bringt mit euch die Bilder froher Tage,
Und manche liebe Schatten steigen auf;
Gleich einer alten, halbverklungnen Sage
Kommt erste Lieb’ und Freundschaft mit herauf;
Der Schmerz wird neu, es wiederholt die Klage
Des Lebens labyrinthisch irren Lauf,
Und nennt die Guten, die, um schöne Stunden
Vom Glück getäuscht, vor mir hinweggeschwunden. 
Sie hören nicht die folgenden Gesänge,
Die Seelen, denen ich die ersten sang; 
Zerstoben ist das freundliche Gedränge,
Verklungen ach! der erste Widerklang.
Mein Lied ertönt der unbekannten Menge,
Ihr Beifall selbst macht meinem Herzen bang,
Und was sich sonst an meinem Lied erfreuet,
Wenn es noch lebt, irrt in der Welt zerstreuet.
Und mich ergreift ein längst entwöhntes Sehnen
Nach jenem stillen, ernsten Geisterreich,
Es schwebet nun in unbestimmten Tönen
Mein lispelnd Lied, der Äolsharfe gleich,
Ein Schauer fasst mich, Träne folgt den Tränen,
Der strenge Herz, es fühlt sich mild und weich;
Was ich besitze, seh’ ich wie im Weiten,
Und was verschwand, wird mir zu Wirklichkeiten.
—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
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And yet the ear cannot right now part with the music and 
allow the tale to fade; the chords of fate itself continue to 
vibrate; and no obstruction for the sage exists where I have 
put The End. 
(I vse zh slukh ne mozhet srazu rasstat’sia s myzykoi, 
rasskazu dat’ zameret’ . . . sud’ba sama esche zvenit—i dlia 
vnimatel’nogo net granitsy.)
—Vladimir Nabokov, The Gift (Dar)
In the preceding chapter we began our discussion of the last stanza of 
Eugene Onegin with Nabokov’s search for the source of Pushkin’s so-
called Saadi line, “Some are no more, others are distant” (Inykh uzh net, 
a te daleche), and begin this one with a question: Why did Nabokov pass 
over specific allusions to Goethe’s “Dedication” (Zueignung) to Faust 
and to Zhukovsky’s “Imitation of Goethe”? Nabokov had composed 
a verse translation of Goethe’s poem into Russian in 1923. He published 
that poem in 1932 on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Goethe’s 
death.2 He was thoroughly familiar with Zhukovsky’s well-known 
adaptation of Goethe’s “Dedication,” as well as with his theory of 
translation. It cannot be said, then, that in his commentary on the two 
final stanzas of Eugene Onegin he overlooked Goethe and Zhukovsky. 
He simply passed them over in silence. 
In his commentary in general, Nabokov addresses various 
matters pertaining to Pushkin and Goethe. He is occasionally testy 
with Goethe.3 He acknowledges that Pushkin had a “boundless 
admiration” for Goethe and “placed him above Voltaire and Byron, 
next to Shakespeare.”4 It is noteworthy, however, that he chooses not to 
2 Nabokov, using the pseudonym V. Sirin, published his translation of 
Goethe’s poem under the heading, “Iz Gete. Posviashchenie k Faustu,” in 
the Paris-based Russian newspaper, Poslednie novosti (December 15, 1932), 3. 
3 Nabokov was deeply ambivalent about Goethe. As Omry Ronen puts it, 
“Nabokov manifested throughout his art mixed feelings toward Goethe: 
a proud attraction tinged with a streak of equally deep revulsion.” See Ronen, 
“The Triple Anniversary of World Literature: Goethe, Pushkin, Nabokov,” 
in Nabokov at Cornell, ed. Gavriel Shapiro (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 175, as well as his “Nabokov and Goethe” in Cold Fusion: Aspects of 
the German Cultural Presence in Russia, ed. Gennady Barabtarlo (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2000), 241–251.
4 Aleksandr Pushkin, Eugene Onegin: A Novel in Verse, translated from Russian, 
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mention Pushkin’s lavish praise of Goethe’s Faust as a “supreme creation 
of the poetic spirit,” a work, Pushkin wrote, that is “a representative 
example of contemporary poetry in the same way that The Iliad is 
a monument of classical antiquity.”5 This omission fully accords with 
Nabokov’s decision to ignore echoes of “Dedication” in the last stanzas 
of Eugene Onegin. In any case, Pushkin’s testimony in behalf of Faust 
would not have resonated well with Nabokov’s dismissive remark that 
“there are readers who prefer Pushkin’s ‘Scenes from Faust’ (1825) to 
the whole of Goethe’s Faust, [a work] in which they distinguish a queer 
strain of trivality impairing the pounding of its profundities.”6 
In his commentary, Nabokov minimizes any serious impact on 
Pushkin of the German language, literature, or culture. Though he had 
earlier, and elsewhere, argued that Pushkin had a good knowledge of 
German, English, and Italian,7 he reaches the opposite conclusion in 
his commentary. He flatly states that “Pushkin had even less German 
than he had English, and only vaguely knew German literature. He 
was immune to its influence and hostile to its trends. The little he 
read of it was either in French versions (which quickened Schiller but 
asphyxiated Goethe) or in Russian adaptations.”8 In fact, Nabokov 
writes again, “All that Pushkin knew of German literature and culture 
was through Zhukovsky’s adaptations and translations and through 
Mme. de Stael’s De l’Allemagne.”9 Nabokov bars Pushkin’s way to any 
first-hand knowledge Goethe and Faust. At the same time he leaves open 
with a commentary by Vladimir Nabokov in Two Volumes, Bollingen Series 
LXXII (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) 2: Part 1, 236.
5 See Pushkin o literature, ed. N. B. Bogoslovskii (Leningrad: Academia, 1934), 
116.
6 Nabokov, op. cit., Part 1, 235–236. “There is dreadful streak of poshlost 
running through Goethe’s Faust,” Nabokov writes in his book on Gogol in 
connection with the subtleties of the Russian word “poshlost’” (the banal, 
the trivial, the mediocre, etc.). See Nabokov, Nikolai Gogol (New York: New 
Directions, 1961), 64. Véra Nabokov was one of the people who shared her 
husband’s view of Faust. “I consider Faust one of the shallowest plays ever 
written,” she is reported to have remarked, much to the delight of Nabokov. 
See Stacy Schiff, Véra: Mrs. Vladimir Nabokov (New York: Modern Library, 
1999), 187. 
7 See “Zametki peredvodchika,” in Novyi zhurnal 49 (1957): 131–132.
8 Nabokov, Eugene Onegin, op. cit., 235.
9 Ibid., 230.
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a path to Goethe through Zhukovsky’s “adaptations and translation.” 
He does not go down that path, however, in his commentary on the last 
two stanzas of Eugene Onegin. 
In general, Nabokov’s discussions of Zhukovsky’s poetics, style, 
literary sensibilities, adaptations of English and German writers, and 
of the poet’s literary relations with Pushkin, are abundant, subtle, and 
generous, though marked occasionally by a gentle irony. Nabokov’s fine 
critical understanding and appreciation of Zhukovsky’s work may be 
felt, for example, in his observations on Zhukovsky’s Zamok Smal’gol’m 
(Smaylhome Castle, 1822), an adaptation of Sir Walter Scott’s The Eve of 
St. John—a work, Nabokov notes, that in the hands of Zhukovsky takes 
on “a more romantic and pathetic air.”10 This observation could have 
been directed as well to Zhukovsky’s “Imitation of Goethe.” 
Nabokov’s comments on Zhukovsky’s work as a translator 
or adaptor are always acute. “His versions of foreign poetry are not 
really translations but talented adaptations remarkably melodious and 
engaging; and they seem especially so when the original is not known 
to the reader. Zhukovsky at his best communicates to his reader much 
of the enjoyment he obviously experiences himself in molding and 
modulating a young language while having his verses go through this 
or that impersonation act.”11 Zhukovsky’s “Imitation of Goethe” is an 
example of just such an act of impersonation. 
In the jigsaw puzzle of his commentary, Nabokov left a space for 
a piece called “A Dream. An Imitation of Goethe.” That space remains 
invisible, however, and Nabokov holds the fitting piece tightly in his 
hand, as he does Goethe’s “Dedication” and his own “Dedication to 
Faust.” How can one explain Nabokov’s reluctance to raise the question 
of Goethe’s presence in the last stanzas of Eugene Onegin? 
In the period of Nabokov’s Eugene Onegin project, a time when 
he was formulating, defending, and putting into practice his theory of 
literal faithfulness in translation, a discussion of Goethe’s “Dedication,” 
Zhukovsky’s adaptation of it, and, perhaps, allusion to his own 
verse translation of Goethe’s work, might well have complicated his 
polemical arguments. Nabokov’s harsh criticism of verse translations 
of Eugene Onegin into English, as well as his polemics with Edmund 
10 Ibid., Part Two, 146. 
11 Ibid., Part Two, 145.
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Wilson on matters pertaining to his own literal translation of Eugene 
Onegin, are well known. In characteristically strong opinions Nabokov 
had denounced what he called the “dictatorship” of verse translation. 
He had referred scornfully to the “facile beauty” which results from 
an effort to imitate verse forms. “Why adaptation rather than faithful 
translation,” Nabokov asks in a scathing review of Robert Lowell’s 
adaptation of the poetry of Osip Mandelstam (1892–1938). “What . . . 
is there especially adaptive or adaptational in an obvious travesty? . . . 
‘Adapted’ to what? To the needs of an idiot audience? To the demands of 
good taste? To the level of one’s own genius?”12 One recalls Nabokov’s 
remark that Zhukovsky’s adaptations of German and English poetry 
seemed especially “melodious and engaging” to the Russian reader 
who did not know the original. 
Nabokov would hardly have adopted strident tones in 
addressing the poetic extravagances of “gentle Zhukovsky,” as he dubs 
him in his commentary, had the latter’s “Imitation of Goethe” come 
under his microscope. In that work Zhukovsky had engaged in the 
kind of fanciful circumlocutions that Nabokov later found intolerable 
in American translators of Eugene Onegin. Zhukovsky, as a theoretician 
and practitioner of translation, had also advanced a militant translator’s 
declaration of independence.13 He had insisted that the translator 
“necessarily must have almost the same [degree of] imagination as his 
model, the same literary art, the same power of mind and feelings.” 
In the same breath Zhukovsky denounced translators who “slavishly” 
adhere to the text. The translator of Eugene Onegin surely did not want 
to complicate his task by getting into a discussion of Zhukovsky’s 
theory of translation or of the merits and demerits of his translation of 
Goethe’s “Dedication.” Such a discussion would inevitably open the 
gates to a consideration of his own verse translation of Goethe’s poem.
Nabokov’s “Dedication to Faust,” however, is in no sense a “sla-
vish” translation; it is not a melodious adaptation for readers who do 
not know the original; nor does it involve “impersonation.” It is an 
empathetic yet at the same time independent response to the poem, its 
poignant motifs of parting and loss, and its poetics of transcendence. It 
is a translation on the highest level of the young Nabokov’s genius. His 
12 New York Review of Books, December 4, 1969. 
13 For a discussion of Zhukovsky’s theory of translation, see footnote 19 in the 
preceding chapter. 
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rhymed translation, lithe and alive, is a feat of Pushkinian compression 
and economy of means: it conveys the power that created a great style, 
as well as the power of the translator to make a poetic statement of 
his own. All this is accomplished with a remarkable degree of fidelity 
to the form and content of the original, that is, with a minimum of 
compromise of the original text. Nabokov’s “Dedication to Faust” is an 
important poem in its own right.
Nabokov not only translated Goethe’s poem, he “translated” 
himself into the poem: his exile, the loss of his native cultural milieu, 
the scattering and death of friends and family. To the loss of his 
homeland (he left Russia in April 1919) was added the death of his 
father—murdered by an assassin in Berlin, March 28, 1922. In his 
translation Nabokov relates directly to the pathos of Goethe’s poem, 
its motifs of parting and loss and—the crux of poem—its movement 
towards an imaginative evocation and renewal of the past in art, the 
poet-narrator’s decision in the face of anxiety and nostalgia to plunge 
again into the creative process. 
Remarkable with respect to Nabokov’s own artistic genius is 
the way Russian word and image in his translation maximally convey 
the poetic idea and material of the original text, while at the same 
signalling his, the translator-poet's, own heightened emphases with 
respect to the poem’s major themes. This double-action is one of the 
major poetic achievements of Nabokov’s poem; it marks the opening 
line of Nabokov’s translation of the second stanza of “Dedication” 
where Goethe refers again to those wavering forms or figures from out 
of his past that have come before his inner gaze:
Otrada v vas mne chuditsia bylaia,
i ten’ vstaet rodnaia ne odna
[Past joy in you appears before me,
And not alone the familiar shadows of home]14
The phrase “ten’ . . . rodnaia” (dear shadows) well approximates 
Goethe’s “liebe Schatten” (dear or precious shadows). At the same 
time, the word “rodnaia,” through its root, “rod” (family, kin, clan), 
also conveys the idea of something that is close, familiar or native, 
14 Goethe’s German text reads: “Ihr bringt mit euch die Bilder froher Tage,/ 
Und manche liebe Schatten steigen auf.”
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as in “rodnoi iazyk” (mother tongue) or “rodina” (one’s native land, 
motherland). “Ten’ . . . rodnaia,” then, suggests native shadows or 
shadows of home. “Rodnoi” here contrasts with Nabokov’s use of 
the word “chuzhoi” (alien, foreign) in the third stanza to characterize 
Goethe’s “unknown multitude” who hear the poet’s song. 
Meanwhile, Nabokov in his rendition of Goethe's lines about 
“die Guten, die, um schöne Stunden/ Vom Glück getäuscht, vor 
mir hinweggeschwunden” (those dear ones who, cheated of joy by 
fortune, have vanished before me), without the slightest doubt conveys 
personal pain ("bol'"—Goethe's "Schmerz"), anguish and bitterness 
over the suffering and loss of his own dear ones. Nabokov’s narrator-
poet cries out: “Zovu ia milykh, schastiem zhestoko/ obmerennykh, 
ischeznuvshikh do sroka (I call out to the dear ones/ by fortune cruelly 
struck, vanished before their time). The word “zhestoko” (cruelly, 
savagely) stands out starkly. “Schast’e” is used not as “happiness,” but 
as “lot,” “fortune,” “fate.”15 The “cruel” lot, indeed, the tragedy of the 
poet’s “dear ones” is highlighted in Nabokov’s rendition of Goethe’s 
third stanza:
Te, dlia kogo ia pel pervonachal’no,
ne slyshat pesen nyneshnykh moikh;
ushli druz’ia, i zamer otzvuk dal’nii
ikh pervago priveta. Dlia chuzhikh,
nevedomykh, zvuchit moi stikh pechal’nii,
boius’ ia dazhe odobren’ia ikh,
a vernyia mne dushi, esli zhivy,
skitaiutsia v izgnan’e sirotlivo.
[Those for whom I originally sang,
do not hear my present songs;
friends have gone, the far off echo
of their first greetings fades. To strangers,
unknown people, my sad verse rings out,
I even fear their applause,
while souls true to me, if alive,
are wandering like orphans in exile.]
15 Nabokov, unlike Zhukovsky who translates “Glück” as “rok” (dark 
inescapable fate or doom), uses the Russian word “schast’e,”one that 
matches Goethe’s “Glück.” “Sud’ba” suggests a notion of “fate” or “fortune” 
as something that is not inevitable; one can alter one’s “fate” (sud’ba). 
“Rok,” or destiny, on the other hand, represents absolute fatality.
362 Poetry of Parting
The words and lines are as close as possible to Goethe’s original 
text, to its basic idea. Yet to the Russian reader of the time Nabokov’s 
verses evoke the bitter taste of exile and loss. 
Goethe’s poet first sang to a friendly audience, one that has 
passed away; now he sings his song (Lied) to an “unknown crowd” 
(unbekannten Menge). In Nabokov’s translation the poet who sang his 
first songs to friends, now sings his “sad verse” (stikh pechal’nyi) to 
foreigners, alien people, strangers.16 These people, the chuzhie, contrast 
with the “rodnye” (kin, family) referred to in the first stanza. The poet, 
in fact, is living in exile. Nabokov declares this outright in his rendering 
of Goethe’s lines, “Und was sich sonst an meinem Lied erfreuet/ Wenn 
es noch lebt, irrt in der Welt zerstreuet,” as “a vernye mne dushi, 
esli zhivy,/ skitaiutsia v iz’gnan’e sirotlivo” (while souls true to me, 
if alive,/are wandering like orphans in exile). Nabokov’s verse, more 
directly than Goethe’s, draws upon a biblical subtext: the ancient Jews 
who unwillingly and sadly saing the Lord’s song in a foreign land 
(Psalm 137). Like the biblical Jews with their harps, Nabokov’s poet is 
orphaned and exiled. Quite understandably, he is uncomfortable with 
the applause or acclamation (“Beifall,” “odobren’e”) of his audiences. 
Nabokov’s open reference not only to personal exile, but to the exile 
of a people, a nation; his reference to the poet’s “sad verse,” and to the 
poet’s reluctance to sing, inevitably awakens in the reader’s mind the 
oath of the weeping Jews: “If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right 
hand wither.” Thus Nabokov in the third stanza of his translation of 
“Dedication,” like Pushkin in the opening sentence of the last stanza of 
Eugene Onegin (But those to whom at friendly meetings/the first strophes 
I read . . .), historicizes Goethe’s poem. Where Pushkin’s subtext alludes 
to the tragedy of the Decembrists,17 friends and acquaintances whose 
lives were cut short or exiled, Nabokov’s subtext points to the tragedy 
of other Russian people a century later—friends, families, political 
figures, artists, poets, indeed, representatives of a whole nation, country, 
16 “Stikh pechal’nyi”: The first edition of Goethe’s Faust contained a misprint 
(“Leid” for “Lied”) which Goethe subsequently retained. Modern editions 
of the poem return to “Lied.”: “Mein Lied ertönt der unbekannten Menge.” 
In his use of “Leid” as opposed to “Lied,” in this instance, Nabokov adheres 
to an earlier tradition. 
17 Pushkin’s purely literary subtext, of course, is Goethe’s line from 
“Dedication”: Sie hören nicht die folgenden Gesänge,/ Die Seelen, denen 
ich die ersten sang.” 
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or rodina—who were cast into exile or perished in the whirlwind 
of the Bolshevik revolution. Such is the brutal and tragic subtext of 
Nabokov’s translation of “Dedication.” In its subtext Nabokov’s poem 
echoes Zhukovsky’s somber and tragic (albeit Romantic) evocation of 
Goethe’s “Dedication” in his “Imitation of Goethe.” 
As in Goethe’s poem, however, Nabokov moves toward a reso-
lution of pain and nostalgia in renewed creative activity. He renders 
Goethe’s powerful, but emotionally restrained and spiritual—“Und 
mich ergreift ein lãngst entwöhntes Sehnen/ Nach jenem stillen, ernsten 
Geisterreich . . .”—with a line that begins (as Goethe’s line ends) in 
spiritual quiet, but ends (as Goethe’s line begins), with a moving inner 
event: “Po istovom i tikhom tsarstve dukha/ o mne toska zabytaia 
zazhglas’” (a forgotten and quiet yearning has been kindled in me/ for 
the deep and quiet kingdom of the spirit). The yearning, the kindling 
of inspiration to create, comes almost as a response to the final lines 
of the third stanza with its cold and bleak vision of orphaned souls 
wandering in exile.
Pain and bitteress are not forgotten, but sublimated now in a new 
and powerful yearning to create. The words, “I plachu ia i uzhasaius’ 
glukho,/ v surovom serdtse neshnost’ razlilas’” (And I weep, and feel 
a silent terror/ Tenderness floods the severe heart) signal a catharsis, an 
end to a crisis, a movement toward creation, self-mastery, overcoming 
of history, reappropriation of the past and its renewal, in art, in the 
present:
Vse nastoiashchee vdali propalo,
a proshloe deistvitel’nost’iu stalo.
[Everything present has disappeared in the distance
while the past has become present.]
The theme of loss and grief, one may note in conclusion, might 
well have been a factor in inclining Nabokov to undertake in 1923 
a translation into Russian of Charles Lamb’s popular poem, “The Old 
Familiar Faces” (1798; 1817). Lamb sums up the pervasive theme of loss 
in the final lines of the poem:
So might we talk of the old familiar faces—
How some they have died, and some they have left me,
And some are taken from me; all are departed—
All, all are gone, the old familiar faces.
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In the first lines of the original 1798 poem (lines deleted from the 
1817 edition), Lamb alludes to the horrendous death of his mother—
she had been stabbed to death by his deranged sister, Mary Lamb:
Where are they gone, the old familiar faces?
I had a mother, but she died, and left me,
Died prematurely in a day of horrors—
All, all are gone, the old familiar faces.
Nabokov, of course, had had a similar day of horrors: the assassination 
of his father in 1922. It is of special interest, in this connection, that 
he renders the last three words of the poem’s refrain—“old familiar 
faces”—in a way that vastly and emotionally intensifies the notion of 
familiar faces: he writes of “indescribably familiar faces” (neskazanno-
znakomye litsa).18 
Nabokov’s translation of Lamb’s poem, finally, is of interest in 
the context of his later search for the origin and echoes in literature of 
Pushkin’s so-called “Saadi” line in the opening lines of the last stanza 
of Eugene Onegin:
No te, kotorym v druzhnoi vstreche
Ja strofy pervye chital . . .
“Inykh uzh net, a te daleche”,
Kak Sadi nekogda skazal. 
[But those to whom at friendly meetings
the first strophes I read . . .
“Some are no more, others are distant,”
as erstwhile Saadi said.]
In his commentary on Eugene Onegin, Nabokov was as aware of Lamb’s 
“Saadi” line, “How some they have died, and some they have left me,” 
as he was of Goethe’s “Dedication” to Faust, Zhukovsky’s “Imitation 
of Goethe,” and his own “Dedication to Faust.” He prefered not to 
introduce these works into the discussion for a complex of reasons, 
not the least of which were his own painful and tragic parting with 
18 Nabokov, however, translates the title of Lamb’s poem, “The Old Familiar 
Faces,” as simply “Znakomye litsa” (Familiar Faces). The original 
unpublished draft of Nabokov’s translation into Russian of Lamb’s poem is 
held in the Archives of Vladimir Nabokov in the New York Public Library.
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family (rod) and country (rodina). Nabokov left a puzzle behind him 
in his commentary on Pushkin's last stanza of Eugene Onegin. True to 
his creative method, however, he left clues to that puzzle—“something 
in a scrambled picture . . . that the finder cannot unsee once it is seen” 
(Speak, Memory).
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“Tsar and God” and oTher essays  
in russian CulTural semioTiCs
Victor ZHIVOV, University of California, Berkeley and the Russian Language Institute 
of the Academy of Sciences, Moscow  
and BORIS USPENSKIJ, Russian State University for the Humanities 
Translated and edited by Marcus LEVITT, University of Southern California
December 2012 300 pp.  9781936235490        Cloth
Featuring a number of distinguished essays by internationally known Russian 
cultural historians Boris Uspenskij and Victor Zhivov, this collection encompasses 
various ground-breaking works appearing in English for the first time. Focusing 
on several of the most interesting and problematic aspects of Russia’s cultural 
development, these essays examine the survival and reconceptualization of Russia’s 
past in later systems, and some of the key transformations of Russian cultural 
consciousness. This volume contains important examples of cultural semiotics and 
indispensable contributions to the history of Russian civilization. 
“i am a Phenomenon QuiTe ouT of The ordinary”
The Notebooks, Diaries, and Letters of Daniil Kharms
Translated and Introduced by Anthony ANEMONE, New School 
and PETER SCOTTO, Mount Holyoke College
February 2013  600 pp.  9781936235964                    Cloth
“I am a Phenomenon Quite out of the Ordinary” offers a fascinating look into the 
life and mind of poet and prose miniaturist Daniil Kharms (1905-1942). One of 
the legendary figures of the “Last Soviet Avant-Garde,” Kharms was the tutelary 
spirit of “Russia’s lost literature of the absurd.” His work, rescued from oblivion by 
a dedicated group of friends and scholars, has attained an almost cult-like status 
among present-day Russia’s literary elite.  In this volume, Anthony Anemone and 
Peter Scotto translate a wide-ranging selection of materials from Kharms’ private 
notebooks, diaries, letters, and even documents from the KGB archives detailing 
Kharms’ tragic end in a psychiatric prison hospital—most never before published 
in English. This is essential reading for anyone interested in Russian literature, 
Soviet culture, and the inner workings of the mind of a quirky genius.
freedom from ViolenCe and lies
Essays on Russian Poetry and Music by Simon Karlinsky
Edited by Robert P. HUGHES, Thomas A. KOSTER, 
and Richard TARUSKIN, all University of California, Berkeley 
June 2013  500 pp.  9781618111586                 Cloth
Freedom from Violence and Lies is a collection of forty-one essays by Simon 
Karlinsky (1924–2009), a prolific and controversial scholar of modern Russian 
literature, sexual politics, and music who taught in the University of California, 
Berkeley’s Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures from 1964 to 1991. 
Among Karlinsky’s full-length works are major studies of Marina Tsvetaeva and 
Nikolai Gogol, Russian Drama from Its Beginnings to the Age of Pushkin; editions 
of Anton Chekhov’s letters; writings by Russian émigrés; and correspondence 
between Vladimir Nabokov and Edmund Wilson. Karlinsky also wrote frequently 
for professional journals and mainstream publications like the New York Times 
Book Review and the Nation. The present volume is the first collection of such 
shorter writings, spanning more than three decades. It includes twenty-seven 
essays on literary topics and fourteen on music, seven of which have been newly 
translated from the Russian originals.
russians abroad
Literary and Cultural Politics of Diaspora (1919-1939)
Greta SLOBIN
Edited by Katerina CLARK, Yale University, 
Nancy CONDEE, University of Pittsburgh,
Dan SLOBIN, University of California, Berkeley, Emeritus  
and Mark SLOBIN, Wesleyan University
May 2013  300 pp.  9781618112149                Cloth
This book presents an array of perspectives on the vivid cultural and literary 
politics that marked the period immediately following the October Revolution 
of 1917, when Russian writers had to relocate to Berlin and Paris under harsh 
conditions. Divided amongst themselves and uncertain about the political and 
artistic directions of life in the diaspora, these writers carried on two simultaneous 
literary dialogues—one with the emerging Soviet Union, and one with the dizzying 
world of European modernism that surrounded them in the West.  The book’s 
chapters address generational differences, literary polemics and experimentation, 
the heritage of pre-October Russian modernism, and the fate of individual writers 
and critics, offering a sweeping view of how exiles created a literary diaspora. The 
discussion moves beyond Russian studies to contribute to today’s broad, cross-
cultural study of the creative side of political and cultural displacement.
shaPes of aPoCalyPse 
Arts and Philosophy in Slavic Thought
Andrea OPPO, Pontifical Faculty of Theology of Sardinia, Italy
April 2013  290 pp.  9781618111746  Cloth
This collective volume aims to highlight the philosophical and literary idea 
of “apocalypse,” within some key examples in the “Slavic world” during the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. From Russian realism to avant-garde painting, 
from the classic fiction of the nineteenth century to twentieth century philosophy, 
not omitting theatre, cinema or music, there is a specific examination of the concepts 
of “end of history” and “end of present time” as conditions for a redemptive image 
of the world. To understand this idea means to understand an essential part of 
Slavic culture, which, however divergent and variegated it may be in general, 
converges on a specific myth in a surprising manner.
ProsaiCs and oTher ProVoCaTions 
Skeptical Answers to Accursed Questions
Gary Saul MORSON, Northwestern University 
June 2013  300 pp.  9781618111616  Cloth
Gary Saul Morson’s ideas about life and literature have long inspired, annoyed, 
and provoked specialists and general readers. His work on “prosaics” (his 
coinage) argues that life’s defining events are not grand but ordinary, and that the 
world’s fundamental state is mess. Viewing time as a “field of possibilities,” he 
maintains that contingency and freedom are real. To represent open time, some 
masterpieces have developed an alternative to structure and require a “prosaics of 
process.” Morson’s curmudgeonly alter ego, Alicia Chudo, invents the discipline 
of “misanthropology,” which explores human voices from voyeurism to violence. 
Reflecting on his legendarily popular courses, Morson argues that what literature 
teaches better than anything else is empathy. Himself an aphorist, Morson offers 
a witty approach to literature’s shortest genres and to quotation in general.


